

THEOPHRASTUS OF ERESUS
SOURCES FOR HIS LIFE, WRITINGS
THOUGHT AND INFLUENCE

COMMENTARY VOLUME 8
SOURCES ON RHETORIC
AND POETICS

PHILOSOPHIA ANTIQUA

A SERIES OF STUDIES
ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

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THEOPHRASTUS OF ERESUS

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(Texts 666-713)

BY

WILLIAM W. FORTENBAUGH



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HS&G

with thanks for many years
of collaboration and friendship

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Preface

When I completed my graduate studies in 1964, I had given almost no thought to rhetoric and poetics. To be sure, I knew that Plato had made uncomplimentary remarks concerning rhetoricians and poets, and that Aristotle had written treatises on both rhetoric and poetics, but beyond that I was embarrassingly ignorant. That began to change in the late sixties when I read Aristotle's account of emotion in Book 2 of the *Rhetoric*. My reason for reading the account was not a sudden fascination with rhetoric but rather a strong desire to understand Aristotle's doctrine of moral virtue. In his ethical writings, Aristotle defines moral virtue as a correct disposition in regard to emotional response, but he offers little concerning what constitutes emotional response. His detailed discussion of the subject is to be found in the *Rhetoric*. I, therefore, opened that work and to my surprise discovered a philosophically sophisticated discussion of emotion that has implications for a variety of disciplines including ethics, politics, rhetoric and poetics.¹ That was my first flirtation with rhetoric but I was not moved to read the whole of the *Rhetoric*, let alone become a serious student of the discipline. In time, however, I began to see both the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics* as helpful approaches to Aristotle's distinction between practical wisdom and moral virtue and between the virtue of a citizen and that of the morally perfect man. I became interested in what Aristotle calls persuasion through character and in what he says about character according to age and fortune. Still, I had little enthusiasm for Aristotle's account of rhetorical argument, his discussion of style or expression and his analysis of tragedy and comedy. It was only when Project Theophrastus was founded in 1979 that my interest expanded to cover the entirety of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*.² A small group including myself had committed ourselves to collecting, editing, translating and commenting on the fragments of Theophrastus, and given our different talents and interests, it was clear that

¹ See *Aristotle On Emotion*, London: Duckworth 1975, reprint with epilogue 2002.

² For a brief account of the early years of Project Theophrastus, see *Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence* vol. 1 p. 3–4.

work on Theophrastus' rhetorical and poetic fragments fell to me. It was also clear that I could not deal with these fragments unless I acquired a fuller knowledge of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*. In addition, I would have to read widely in the major source authors like Cicero and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, for without some understanding of these authors it would be quite impossible to deal well with the fragments they preserve. In short, I was forced to spend considerable time working up new areas. At times the experience was onerous, and I have hardly become an expert on all the sources. In some cases, I remain a tyro or worse. But that said, I have no regrets, for the rhetorical and poetic fragments are of great interest. And while previous scholars have often claimed too much for Theophrastus, there can be no doubt that he was an important figure. Much has been lost, but what has survived is worth serious study.

Many persons in many different ways have helped me come to grips with the surviving rhetorical and poetic fragments. Among persons in departments of speech communications, I want to thank Thomas Conely, Robert Gaines and Michael Leff. Among philosophers, Peter Klein, Eugene Ryan and Richard Sorabji may be named. The number of classicists is large, but perhaps I can pick out the following for special thanks. First there are my former students David Mirhady and Michael Sollenberger, who often contributed as much to my work as I did to theirs. Second, I think of Wolfram Ax, Gualtiero Calboli, Lucia Calboli Montefusco, Michael Chase, Mervin Dilts, Tiziano Doranadi, Kenneth Dover, Doreen Innes, George Kennedy, Walter Lapini, Elisabetta Matelli, Jan van Ophuijsen, David Runia, Dirk Schenkeveld, Klaus Schöpsdau, Eckart Schütrumpf, David Sedley, Maddalena Vallozza, Jakob Wisse, Michael Winterbottom and Georg Wöhrle.

Thanks for a very different kind of contribution goes to Diane Smith, who has prepared camera-ready copy for Project Theophrastus since its earliest years. She prepared the two volume source book, *Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence*, published in 1992, the volume of opuscula entitled *Theophrastus of Eresus: On Sweat, On Dizziness, On Fatigue*, 2003, my collected essays, *Theophrastean Studies*, also 2003, and all twelve volumes of Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities (RUSCH) that have appeared between 1983 and 2004. Now I thank her warmly for preparing the present work for publication.

Finally, I want to dedicate this volume to HS&G: Pamela Huby, Robert Sharples and Dimitri Gutas. Without these three colleagues, the fragments of Theophrastus would not have been collected, translated and published in a timely fashion. And without their continued interest, Project Theophrastus would not have continued and developed as it has.³ I thank them not only for being true team players but also for being my friends.

WWF

August 30, 2004

³ On the development of Project Theophrastus, so that it now includes editions and commentary on the larger school of Aristotle, what Fritz Wehrli called *Die Schule des Aristoteles*, see now the preface to volume 12 of Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities = *Lyco of Troas and Hieronymus of Rhodes: Text, Translation, and Discussion* (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction 2004) p. ix–x.

I. Introduction

When the fragments of Theophrastus — texts with facing translation — were published in two volumes under the title *Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence* (1992), eight volumes of commentary were announced. Three have already been published: two by Robert Sharples (no. 3.1 on physics and no. 5 on human physiology, living creatures and botany)¹ and one by Pamela Huby with contributions on the Arabic material by Dimitri Gutas (no. 4 on psychology).² The present volume (announced as no. 8) is the fourth to appear. It concerns the rhetorical and poetic fragments that are found in the second of the two text-translation volumes.

The central sections of the commentary, i.e., III and IV, are ordered in accordance with the material presented in the second text-translation volume. Section III covers the twenty-four titles that have their primary listing in the section on the “Titles of Books.” That section carries the number **666**. It also includes discussion of nine titles that have their primary listing elsewhere (under logic, mathematics, physics, ethics, religion and miscellaneous items) but for one reason or another have or might be thought to have a connection with rhetoric and poetics. Each of these related titles is referred to in **666** and appears in this commentary in the same position in which it is found in **666**. For example, the mathematical title *In Reply to Aeschylus* (**137** no. 42) appears both in the source volume and in this commentary after the second work *On the Art of Poetry* (**666** no. 21) and before *On Comedy* (**666** no. 22).

Section IV on “The Texts” is also ordered in accordance with the second text-translation volume: i.e., the discussion of texts **667–713** proceeds in numerical order. There are, however, occasional interruptions, ten in all, when texts whose primary listing occurs elsewhere (under life, logic and ethics, among the miscellaneous items and in the appendix to the second text-translation volume) are discussed. In each case, the text is referred to

¹ Commentary vol. 3.1 was published in 1998 and Commentary 5 in 1995.

² Commentary vol. 4 was published in 1999.

in the second text-translation volume within the section on rhetoric and poetics, and discussion occurs in accordance with the position of the reference. For example, a logical text from Alexander of Aphrodisias (**135**) is referred to after one from Cicero (**672**) and before one from the codex Parisinus Graecus 3032 (**673A**), and discussion of the text occupies a similar position in this commentary.

I have created a separate section on the ancient sources — Demetrius Rhetor, Philodemus, Cicero, etc. — and placed it at the beginning of the commentary proper, i.e., as Section II. An alternative would have been to reserve discussion on any given source until a text taken from that source is commented upon. Were that procedure adopted, Cicero *qua* source would be discussed at the very outset, for the first text among the rhetorical and poetic texts is taken from Cicero (**667**). In contrast, discussion of Philodemus, Cicero's contemporary, would occur much later (**689A**). In itself that is not a problem; nevertheless, two further considerations have led me to discuss all the source authors in a single section at the beginning of the commentary. First, an author like Cicero or Dionysius of Halicarnassus is the source of several texts (fourteen and five, respectively), so that joining the discussion of such an author to a single text would leave the discussion of other texts separated from the discussion of the source author. It is, I think, simpler and easier for the reader to have the discussion of the sources presented in a single section to which he can turn without having to search among the discussion of individual texts. Second and more important, knowing the source authors, their biases and general reliability, is important for understanding what they report. All too often scholars take a report at face value without considering whether the source author has an agenda, tends to omit or add material on his own, or otherwise writes in a way that may mislead the incautious reader. I am not saying that all our sources are occasional liars or simply unreliable. But some, even a major source like Cicero, must be treated with caution. I have discussed Cicero elsewhere at some length,³ and in the section on sources, I treat him in a more abbreviated manner. Indeed, to do full justice to all the sources (thirty of them⁴) would take a volume every bit as large as the

³ "Cicero as a Reporter of Aristotelian and Theophrastean Rhetorical Doctrine," forthcoming in *Rhetorica* 23.1 (2005). The article builds on and in some respects replaces an early piece, "Cicero's Knowledge of the Rhetorical Treatises of Aristotle and Theophrastus," published in 1989.

⁴ Two anonymous papyri that are printed as appendices to the second text-translation volume, i.e. **Appendix 8** and **9**, have not been included in the section on sources. Informa-

present commentary and a decade of research or more. That is, however, no reason to ignore the topic, and in Section II, I have tried to discuss the several sources in a way that will be helpful to the reader, at very least offering some thoughts and bibliography that will assist him, should he wish to investigate a particular source in greater detail.

A summary of what has been learned in the discussions of the titles and texts, i.e., in Sections III and IV, follows immediately on these discussions and therefore appears as Section V. It is conceived of as a helpful review and in no way replaces the detailed discussions that precede.

The commentary concludes with a bibliography and various indices. The bibliography, Section VI, lists the scholarly literature that is most important for a study of the rhetorical and poetic fragments of Theophrastus. As a general rule, full references to the literature are not given in the preceding sections of the commentary. The reader will find them in the bibliography. There are, however, exceptions. For works that are of lesser importance and rarely referred to in the commentary (typically on a single occasion), full references are given in the footnotes.

Section VII includes three indices. First comes an index of the important Greek and Latin words that occur in the titles and texts. This index covers not only the titles and texts that find their primary location in the section on rhetoric and poetics, i.e., **666–713**, but also titles and texts that are referred to within the section. Second comes an index of titles: whole titles as against individual words occurring in a title. The index is divided into Theophrastean and non-Theophrastean titles, and covers all titles found in the rhetorical and poetic section of the second text-translation volume.⁵ Third comes an index of persons and places referred to in the texts.

Section VIII contains indices to the commentary. First, there is an index of passages cited in Sections II–V. Second and last, there is a subject index that is designed to help the reader move about the commentary in an efficient manner. I have tried to cover all important and interesting subjects without becoming mired in trivia.

tion concerning the dates of the papyri is given when the papyri are discussed within the section on “The Texts” (IV.5). Some discussion of the possible authors of the content of the papyri can be found there. Also omitted from the section on sources is another anonymous papyrus that had not been published when the text-translation volumes went to press. It is printed and discussed as part of the commentary on **671**.

⁵ I.e., it includes titles that are not regarded as primarily rhetorical or poetic but are nevertheless referred to in **666** or mentioned in **667–713**.

II. The Sources

Since all the writings of Theophrastus on rhetoric and poetics have been lost, our understanding of his contributions to these areas is dependent on reports in later authors. As a result our understanding is only as good as those reports. If they come to us from reliable sources, we can accept them with reasonable confidence; and if together they cover the fields in question, we can gain a rather complete view of Theophrastus' contributions. Should the sources be unreliable and narrow, the consequences are discouraging. With that in mind, I am offering an overview of the sources before taking up individual texts and commenting in detail on Theophrastus' contributions to rhetoric and poetics.¹ Necessarily my remarks will be introductory in nature,² but they will provide basic information, be arranged chronologically and call attention to texts which are from a single source and yet separated from each other in our printed collection.³ Sometimes I shall indicate my own assessment of a source; more often I shall point out difficulties and use the notes to refer to the scholarly literature.

¹ Prior to the publication of our text-translation volumes, David Runia called attention to the importance of evaluating the sources for fragmentary authors; and in regard to Theophrastus, he suggested (p. 25) that the list of sources be placed at the beginning of the collection and not relegated to an appendix. That suggestion has not been adopted; the sources are listed at the end of the second volume (p. 629–705). Nevertheless, Runia's emphasis on sources is entirely in order; and in this commentary volume, the sources do come first.

² A definitive statement concerning the sources would require an exhaustive investigation of each source author, including all his surviving works, his goals and prejudices, his style and his method of citing other authors. The last requirement would necessitate an investigation not only of reports concerning Theophrastus' views on all topics — e.g., physics and biology as well as rhetoric and poetics — but also of reports concerning closely related Peripatetics, i.e., Aristotle and the colleagues and pupils of Theophrastus. Indeed, we would be obliged to consider reports that have nothing to do with the Peripatos, for they may provide an important check on a given author's reliability. (See, e.g., J. Bernays, *Theophrastos' Schrift über Frömmigkeit* [Breslau: Hertz 1866] p. 22–8 and W. Pötscher, *Theophrastos, ΠΕΡΙ ΕΥΣΕΒΕΙΑΣ* [Leiden: Brill 1964] p. 5–14 on Porphyry's excerpts from Josephus and Plutarch.)

³ Because our collection of texts is ordered by subject matter, texts drawn from a single author may be separated from each other. An editor who wishes to emphasize the sources might choose to order the texts chronologically by author.

1. The Hellenistic Period and Republican Rome

Demetrius] perhaps 2nd cent. B.C.

Demetrius' work *On Style* exhibits strong Peripatetic influence and was once attributed to Theophrastus' pupil Demetrius of Phalerum. That attribution is today without supporters. Instead one calls the author Demetrius Rhetor or simply Demetrius. If we ask when this Demetrius wrote *On Style*, one (perhaps the safest) answer is that he wrote it during the second half of the Hellenistic period. A more precise answer might be during the second century B.C.⁴ In any case, the author was probably not a Peripatetic but a rhetorician who was familiar with and impressed by the rhetorical doctrines of Aristotle and Theophrastus.⁵ But did he have first hand knowledge of the Aristotelian and Theophrastean treatises, or did he obtain his knowledge through intermediaries? Inaccuracies (I shall give examples in what follows) might suggest that Demetrius is drawing on an intermediary, but it is also possible that Demetrius quotes from memory, and that on occasion he introduces a change that reflects his own doctrine.⁶

Aristotle's influence on Demetrius is beyond doubt. He is both cited by name and drawn on without explicit acknowledgment. For our purposes, the important point is that Demetrius may offer what appears to be a direct quotation but on inspection turns out to be not entirely accurate.⁷ Sometimes the inaccuracy is of little significance, involving nothing more than minor variation in wording. For example, Aristotle defines the colon as "one of two parts" of the period (1409b16). Demetrius varies the word for "part" — he reports μέρος instead of μέρος — and in what follows he varies the word for "simple" — ἀπλῆ instead of ἀφελῆ (1409b16) — when referring to Aristotle's simple period, i.e., that which has only one colon (34).⁸ More serious is the definition of the period. Demetrius writes: "Aristotle defines the

⁴ Grube (1961) p. 39–56 prefers a date in the first half of the third century, i.e., c. 270 B.C. For the second century, see Innes (1995) p. 313, and for the first century, see Kennedy (1997) p. 27. For a more complex answer — written in the first century A.D. but based on material dating from the second and early first century B.C. — see Schenkeveld (1964) p. 147–8.

⁵ We may compare those Hellenistic rhetoricians who are said by Cicero "to have taken their start from Aristotle and Theophrastus" (674.2–3).

⁶ Solmsen (1931) p. 265 thinks it probable that Demetrius is drawing on an intermediary. In contrast, Grube (1961) p. 39 thinks that Demetrius had first hand knowledge of both Aristotle and Theophrastus. Innes (1995) p. 316 states the alternatives and in the case of Aristotle seems to favor an intermediary, but she does not say so explicitly.

⁷ See, e.g., Grube (1961) p. 32–8 and Innes (1995) p. 315–19.

⁸ Or possibly Demetrius' source has varied the word for "part" and for "simple," if Demetrius is drawing on an intermediary and not directly on Aristotle's text.

period as follows, ‘the period is an expression having a beginning and an end’ ” (11). The trouble here is that Demetrius has broken off the quotation, so that three important words have been omitted: namely “it (the period) in itself” (αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτήν, *Rhetoric* 3.9 1409a36). Without these words, it is much easier to argue that Aristotle considered rhythm essential to the period, for it is rhythm (a rhythmical cadence) which effectively brings the period to a close. But when the words are included in the definition, it seems more probable that Aristotle saw the essence of the period in its internal structure. He thought of rhythm as something extraneous which may enhance the period but is not essential to it.⁹

Much the same can be said concerning the paeon. According to Demetrius, Aristotle speaks of paeonic composition as “grand” (μεγαλοπρεπής 38), but in fact Aristotle uses the adjective “dignified” (σεμνός 3.8 1408b32). If we did not have the *Rhetoric*, we might believe that Aristotle actually described the paeon as grand and that he anticipated Demetrius in advancing a notion of the grand style. But, of course, we do have Aristotle’s rhetorical treatise. What we lack is a rhetorical treatise by Theophrastus, and as a result, we may wonder whether Demetrius is using his own vocabulary when he cites Theophrastus for an “example of grandeur” (παράδειγμα μεγαλοπρεπείας 41 = **703**). Perhaps the Eresian did speak of “grandeur,” but he may have followed his master and spoken of “dignity.”¹⁰ Be that as it may, the example attributed to Theophrastus is important for it suggests that Theophrastus went beyond his master and recognized that a paeonic colon need not be based on perfectly paeonic feet.

Demetrius may transfer Theophrastean material from one context to another. For example, in his discussion of the plain style, Demetrius cites Theophrastus concerning the omission of details that are known to the audience (**696**). The original context was not a discussion of the plain style; most likely it was a discussion of narration. More striking is Demetrius’ quotation of Theophrastus’ definition of frigidity (**686**): it is quoted within a discussion of one of four faulty styles, the frigid style, which was recognized by Demetrius, but not by Theophrastus. In addition, the definition, as reported by Demetrius, may involve variation in terminology, though that is by no means certain. The definition of beauty in a word (**687**) is at first glance less problematic. It is closely related to Aristotle’s definition of

⁹ See the commentary on **701**.

¹⁰ See the commentary on **703**.

beauty in a word (3.2 1405b5–6, 17–19) and can be interpreted by reference to that definition. Nevertheless, Demetrius does not report the Theophrastean context and the structure of the definition invites alternative interpretations. These are all grounds for caution in dealing with what Demetrius says concerning Theophrastus, but they do not undermine the importance of Demetrius as a source for Theophrastus' rhetorical theory. In all probability he is our earliest source, and he may have had in hand one or more Theophrastean treatises on rhetoric.

Philodemus] c. 110–40 B.C.

Philodemus of Gadara in Syria was an Epicurean philosopher and poet. He studied under Zeno of Sidon, who was head of the Epicurean school in Athens. Later Philodemus moved to Rome, where he taught and wrote extensively. The works that survive are on papyrus roles. They were buried at Herculaneum when the volcano Vesuvius erupted in 79 A.D. As a result, what we have is often badly damaged and difficult to interpret.

Like Epicurus (341–270 B.C.), who wrote a work critical of Theophrastus (fr. 14 Arrighetti = **280**),¹¹ Philodemus was prepared to express his disagreement with Theophrastus. And like many members of the Epicurean school, Philodemus was keenly interested in ethical issues, but he also concerned himself with rhetoric, poetics and music. On each of these areas, he wrote a separate treatise. The work *On Music* is instructive for several reasons.¹² First, we find Philodemus defending his own views against those of Theophrastus (**721A**). Second, what survives lacks context, so that evaluation calls for considerable caution and philological expertise (**720**). Third, what is reported concerning Theophrastus is not detailed, so that we must ask what qualifications or additions Theophrastus would insist upon. For example, Philodemus appears to tell us that according to Theophrastus rhythms barely contribute to virtue (**720**).¹³ As far as it goes,

¹¹ The work of Epicurus entitled Πρὸς Θεόφραστον is explicitly mentioned only by Plutarch in his treatise *In Reply to Colotes* 7 1110C = **280.1**. The title is not found in Diogenes' catalogue of Epicurean works (*Lives of the Philosophers* 10.27–8), but that is of little importance, for Diogenes says that he is listing only the best of Epicurus' writings. I agree with Pamela Huby that πρὸς in the Epicurean title is best construed as "against." See Commentary 4 p. 66. For a list of the passages in which Philodemus cites Theophrastus, see the second text-translation volume p. 678–9, and for a general survey of Philodemus' remarks on Theophrastus, see Gigante p. 87–95.

¹² The two texts that I shall cite in what follows (**720** and **721A**) do not make explicit mention of *On Music*, but assigning the texts to that work seems entirely reasonable.

¹³ The qualifier "appears" must be taken seriously. See footnote 1 to the translation of **720**.

that report may not be false, but it probably omits an important addition: i.e., that Theophrastus, following Plato (*Laws* 669E1–4) and Aristotle (*Politics* 8.6 1341a24–5), held that music with words is more desirable than music without words, when it comes to moral training.¹⁴

The work *On Rhetoric* survives in a number of papyri, only some of which carry a *subscriptio* that not only identifies the work and author but also gives the book number within the work as a whole. On the basis of these book numbers, we can say that Philodemus' work was composed of at least eight books.¹⁵ Moreover, the work was not written in a single, unbroken period. Rather it was composed over several decades, apparently beginning in the seventies and ending in the forties of the first century B.C. Our special interest is in Book 4, which has been assigned to the forties.¹⁶ There Theophrastus is cited in regard to the apologetic metaphor (**689A**). The citation appears to be a quotation: the participle ἐπιφωνοῦντες (line 2) almost certainly introduces words that are or are purported to be Theophrastean. The text is damaged, so that quite different readings have been proposed, but comparison with **689B** provides some welcome control (see the commentary on **689A** and **B**).

The work *On Rhetoric* is currently available in the Teubner Series, but it will soon be replaced by a much improved edition. The work is divided among a team of scholars. Robert Gaines and Costantina Romeo are responsible for P.Herc. 1007/1673, from which **689A** is taken.

Cicero] 106–43 B.C.

Cicero is best known as an orator of the late Roman Republic. He was also a writer on rhetoric, politics and philosophy, and a prolific correspondent as well.¹⁷ The rhetorical works number eight and were composed over

¹⁴ See Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 196–7.

¹⁵ On the contents of the surviving portions, see T. Di Matteo, "La retorica da Epicuro a Filodemo," *Cronache ercolanesi* 30 (2000) p. 82–5.

¹⁶ See G. Cavallo, "Libri scritte scribi a Ercolano, I Suppl.," *Cronache ercolanesi* 13 (1983) p. 63–4 and T. Dorandi, "Per una ricomposizione dello scritto di Filodemo Sulla retorica," *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 82 (1990) p. 62, 67 and "Gaio bambino," *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 111 (1996) p. 41–2. Assuming that Book 4 is correctly dated to the forties, the date given for Philodemus in the second of the text-translation volumes p. 678 (*ineunte saec. 1 ante Chr.*) should be modified to include the first decade of the second half of the first century B.C.

¹⁷ Cicero also wrote poems. I pass over them, for they provide no information concerning Theophrastus.

a lifetime. I mention those which especially concern us.¹⁸ *On Invention* is a work of Cicero's youth or early manhood. It may have been written as early as 90 B.C.; it is unlikely to be later than 80 B.C. *On the Orator*, often regarded as Cicero's finest work on rhetoric, was composed in 55 B.C., i.e., at least twenty-five years after *On Invention*. The *Orator* was written nine years later, in 46 B.C., toward the end of Cicero's life. The political and philosophical works were also written over a long period beginning in 54 B.C. and running to 44 B.C. Of especial interest to us are *On Ends* and *On Divination*, written in 45 and 44 B.C. respectively. From Cicero's correspondence, over 900 letters survive, dating from 68 to 43 B.C. Only five mention Theophrastus, and of these only one concerns rhetoric. It was written in 45 B.C. (*To Friends* 16.17.1 = **689B**). Given such temporal spread, it is easy to imagine a significant development in Cicero's knowledge of the early Peripatetics, especially if Tyrannion provided him with the books of Theophrastus brought to Rome by Sulla (**37.24–7**, **38.1–6**). But no text tells us that he did.¹⁹ Moreover, in his last years Cicero worked with haste,²⁰ so that even if he had ready access to Theophrastean works,²¹ there is no guarantee that his reports are based on careful autopsy.²²

¹⁸ I omit *On the Best Kind of Orator*, *Classification of Oratory*, *Brutus*, *Topics* and *Stoic Paradoxes*. The last is a collection of rhetorical exercises on philosophical subjects. See F. G. Powell, *Cicero the Philosopher* (Oxford: Clarendon 1995) p. 7, 21.

¹⁹ In 84 B.C. Sulla is said to have brought the library of Theophrastus, including the esoteric writings of both Aristotle and Theophrastus, to Rome. There Tyrannion got his hands on the books (**37.26–7**). Since he and Cicero were on friendly terms — Tyrannion rearranged Cicero's library in 56 B.C. (*Letters to Atticus* 4.4a.1, 4.8.2) — it is easy to imagine Cicero obtaining Theophrastean works from Tyrannion. But there is no source that says that; indeed, it may be that Tyrannion became involved with the library of Theophrastus after the death of Cicero. See Barnes p. 18 and 46, commenting on Cicero's knowledge of Aristotle's esoteric writings.

²⁰ A good indication of haste is using the same introduction for two separate works. See *Letters to Atticus* 16.6 (44 B.C.), where Cicero acknowledges his own negligence.

²¹ Cicero was proud of his library and may have acquired Theophrastean works independently of Tyrannion. Putz p. 64–5 suggests that he possessed several ethical works, *Callisthenes* (**436** no. 15a–c), *On Ambition* (no. 21) and *On Friendship* (no. 23a–b), and one rhetorical work, *On Style* (**666** no. 17a). But in each case, there is no text that says so explicitly. In order to consult *On Ambition*, Cicero requested the copy that his brother Quintus possessed (*Letters to Atticus* 2.3.4, quoted at **436** no. 21). Perhaps Cicero kept it or had a copy made for himself, but most likely he simply returned it. In any case, ready access and ownership are two different things.

²² In Cicero's rhetorical and philosophic works, Theophrastus is repeatedly described as delightfully pleasant (**50–2**, **497**); and in Plutarch's *Life of Cicero*, we are told that Cicero called Theophrastus his own private indulgence (**53**). Taken together these texts may suggest that Cicero enjoyed a direct and thorough knowledge of the writings of the

In his youthful work *On Invention*, Cicero follows his sources closely, and these sources, i.e. his teachers and the available handbooks, may well have been reliable reporters of the tradition. A case in point is **674**, in which Cicero says that “all who take their start from Aristotle and Theophrastus” have adopted a five-part analysis of deductive reasoning (lines 2–3). Here Cicero is reporting correctly the doctrine of certain Hellenistic rhetoricians who identified themselves with the Peripatetic school. What Cicero fails to make clear is whether or not the quinquartite analysis goes back to the founders of the Peripatos. In my judgment, it did not, but the subsequent reference to Aristotle and Theophrastus as frequent practitioners of deductive reasoning (lines 5–7) might be thought to suggest that the analysis originated with them.²³

The work *On the Orator* is very different. Cicero has mastered Latin prose and is writing a dialogue in which he has the speakers disagree. That makes for lively reading; it also reflects Cicero’s interest in arguing both sides of an issue, *in utramque partem dicere*. There is, however, a negative here: the presentation of competing views encourages slanting a report, in order to generate opposition. Among our texts, an example may be **668**, which presents a reply to **667**, including a shaky conclusion concerning how Aristotle and Theophrastus viewed their own writings on rhetoric. Within the discussion of prose rhythm and periodic structure, Aristotle and Theophrastus are cited in close proximity. What is said about Theophrastus appears unobjectionable (**701**), but what is said regarding Aristotle is confused and in part quite wrong. To some extent Cicero may be a victim of his source, assuming he is not consulting Aristotle directly, but confusion concerning the trochee and tribrach seems attributable to Cicero himself

Eresian; but caution is in order. I mention two considerations. First, some of the references to Theophrastus’ pleasing style seem to be *pro forma*, especially when he is named along side other writers like Aristotle and Demetrius of Phalerum (**51**, **52B**). Second, the assessment of Theophrastus’ style may be based largely on exoteric writings (published dialogues); and if that is the case, the assessment tells us little concerning Cicero’s knowledge of the esoteric works (school texts). Moreover, appreciation of style does not in itself guarantee the accuracy of reports concerning doctrine.

²³ Given Cicero’s youth and the fact that he is writing an *ars* and not a history of rhetoric, it is unreasonable to expect precision with regard to all historical matters. Nevertheless, I want to underline that Cicero never says explicitly that the quinquartite analysis goes back to Aristotle and Theophrastus. In **674.1–3**, the analysis is referred to those “who take their start from Aristotle and Theophrastus.” In **674.3–8**, a comparison is drawn with Socrates’ frequent practice of induction; it says only that Aristotle and Theophrastus made special use of deduction.

(3.182).²⁴ It has been suggested that Cicero's report concerning Aristotle derives from Theophrastus' work *On Style*.²⁵ The idea is not impossible; but there is little to recommend it, and we are left wondering whether Theophrastus misrepresented the views of his teacher or stated them in such way that Cicero failed to understand. In any case, what Cicero says concerning delivery (713) will not have been drawn from *On Style*. It derives from *On Delivery*. Cicero may have had this work before him when he cited Theophrastus; but my guess is that all his reports are derived from handbooks.

The work entitled *Orator* is a treatise addressed to Marcus Brutus, who is said to have requested an account of the perfect orator. Like *On the Orator*, the *Orator* contains a discussion of prose rhythm, but the discussion differs in that Cicero's knowledge of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is markedly improved. It is both more accurate and more detailed,²⁶ but it is not free of error. Once again the trochee is incorrectly construed as the tribrach, and while Aristotle speaks of the trochee being rather akin to the cordax, Cicero has Aristotle actually calling the trochee a cordax, i.e., a vulgar dance (193). Less serious but still misleading is Cicero's report of what Aristotle first says about the paeon: namely, that all men use it but do so unconsciously (193). In fact, Aristotle does not speak of "all" men; instead he speaks of persons "beginning with Thrasyarchus." Nor does he say that men use the paeon without realizing what they are doing.²⁷ Rather, he says that men were unable to say what it is, i.e., they could not name it or had no definition of it (3.8 1409a2–3).²⁸ It is noteworthy that Cicero speaks of

²⁴ See Fortenbaugh (1989) p. 46–7.

²⁵ Wisse (1989) p. 180–3.

²⁶ See Fortenbaugh (1989) p. 50.

²⁷ In saying that men make unconscious use of the paeon (*non sentire cum utantur* 193), Cicero is introducing an idea of his own. Cf. the later statement that the ears mark the measure of rhythm by unconscious intuition (*tacito . . . sensu* 203). See also *On the Orator* 3.195.

²⁸ Misrepresentations of Aristotle are not confined to reports concerning prose rhythm. When Cicero tells us that the perfect orator should be capable not only of speaking fluently and broadly but also of arguing logically, he first reports the Stoic Zeno's famous image of the closed and open fist (113), after which he cites Aristotle. The Peripatetic, we are told, said that rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic, so that clearly they differ in that rhetoric is broader and logic more contracted (114). Reading quickly we might think that the contrast between "broader" and "more contracted" is Aristotelian, but it is not. Cicero has added his own interpretation: "broader" picks up what has been said in the preceding section (*latius* picks up *late*) and "more contracted" (*contractior*) seems to reflect Zeno's image of the closed fist (113). Happily, we have Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, so that we can check Cicero's report and determine what is actually contained in the Aristotelian treatise

Theophrastus writing more accurately than either Aristotle or Theodectes on prose rhythm (700), but it is not clear how much weight can be attached to this statement, for in what follows Theophrastus is not cited by himself as Cicero's source for some doctrine. Rather he is mentioned as a part of a group or a pair (704, 702, 699). Earlier, however, Theophrastus is cited as the sole source for a report concerning the historians Herodotus and Thucydides (697). The reference to Theophrastus has been thought to extend to the next section in which prose rhythm is mentioned (40), and that assumption has become the basis of the claim that an acquaintance with Theophrastus' work *On Style* led to improvement in Cicero's knowledge of early writers on prose rhythm. The claim has its appeal, but the argument supporting the assumption is weak.²⁹ To be sure, there is also a reference to Theophrastus, when Cicero describes the plain style (684), but that passage, however important it may be,³⁰ does not tell us — even in combination with the other Theophrastean passages — how and to what extent Cicero was influenced directly by Theophrastus' work *On Style*.

On Ends and *On Divination* are not rhetorical works, but each contains a brief statement to the effect that Aristotle and Theophrastus wrote on rhetorical as well as purely philosophical subjects. The passage in *On Ends*, 672, is of especial interest, for a correct report is contained within an anachronistic context. Cicero has Piso assert correctly that Aristotle and Theophrastus passed on precepts for dialectic and rhetoric, but the assertion is within a tripartite division of philosophy which is Stoic and not attributable to the early Peripatos. In the introduction to *On Divination*, Cicero cites Theophrastus twice, 592 and 669, but in a general way and for his own purposes. When Cicero wants to underline the importance of his work *On the State*, he tells us that the subject has been richly dealt with by Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus and the whole family of Peripatetics (592.3–4); and when he wants to justify grouping his own rhetorical writings together with those on philosophy, he cites Aristotle and Theophrastus (669.1).³¹

(1.1 1354a1). In the case of Theophrastus, we cannot check Cicero's reports, so that we must observe caution in assessing what we are told.

²⁹ See Fortenbaugh (1989) p. 52.

³⁰ The passage is fundamental to the view that Theophrastus recognized four virtues of style. It is of special interest, for it illustrates how Cicero may on his own add to a report without signaling that he is no longer reporting the views of someone else. See the commentary to 684.

³¹ Runia p. 33, 35 argues that Cicero regards Aristotle and Theophrastus as examples to follow and to emulate in his attempt to present Greek philosophy, including rhetoric, to

Cicero's letter to Tiro, **689B**, well illustrates how Cicero can use a famous name, here that of Theophrastus, to add authority to criticism directed toward another person. Such name dropping may, but need not, involve inaccuracy. Comparison with **689A** makes clear that Cicero has not misused the Eresian's name in writing to Tiro.³²

2. The Augustan Period

Dionysius of Halicarnassus] fl. 30–10 B.C.

Dionysius is the best known of the Augustan rhetoricians. He came to Rome in 30 B.C., lived there for over twenty years, taught grammar and rhetoric, and wrote a historical work entitled *Roman Antiquities*. It is uncertain whether he made his living primarily as a teacher or enjoyed significant patronage for his work on Roman history.³³ His rhetorical writings include *On Imitation*, *On Literary Composition*, *On the Ancient Orators* (which included essays on six orators; two essays are lost), *On Thucydides*, *On Dinarchus*, two *Letters to Ammaeus* and the *Letter to Pompeius*. Of especial interest is the first *Letter to Ammaeus*, in which Dionysius refutes the argument of an unnamed Peripatetic who attempted to show that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* predates the speeches of Demosthenes and that Demosthenes learned the art of rhetoric from the Aristotelian treatise.³⁴ We have here a clear indication both of contemporary Peripatetic interest in the works of Aristotle, perhaps reflecting the editorial work of Andronicus, and of Dionysius' own familiarity with Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.³⁵ That he had a similar familiarity with the rhetorical works of Theophrastus seems likely,

the Romans. That is certainly correct, but equally he uses them to justify and to amplify his own accomplishments.

³² For further discussion, especially concerning *On Invention*, *On the Orator* and the *Orator*, see my article "Cicero as a Reporter of Aristotelian and Theophrastean Rhetorical Doctrine," forthcoming in *Rhetorica* 23.1 (2005).

³³ For the former possibility, see, e.g., Kennedy (1972) p. 342–3, and for the latter, e.g., Usher (1974) p. xix–xx.

³⁴ It has been suggested that the unnamed Peripatetic is Critolaus who lived in the second century B.C. See Düring (1957) p. 251 and A. Chroust, "The *Vita Aristotelis* of Dionysius Halicarnassus (I *Ep. Ad Amm.* 5)," *AAantHung* 13 (1965) p. 369–77. The suggestion has been rejected by Wehrli (1967–74) vol. 10 p. 72, and is quite inconsistent with what Dionysius says in Section 1 of the first *Letter to Ammaeus*. For there the unnamed Peripatetic is presented as a contemporary of Dionysius and not a much earlier Peripatetic of the second century B.C.

³⁵ Barnes p. 50–1. Although Dionysius was familiar with Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, he seems not to have been acquainted with the *Poetics*. See the commentary on **683**.

especially when one considers the fact that he makes frequent reference to Theophrastus: he names him repeatedly in *On the Ancient Orators* and once in *On Literary Composition*.³⁶ In two places he makes explicit mention of Theophrastus' work *On Style* (688.4 and 692.3), and in one of these, he quotes Theophrastus at length (692.10–19). For accuracy in quotation we may compare the first *Letter to Ammaeus*, where Dionysius quotes substantial passages from all three books of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. There are divergences from our text of the *Rhetoric*, some of which seem noteworthy: e.g., in a quotation intended to show that in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle refers to his *Analytics* (7), ἀναλυτικοῖς occurs instead of διαλεκτικοῖς (1.2 1356b1); in the quotation of the fifth topic or line of argument (11), there is variation in construction, so that the preposition εἰς replaces the quasi-technical term ἐκ (2.23 1397b27); and in the quotation of the third topic (12), there is omission (2.23 1397a24, a26, b3–7) as well as expansion (1397a29) and variation when τούτου replaces σοῦ (1397a31). How much weight we should attribute to these and other divergences is not easy to determine, especially as there are places where a quotation in Dionysius enables us to correct a corrupt passage in Aristotle.³⁷ My impression is that the divergences do not justify doubting the overall reliability of Dionysius, but they are grounds for caution in dealing not only with quotations but also with reports of what Theophrastus may have said. Indeed, in the one passage in which a report is followed by a quotation (692), there is reason to ask whether Dionysius' report is faulty or at least misleading.³⁸

On Imitation is largely lost, but we do have a definition of rhetoric which may come from that work. It runs: ῥητορική ἐστὶ δύναμις τεχνικὴ πιθανοῦ λόγου ἐν πράγματι πολιτικῷ, τέλος ἔχουσα τὸ εὖ λέγειν, "rhetoric is the artistic faculty of persuasive speech in political matters, having speaking well as its goal" (fr. 1 Usener-Radermacher). The mention of persuasion and the reference to political matters give the definition an Aristotelian ring. The phrase "having speaking well as its goal" has been said to set the definition apart by suggesting an emphasis on style which is independent of practical considerations,³⁹ but it seems equally possible and

³⁶ Dionysius also refers to Theophrastus in the *Roman Antiquities* (5.73.3 = 631.3).

³⁷ E.g., in quoting 1.2 1356a35–b20, Dionysius provides us with words that have fallen out at 1356b4.

³⁸ Theophrastus' criticism of a single passage by Lysias may have been misconstrued as a general criticism of Lysias' style. See the commentary on 692.

³⁹ Kennedy (1972) p. 347–8.

perhaps more natural to construe “well” closely with “persuasive” and to see here a close relationship to Aristotelian doctrine: namely, that the orator does well when he makes use of the available means of persuasion, whether or not he actually succeeds in persuading his audience.⁴⁰ Be that as it may, an emphasis on style is made explicit in the introduction to *On the Ancient Orators*: Dionysius criticizes the Asianic excesses of the Hellenistic period, praises the recent revival of Attic restraint (1–3) and declares his intention to strengthen further the ascendancy of neo-Atticism (4). Moreover, *On Literary Composition* is devoted entirely to the harmonious juxtaposition of words and phrases. Dionysius tells us that his essay has few antecedents and that an accurate and adequate treatment of the subject is still wanting (1). That may or may not be overstatement,⁴¹ but it does raise the question whether Theophrastus’ work *On Style* made a significant advance over what Aristotle offered in Book 3 of the *Rhetoric*. To be sure, Cicero says that Theophrastus wrote more accurately than Aristotle on prose rhythm (700.3–4), and that statement encourages the idea that Dionysius’ rather full account of rhythm is at least in part dependent on Theophrastus.⁴² But it is not clear how much weight can be attached to Cicero’s statement,⁴³ and even if it is accepted at face value, Dionysius never says that his account of rhythm is based on or even takes its start from what Theophrastus says in *On Style*.

There are places where a reference to Theophrastus is quite brief and largely introductory to what Dionysius wants to say about a particular Attic orator or about good style in general. In 685, we are told that Theophrastus recognized Thrasyarchus as the first to develop a mixed style. Dionysius is beginning a discussion of the mean in diction with special reference to Isocrates, Plato and Demosthenes; Theophrastus is not mentioned again. In 691, he cites Theophrastus in regard to three sources of elevated style. For our knowledge of Theophrastus, the citation is of some value, but Dionysius is primarily concerned with providing a framework with which

⁴⁰ To the extent that the ancient sources comment on the phrase “having speaking well as its goal,” they favor a close connection with Aristotle and his concern with the available means of persuasion (*Rhetoric* 1.2 1355b26–7. For the sources, see Usener-Radermacher vol. 2.1 p. 197–200, esp. p. 198.17, 199.2–6, 199.26–200.2).

⁴¹ In *On the Ancient Orators*, intro. 4, Dionysius says that he can find no precedents for the essays that follow. The caution with which he expresses himself and the apparent correctness of his statement lends credence to what he asserts in *On Composition* 1.

⁴² Usher (1974) p. xiii–xiv.

⁴³ See above, p. 12–13 and below p. 322–3.

he can evaluate the style of Isocrates. Similarly in **688**, when Dionysius refers to Theophrastus' distinction between beautiful words and those that are paltry and mean, he is preparing to discuss how one deals with unattractive words.

Dionysius' interest in style may determine what he cites from Theophrastus and that in turn may give a false picture of *On Style*: i.e., it may encourage us to think of *On Style* as a treatise (almost) entirely devoted to the aesthetic aspects of language. An example may be the quality or virtue of compression. The quality is properly viewed as stylistic, but it also has close ties to argument. Dionysius does connect it with judicial oratory and generally with real contests (**695**), but he does not make the connection with argument explicit. In Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, the connection is much clearer, and Theophrastus, following his teacher, may have made it even clearer.

pseudo-Longinus] fl. early 1st cent. A.D.

The identity of the author of *On the Sublime* is problematic. The primary manuscript names Dionysius Longinus in the title, but in the index we read "Dionysius or Longinus." The Dionysius in question is Dionysius of Halicarnassus (fl. 30–10 B.C.), and the Longinus is Cassius Longinus of Palmyra (3rd century A.D.). Neither of these persons is the author. Modern scholars have made various suggestions, but the identity of the author remains uncertain. Less problematic but still undetermined is the date of the treatise. Since the author introduces his treatise as a reaction against a like named work by Caecilius of Calacte (1.1),⁴⁴ and since no one later than Theodorus is named in the treatise (3.5),⁴⁵ it seems sensible to assign the treatise a date late in the Augustan principate or during that of Tiberius; but a date at the end of the century has been advanced in the literature.⁴⁶ Be that as it may, the author seems to have been a Greek rhetorician, who lived and taught in Rome. His treatise, however, is anything but a standard rhetorical handbook. Its focus is the inspired passage, and in that context poets and prose writers are quoted in order to illustrate what succeeds and what fails.

⁴⁴ Since Dionysius of Halicarnassus refers to Caecilius as a friend (*Letter to Pompeius* 3), we can be sure that he lived during the Augustan period. Apparently the surviving treatise *On the Sublime* was a more or less immediate response to the work of Caecilius.

⁴⁵ The Theodorus named in 3.5 seems to be Theodorus of Gadara, who taught the future Emperor Tiberius (Suetonius, *The Lives of the Caesars* 3.57).

⁴⁶ See, e.g., Kennedy (1972) p. 370–2, Matelli (1988) p. 64–7 and D. Russell's introduction to the Loeb edition (Cambridge MA: Harvard 1995) p. 145–7.

Sometimes the quotations are loose,⁴⁷ perhaps because the author is quoting from memory or drawing on a source in which the text in question has been quoted freely. That is some reason for caution when considering the author's report concerning what Aristotle and Theophrastus said about bold metaphors: namely, that such metaphors are softened by phrases like "just as if" and "as it were" (690). Nevertheless, the report is not a quotation in the strict sense, so that verbal accuracy is not an issue. But having said that, I want to call attention to the use of ἰᾶσθαι, "to cure" in 690.4. The image of curing is found in the Aristotelian text most closely related to 690, i.e., at *Rhetoric* 3.7 1408b1, ἄκος occurs. Later the image recurs in Quintilian, *Oratorical Education* 8.3.37, where *remedium* is used. We can guess that Theophrastus, too, used the image, so that the author of *On the Sublime* fairly represents not only his view but also his manner of expression.

3. The High Roman Empire

Quintilian] c. 30/5–100 A.D.

Quintilian was a professional teacher of rhetoric who, upon retirement, wrote a substantial work on *Oratorical Education*. In the preface to the first book of that work, he tells us that his career as a teacher ran over twenty years (1.pr.1); and in a letter to his publisher Trypho, he speaks of having spent two years composing the work on oratorical education, devoting much of his time to research and reading what other authors had to say on the subject (*To Trypho* 1).⁴⁸ Quintilian, therefore, had ample opportunity to acquaint himself with Theophrastus' contributions to the field of rhetoric. But did he take advantage of the opportunity, and in particular did he read Theophrastus for himself? The question is not easy to answer. Some of what Quintilian tells us about the Eresian is of a quite general nature and could easily come from an intermediary. For example, Theophrastus is said to have expressed himself with splendor (app. 5B) and to have written diligently on rhetoric (670). Other comments are more specific. We are told that Theophrastus recommended reading poets (707), and that he recognized the possibility of beginning a judicial oration from something said in the preceding speech of an opponent (680). These reports are of considerable interest; and since they are not found in earlier

⁴⁷ R. W. Roberts, *Longinus, On the Sublime* (Cambridge: University Press 1899) p. 216–17.

⁴⁸ Cf. *Oratorical Education* 1. pr. 2, 3.1.22, 12.11.8 and Kennedy (1972) p. 506–7.

writers, we may be inclined to attribute to Quintilian a first hand knowledge of Theophrastus. In addition, the statement that Theophrastus did not hesitate to disagree with his teacher Aristotle (694) might stem from a personal reading of the two leaders of the Peripatos.⁴⁹ But we should be cautious, for Quintilian is irritatingly silent concerning the details of disagreement between Aristotle and Theophrastus. Certainly we should not conclude that all or even most references to Theophrastus are based on a direct reading of the Eresian. The report that Theophrastus held the same views as Aristotle in regard to prose rhythm (app. 704) is a case in point. It seems to be based entirely on Cicero (*Or.* 192–4). Similarly when Quintilian speaks of Theophrastus following Aristotle in separating epideictic oratory from that which is practical (671), he does not seem to have a particular Theophrastean text in mind. And when he goes on to explain epideictic in terms of display, he appears to be influenced by later writers including Cicero (*Or.* 37). I am inclined to say that even the reports concerning the reading of poets (707) and the opening of a judicial speech (680) are in fact taken from an intermediary source. But perhaps the point need not be pressed. It is clear that Quintilian is not especially interested in the history of rhetoric. His survey of Greek writers on rhetoric (3.1.8–18) reflects that, as does his meager statement concerning Theophrastus: namely, that the Eresian wrote diligently on the subject (670). Cicero had reported that (667–9), and at the end of the first century A.D. it was a commonplace.⁵⁰

Plutarch] c. 45–120 A.D.

Plutarch of Chaeronea in Boeotia was a philosopher and biographer as well as a religious man, who spent the last thirty years of his life as a priest in Delphi. In addition, he is one of our most important sources for reports

⁴⁹ I shall not discuss in any depth the question of Quintilian's knowledge of Aristotle. Kennedy (1969) 107 says it is perverse to assume that Quintilian did not himself know Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. That may be correct, but Quintilian's treatment of Aristotle can be remarkably sloppy and unfair. See the commentary to 671 and 694, and also J. Adamietz, "Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria*," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, vol. 2.32.4 p. 2252, who suggests that Aristotle is not cited directly but only through secondary sources. I incline to Adamietz' view, but prefer to leave the matter open. Concerning Theophrastus, however, I agree entirely with Kennedy: "What Quintilian got from Theophrastus could have come through Cicero or other sources."

⁵⁰ Quintilian mentions Theophrastus' splendid style in conjunction with the well-known explanation of his name (app. 5B): θεός = "god" and φράζω = "speak." Cicero has the explanation (*Or.* 62) as well as similar descriptions of Theophrastus' style (*Brut.* 121, *On Ends* 4.3, cf. 5). Clearly Quintilian can be drawing on Cicero or on the tradition in general.

concerning Theophrastus. That is true not only because Plutarch wrote extensively and named Theophrastus on numerous occasions,⁵¹ but also because Plutarch's wide-ranging knowledge of earlier Greek literature is not in doubt. For a survey that covers epic, lyric, tragedy, comedy, philosophy, oratory, history, medicine, mathematics and grammar, see Ziegler's article in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* 21.1.⁵² In the Lamprias Catalogue of Plutarch's writings,⁵³ we find several works on rhetoric and poetics — *On Rhetoric* (no. 47), *Is Rhetoric a Virtue?* (no. 86), *Against Those Who, because of Rhetoric, Fail to Engage in Philosophy* (no. 219), *On the Art of Poetry* (no. 60), *What Attention Is To Be Paid to Works of Poetry?* (no. 220) — and that raises expectations concerning what Plutarch can contribute to our knowledge of Theophrastus' views on rhetoric and poetics. We are, however, largely disappointed. Our collection of rhetorical and poetic texts contains only three texts drawn from Plutarch, and at least two of these texts appear not to report what was said in a Theophrastean work specifically devoted to rhetoric or poetics.

Text **705** is a clear case. It tells us that according to Theophrastus, Alcibiades had no trouble determining what needed to be said, but he often stumbled when he tried to express himself in words. Put technically, Alcibiades was skilled in invention but was deficient in diction. In reporting what Theophrastus said about Alcibiades, Plutarch uses the language of rhetoric (ἃ δεῖ λέγειν, ὡς δεῖ λέγειν), and that may encourage us to think that Plutarch is not only drawing on a rhetorical treatise of Theophrastus but also adopting Theophrastus' words. We must, however, be careful, for no Theophrastean treatise is named, and when we look at the parallel texts, especially *Precepts of Statecraft* 8 804A, in which sudden situations are emphasized, it seems possible and even probable that Plutarch is not drawing on a rhetorical treatise but rather on a political treatise like *Politics Regarding Crises* (**589** no. 4a).⁵⁴ The same may be

⁵¹ In the text-translation volumes, 67 Plutarchan texts are printed, mentioned in the apparatus of parallel texts, or referred to in a list. That does not count the eight texts that modern scholars attribute to pseudo-Plutarch.

⁵² K. Ziegler, "Plutarchos 2" in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* 21.1 (1951) col. 914–26 = *Plutarchos von Chaironeia* (Stuttgart: Druckenmüller 1964) col. 277–89.

⁵³ The Lamprias Catalogue has been dated to the third or fourth century A.D. See, e.g., F. Sandbach in the Loeb edition (1969) p. 7 and D. Russell in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, revised third edition (2003) p. 1200.

⁵⁴ D. Russell, "Plutarch, Alcibiades 1–16," in *Essays on Plutarch's Lives*, ed. B. Scardigli (Oxford: Clarendon 1995) p. 200 n. 28 suggests that text **705** derives from a rhetorical-poetic treatise: namely, *Περὶ ὑποκρίσεως*, *On Delivery*. The idea is not foolish, for Alcibiades is said to fall silent while speaking, i.e., while delivering a speech. Never-

true of text **706**. Theophrastus is said to have considered Demades a better orator than Demosthenes. Since Plutarch has just told us that everyone rated Demades above Demosthenes in responding to a sudden situation, it is plausible to think that the original Theophrastean context was to be found in the treatise *Politics Regarding Crises*.⁵⁵ Moreover and in some ways more important, it should be noticed that Plutarch does not cite Theophrastus directly. He cites him indirectly through the Stoic Aristo of Chios. I do not want to suggest that in general Plutarch's knowledge of Theophrastus was dependent on secondary sources, but here we do have a case in which Plutarch is quite explicit that he is citing Theophrastus through an intermediary. That need not be a problem and seems not to be one in the case before us, but we should at least keep in mind that the involvement of an intermediary creates an additional opportunity for a report to be altered and even seriously corrupted.

Very different is text **711**. It is not taken from one of the *Lives*; instead it comes from the *Moralia*: in particular, from *Table Talk* 2.1.4. We are not offered a report or judgment concerning an individual but rather Theophrastus' definition of the jest: it is "a concealed rebuke for error." There is no reason to doubt the genuineness of the definition; in fact, there is good reason to accept it. For the definition fits well with text **710**, which records the playful and humiliating use of a proverb. Moreover, the definition exhibits an interest in audience psychology: a concealed rebuke is one that the listener interprets and in doing so is pleased *inter alia* with his own perceptivity. We may compare text **696**, which involves a similar interest in audience psychology.⁵⁶

Alexander of Aphrodisias] fl. 200 A.D.

Alexander, who was known to later generations as "The Commentator" on Aristotle,⁵⁷ was well schooled, having studied under Aristotle of

theless, *Περὶ λέξεως*, *On Style*, seems more likely. Note the use of *λέξις* in line 5. Even more likely, I think, is *Πολιτικά πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς*, *Politics Regarding Crises*. See the commentary on **705**.

⁵⁵ A different Theophrastean treatise is, of course, possible, but in my judgment less likely. See the commentary on **706**.

⁵⁶ When an orator leaves something for the listener to supply for himself and the listener is able to do so, then the listener becomes well disposed toward the speaker, for he thinks that the speaker has provided him with an occasion to exercise his own intelligence. See the commentary on **696**.

⁵⁷ See Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* p. 707.33, 1170.2, 1176.32 Diels and Philoponus, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* p. 136.20 Wallies.

Mytilene (or Aristocles of Messene),⁵⁸ Herminus (a pupil of the commentator Aspasius) and Sosigenes. The dedication of Alexander's work *On Fate* to Septimius Severus and Caracalla tells us that he was lecturing (presumably in Athens) at the end of the second and beginning of the third century A.D.⁵⁹ He wrote both commentaries on Aristotle's treatises and systematic works of his own. The surviving commentaries concern *Prior Analytics* 1, *Topics*, *Metaphysics* 1–5 (A–Δ), *Meteorologica* and *On Sense*. The commentary on the *Sophistic Refutations* is deemed spurious, as is the later portion of the commentary on the *Metaphysics*.⁶⁰ The lost commentaries include works on the *Categories*, *De interpretatione*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Physics*, *De caelo*, *On Generation and Corruption*, *On the Soul* and *On Memory*.⁶¹ The idea that Alexander wrote commentaries (now lost) on the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics* derives from the erroneous transference of material in Ibn-al-Qifti's *History of the Philosophers*.⁶²

Alexander was the last of the purely Peripatetic commentators on Aristotle. I.e., he tried to interpret Aristotle on the basis of Aristotle's own works.⁶³ For our purposes, the important point is that he had available the writings of Aristotle, which he read closely, and the same appears to be true in regard to Theophrastus. In our collection of sources, there are 60 texts in which Alexander refers to Theophrastus. That makes Alexander a valuable source for recovering the doctrines of Theophrastus, but if we look to him for information concerning Theophrastus' rhetorical and poetic teachings we are disappointed. No text is printed in the section on rhetoric and poetics, and only one is referred to (135). It appears among the logical texts and tells us that Aristotelian and Theophrastean collections of theses were extant in Alexander's time. Alexander's report is quite brief, but it does allow us to say that the collections contained arguments concerning set theses. The arguments were both pro and contra, and they proceeded on the

⁵⁸ See P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias*, Bd. 2 (Berlin: De Gruyter 1984) p. 399–401 and R. Sharples, "Alexander of Aphrodisias, Scholasticism and Innovation," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 2.36.1 (1987) p. 1177–8.

⁵⁹ *On Fate* p. 164.3–20 Bruns.

⁶⁰ On the later portion of the commentary on the *Metaphysics*, i.e., on Books 6–14 (E–N), see p. 42–3 on pseudo-Alexander.

⁶¹ In Alexander's commentary on the *Topics*, there is a reference to ὑπομνήματα on the *Ethics*, but the nature of the work is problematic.

⁶² See Sharples, "Alexander of Aphrodisias, Scholasticism and Innovation" p. 1186.

⁶³ P. Moraux, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Exégète de la Noétique d'Aristote* (Liege 1942) p. 16; D. Frede, "Alexander," in the *Encyclopedia of Classical Philosophy*, ed. D. Zeyl (Westport: Greenwood 1977) p. 21.

basis of generally held opinions. We are not told how, or even whether Theophrastus employed the collections of theses in his teaching of rhetorical argumentation, but it seems certain that he did. See the commentary on **68** no. 34–6.⁶⁴

Athenaeus] fl. 200 A.D.

Athenaeus was born in Naucratis but appears to have spent most of his life in Rome. He wrote several works, of which only one survives, albeit imperfectly. This work is *The Sophists at Dinner*. The time of composition cannot be determined with exactitude. An unfavorable description of the Emperor Commodus in Book 12 is not likely to have been written before the Emperor's death in 192 A.D.⁶⁵ The death of Ulpian of Tyre, a major figure in Athenaeus' work, is mentioned in Book 15. If this Ulpian can be identified with the famous jurist, then Athenaeus was still at work in 228 A.D.; but the identification is problematic.⁶⁶ What we can say with certainty is that Aelian, c. 170–235 A.D., knew and used the work.⁶⁷ That is a matter of some importance for evaluating our ethical sources,⁶⁸ though it plays no role in regard to rhetoric and poetic texts.

The Sophists at Dinner contains fifteen books. It has been argued that the work in its original form extended to thirty books, but that view now appears to be unfounded.⁶⁹ The primary manuscript is a codex Marcianus from the late ninth or early tenth century. All other surviving manuscripts

⁶⁴ We have placed the three titles that refer explicitly to theses among the logical titles (**68** no. 34–6) and included a reference to the three titles within the list of rhetorical titles (after **666** no. 7). Regenbogen col. 1523 lists the titles under rhetoric but admits that distinguishing between logical and rhetorical titles is often difficult. Wehrli (1983) p. 489, 498 lists two of the titles under rhetoric (no. 34 and 35) and one under "Seelenlehre" (no. 36).

⁶⁵ In 12.53 537F, Commodus is referred to as a contemporary, and his efforts to identify himself with Heracles are mentioned.

⁶⁶ In 15.33 686C, the Ulpian of Athenaeus is said to have died happily (εὐτυχῶς) a short time later. That fits poorly with the violent death that befell the jurist while *praefectus praetorio* in 228 A.D.

⁶⁷ For discussion see G. Wentzel, "Athenaios 22," *Paulys Realencyclopädie* 2 (1896) col. 2027.

⁶⁸ We have three cases in which Athenaeus and Aelian offer parallel texts: **552A–B**, **567A–B**, **579A–B**. The last pair is of special interest, for consideration of the texts including surrounding material suggests that Athenaeus and Aelian are drawing on a common middle-source: i.e., neither draws directly on Theophrastus. See Fortenbaugh (1984) 333–5.

⁶⁹ See now G. Arnott, "Athenaeus and the Epitome: Texts, Manuscripts and Early Editions," in *Athenaeus and His World: Reading Greek Culture in the Roman Empire*, D. Braund and J. Wilkins ed. (Exeter: University Press 2000) p. 42–3.

are descended from it. Books 1–2 and portions of books 3, 11 and 15 are missing in the codex Marcianus and therefore in the dependent manuscripts as well. There is also a so-called Epitome, which dates from the tenth or eleventh century and survives in several manuscripts. The relationship of the Epitome to the codex Marcianus is uncertain. Either it is derived solely from the codex Marcianus, or, as the most recent commentator suggests, it is based on at least one other manuscript.⁷⁰ Be that as it may, the Epitome can be important not only for filling omissions in the codex Marcianus, but also for confirming and possibly correcting the readings of the codex. Caution is, however, in order, for the evidence of the epitome is not always unambiguous. An example is provided by **709.1**, where the codex Marcianus has φιλόγελως, accusative plural. The reading of the epitome is problematic; at least one manuscript has φιλογέλωτας, which is possible but not likely to be what Athenaeus wrote. See the commentary on **709**. In addition, the Epitome can be quite wrong. A clear case is provided by **603** (a political text). In 4.25 144E–145A, Athenaeus is discussing the Persian kings and their fondness for luxury. He first cites Theophrastus (144E = **603.1**) and then continues the discussion with two references to Theopompus (144F–145A).⁷¹ In the codex Maricanus, the first reference to Theopompus is confirmed by the second which reads: “the same Theopompus.” The epitome goes wrong here, replacing the first reference to Theopompus with “Theophrastus” and then reading simply “he says” for the second. It seems quite clear that the epitomator or a scribe has been influenced by the preceding reference to Theophrastus in 144E.⁷² Scribal confusion regarding the names “Theophrastus” and “Theopompus” was, of course, all too easy. In our collection of sources, we find it in the manuscript tradition of Plutarch’s life of *Demosthenes*; see the *apparatus criticus* to **619** and **665**.⁷³

The Sophists at Dinner depicts a banquet lasting over several days. No topic relevant to the occasion appears to have been omitted. Food and drink figure prominently; luxurious habits are discussed, so are parasites

⁷⁰ Arnott p. 47–50.

⁷¹ The two references (144F–145A) are not printed as part of text **603**.

⁷² See S. Peppink, *Athenaei Dipnosophistarum epitome* (Leiden: Brill 1937) part 1 p. xxv.

⁷³ Even where our text of *The Sophists at Dinner* is totally dependent on the epitome, we can detect error. An example is **340** (= 2.21 44B–C), which is derived from Plutarch’s *Table Talk* 4.1 660E. What we find in the epitome is confused; the reference to Theophrastus is almost certainly mistaken. On this text, see the discussion of Robert Sharples in *Commentary* vol. 5 on **340**.

and flatterers and much else. Theophrastus is cited repeatedly in regard to wine and drunkenness (569–76, 578–9), eros (559, 561–4, 567), pleasure (549–53) and flattery (547–8). Since Athenaeus refers often to Middle and New Comedy,⁷⁴ we might expect him to mention Theophrastus in this connection. For the Eresian taught Menander (18 no. 12) and wrote works entitled *On Comedy* (666.22) and *On the Ludicrous* (666.23). In fact, we have only a single reference to Theophrastus' work *On Comedy* (709.1) and another to the work *On the Ludicrous* (710.7–8). In neither case is the immediate context comedy. The former is of interest as an example of how Athenaeus slides from one topic to another. He has been discussing the evils of flattery and turns to rulers and leaders who have a weakness for laughter. He cites a string of individuals and then introduces two cities in which laughter is a way of life. Text 709 concerns the first of the cities: namely Tiryns. We may criticize the addition of cities as only loosely connected with the preceding remarks on individuals, but for our knowledge of Theophrastus, this kind of mindless addition may be a virtue. Athenaeus is not shaping his material to make a well-knit whole. He simply repeats what he has collected, either through his own reading of the authors cited, or at second hand through existing anthologies and other kinds of handbook.⁷⁵ This use of anthologies and generally secondary sources is well illustrated by the latter of the two texts cited above, i.e., by 710. Here Athenaeus reports two versions of a proverb that was used abusively by the cithara-player Stratonicus. In each case, Athenaeus cites his source, giving both author and title. In what follows he continues to record the sayings of Stratonicus, citing eight different sources of whom three are Peripatetics: Clearchus, Callisthenes and Phaenias (8.41–6 348D–352D). There are, however, problems. Text 710 is immediately followed by material drawn from Aristotle's *Constitution of the Naxians*, whose relevance to

⁷⁴ He cites over 1,250 writers, gives more than 1,000 titles and quotes over 10,000 lines.

⁷⁵ It is well established that Athenaeus drew on existing collections when reporting Peripatetic material on animals and plants. In regard to animals, see D. Balme, *Aristotle, History of Animals, Books VII–X* (Cambridge MA: Harvard 1991) p. 5 and Robert Sharples in *Commentary* vol. 5 on 350–83, discussing Athenaeus' knowledge of Aristotle's *History of Animals*. For botanical matters, see Regenbogen col. 1443–4 and Sharples on 384–435 and 392–4, who comment *inter alia* on Athenaeus 3.11–13 77A–78A. The passage is instructive, for it suggests a source which not only combined material from Theophrastus' *Research on Plants* and *Plant Explanations* but also included three references to *Research on Plants* 2 that do not match the existing text. Whether the references are careless errors or signs of a fuller version of Book 2, we should resist faulting Athenaeus. More than likely he is reporting his source as he found it.

710 is unclear.⁷⁶ And when Athenaeus decides to continue recording the sayings of Stratoniceus, he first tells us that he himself (αὐτός 348D) will say something concerning Stratoniceus' cleverness in repartee. Two sayings are given, after which Athenaeus begins to cite sources. Why he fails to give a source for the first two is unclear.

Diogenes Laertius] fl. 200 A.D.

Diogenes was the author of epigrams that were published under the title *Every Kind of Verse* and of a history of philosophy whose full title appears to have been *Compendium of the Lives and Opinions of Philosophers*. We have regularly shortened the title to *The Lives of the Philosophers*. Diogenes' dates are nowhere stated explicitly. On the basis of the latest person mentioned in his history of philosophy and from the fact that there are no reflections of neo-Platonism in the history, his floruit may be placed at the end of the second and beginning of the third century A.D.

The Lives of the Philosophers is made up of ten books. Book 1 contains an introduction and discussion of pre-philosophic sages. Books 2–7 deal with the Ionic or western philosophers and Books 8–9 treat the Italian or eastern philosophers. Book five is devoted to the Peripatos.⁷⁷ It begins with Aristotle, the founder of the School, after whom come Theophrastus, Strato, Lyco, Demetrius of Phalerum and Heraclides of Pontus. That is, the first four leaders of the School are treated in order of succession, followed by two others: Demetrius, who was a pupil of Theophrastus (18 no. 5), and Heraclides of Pontus, whose credentials as a Peripatetic are weak.⁷⁸

The life of Theophrastus contains no discussion of his teachings.⁷⁹ Rather we are offered some biographical material (5.36–41), followed by a catalogue of Theophrastus' writings (5.42–50) and his will (5.51–7). Since the biographical material has been well discussed before⁸⁰ and will be discussed thoroughly in the first commentary volume of this series, I limit myself to two observations that have a relationship to rhetoric. First, we are told that Theophrastus was originally named Tyrtamus and that

⁷⁶ See the commentary on **710**.

⁷⁷ On Book 5, see Sollenberger (1992) p. 3793–879.

⁷⁸ F. Wehrli printed the fragments of Heraclides in volume 8 of his *Die Schule des Aristoteles* (1953, 2nd ed. 1969). A new edition of the fragments with discussion will appear in volume 14 of Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities.

⁷⁹ In line with his usual practice, Diogenes gives an account of the philosophy of the founder of the School, i.e., Aristotle (5.28–34). The account is inadequate and does not depend on Diogenes' own reading of the *corpus Aristotelicum*.

⁸⁰ See Sollenberger (1985) p. 22–5, 135–219.

Aristotle changed his name on account of the divine character of his speech (5.38 = 1.30–1).⁸¹ The fact that Theophrastus was a popular teacher — he is said to have had about 2000 students (5.37 = 1.16, cf. 2.7) — suggests that he indeed had a pleasing voice. Moreover, he wrote on delivery (666 no. 24) and recognized the importance of voice in delivery (712.4). Nevertheless, Theophrastus was not a rare name, and it is quite possible, indeed likely, that the story of the name change was a posthumous fabrication based on the name Theophrastus. Hermippus has been suggested as the originator of the fabrication.⁸² He is said to have written a work *On Theophrastus* (Diog. Laert. 2.55 = app. 1) and to have described the philosopher's animated style of lecturing (Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 1.38 21A–B = 12). A different possibility is Nicanor of Cyrene, who wrote a work on *Changes of Name* (Athenaeus 7.47 296D).

The second observation concerns an apophthegm. Theophrastus is reported to have said, “One ought sooner to trust in an unbridled horse than in a disorganized speech” (5.39 = 1.41–2). The mention of an unbridled horse is striking, for only a few lines earlier Diogenes has told us that Aristotle spoke of Theophrastus needing a bridle, for he interpreted every thought with excessive quickness (5.39 = 1.33–8). The apophthegm, however, makes a general point about arrangement: disorganized speech is not to be trusted, and we may add, it fails to inspire trust. The importance of organizing one's thoughts in some intelligible way was, of course, not new with Theophrastus. We may compare Plato's *Phaedrus* in which Lysias is criticized for arranging arguments haphazardly (264B3–8).

The catalogue of Theophrastus' writings is of especial value, for it makes clear that Theophrastus, like his teacher, wrote on a great variety of topics. There are 224 titles that are divided into five separate lists, each of which may represent a separate purchase by the library in Alexandria. Since I have discussed the catalogue and the individual rhetorical and poetic titles at some length in Section III of this commentary, I refer the reader to the place.

The will of Theophrastus is in many ways informative. We gain an idea of Theophrastus' personal wealth and his concern for others. We also learn of his provisions for the continuation of the School among a group of persons. Strato is named within the group but not singled out as Theophrastus'

⁸¹ Diogenes is not the first to report the change of name. It goes back at least to Strabo (*Geography* 13.2.4 = 5A), who lived some two hundred years before Diogenes (from c. 63 B.C. to 19 A.D.).

⁸² Stroux p. 38 n. 2.

successor (1.311–23). The most striking bequest is that contained in the single sentence “All the books I give to Neleus” (1.310–11). That is in line with the story of Neleus removing the library of Theophrastus, which contained the library of Aristotle, to Scepsis, thereby leaving the members of the Peripatos without books and unable to do philosophy in a systematic way (37). The story is, however, not to be accepted as told.⁸³

Laurentian Epitome = Longinus] c. 213–73 A.D.

Codex Laurentianus 24 plut. 58 contains an epitome entitled Ἐκ τῶν Λογγίνου, *From the (Writings) of Longinus*.⁸⁴ The epitome contains 24 sections which vary in content and exhibit no clear order. The title suggests that more than one work of Longinus has been drawn upon by the epitomator;⁸⁵ but the title itself is problematic, for it is written by a second hand. That has encouraged some scholars to reject the title as an erroneous addition, perhaps encouraged by a reference to Longinus in section 2. That reference is equally problematic on grammatical grounds, so that scholars have proposed emending the text in various ways.⁸⁶ There are real difficulties here, but we should guard against making matters worse. The clearest example is Mayer,⁸⁷ who claimed that the title and the reference to Longinus in section 2 derive from a marginal gloss, that parts of the epitome including a section mentioning Theophrastus are attributable to Caecilius of Calacte, and that references to Aristides in these parts should be emended to read “Aeschines.”⁸⁸ Such heavy handed remedies find little acceptance among current scholars who are impressed by agreement between the material found in the epitome and what is known from elsewhere concerning the views of Longinus.⁸⁹ For our knowledge of Theophrastus, that is encouraging. If the epitome is based on one or more works of Longinus, then it goes back to a scholar who taught in Athens (before going to Palmyra in c. 267 A.D.), had a genuine interest in philosophy and

⁸³ See Sollenberger (1985) p. 409–11 with the literature listed there, as well as Barnes (1997) p. 1–69.

⁸⁴ The manuscript is dated to the fourteenth century by Bandini, *Bibliotheca Laurentiana* (Florence) col. 466. Among the contents of the manuscript, the excerpts from Longinus are listed as no. 8 in col. 465.

⁸⁵ Kennedy (1972) p. 640.

⁸⁶ See L. Spengel, quoted in *RhGr* vol. 1, ed. Hammer (1894) p. xiii.

⁸⁷ Mayer p. xxxii–vii; criticized by Drerup col. 1655–8.

⁸⁸ Aristides is later than Caecilius (2nd cent. A.D. as against 1st cent. A.D.) and therefore cannot be referred to by Caecilius.

⁸⁹ K. Aulitzky, “Longinus,” in *RE* 13 (1927) col. 1414.

was especially respected as a rhetorician and philologist.⁹⁰ The report concerning Theophrastus' six modes of amplification (sec. 11 = **679**) is, therefore, likely to be accurate. Only, it comes to us *via* an epitomator who has eliminated all explanatory material, so that we are left with no more than a bare list of headings.

4. Latin Grammarians

Diomedes] 2nd half of the 4th cent. A.D.

The *Art of Grammar* by Diomedes will be found in the first volume of Keil's *Grammatici Latini* (1874). In recent literature, it has been dated to 370–80 A.D.⁹¹ It was written for teaching in the schools and contains three books: the first is on the eight parts of speech, the second on the elements of grammar and style, and the third on meter and poetry. Diomedes has based his work on that of predecessors, especially Charisius⁹² but also Donatus⁹³ and others. Of especial interest for Theophrastean studies, is the chapter *De poematibus*, "On Poems" (p. 482.13–492.14 Keil). It occurs in the third book, contains an inclusive discussion of kinds of poetry and cites a Greek definition of tragedy that is attributed to Theophrastus (**708.5–7**). There are also Greek definitions of epic, comedy and mime that are not attributed to any particular Greek but have been referred to Theophrastus by modern scholars.⁹⁴ The chain of sources reaching back to the Hellenistic

⁹⁰ Porphyry, who was a pupil of Longinus before turning to Plotinus, reports Plotinus' characterization of Longinus: a "philologist, not at all a philosopher" (*Life of Plotinus* 14); but Porphyry also recognizes Longinus' interest in philosophy and quotes from his work *On the End* (20). More than likely, Plotinus' characterization of Longinus is based upon the latter's preference for "sticking to the text" when interpreting the works of Plato (so A. Armstrong in the Loeb ed. of Plotinus, vol. 1 p. 50–1 n. 1). That may be a negative attribute in the eyes of speculative philosophers, but it is a virtue in regard to reporting the views of predecessors.

⁹¹ *Handbuch der Lateinischen Literatur der Antike*, vol. 5, ed. R. Herzog and P. Schmidt (Munich: Beck 1989) p. 133. Diomedes is no. 524 in Herzog-Schmidt p. 132–6 and no. 47 in R. Kaster, *Guardians of Language: The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley: University of California 1988) p. 270–2.

⁹² Charisius is no. 523.2 p. 125–31 in Herzog-Schmidt, and no. 200 p. 392 in Kaster. I am reporting the judgment of Herzog-Schmidt p. 133. More cautious is R. Browning in *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature*, vol. II, ed. E. Kenney and W. Clausen (Cambridge: University Press 1982) p. 767, who says that the relationship between Diomedes and Charisius cannot be determined with certainty, for they have too many sources in common.

⁹³ Donatus is no. 527 p. 143–58 in Herzog-Schmidt and no. 52 p. 275–8 in Kaster.

⁹⁴ E.g., Reich vol. 1 p. 265 and Dosi p. 600, 620. See the commentary on **708**.

and early Roman period has been much discussed in the scholarly literature, but problems remain. Varro is named by Diomedes on four occasions in regard to four different kinds of poetry (p. 486.8, 487.15, 488.7 489.18), and Suetonius is named toward the end of the chapter (491.31).⁹⁵ That prompted Jahn to argue that Varro is a fundamental source, who has been drawn on and transmitted by Suetonius. Diomedes, we are told, will have had a copy of Suetonius' work *Ludicra historia* in front of him.⁹⁶ The role of Suetonius as transmitter was accepted by Reifferscheid, who departs from Jahn in that he replaces Suetonius' *Ludicra historia* with the introduction to the section *De poetis* in the larger work *De viris illustribus*.⁹⁷ The idea of assigning an important role to Suetonius has been criticized by, e.g., Usener⁹⁸ and Buchholz. The latter sees Probus as a major source for Diomedes.⁹⁹ Whatever the truth concerning Suetonius and Probus,¹⁰⁰ Varro is likely to have been important in the transmission of Theophrastean material (cf. 682.4–7). It is not impossible that Varro quoted Theophrastus directly, perhaps assisted by Tyrannion, but in all likelihood, Varro had Theophrastean material through a work on poetry that was Peripatetic in origin or at least heavily influenced by Peripatetic doctrine. This work will also have been a source for Greek writers who in certain doctrines exhibit a close relationship to Diomedes. I am thinking of, e.g., Proclus,¹⁰¹ scholia to Dionysius Thrax, Tzetzes and the Tractatus Coislinianus. That encourages matching Greek and Latin texts in order to discover Theophrastean doctrine.¹⁰² Such an undertaking is not foolish, but it demands considerable caution that sometimes seems in short supply. An example is the statement of differences between tragedy and comedy that one finds in Diomedes (lines 10–15) and a scholion to Dionysius (*Grammatici Graeci* vol. 1.3 p. 306.21–7 Hilgard).¹⁰³ Both characterize tragedy by reference to the

⁹⁵ Suetonius is referred to by his cognomen Tranquillus.

⁹⁶ D. Jahn, "Vermischtes," *Rheinisches Museum* 9 (1854) p. 629, who tells us that Diomedes had a copy of Suetonius' work *Ludicra historia* in front of him.

⁹⁷ A. Reifferscheid, *Suetonii reliquiae* (Leipzig: Teubner 1869) p. 371. Cf. Keil in the *praefatio* to his edition (1874) p. LIV.

⁹⁸ Usener (1892) p. 615–20,

⁹⁹ A Buchholz, "Über die Abhandlung De poematibus des Diomedes," *Jahrbuch für Philologie* (1897) p. 127–44 (summary on p. 143–4).

¹⁰⁰ See the overview of scholarly opinion in M. Schanz, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur bis zum Gesetzgebungswerk des Kaisers Justinian*, Teil 4.1 *Die Literatur des vierten Jahrhunderts* (Munich: Beck 1914) p. 171.

¹⁰¹ As excerpted by Photius, *The Library* 239 318b21–322a40 (CB vol. 5 p. 155.9–166.16 Henry)

¹⁰² See, e.g., Rostagni p. 106–24 and Dosi p. 605–6.

¹⁰³ Discussed by Janko (1984) p. 49–50.

heroic and both make mention of recognition, but it is not clear that connecting tragedy with ἱστορία and comedy with διὰπλάσμα (*GG* p. 306. 24–6) takes us back to Theophrastus.¹⁰⁴ See the commentary on the two treatises *On Poetry*, **666** no. 20 and 21.

pseudo-Sergius] 5th cent. A.D.

A partial edition of a commentary entitled *Explanations concerning the Art of Donatus* is printed by Keil in the fourth volume of *Grammatici Latini*. In its complete form, the work falls into three parts: the first is a commentary on Donatus' *ars minora*, the second deals with the *ars maiora* and the third with the doctrine of figures. In the oldest manuscript dating from the eighth century, the first part is assigned to Servius, while the second and third parts are attributed to Sergius by a later hand.¹⁰⁵ According to Schindel, the attribution of the first part to Servius is not universal. In a manuscript of the tenth century, the attribution is to Sergius.¹⁰⁶ Since "Sergius" may be no more than a variation on "Servius," it is tempting to believe that at least the first part is a genuine work of Servius, but that is ruled out (or at least complicated) by an explicit reference to Servius within the first part: *haec sunt quae Donatus in prima parte artium tractavit. haec magister Servius extrinsecus dictavit* (p. 496.26–7 K.).¹⁰⁷ Wessner sees here an indication of lecture notes taken by a student of Servius and subsequently expanded into the text that has come down to us.¹⁰⁸ Schindel, however, thinks it more probable that we are dealing with an abridgement of a written work of Servius.¹⁰⁹ Be that as it may, the commentary as a whole is divided into two books, and the division between books does not correspond to either of the aforementioned divisions between parts.¹¹⁰ According to Jeep, the two books are likely to have different

¹⁰⁴ Theophrastus has been credited with the tripartite division that connects tragedy with ἱστορία, comedy with πλάσμα and epic with μῦθος (Rostagni p. 119–22, Dosi p. 605–6, 613, 620), but the division is never ascribed to Theophrastus by name (Janko p. 50).

¹⁰⁵ On Servius, see no. 136 in Kaster p. 356–9, esp. 358, and on Sergius, see no. 255 p. 429–30, esp. Sergius 2 p. 429.

¹⁰⁶ U. Schindel, *Die lateinischen Figurenlehre des 5. bis 7. Jahrhunderts und Donats Vergilkommentar* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1975) p. 34–5.

¹⁰⁷ The first *haec* is backward looking, the second forward looking.

¹⁰⁸ P. Wessner, "Servius," in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* vol. 2.2.A (1923) col. 1845–6.

¹⁰⁹ Schindel p. 35 n. 10.

¹¹⁰ The commentary on the *ars minor*, i.e., the first part, concludes within the first book at p. 518.29 K. The division between books occurs at p. 534.12 and breaks up the commentary on the *ars maior*.

authors.¹¹¹ Wessner thinks that the author of the second book may have attempted to complete the work that he found in the first part, not only by composing the second book but also by adding to the first book.¹¹²

If the scholarly opinions summarized above are largely correct, we can easily imagine occasional confusion in the reports given in the *Explanations*. If we are dealing with the notes of a student, it is possible that the student nodded at a crucial moment and then wrote down something quite wrong. If we are dealing with an abridgement, material may have been omitted or combined in an unfortunate manner. And if we are dealing with an addition, the source may be mistaken or misused. Confusion of this sort cannot be entirely ruled out in the case of text **682**. The text occurs in that portion of the first book that comments on the *ars maior*. The topic is pitch accent, and several people including Theophrastus are said to have anticipated Tyrannion and Varro in recognizing a middle accent, *media prosodia*. According to Funaioli, pseudo-Sergius is drawing indirectly on Varro, who has drawn on Tyrannion.¹¹³ Even if pseudo-Sergius has drawn on his immediate source with care, error may have entered at an earlier stage in the chain of dependence. Nevertheless, there seems to be no strong reason to doubt the report concerning Theophrastus, but interpreting it in detail is challenging. See the commentary on **682**.

Rufinus] fl. 2nd half of the 5th cent. A.D.

Rufinus was a Latin grammarian in Antioch.¹¹⁴ Two of his works survive: *On the Meters of Terence* and *On the Rhythms of the Orators*. The latter, which concerns us, may be found in volume six of Keil's *Grammatici Latini*. It is little more than a collection of excerpts, drawn from various sources, but mostly from Cicero's rhetorical works. Among the excerpts from Cicero, three mention Theophrastus: one is taken from *On the Orator*, **701**, and two are taken from the *Orator*, **700** and **702**. In the text-translation volumes, these texts are printed under the name of Cicero; reference to Rufinus will be found in the apparatus of parallel texts. There is, however, one short passage, in which Theophrastus is named and which is not a simple excerpt. I am thinking of text **698**, which lists ten Greek

¹¹¹ L. Jeep. *Geschichte der Lehre von der Redeteilen bei den lateinischen Grammatikern* (Leipzig 1893) p. 35–8.

¹¹² Wessner col. 1846–7.

¹¹³ H. Funaioli, "Hermokrates" (11) in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* (1912) vol. 8 col. 888; cf. Wessner col. 1845.

¹¹⁴ Rufinus is no. 130 in Kaster p. 351–2.

authors, including Theophrastus, all of whom wrote on prose rhythm. Rufinus tells us that he is following Cicero (line 1), and each of the ten authors is named by Cicero in the *Orator* within a section concerned with prose rhythm.¹¹⁵ We may conclude that Rufinus is entirely dependent on Cicero for his knowledge of Theophrastus.

5. Prolegomena from Late Antiquity

Prolegomena 12 Rabe = Athanasius] late 4th or early 5th cent. A.D.

The Athanasius under consideration is not to be confused with the better known bishop of Alexandria, whose dates are 295–373 A.D. (The confusion occurs in the “Index of Theophrastean Texts” printed in the text-translation volumes on page 638 of volume 2). Rather, our concern is with a later Athanasius, who wrote commentaries on Aelius Aristides (now lost) and Hermogenes.¹¹⁶ Text **712** comes from a preface or introduction to Hermogenes’ *On Issues*. More precisely, it comes from a collection of excerpts drawn from *Prefatory Remarks* attributed to Athanasius. The attribution to Athanasius is found in a single manuscript, but in the absence of a named alternative,¹¹⁷ it seems reasonable to believe that the *Prefatory Remarks* in question were in fact written by Athanasius. His work was corrected a century later by Zosimos of Gaza or a like named person from Ascalon.¹¹⁸ Presumably the excerpts were made at a still later date. There are grounds here for caution: even if Athanasius always expressed himself with accuracy, his corrector and excerptor may have introduced infelicities. By way of example, we may consider what is said concerning Aristotle. He is called admirable (p. 173.17 Rabe) and his definition of

¹¹⁵ Thrasy-machus 39, 40, 175; Naucrates 172; Gorgias 39–40, 165–7, 175–6; Ephorus 172, 191–2, 194, 218; Isocrates 38, 40, 167, 172, 174–5; Theodectes 172, 194, 218; Aristotle 172, 192, 194, 214, 218, 228; Theodorus 30–40; Theophrastus 172, 194, 218, 228 and Hieronymus 190.

¹¹⁶ P. Maraval, “Athanasios,” in *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques*, ed. R. Goulet and P. Hadot (Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique 1989) vol. 1 p. 639, asks without answering whether one ought to identify our Athanasius with the philosopher who belonged to the circle of Hypatia (died 415 A.D.) in Alexandria and was a friend of Synesius.

¹¹⁷ We know of four manuscripts that refer to an Anonymous. See Matelli (1999) p. 54–6 and the commentary on **712**.

¹¹⁸ See the introduction of Rabe in *RhGr* vol. 14 p. lviii–lx, H. Gärtner, “Zosimos 7,” *Realencyclopädie* zw. R. vol. 10 col. 790.34–791.30, H. Hunger, *Die Hochsprachliche Profane Literatur der Byzantiner* (München: Beck 1978) vol. 1 p. 80 and Kennedy (1983) p. 120, 170.

rhetoric is treated with approval (p. 172.8). Nevertheless, the definition is not reported exactly as we have it at *Rhetoric* 1.2 1355b26–7. The infinitive “to observe” is omitted, resulting in a change of construction. Furthermore, the word “technical” is added and then praised, because it implies something useful. It marks off rhetoric from false and evil arts like those of the cook and the pimp (p. 172.12–17). There is a similar treatment of Aristotle’s assertion that rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic. Instead of a report that is limited to what Aristotle says at *Rhetoric* 1.1 1354a1, we are offered more: rhetoric is said to differ from dialectic in that it is concerned only with political matters, and its investigations proceed almost exclusively through the particular (p. 173.17–23).¹¹⁹ These additions may be indications of thoughtfulness and originality, but they also provide grounds for concern. We cannot simply assume that Athanasius’ reports are free from addition and interpretation. That has application to **712**, for this text contains what appears to be Stoic terminology, ὁ τόπος τῆς ψυχῆς. It may be that Theophrastus anticipated the Stoa, but it seems more likely that the terminology in question has been introduced by Athanasius or by his corrector, Zosimus, or by the excerptor. And if none of these applies, scribal error is a possibility. See the commentary on **712**.

Prolegomena 14 Rabe = excerpts from cod. Parisinus 3032] 5th cent. A.D.

Codex Parisinus 3032 is dated to the tenth century A.D.¹²⁰ It contains a preface to Hermogenes’ *On Issues*, no. 14 in Rabe’s collection. The preface is anonymous and seems to have been written during the early fifth century. It is closely related to another anonymous preface, no. 13 in Rabe, which is roughly contemporaneous. According to Rabe, the two prefaces share for the most part a common source.¹²¹ Whatever the exact relationship, there are striking differences between the two prefaces. Whereas Pr. 13 attributes to the Peripatetics a fivefold division of λόγος (p. 186.17–187.2 Rabe), the division is omitted in Pr. 14, and whereas Pr. 13 tells us simply that Lollianus and Theophrastus ordered or developed λόγος

¹¹⁹ Athanasius uses indirect speech to report the comparison with dialectic and then continues in indirect speech (μὲν ... εἶναι δὲ 173.17–18), so that the reader is apt to think that Aristotle himself added a remark on the difference between rhetoric and dialectic.

¹²⁰ Tenth century is the date given by Rabe in his edition of 1931, *RhGr* vol. 14 p. lxvii. In his earlier publication of 1909, *RhM* 64 p. 566, he dates the manuscript to the eleventh century.

¹²¹ Rabe in *RhGr* vol. 14 p. lxvii. At one time, Conley (1994) p. 225 attributed Pr. 13 to Athanasius and made him the source for Pr. 14. Now in private correspondence (2004), Conley suggests that his earlier view should be ignored.

ἐνδιάθετος, “internal reason” (p. 188.6–7 = app. **673A**), Pr. 14 refers to the written τέχνηαι of Lollianus and Theophrastus concerning epicheiremes and enthymemes (**673A**.1–2). We can say that Pr. 13 is fuller in one case (it reports a fivefold Peripatetic division) and less full in another (there is no mention of written τέχνηαι and epicheiremes). Since we know from Diogenes Laertius that Theophrastus wrote on both epicheiremes (5.43, 49 = 1.104, 247 = **68** no. 22–3) and enthymemes (5.47 = 1.198 = **666** no. 6), there is no reason to doubt the report of Pr. 14 concerning Theophrastus. To be sure, Marcellinus refers only to Theophrastus’ τέχνη *On Enthymemes* — at **673B**.4 there is no mention of epicheiremes — but that is compatible with what we read in Pr. 14. Moreover, we may compare a parallel passage in Sopatros, where epicheiremes are mentioned along side of enthymemes (*RhG* vol. 5 p. 2.22–4¹²²). Be that as it may, the mention of epicheiremes fits well with a general interest shared by the writers of prolegomena: namely, an interest in legitimizing rhetoric by relating it to dialectic.¹²³

Prolegomena 17 Rabe = Marcellinus ?] 5th cent. A.D.

Marcellinus wrote a commentary on Hermogenes’ work *On Issues* and is apparently the author of an anonymous preface that was revised by a later editor. It appears as no. 17 in Rabe’s collection. Athanasius seems to have been a primary source for both the commentary proper and the preface.¹²⁴ This dependence upon Athanasius suggests that Marcellinus was writing c. 450 or later. A date as late as the beginning of the sixth century is possible but unnecessary.¹²⁵ Be that as it may, the preface cites Theophrastus only once and then only by way of illustration. See the commentary on **673B**.

¹²² ἡ (τέχνη) περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ ἐπιχειρημάτων γεγραμμένη, ἡ διδάσκουσα πῶς δεῖ ἐνθυμῆσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι. Here as in **673A**, epicheiremes are first mentioned and then not referred to in what immediately follows.

¹²³ For the connection between the epicheireme and dialectic, see, e.g., Aristotle’s *Topics* 8.11, where the epicheireme is said to be a dialectical syllogism (162a16). On the general interest in legitimizing rhetoric, see Conley p. 225.

¹²⁴ Rabe in *RhM* (1909) p. 585 and *RhGr* vol. 14 (1931) p. lxxvi–lxxxv, O. Schissel, “Marcellinus 50,” in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* vol. 14 (1930) col. 1487 and Kennedy (1983) p. 112–13, 120, (1994) p. 220–1.

¹²⁵ The question of Marcellinus’ dates is complicated by the further question whether Marcellinus the commentator on Hermogenes is to be identified with Marcellinus the biographer of Thucydides. See Schissel, *RE* vol. 14 col. 1488 and Kennedy (1983) p. 112.

6. Neoplatonic Commentators on Aristotle

Syrianus] 1st half of the 5th cent. A.D.

Syrianus was a Neoplatonist in the tradition of Iamblichus. He studied under Plutarch of Athens, whom he succeeded as head of the Academy in 432 A.D. His own pupil Proclus took over the headship after his death around the year 437 A.D. Although the majority of Syrianus' writings are lost, we do have his commentary on Books 3, 4, 13 and 14 (B, Γ, M and N) of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (CAG vol. 6.1) and his commentaries on two rhetorical works: namely, Hermogenes' *On Qualities (of Style)* and *On Issues*.¹²⁶ Philosophically Syrianus was a Neoplatonist in the tradition of Iamblichus. In his *Metaphysics* commentary, he defends Plato's theory of forms against the criticisms of Aristotle, and in discussing Aristotle's attack on Pythagorean numerology, he cites Theophrastus for a report concerning the sigmatic compounds Ζ, Ξ, Ψ (**app. 681**). Archinus, we are told, specified the regions of the mouth in which the compounds are pronounced. Although no Theophrastean work is cited and no context for Archinus' remarks is given, the report appears reliable. Indeed, we know that Archinus was interested in the alphabet and in 403/2 B.C. proposed that the Ionic letters Η, Ω, Ξ and Ψ be added to the Attic alphabet.¹²⁷ The same report concerning Archinus is also attributed to Theophrastus by pseudo-Alexander (perhaps Michael of Ephesus, 12th c. A.D.) in his commentary on the *Metaphysics* (**681**). With only minor deviations, the report is given in identical words, so that a close relationship between the two reports is certain. While use of a common source is conceivable,¹²⁸ it is far more likely that pseudo-Alexander is copying directly from Syrianus. And if that is correct, we have erred in making pseudo-Alexander our primary source text and not Syrianus, who has been relegated to the apparatus of parallel texts.

Ammonius] 435/445–517/526 A.D.

Ammonius was the son of Hermeias, the first professor of Platonic philosophy in Alexandria, and Aedesia, a relative of Syrianus. After studying in Athens under Proclus, Ammonius became professor in Alexandria, where he

¹²⁶ The rhetorical works may be found in H. Rabe, *Syriani in Hermogenem Commentaria*, 2 vols. (Berlin: Teubner 1892–3).

¹²⁷ See the commentary on **681**.

¹²⁸ The idea of drawing on a common source can be complicated. Instead of both authors drawing directly on the same source, one or both may be drawing on a common source through one or more intermediaries.

lectured on both Plato and Aristotle. His students included Asclepius, Damascius, Philoponus and Simplicius. Many of Ammonius' lectures on Aristotle were written down by his students; some were published under his name and others under those of Asclepius and Philoponus. Writings in his own hand seem to have been few; and of these the only surviving work is the *Commentary On Aristotle's De interpretatione*.¹²⁹ In the introduction to that work, Ammonius tells us that he has recalled the expositions of the divine Proclus (1.7–8), i.e., he has based his commentary on notes made when he was a student of Proclus in Athens. An additional source of importance was Porphyry's commentary on the *De interpretatione*. That work has not survived, but we know that it contained considerable information concerning earlier philosophers.¹³⁰ When Ammonius cites Theophrastus (78), he is almost certainly drawing on Porphyry's commentary, which will have contained a report based on Theophrastus' treatise *On Affirmation and Denial*. Hence, the Theophrastean material reported by Ammonius has a logical orientation, and what is said about the business of rhetoric and poetics is secondary and perhaps largely the addition of the commentator or his source. It is of little value for reconstructing the rhetorical and poetic thought of Theophrastus.¹³¹

Simplicius] c. 490–560 A.D.

Born in Cilicia in Asia Minor, Simplicius studied first under Ammonius in Alexandria and then under Damascius in Athens. When Justinian took action against the pagans in 529 A.D., Simplicius left Athens for Persia along with Damascius and other philosophers. His subsequent movements remain in doubt. Some scholars believe that Simplicius settled in Carrhae, modern Harran, and there wrote all his commentaries. But the idea is supported by questionable evidence and as a result has found only limited acceptance.¹³² Many of Simplicius' works are lost; among them may be a

¹²⁹ L. Westerink, "The Alexandrian commentators and the introductions to their commentaries," in *Aristotle Transformed*, ed. R. Sorabji (London: Duckworth 1990) p. 326.

¹³⁰ Blank p. 3–4.

¹³¹ Fortenbaugh (1990) p. 168–75.

¹³² Among those who think that Simplicius established himself at Carrhae are M. Tardieu, "Les Calendriers en usage à Harrân d'après les sources arabes et commentaire de Simplicius à la Physique d'Aristote," in *Simplicius: Sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie*, ed. I. Hadot (Berlin: De Gruyter 1987) = *Peripatoi* 15 p. 40–57 and I. Hadot, "The Life and Work of Simplicius in Greek and Arabic Sources," in *Aristotle Transformed*, ed. R. Sorabji (London: Duckworth 1990) p. 278–89 and "Simplicius," in *Encyclopedia of Classical Philosophy*, ed. D. Zeyl (Westport: Greenwood 1997) p. 490. The view has been criticized by, e.g., P. Foulkes, "Where was Simplicius," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 112 (1992) p. 143 and H. Blumenthal, *Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity* (Ithaca: Cornell 1996) p. 44–6.

work entitled *Summary of Theophrastus' Physics* (279.10–11), but both the title and the author are matters of dispute.¹³³ The surviving works are a commentary on Epictetus' *Handbook* and several commentaries on Aristotelian treatises including one on the *Categories*. In this commentary, Simplicius not only mentions Theophrastus by name (683.6) but also cites what appears to be the title of a Theophrastean work or part thereof (683.5–6 = 666 no.17b). The reference to Theophrastus occurs within a report of Porphyry's view concerning the subject of the *Categories*. The latter is said to have identified the subject as the simple sounds that signify things in so far as they are significant. Theophrastus is mentioned, for he took notice of these sounds in so far as they are expressions (683.3–5). It seems quite certain that the information concerning Theophrastus is not attributable to Simplicius' own reading of the Eresian. Rather Simplicius is dependent on Porphyry, who is called "the cause of everything fine for us" (2.5–6). Porphyry is said to have written a complete commentary on the *Categories* dedicated to Gedalius. It ran seven books (2.6–8) and will have contained the Theophrastean material reported by Simplicius.¹³⁴ It is possible that Simplicius has the material at second hand from Iamblichus, who is called divine and said to have written a lengthy treatise, which in many places followed that of Porphyry even in wording (2.9–13).¹³⁵ But whoever Simplicius' immediate source may have been, he is drawing on the tradition when he cites Theophrastus.

7. The Carolingian Renaissance

Dunchad] 9th cent. A.D.

Dunchad is a shadowy figure. The only hard facts are conveyed by a manuscript deposited in the British Museum (Reg. 15, A XXXIII). On a folio numbered three, we find the superscription: *Dunchat Pontificis Hiberniensis quod contulit suis discipulis Monasterii Sancti Remigii docens super astrologia Capellae Varronis Martiani*. There follow notes on the computation of time. The folio in question does not belong to the codex in

¹³³ See Sharples on 137 no. 7 in the *Commentary* vol. 3.1 p. 13.

¹³⁴ At 683.1–2 Simplicius cites two works by Porphyry: *To Gedalius* and *By Question and Answer*. Both works concern the *Categories*, but the latter can be eliminated as Simplicius' source for Theophrastean material. It survives and does not mention Theophrastus. See Schenkeveld (1998) p. 69 n. 5.

¹³⁵ Simplicius says that he has followed Iamblichus as closely as possible and in many places used the wording of Iamblichus (3.3–4). Chase p. 107 n. 147 says that Simplicius' source "is likely to be either Porphyry or, less probably, Iamblichus."

which it is found, but it does tell us that Dunchad was an Irish bishop who taught at the Monastery of Saint Remi in Rheims and wrote glosses on at least Book 8 (on astronomy¹³⁶) of Martianus Capella's work *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii* (*On the Marriage of Philology and Mercury*).¹³⁷ No surviving commentary on the *De nuptiis* carries the name of Dunchad, but there is an anonymous commentary that has been attributed to him.¹³⁸ The same commentary has also been assigned to Martin of Laon.¹³⁹ The issue has not been resolved,¹⁴⁰ so that scholars occasionally use scare quotes when naming Dunchad or speak jointly of Dunchad-Martin. In fact, we do not know how many scholars of the ninth century commented on the *De nuptiis*; the author of the commentary in question may have been someone else.¹⁴¹ Be that as it may, our interest is in a brief notice in Book 5 (on rhetoric), where the *Peplos* of Theophrastus is cited as the source for the report that Corax invented the art or words (**736A**). The manner of citation — the reference to the *Peplos* is given in Greek and translated into Latin: ἐκ ex, τοῦ Πέπλου *Peplo*, Θεοφράστου *Teofrasti* — suggests that the commentator is copying from an intermediate source and not directly from a Theophrastean book. See the commentary on **736A–C**.

Martin of Laon] 819–75 A.D.

Like Dunchad, Martin was an Irishman, who migrated to France. The move occurred sometime in the late 840s or early 850s. He taught at the cathedral school in Laon and was viewed as an authority on Greek

¹³⁶ The mention of *astrologia* in the superscription on folio 3 of ms BM Reg. 15 A XXXIII, where one might expect *astronomia*, may cause pause, but *astrologia* is classical Latin for astronomy, and the manuscripts have *astrologia* in the heading to Book 8 (albeit in a later hand). The heading *De astronomia* is Dick's (see his *apparatus criticus* and that of Willis). Moreover, Remigius (see below), in his commentary on Martianus, uses *astrologia*, where we might expect *astronomia*. See Lutz (1962) p. 21 and 32 n. 11.

¹³⁷ Lutz (1939) p. 229 and Préaux p. 440–1.

¹³⁸ Manitius p. 525 and Lutz (1939) 230–1 and (1944) p. xi. The commentary that Lutz (1944) published under the name of Dunchad is a partial commentary preserved in a Paris manuscript (Bibliothèque Nationale, fonds lat. no. 12960 fol. 25^r–30^v). There are comments on the last third of Book 2 (the second of two books that give the setting of the work), on the whole of Book 4 (on dialectic) and on a third of Book 5 (on rhetoric). For more on the manuscript tradition of the commentary in question, see Préaux p. 437–41, 459.

¹³⁹ Préaux p. 437–59.

¹⁴⁰ See, e.g., J. Contreni, "Three Carolingian Texts attributed to Laon: Reconsiderations," *Studi Medievali* 17 (1976) p. 807–13, *The Cathedral School of Laon from 850 to 920: Its Manuscripts and Masters* (Munich 1978) p. 114 and D. Cróinín, "Dunchad 2" in *Lexicon des Mittelalters* vol. 3 (1986) p. 1454.

¹⁴¹ Contreni, *The Cathedral School of Laon* p. 813.

subjects.¹⁴² He will have known John Scotus Eriugena (see below), who taught at the palace school in Laon,¹⁴³ but unlike Eriugena, he was not given to philosophy and did not embroil himself in controversy.¹⁴⁴ Whether or not the commentary on the *De nuptiis* of Martianus Capella, sometimes assigned to Dunchad (see above), is really the work of Martin, the *De nuptiis* will have figured in his teaching. Of especial interest is a Laon manuscript (Bibl. Mun. 444), which is in part an autograph of Martin himself. It contains *inter alia* a Greek-Latin glossary and notes on Greek grammar and vocabulary.¹⁴⁵ On fol. 289^v we find Theophrastus' *Peplos* cited as the source of information concerning the discovery of letters (735). When this citation of the *Peplos* is combined with that which concerns Corax (376A–C), we may be tempted to say that the *Peplos* was available and consulted during the Carolingian Renaissance. But again, the way in which the *Peplos* is cited suggests citation through a secondary source. Moreover, we may wonder whether the *Peplos* can be called Theophrastean without considerable qualification. See the commentary on 735 and 736A–C.

John Scotus Eriugena] fl. 850–70 A.D.

Eriugena is the best known of the several Irish scholars who contributed to the Carolingian Renaissance. In all probability he began his studies in a monastery school in Ireland and migrated to France in the 840s. He acquired some knowledge of Greek in Ireland and found in France a ruler, Charles the Bald, who encouraged Greek studies. Eriugena interested himself in a variety of fields including biblical commentary, medicine and the seven liberal arts (the *trivium* and the *quadrivium*). His work *On Predestination* embroiled him in a theological controversy concerning the relationship between free will, grace and predestination. The work involved dialectical arguments and went against the authority of Augustine; it was condemned in 855 and again in 859.¹⁴⁶ His greatest work is the *Periphyseon*, the *Division of Nature*, whose primary theme is creation and the return of all things to their source, which is God. Again the application of dialectic is

¹⁴² O'Meara p. 16.

¹⁴³ On the palace school, especially its location in the region around Laon if not in Laon itself, see O'Meara p. 12–15.

¹⁴⁴ J. Contreni, "The Irish 'Colony' at Laon During the Time of John Scottus," in *Jean Scot Érigène et l'histoire de la philosophie*, ed. R. Roques 1977, reprint in *Carolingian Learning, Masters and Manuscripts* (Hampshire: Variorum 1992) p. VIII.65–6.

¹⁴⁵ O'Meara p. 17.

¹⁴⁶ For discussion of *On Predestination*, see O'Meara p. 32–50 and D. Carabine, *John Scottus Eriugena* (Oxford: University Press 2000) p. 9–12.

evident; condemnation followed (this time posthumously) in 1050, 1059, 1210 and 1225.¹⁴⁷ Like Dunchad, Eriugena commented on the *Marriage of Philology and Mercury* by Martianus Capella. His comments are preserved in different versions¹⁴⁸ that have been variously explained. Perhaps the differences reflect different times of composition. Alternatively the comments may have been written on a single manuscript of Martianus' work and subsequently excerpted by different persons with different interests. Or the differences may reflect different manuscripts of Martianus that were glossed independently of each other. Whatever the correct explanation may be, our concern is with references to Theophrastus. Among the comments on Book 5, Theophrastus' *Peplos* is cited in regard to Corax, who is said to be the founder of the art of words (**736B**). The report is all but identical to that found in Dunchad (or Martin of Laon): in both we have the Greek phrase ἐκ τοῦ Πέπλου Θεοφράστου plus translation and a very similar report concerning Corax's achievement. Apparently a common source was used by the two commentators. This common source will not have been the *Peplos* of Theophrastus, though the report may ultimately go back to a work that circulated under the title Πέπλος Θεοφράστου. There is, of course, a second reference to the *Peplos* in one version of Eriugena's commentary on Book 1.¹⁴⁹ The reference is in Latin (the Greek phrase ἐκ τοῦ Πέπλου Θεοφράστου is not present) as is the entire gloss which concerns the phrase *augur Pythius* (**582**). At first reading, one might think that Eriugena has inspected the *Peplos* for himself, but here too the gloss is almost certainly based on an intermediary. Moreover, the gloss is remarkable in that Apollo's role as a prophet has been transferred from Delphi to Delos. That may be what Eriugena found in his source, but we should not assume that Theophrastus would have accepted the transfer.¹⁵⁰ See the commentary on **736A–C**.

In two separate passages, Eriugena explains the name of Theophrastus by reference to the Greek words θεός and φράζω. In the first, the Greek words are translated by *deus* and *exponere*. Theophrastus is someone who

¹⁴⁷ On this work, see O'Meara p. 80–154 and Carabine p. 22–6.

¹⁴⁸ One set of comments is found in the Paris manuscript, BN Lat. 12960 fol. 47^r–115^v, which contains the comments attributed to Dunchad (or Martin of Laon). Another set is found in an Oxford manuscript, Bodl. Auct. T.2.19. For other manuscripts, see O'Meara p. 25 n. 40.

¹⁴⁹ The reference is found in the Oxford manuscript Bodl. Auct. T.2.19 fol. 7^v and is printed by Labowsky p. 189.

¹⁵⁰ As Labowsky p. 189 n. 2 says, "it is unlikely that the name of *Pythian* oracle should have been transferred to Delos by any ancient writer." That includes Theophrastus.

“sets forth god” (p. 203.7–8 Lutz = **6**). In the second passage, *exponere* is replaced by *componere* (p. 204.21–2 = **app. 6**). The explanation does not agree with those found in authors of an earlier date (1.30–1, **5A–B, D**).

Remigius of Auxerre] c. 841–908 A.D.

Remigius, too, may have been Irish by birth.¹⁵¹ If so, he left Ireland for Auxerre, where he became a student of Heiric and later his successor as master of the school. Subsequently he moved to Rheims, where he taught before going to Paris. He was above all a teacher, and as part of his profession he wrote numerous commentaries covering a wide variety of topics including the bible, dogma, philosophy, grammar and works of literature. To the last category belongs his commentary on the *Marriage of Philology and Mercury*. The commentary is fuller than those of Dunchad and Eriugena. It draws on their commentaries¹⁵² and was widely used by later scholars. It too cites the *Peplos* of Theophrastus regarding the invention of rhetoric and does so in Greek without a Latin translation. Perhaps Remigius is copying directly from a Greek source (that used by Dunchad and Eriugena), but more likely he is following Dunchad and Eriugena and simply making a single Greek sentence out of their fragmented Greek sentence. In Remigius’ commentary, the sentence is preceded by a foolish comment to the effect that Corax handed over to the Latins the rules of Theophrastus (**736C**).

On three other occasions, Remigius names Theophrastus. First, he follows Eriugena in explaining Theophrastus’ name as *dei expositor vel deum exponens* (**app. 6**). Second he cites Macrobius as his source and reports Theophrastus’ understanding of the Milky Way. But the report may be mistaken (**166**).¹⁵³ Third, he explains two words used by Martianus when the latter tells us that Theophrastus used the flute in treating disturbances of the mind (**app. 726A**). That Theophrastus recognized a cathartic effect of music on the soul seems clear.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵¹ Lutz (1962) p. 5 suggested that Remigius was born of Burgundian parents. Subsequently W. Stahl, *Martianus Capella and the Liberal Arts* (New York: Columbia 1971) vol. 1 p. 63 n. 38 argued for Irish birth on the basis of a comment on Martianus’ *De Nuptiis* 846 p. 446.3 Dick: in our land, Remigius says, the length of the day is 18 hours at the summer solstice.

¹⁵² Lutz (1962) p. 17.

¹⁵³ See the commentary (no. 3.1) of Sharples p. 109–10.

¹⁵⁴ See 717.130–2, and for brief comments, see Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 197.

8. Byzantine Scholars

John of Sardis] fl. 800 A.D. (?)

John of Sardis, who wrote a commentary on the *Preparatory Exercises* of Aphthonius, is an elusive figure. If he is the correspondent of Theodore the Studite (*Letters* 2.108, *PG* vol. 99 p. 1368–9), he will have been active at the beginning of the ninth century A.D., but there are other possibilities.¹⁵⁵ In addition to the commentary on Aphthonius, John also commented on Hermogenes' *On Invention* (*RhGr* vol. 14 p. 351–60) and *On Issues* (cod. Vat. Gr. 1022, still unpublished); he may have commented on the entire Hermogenic corpus.¹⁵⁶ Given the sorry state of Sardis at the beginning of the ninth century, it seems likely that John wrote these works in Constantinople before becoming bishop in Sardis. In any case, John had available and drew on earlier sources. For his commentary on Aphthonius, he used the works of several rhetoricians including Theon, Nicolaus the Sophist and Sopatros. There are also reflections of Aristotelian commentators like Olympiodorus, David and Elias.¹⁵⁷ In regard to Aristotle and Theophrastus, John's interest is limited and his reports are derivative. In our collection of sources, three texts name Theophrastus (677.3, 678.2, 693.1, 6). In two of these texts, Aristotle is also named (677.2, 693.1), and both times there is no Aristotelian text to which John clearly refers.¹⁵⁸ His reports may go back to a lost Peripatetic treatise, but certainty seems quite impossible.

Georgius Choeroboscus] fl. early 9th cent. A.D.¹⁵⁹

George the Swineherd was a grammarian, deacon and keeper of the archives at Hagia Sophia in Constantinople. He was also a teacher, almost certainly under the aegis of the church, although a secular institution cannot be altogether ruled out.¹⁶⁰ His lectures and writings covered a variety of subjects including declension and conjugation, prosody and poetic figures.

¹⁵⁵ Kennedy (1983) p. 275–6, (1999) p. 135 and A. Kazdahn, "John of Sardis," in the *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium* (Oxford: University Press 1991) vol. 2 p. 1067.

¹⁵⁶ H. Rabe, *RhGr* vol. 14 p. lxxxix–xciii.

¹⁵⁷ H. Hunger, *Die Hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner* (Munich: Beck 1978) vol. 1 p. 78–9, 82–3.

¹⁵⁸ See the commentary on 677 and 693.

¹⁵⁹ Some scholars, e.g. L. Cohn, "Choiroboskos," *RE* 3 (1899) col. 2363.51, have assigned George to the 6th c., but recent investigations have now established the first quarter/half of the 9th c. as the period of George's activity. For a survey of the literature, see R. Kaster, *Guardians of Language* (Berkeley: University of California 1988) p. 395–6.

¹⁶⁰ Wilson p. 70.

His knowledge of the ancient grammarians is beyond question — in one form or another, he took account of Dionysius Thrax, Apollonius Dyscolus, Herodian and Theodosius of Alexandria — as is his importance as a source for later generations. Most of the surviving treatises are records of his lectures, made by students in attendance: they are ἀπὸ φωνῆς. That is true of the commentary on Hephaestion's *Handbook on Meters*. The commentary is incomplete¹⁶¹ and according to Wilson, "sketchy and not free from error."¹⁶² The commentary is of interest to us, for in it there is mention of a Theophrastean work entitled Περὶ εὐρήσεως (666 no. 4). Unfortunately the title as reported in the manuscripts is almost certainly corrupt. Indeed, one may even doubt the reliability of the student who recorded George's lecture. See the commentary on 666 no. 4.

Michael Psellus] 1018–72 (or later) A.D.¹⁶³

Psellus was both a political figure and a teacher. In the former role he seems to have enjoyed considerable influence within the imperial palace. His own service as well as much else is recounted in his *Chronographia*, a history or memoirs of the period. In the latter role, he was a popular professor of philosophy and rhetoric, who attracted pupils from diverse lands. He was something of a polymath, expressing an interest in at least five different cultures: Chaldean, Egyptian, Greek, Jewish and Christian (*Scr. min.* vol. 1 p. 441.21–442.1 Kurtz-Drex1). He was keen on Plato and the Neoplatonists, but also involved himself with Aristotle. Interest, however, was not always a guarantee of truth in reporting. Especially shocking are the assertions that Plato's activity in Sicily resulted in a distribution of the tyrant's treasures to Academic and Stoic (sic!) philosophers (*Scr. min.* vol. 1 p. 362.13–14 K–D), and that Aristotle masterminded the military achievements of Alexander the Great (vol. 1 p. 362.21–364.13).¹⁶⁴ In regard to rhetoric, his knowledge of major figures like Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Hermogenes and Longinus is not in doubt. He wrote on the styles of certain church fathers and even composed a poem of over five hundred lines in which he summarizes the art of rhetoric (*RhGr* vol. 3 p. 687–703 Walz). For our purposes, it is important to note that Psellus was

¹⁶¹ The last two chapters of Hephaestion's work are not commented upon.

¹⁶² Wilson p. 73

¹⁶³ The year of Psellus' death is uncertain. Kennedy (1983) p. 296 gives "1072 or later." The *Tusculum Lexikon griechischer und lateinischer Autoren des Altertums und des Mittelalters*, 3rd ed. (Munich: Artemis 1982) p. 675 offers three possibilities: 1078 (probable), shortly after 1081, or 1096/7.

¹⁶⁴ Wilson p. 160–1.

given to citing an ancient author as if he had consulted the author at first hand and not through a secondary source. For example, when he names Theopompus and refers to the seventeenth book of the *Philippica* (*Scr. min.* vol. 1 p. 75.8 K–D), he almost certainly wants us to believe that he has consulted Theopompus' work itself, but as Paul Maas has demonstrated, Psellus has the material from Athenaeus.¹⁶⁵ Maas warns: "Der Fall zeigt erneut, welche Vorsicht bei der Verwertung byzantinischer Klassikerzitate geboten ist, vor allem wenn der Zitierende so viel Geist hat wie Psellos, und der Zitierte so vollkommen aus der Überlieferung geschwunden war wie Theopompos."¹⁶⁶ Similarly, when Psellus refers to Theophrastus as one of several critics who rated highly certain Greek prose authors (app. 670), we should not be fooled into thinking that Psellus had attained a copy of some rhetorical work of Theophrastus. Nor should we assume that Theophrastus' treatment of the authors was identical to that of the other critics mentioned by Psellus. In particular, we should not assume that Theophrastus anticipated Dionysius of Halicarnassus and discussed the authors individually in terms of three kinds of style. See the commentary on 670.

John the Deacon] end 11th cent. A.D.

Gregory of Corinth] 1st half of the 12th cent. A.D.

John the Deacon was logothete of Hagia Sophia in Constantinople. He composed a commentary on Hermogenes' work *On Ideas* and another on the pseudo-Hermogenic *On Method*. The former commentary does not survive. The latter does and is the earliest extant commentary on *On Method*. The entire commentary awaits publication, but portions have been published by Rabe.¹⁶⁷ These portions include one of our two texts from John. It is 676. The second text, 675, was not published by Rabe.¹⁶⁸ John's knowledge of Theophrastus is entirely dependent on an earlier source that was also used by Gregory of Corinth.

Gregory, originally known as Padros,¹⁶⁹ taught in Constantinople and

¹⁶⁵ I.e., Psellus has the material from *The Sophists at Dinner* 1 26B before the passage was epitomized by Eustathius. See P. Maas, "Psellos and Theopompos," in *Kleine Schriften*, ed. W. Buchwald (München: Beck 1973) p. 472–7.

¹⁶⁶ Maas p. 475.

¹⁶⁷ Rabe (1908) p. 127–51; Kennedy (1983) p. 314.

¹⁶⁸ It has recently been published by Fortenbaugh (1986) p. 135–40.

¹⁶⁹ B. Müller, "Gregorios. 1)," in Paulys *Realencyclopädie* vol. 7 (1912) col. 1848–9, citing cod. Parisinus Graecus 2669. Both R. Browning, "The Patriarchal School at Constantinople in the Twelfth Century," *Byzantion* 33 (1963) p. 19–20 and A. Kazhdan, in *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium* (Oxford: University Press 1991) vol. 3 p. 1587 list Gregory under "Padros."

later became metropolitan of Corinth. He compiled works on rhetoric and grammar;¹⁷⁰ he also wrote commentaries on religious poetry and produced his own religious epigrams. Like John, Gregory produced a commentary on the pseudo-Hermogenic *On Method*. The commentary survives in a longer and shorter version.¹⁷¹ Gregory often reproduces less of the source he shares with John; and as a result, a false impression can be given. That is the case in regard to Theophrastus' definition of the maxim (676.6–7). John omits the immediately preceding definition taken from the pseudo-Aristotelian *Rhetoric to Alexander*, and that has led some scholars to believe that more material than a single definition can be attributed to Theophrastus. John's other reference to Theophrastus, 675.16–17, is omitted by Gregory.

Pseudo-Alexander] 1st half of the 12th cent. A.D.

The commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* printed in Volume I of the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* is the work of two different authors. The comments on Books 1–5 (A–Δ) are the work of Alexander of Aphrodisias. The remaining comments on Books 6–14 (E–N) are by a different person, pseudo-Alexander, whose identity has been a matter of considerable scholarly debate. Here are three possibilities. The author was a forger who wanted his work to be taken for the genuine work of Alexander. He predates Syrianus, who lived in the fifth century A.D. and used the forger's work in writing his own commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Tarán). Alternatively, the author may have been a forger who lived after Syrianus in the later fifth or sixth century and drew upon his commentary (Freudenthal). Or the author was Michael of Ephesus, to whom a second hand in a Paris codex attributes the commentary on Book 6 (E). Michael lived in the twelfth century and will have made use of Syrianus' commentary (Praechter).¹⁷² Given these competing views with their remarkable difference in time (a full seven centuries separates Michael of Ephesus from

¹⁷⁰ On Gregory's writings on syntax, Greek dialects and style, see Wilson p. 185–90, who offers some less than complimentary observations.

¹⁷¹ The shorter version can be found in *Oratores Graeci*, ed. Reiske, vol. 8 (1773) p. 883–971; the longer in *Rhetores Graeci*, ed. Walz vol. 7 (1834) p. 1088–1352.

¹⁷² For a brief survey of the divergent scholarly opinion, see L. Tarán, "Syrianus and Pseudo-Alexander's Commentary on Metaph. E–N," in *Aristoteles: Werk und Wirkung*, ed. J. Wiesner (Berlin: De Gruyter 1987) p. 214–20. Tarán's own view is set forth on pages 221–31. In a commentary on the *Metaphysics* by ps.-Philoponus (fol. 25a; an edition is being prepared by Jürgen Wiesner), a passage on Book 6 in the commentary of pseudo-Alexander is referred to as the work of the Ephesian, i.e., Michael of Ephesus. Tarán p. 215–16, 220 cites the passage but dismisses it as devoid of evidential value.

the forger who is alleged to predate Syrianus), it may seem prudent to speak of pseudo-Alexander, when referring to the author, and to give his dates as uncertain. That is what we did in the text-translation volumes. Nevertheless, the most recent scholarship has shown that the text is comparatively late, later than Simplicius, who worked in the sixth century, and therefore later than Syrianus (Sharples).¹⁷³ Indeed, the text may belong to the twelfth century and be attributable to Michael of Ephesus (Luna).¹⁷⁴ That has a consequence for our understanding of text **681**, which we have cited as a text taken from pseudo-Alexander's commentary on *Metaphysics* 14 (N). The same text with no significant differences occurs in Syrianus' commentary. Apparently pseudo-Alexander has the text from Syrianus, which would be quite in line with Michael's general practice of searching through earlier materials and taking over whatever he thinks will contribute to the commentary of the moment. To use Ebbesen's words, Michael "vacuumed old manuscripts."¹⁷⁵ That speaks for identifying pseudo-Alexander with Michael, but whether the identification is correct or incorrect, Syrianus should have been preferred to Michael as the author of our source text.¹⁷⁶

9. Florilegia

Gnomologium Vaticanum] 14th cent. A.D.

The *Gnomologium Vaticanum* is a collection of 577 sayings preserved in a Vatican manuscript, codex Vaticanus Graecus 743, of the fourteenth century. The majority of the sayings (through no. 537) are arranged alphabetically by author. The end of the collection contains sayings attributed to women (no. 564 through 577). To speak of "sayings," ἀποφθίγματα or *dicta*, is grammatically correct. The collection begins "Antisthenes said" and continues in this manner. However, in regard to content many of the

¹⁷³ R. Sharples, "Pseudo-Alexander on Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Λ," in *Alessandro di Afrodisia e la Metafisica di Aristotele*, ed. G. Movia (Milan: Vita e Pensiero 2003) p. 200, 205–6. In private correspondence, Sharples informs me that he accepts the attribution to Michael of Ephesus but objects to him being called a forger. He refers to his review of Luna (see the following note) forthcoming in *Classical Review*.

¹⁷⁴ C. Luna, *Trois études sur la tradition des commentaires anciens à la Métaphysique d'Aristotele* (Leiden: Brill 2001) p. 53–71.

¹⁷⁵ S. Ebbesen, "Philoponus, 'Alexander' and the origins of medieval logic," in *Aristotle Transformed*, ed. R. Sorabji (London: Duckworth 1990) p. 451. Cf. H. Mercken, "The Greek Commentators on Aristotle's *Ethics*," in *Aristotle Transformed* p. 432.

¹⁷⁶ Since Syrianus should have been our primary source text, I have included some discussion of him above on p. 36.

sayings might be better classified as maxims, γνώμαι *sententiae*. They express moral wisdom apart from any indication of the addressee or the particular occasion.

There are fifteen sayings attributed to Theophrastus. One names the addressee and describes the circumstances (no. 330); eight indicate the context in a general way (no. 322, 323, 324, 329, 331, 332, 333, 335); six are without any indication of context (no. 325, 326, 327, 328, 334, 336). Text **453** (= no. 327) belongs to the last group. It contains a general statement concerning acceptable jokes and is discussed below along with other related texts.¹⁷⁷

The sayings collected in the *Gnomologium* derive from an earlier and larger collection which is now lost. Other surviving collections of sayings draw on the same source and therefore are not independent evidence. An example is provided by **453**, which is preserved both in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum* and in codex Vaticanus Graecus 1144 f. 229r (15th c.). The date of the original collection is problematic, but it is earlier than the ninth century and appears to have roots in the Hellenistic period.¹⁷⁸ If that is case, then the sayings collected in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, including those attributed to Theophrastus, deserve careful consideration.

¹⁷⁷ **453** is discussed below, p. 396–7, under the heading “The Ludicrous.”

¹⁷⁸ According to H. Chadwick, “Florilegium,” in *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*, vol. 7 (Stuttgart: Hierseemann 1969) col. 1137, the *Gnomologium Vaticanum* contains Hellenistic collections which were used by Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus and Plutarch. See also D. Gutas, *Greek Wisdom Literature in Arabic Translation* (American Oriental Society: New Haven 1975) p. 25.

III. Titles of Books

Our list of rhetorical and poetic titles derives almost exclusively from Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of Theophrastean works (1.68–291).¹ The catalogue follows the biography proper and precedes Theophrastus' will. It contains 224 titles; and with the exception of the *Metaphysics* (246 no. 1), all the surviving works are included.² The catalogue is not a single list but five lists, of which four are arranged alphabetically.³ With one exception, the rhetorical and poetic works occur in the second list (1.177–242) which is alphabetical. The exception is *On Judicial Speeches* (666 no. 9), which is found in the fourth list (1.274). *On Slander* (666 no. 13) occurs in the second list (1.189) and is repeated in lists three and four (1.252, 275). Almost certainly the catalogue is Alexandrian in origin. A likely guess is that it derives from Hermippus of Smyrna (3rd c. B.C.), who was a follower of Callimachus and wrote a biography of Theophrastus.⁴ Hermippus will have recorded the holdings of the library at Alexandria, and the occurrence of five lists within the

¹ The exception is *Περὶ εὐρήσεως* (666 no. 4), which has been translated “*On Invention*.” That is at best problematic. The title may be a variant for *On Discoveries* (727 no. 11).

² It is possible that the *Metaphysics* is included under a different title, either of its own or as part of a larger work. See White (2002) 12, 16, 35.

³ The first list runs 5.42–6 = 1.68–176, the second 5.46–8 = 1.177–242, the third 5.48–50 = 1.243–69, the fourth 5.50 = 1.270–84, the fifth 5.50 = 1.285–91. The third list is not alphabetical. The fifth list ends with two titles out of alphabetical order. See Sollenberger (1984) p. 26, 375 and (1992) p. 3852. Other scholars have treated the fourth and fifth lists as a unit, so that the catalogue divides into four lists. See Schmidt (1839) p. 22, Usener (1858) p. 13, Regenbogen col. 1364 and Blum col. 124, 317.

⁴ A work *On Theophrastus* is attributed to Hermippus by Diogenes Laertius (2.55 = app. 1.61–4 = Hermippus fr. 52 Wehrli). The Hermippian catalogue of Theophrastean writings is likely to have been part of this biography. See Sollenberger (1984) p. 32 and (1992) p. 3854; for a different view, see Wehrli (1967–74) vol. 10 p. 78.

catalogue may represent separate purchases by the library.⁵ That could explain the occurrence of the same title in more than one list, e.g., the occurrence of *On Slander* in three different lists.⁶ However, separate purchases cannot explain all repetitions. For example, the *Ethical Characters* (436 no. 4) occurs twice in the second list. That seems to be a simple case of listing the same work under two different letters, *eta* and *chi* (1.201, 241), though other explanations are possible.⁷

The majority of the titles listed in Diogenes' catalogue are followed by the numeral 1, α'. That numeral indicates one book or roll.⁸ To be precise, 156 out of 224 titles are listed as *monobibla*. The number rises to 163, if we add the seven titles not followed by a numeral to those of one book. In regard to the rhetorical and poetic titles, we can say that all or almost all refer to *monobila*. The only apparent exception, *On Kinds of Rhetorical Arts*, 61 books (Περὶ τέχων ῥητορικῶν εἶδη ξα' 1.235 = 666 no.2a), is problematic. Textual corruption seems to have affected the numeral and perhaps the title itself.⁹

The numerous references to one book need not imply uniform length.¹⁰ A work like *On Style*, 1 book (Περὶ λέξεως α' 1.210 = 666

⁵ See Usener (1858) p. 15, Regenbogen col. 1369 and Sollenberger (1984) p. 33.

⁶ See the commentary on 666 no. 13. Separate purchases can also explain (are compatible with) the occurrence of *On Judicial Speeches* in the fourth list and not in the second. See the commentary on 666 no. 9.

⁷ See the commentary on 436 no. 4. Blum col. 317–19 rejects the idea of separate library purchases, but what he introduces in its place — an alphabetic rearrangement of a Callimachean catalogue by Hermippus, who proceeded by segments and gave up prior to completion — seems to me more complicated and less likely to be correct. White (2002), too, challenges the idea of library purchases: “the failure to integrate the sections remains puzzling if they represent separate purchases or acquisitions, as proposed by Regenbogen” (p. 19 n. 34), but his emphasis on the difference between the first two lists — the first list focuses on physical and biological science and is largely theoretical, while the second list emphasizes language arts and has a practical orientation (p. 12–16) — does not exclude separate purchases. Indeed, a difference in subject matter and approach helps explain the existence of separate collections and separate purchases by the library at Alexandria. Moreover, the differences noted by White, while real, should not be overstated. Both lists, for example, contain works on logic and physics, and both lists contain collections of material. As often, certainty seems unattainable.

⁸ See Fortenbaugh (1998) p. 184–90 and the literature listed there.

⁹ I shall, however, report an interpretation that is compatible with the received text, both title and book number. See below, on 666 no. 2a.

¹⁰ It is certain that books vary in length and in some cases are quite short. We may compare the *opuscula* of Theophrastus. In Diogenes' list, *On Sensations* (1.74

no. 17a) may have been comparatively long, but others are apt to have been quite short, perhaps no longer than the corresponding chapters in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. The title *On Non-technical Proofs*, 1 book (Περὶ τῶν ἀτέχνων πίστεων α' 1.177 = **666** no. 8) invites comparison with *Rhetoric* 1.15 1375a22 (περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων καλουμένων πίστεων). The Theophrastean work may have gone well beyond the Aristotelian chapter and filled a roll of some length, but that is not at all certain and perhaps unlikely. Similarly the title *On Slander*, 1 book (Περὶ διαβολῆς α' 1.189 = **666** no. 13) recalls *Rhetoric* 3.15 1416a4 (περὶ δὲ διαβολῆς, cf. 3.16 1416b16). Theophrastus may have been greatly impressed by the slanderous attacks of political orators, or he may have enjoyed the subject and written at considerable length, but it is equally possible that his remarks were brief and largely concerned with undoing slander, as is the case in the Aristotelian chapter (3.15 1416a4–37).

Whatever the truth concerning any one title, it seems certain that some or even most of the rhetorical titles refer to short works which could have been combined to form a more substantial treatise on rhetoric.¹¹ We can imagine such unifying work occurring soon after the death of Theophrastus (288/7 or 287/6 B.C.),¹² or in the second

= **265** no. 4a), *On Winds* (1.83 = **137** no. 16a) and *On Creatures that Remain on Dry Land* (1.112 = **350** no. 8a) are all assigned one book. However, the first runs twenty columns in Wimmer's edition (fr. 1), the second runs thirteen (fr. 5), while the last runs only two (fr. 171). The last is not a part of a larger work but "a self-contained whole" (R. Sharples, "Theophrastus: *On Fish*," in *Theophrastus: His Psychological, Doxographical, and Scientific Writings* = RUSCH 5 [New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 1992] p. 352).

¹¹ We may compare Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. A careful reading makes clear that shorter pieces were joined together to form a longer treatise. Book 3, for example, was originally separate from Books 1 and 2. Within Book 3 the treatment of arrangement (3.13–19) is almost certainly older than the treatment of style (3.1–12); and within the latter, the chapters on correct Greek, impressiveness and propriety (3.5–7) give the appearance of being pasted into their present position. For further discussion, see Fortenbaugh (1996). Problematic is to what extent the *Rhetoric* in its present form depends upon revisions made by Aristotle and how much it owes to one or more later editors, perhaps his own pupils.

¹² Strabo tells us that after the death of Theophrastus, Neleus removed the library of Theophrastus to Scepsis, and as a result members of the Peripatos had no access to the esoteric writings of both Aristotle and Theophrastus (37.1–21). Neleus may well have taken books to Scepsis, but it is demonstrably false that Peripatetics were entirely without or unable to obtain copies of some esoteric writings. In regard to Theophrastus, we have the evidence of Apollonius, *Amazing Stories* 50 = **384** no. 1g and **413** no. 107. Here a writer of the second century B.C. refers to Book 9 as the last book of *Research on Plants*, which it is in the edition known to us. See Suzanne Amigues, "Problèmes de composition et de classification dans

half of the first century B.C.,¹³ or not at all. We lack the evidence to make a firm assertion. What we can say with confidence is that the shorter works will have formed the basis of individual lectures within the Peripatos and that Theophrastus will have used them in combination when offering a series or course of lectures.¹⁴

A final concern is whether the titles originated with Theophrastus or are of later origin. The practice of assigning formal, fixed titles appears to have developed in the fourth century.¹⁵ A Peripatetic like Theophrastus would have had good reason to embrace the practice. His library contained numerous rolls, not only those on which his own works were written but also those that had been inherited from Aristotle. To facilitate teaching and research, it was desirable to assign individual works their own titles or at very least to provide the rolls with tags that made it easy to find a desired work.¹⁶ Nevertheless, there are reasons for believing that the titles assigned to Theophrastean works are of later origin. Not only was the practice of

l'Histoire plantarum de Théophraste," in *Theophrastus of Eresus: Reappraising the Sources*, ed. J. M. van Ophuijsen and M. van Raalte = Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities vol. 8 (New Brunswick: Transaction 1997) p. 192.

¹³ We learn from Plutarch that Andronicus of Rhodes obtained from Tyrannion copies of the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus, published them and drew up the lists that were in circulation (37.6–8). Porphyry tells us that Andronicus divided the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus into treatises, collecting together related subjects (39.7–8). Some scholars have taken Porphyry's report to mean that Andronicus, in the second half of the first century B.C., combined related monobibla to form larger treatises. See, e.g., G. Senn, *Die Pflanzenkunde des Theophrast von Eresos*, ed. O. Gigon (Basel: Universität 1956) p. 28–42, who argues that our *Research on Plants* (384 no. 1a) is a compilation by Andronicus, and Sollenberger (1984) p. 34, who speaks more generally of the consolidating efforts of Andronicus. *Concerning Research on Plants*, it seems certain that Andronicus played little or no role, for the version we know, or one very close to it, was in circulation as early as 200 B.C. See Amigues, cited in the preceding note. On the role of Andronicus in general, see Barnes p. 24–66, who argues that the evidence for substantial editing by Andronicus largely disappears on close inspection.

¹⁴ Theophrastus is likely to have varied the combination depending on the students in attendance and the topics he wanted to emphasize. Furthermore, he may have combined materials on rhetoric and poetics within a single work (e.g., *On Delivery*) and nevertheless used that work when lecturing separately on one area or the other (e.g., on the delivery of the orator as against that of the actor).

¹⁵ E. Schmalzriedt, ΠΕΡΙ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ: *zur Frühgeschichte der Buchtitel* (München 1970) p. 80–112.

¹⁶ See I. Düring, "Ariston or Hermippus?" *Classica et Mediaevalia* 17 (1956) p. 14. Düring argues that Aristotelian titles were generally not fixed, while those of Theophrastus were. He attributes this difference to an increase in the number of scholarly works intended for readers. That will have made it necessary to assign a fixed title to each treatise, which is what Theophrastus did.

assigning formal titles to one's own work in its infancy when Theophrastus composed his treatises.¹⁷ but also the Theophrastean writings that do survive are marked by vague cross-references, which suggests that Theophrastus had not assigned fixed titles, which would have made referencing easy and accurate.¹⁸ But even if the titles were not assigned by Theophrastus, it does not follow that the titles lack roots in what Theophrastus wrote. In particular, they may be based on the opening line or lines of a treatise, the incipit, in which the topic to be discussed is announced. For example, the opening line of *On Sweat* mentions sweat, ὁ ἰδρώς and the work carries the title περὶ ἰδρώτων. The title is, of course, too inclusive. The opening lines tell us first what will not be discussed, and then what will be discussed (1.2–6 Fortenbaugh).¹⁹ That can serve as a caveat when dealing with the rhetorical and poetic titles: we should not assume that everything that might be discussed under a given title was in fact discussed. Equally we should not assume that all the rhetorical and poetic works were partial treatments of the topic announced in the title. Such an assumption would be compatible with the numerous references to one book or roll, but some rolls will have been longer than others, and on occasion Theophrastus may have expressed himself succinctly on a great variety of issues.

The following commentary covers not only the twenty-four titles assigned to rhetoric and poetics (those listed in **666** and given a number between 1 and 24) but also a selection of titles referring to works which are either closely related to these areas or might appear to be so (those titles which are mentioned in **666** but not assigned a number). Examples of closely related titles are *Theses* (**68** no. 34–6) and *Ethical Characters* (**436** no. 4); one that might appear to be so is *On Aeschylus* (**137** no.42). In each case, the discussion finds its place in accordance with the listing in **666**.

- no. 1 *On the Art of Rhetoric*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.48 = 1.234

Literature: Spengel (1828) p. 3 n. 8; Schmidt (1939) p. 53–4; Usener (1858) p. 20; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1525; Wehrli (1983) p. 499, 513; Sollenberger (1984) p. 335; Schenkeveld (1997) p. 68

¹⁷ See White (2002) p. 10–11.

¹⁸ See, e.g., Theophrastus, *On Sweat* 1.4 Fortenbaugh.

¹⁹ See Fortenbaugh et al., *Theophrastus of Eresus: On Sweat, On Dizziness and On Fatigue* (Leiden: Brill 2003) p. 53–6.

The title *Περὶ τέχνης ῥητορικῆς*, *On the Art of Rhetoric*, occurs in the second list of Diogenes catalogue. It is, therefore, at home among the rhetorical titles, finding its particular place (under tau) in accordance with the alphabetic arrangement of the list. Spengel thought that the title was part of a longer one whose missing portion made reference to enthymemes. He cited a passage in Marcellinus' *Prefatory Remarks*, where Theophrastus is said to have written a rhetorical *ars* on enthymemes, *τέχνη ῥητορικὴ περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων* (673.4), and found the missing portion earlier in the second list of Diogenes' catalogue: namely, the title *Περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων* α' (1.198 = 666 no. 6). If I understand Spengel correctly, the longer, original title will have been *Τέχνη ῥητορικὴ περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων*, the *περί* at the beginning being dropped as an addition which occurred after and as a result of breaking up the original title. Schmidt mentions Spengel's interpretation but finds it too speculative.²⁰ He does, however, appear to follow Spengel in dropping *περί*. For he finds it credible that Theophrastus not only wrote about the several parts of the art, but also composed a comprehensive account which was called *Τέχνη ῥητορική*.²¹

Usener does not explicitly address Spengel's idea that the two titles *Περὶ τέχνης ῥητορικῆς* and *Περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων* were originally one. His silence may be taken as an endorsement of Schmidt's scepticism, but it also reflects the fact that Usener's own theory, in its simplest form, excludes that of Spengel. Usener believes that *Περὶ τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν εἶδη* (666 no. 2a) is a collective title which covered other rhetorical works mentioned in the second list. These works are said to have made up 17 books, and Usener needs both *Περὶ τέχνης ῥητορικῆς* and *Περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων* to reach that number.²² Regenbogen's position is curious. He accepts Usener's inter-

²⁰ Schmidt p. 54 says: *verumtamen huic ego sententiae (Spengelii) meum non ausim adicere calculum; siquidem in re incerta multae facile effutiantur coniecturae, quae neque probari possint neque argumentis refelli.*

²¹ We may compare Aristotle's *Τέχνη ῥητορικὴ*. There is no corresponding title in the catalogue of Theophrastean writings, but that hardly justifies dropping *περί* from the Theophrastean title.

²² As I understand Usener, he thinks that each of the titles covered by the collective title refers to a separate work. There are no duplicates carrying different titles. Usener's theory could be complicated by assuming that the collective title was introduced after a single title became two, or by positing a librarian who failed to recognize that two copies of the same work carried different titles and therefore counted the works twice when entering the collective title into the book list. But all this becomes too complicated, and Usener's theory is unacceptable. See below, on 666 no. 2a.

pretation of *Περὶ τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν εἵδη*; and for that reason, it seems, he does not explicitly mention the possibility that *Περὶ τέχνης ῥητορικῆς* and *Περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων* were originally two parts of a single title. He does, however, recognize the possibility that *Περὶ τέχνης ῥητορικῆς* is identical with the work cited by Marcellinus, i.e., with *Τέχνη ῥητορικὴ περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων* (637B.4).²³ If it is, Diogenes' second list refers to two works on the enthymeme. That is not impossible, but it is also unnecessary and in my judgment too speculative.

I turn to a simpler interpretation. We should keep the title as transmitted and pay attention to the initial preposition. The title refers to a work “on” or “about” the art of rhetoric. The work was an analytical, theoretical treatise,²⁴ in which the purpose, range and method of the art were discussed. Pedagogically such a work makes good sense. It could serve as an introduction to the other treatises or lectures on rhetoric. The opening chapter of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* might be an example; only it is so restrictive that Theophrastus may have been moved to offer a kind of reply. He may have shifted the focus from enthymematic argument (cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.1 1354a13–18, b16–22) and explicitly called for a more inclusive rhetoric. Perhaps he not only welcomed emotional appeal and persuasion through character but also recognized style and delivery as proper parts of the art. But having said that I want to acknowledge that neither the work *On Style* (666 no. 17a) nor that *On Delivery* (no. 24) is explicitly called a *τέχνη ῥητορικὴ*. That may reflect the paucity of our sources, or it may indicate that the works in question went beyond rhetoric and covered the style and delivery appropriate to dramatic presentation. But it is also possible that Theophrastus followed Aristotle in recognizing the central importance of rhetorical argument — or argument, the speaker's character and emotional appeal (i.e., Aristotle's three artful modes of persuasion) — and for that reason preferred to treat separately the topics of style and delivery.

In the preceding paragraph, I have suggested that the work *On the Art of Rhetoric* was a treatise which might be used in (might begin) a course of lectures on rhetoric. Two caveats are in order. First, we know that Aristotle wrote a work *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς ἢ Γρῦλος α'*, *On (the Art*

²³ In the text-translation volume, we have written *τέχνη ῥητορικὴ Περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων*, so that the title begins with *περί* and not *τέχνη*. That brings the title into line with that found in Diogenes Laertius 5.47 = 1.198. Theophrastus wrote an *ars* entitled *On Enthymemes*. See the commentary on 666 no. 6.

²⁴ Cf. White (2002) p. 15.

of) *Rhetoric*, or *Grylus*, one book (Diogenes Laertius 5.22), in which he denied that rhetoric is an art. The work had a special occasion, the death of Xenophon's son Grylus, and most probably a special target, the school of Isocrates.²⁵ These peculiar features may rule out any connection between the Aristotelian work and Theophrastus' *On the Art of Rhetoric*, but it should be mentioned that the Aristotelian work was a dialogue. We know that Theophrastus wrote dialogues (44.2), and we can at least ask whether his *On the Art of Rhetoric* was a dialogue and therefore not part of a regular course of lectures.²⁶

The second caveat concerns the use of *περί*. I have called attention to the preposition and suggested that the title *Περὶ τέχνης ῥητορικῆς* refers to a theoretical work "on" or "about" the art. That makes sense when we compare, say, Aristotle's *Grylus*, which questioned the status of rhetoric and carried the alternative title *On (the Art of) Rhetoric*. In contrast, the title *Τέχνη ῥητορική* occurs both in the manuscripts of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*²⁷ and in Diogenes' catalogue of Aristotelian works (5.24). In the manuscripts, it refers to the *Rhetoric* as a whole; in the catalogue, it refers to Aristotle's treatment of the technical modes of persuasion, i.e., to the first two books of our *Rhetoric*. Nevertheless, we cannot assume that a clear distinction was always maintained between a *Τέχνη ῥητορική* and a work *Περὶ τέχνης ῥητορικῆς*. Indeed, on at least one occasion Aristotle uses the preposition when referring to his own *Rhetoric*. I am thinking of *Poetics* 19 1456a34–5, where Aristotle says: τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς κείσθω, "What has been said about reasoning in the discourses on (the art of) rhetoric may be assumed."²⁸ It might be argued that the phrase ἐν τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς does not contain a title, but that is something of a quibble. For it is a short step from speaking of "discourses on (the art of) rhetoric" to calling the discourses *On (the Art of) Rhetoric*. There are, then,

²⁵ See Moraux p. 31–2.

²⁶ Dialogues sometimes have alternative titles (an example is Aristotle's *On Rhetoric* or *Grylus*), but not always. We may compare Theophrastus' work *On Piety*. Most likely it was a dialogue, but no alternative title is recorded.

²⁷ See the *apparatus criticus* to Rudolf Kassel's edition of the *Rhetoric* (De Gruyter 1976).

²⁸ In the *Rhetoric*, when referring to the *Poetics*, Aristotle regularly uses the preposition *περί*, i.e. the phrase ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς (1.11 1372a1–2, 3.1 1404a39, 3.2 1404b7–8, 1405a5–6, 3.18 1419b5–6; at 3.2 1404b28, he uses ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιήσεως). That fits well with the opening words of the *Poetics*, i.e. the incipit περὶ ποιητικῆς αὐτῆς κτλ. (1 1447a8), but the title given in Diogenes' catalogue is *Πραγματεία τέχνης ποιητικῆς* (5.24).

grounds for hesitation concerning the preposition περί; and in the case of the Theophrastean title, we should recognize two possibilities. First, if we follow Schmidt and think that Theophrastus composed a comprehensive treatment of rhetoric, then we may find that treatment in Περί τέχνης ῥητορικῆς α' — but without deleting περί, as Schmidt did — even though one book would make the treatment short in comparison with Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Alternatively we may believe that the use of περί is significant, and that the work in question is of an introductory nature, dealing with the existence, limits and value of the art. For such a theme, a work of one book is well suited.

No text can be reasonably (i.e., with any certainty) assigned to *On the Art of Rhetoric*.

no. 2a *On Kinds of Rhetorical Arts*, † 61 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.48 = 1.235

Literature: Spengel (1828) p. 3; Schmidt (1839) p. 59–61; Usener (1858) p. 20; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1523; Blum (1977) col. 318 n. 71; Wehrli (1983) p. 499, 513; Sollenberger (1984) p. 336–8; Lapini (1994) p. 187–96; Schenkeveld (1997) p. 68–9; Fortenbaugh (1998) p. 190–8

The title Περί τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν εἶδη ξα', *On Kinds of Rhetorical Arts*, 61 books, occurs in the second list of Diogenes' catalogue. It appears to be corrupt and has been marked as such in the text-translation volume. The most obvious problem is the number ξα', 61. As a book number, it seems unacceptably high. It is, however, the original reading of the three primary manuscripts, BF and P. In F the number has been corrected to ξ', 60, which is lower only by one. In P it has been corrected to ζα', which is not a number and therefore of no help except as a kind of warning concerning the textual tradition. A much smaller number ιζ', 17, is found in some secondary manuscripts and has been printed by most recent editors.²⁹ The manuscripts in question have no independent authority, so that the reading ιζ' is best viewed as a conjecture,³⁰ albeit an interesting one which has excited considerable speculation.

²⁹ Hicks (Loeb ed.), Long (OCT) and Sollenberger (1984).

³⁰ See Sollenberger (1984) p. 336.

Another problem concerns εἶδη. In the text-translation volume, it has been construed as an accusative object of the preposition περί: hence the translation *On the Kinds of Rhetorical Arts*.³¹ The genitive with περί is, of course, the norm in Theophrastean titles, but the accusative does occur in Τῶν περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἱστορίας α'—ζ', *Research on the Divine*, 6 books (1.243 = 251 no. 1).³² In the case of Περὶ τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν εἶδη ξα', the accusative may have been used to avoid a potentially confusing double genitive. Nevertheless, it is hard not to compare the title that immediately precedes in Diogenes' list: namely, Περὶ τέχνης ῥητορικῆς α' (666 no. 1 = 1.234). Here περί governs the genitive, and the title may refer to a theoretical discussion of the art.³³ If proximity and similarity in wording are not misleading, shouldn't περί in the next title, i.e. in Περὶ τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν εἶδη ξα', govern the genitive, so that the prepositional phrase alone (independently of εἶδη) may be thought to refer to a discussion of several arts, presumably the *artes* of earlier and contemporary rhetoricians? That, however, leaves εἶδη unclear. It may mean "kinds" of *artes*; but its connection with the preceding phrase would need explanation.

In response to the preceding difficulties, scholars have put forward various solutions. I mention six, beginning with Spengel, who saw a connection with Aristotle's Τεχνῶν συναγωγή α'β', *Collection of Arts*, two books (Diogenes Laertius 5.24).³⁴ Much as that work collected and explained the precepts of earlier rhetoricians (Cicero, *On Inv.* 2.6),³⁵ so the Theophrastean work will have surveyed the work of predecessors. Only it will have done so in a more diffuse manner. In mentioning the diffuseness of the Theophrastean

³¹ On περί with the accusative, see Kühner-Gerth, II.1 p. 494–5, no. 437.b.III, esp. sec. 3; and for Aristotelian examples, see H. Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus*, s.v., p. 579. Bonitz comments: *ad significandam eam rem, de qua agitur ac disputatur, περί etiam c. acc. ita usurpatur ut ab usu praep. περί c. gen. non videatur discerni posse.*

³² I have given the translation printed in the text-translation volumes. The translation of Sollenberger (1984) p. 127, *Inquiry into Matters concerning the Divine*, is closer to the Greek, while that of Hicks (Loeb ed.), *The History of Theological Inquiry*, expresses a view of the work's contents. Some scholars have assigned the work to Eudemus (see Sollenberger p. 347 and the literature mentioned there), but doubt concerning authorship does not affect the grammar of the title: περί with the accusative.

³³ On περί and a second possible interpretation, see the commentary on 666 no. 1.

³⁴ See Moraux p. 97. Hesychius' catalogue of Aristotelian works reports one book, not two (no. 71 p. 85 Düring).

³⁵ See on "The Inventor of the Art of Rhetoric," below p. 164–5.

work, Spengel is reacting to the number that accompanies the title. He accepts the smaller number, 17, but recognizes that 17 books would constitute a much longer work than the two books attributed to Aristotle. Spengel, therefore, suggests punctuating the Theophrastean title as follows: *Περὶ τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν · Εἶδη ιζ'.*³⁶ He does not offer any further explanation of the suggestion and was criticized by Schmidt for this omission. If I understand Spengel correctly, he takes εἶδη as a reference to kinds of *artes*; and by introducing a semicolon, he suggests that the work was organized by kinds, 17 in all. If that is correct, no number of books is given — βιβλία is not understood; ιζ' goes with εἶδη — so that the Theophrastean work may have been no more diffuse than that of Aristotle. Eliminating all reference to the number of books is an attractive idea, which may have application to other Theophrastean titles as well.³⁷ But it does not remove doubts concerning the number 17, for this number is found only in secondary manuscripts. In addition, introducing a semicolon before εἶδη seems awkward. It creates a break or pause that has no parallel in Diogenes' catalogue. Perhaps κατὰ should be supplied before εἶδη, so that the title runs: *Περὶ τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν (κατ') εἶδη ιζ'.* We may compare the title *Νόμων κατὰ στοιχείον κδ'*, *Laws according to Letter*, 24 books (1.136 = 589 no. 17a). Here κατὰ is used to introduce a mechanical organizing principle: alphabetical order. For organization which respects content, we may compare two Aristotelian titles: *Ἐξηγημένα κατὰ γένος ιδ'* (*Notes Ordered according to Genus*, 14 books (Diogenes Laertius 5.26) and, as emended by Moraux, *Πολιτεῖαι πόλεων δυοῖν δέουσαι ρξ' κατ' εἶδη δημοκρατικά, ὀλιγαρχικά, τυραννικά, ἀριστοκρατικά*, *Constitutions of 158 Cities according to Kinds: Democratic, Oligarchic, Tyrannic and Aristocratic* (D.L. 5.27).³⁸ In contrast to κατὰ γένος in the first Aristotelian title, the phrase κατ' εἶδη in the second involves a plural substantive which anticipates the

³⁶ Spengel p. 3: "Idem argumentum quod Aristoteles, discipulus eius Theophrastus diffusius, ut videtur, in libris *περὶ τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν εἶδη ιζ'* pertractavit, nisi potius distinguendum: *περὶ τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν · Εἶδη ιζ'.*"

³⁷ I am thinking especially of the collections entitled *Theses* (68 no. 34–6), discussed below p. 83–6.

³⁸ Moraux p. 131 emends the corrupt καὶ ἰδία to read κατ' εἶδη. I have not followed Moraux in putting a semicolon (p. 27) or period (p. 131) in front of κατ' εἶδη. For criticism of Moraux's emendation, see Lapini p. 187–91, who prefers to read κατ' ἰδίαν with Düring (1957) p. 50. I leave the Aristotelian issue undecided. For our purposes it is sufficient that Moraux's emendation is suggestive with regard to the Theophrastean title.

immediately following reference to four kinds of constitutions.³⁹ If we emend our Theophrastean title so that it reads <κατ'> εἶδη, we do not gain a list of kinds following on εἶδη, but we do have a number — 17 if we follow inferior manuscripts — and this number tells us how many divisions Theophrastus introduced in order to organize his material.

A second solution is that of Schmidt. He tells us that τέχνηαι (the plural) refers to any of the arts or artifices by which a speech is embellished, and that εἶδη may be taken in two different ways. It may refer to kinds of speeches and to qualities of style. For kinds of speeches, he refers to the division of political speeches at the beginning of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* 1 1421b8–11, and for qualities of style he cites Aristides, *Rhetorical Arts* 1.pr. (*RhGr* vol. 2 p. 459.5–12 Spengel), Isocrates, *Against the Sophists* 16–17 and Hermogenes, *On Types of Style* 1.1 *RhGr* vol. 6 p. 215.3–5, 218.13–14 Rabe). On the basis of these texts, Schmidt suggests that Theophrastus took account of 17 kinds or qualities. He finds support for this view in Hermogenes' treatise, for there seven qualities become 17, once subdivisions are substituted for generic qualities.⁴⁰ That raises the question whether Hermogenes copied directly from Theophrastus. Here Schmidt is cautious. He rejects the idea and says only that Theophrastus probably took notice of earlier discussions of kinds and qualities, selected particular ones and wrote about them in the work under consideration. That may be correct, but I am reluctant to construe εἶδη in two different ways. Ambiguity is, of course, a common phenomenon; and in the case of εἶδος, different uses are well attested. But granting that, do we want to say that εἶδη in the Theophrastean title refers to both kinds of speeches and qualities of style? Moreover, it is not certain that Theophrastus would have used εἶδος to refer to a quality of style. Aristotle does not use εἶδος in this

³⁹ To prevent any possible confusion, I note that the number 158 does not go with εἶδη. It goes with πόλεων, "cities." The 158 constitutions are divided into four major groups. Nowhere does the title introduce a book number. Of course, each of the discussions of a particular constitution might be counted as one book (be contained in a single roll), but that is not reported in the title.

⁴⁰ Schmidt (1839) p. 60: "Hermogenes, quem notum est pleraque ex aliis scriptoribus, celato auctorum nomine, in suos transtulisse libros, is igitur septem dicit orationis esse formas (ιδέας) σαφήνειαν, μέγεθος, κάλλος, γοργότητα, ἥθος, ἀλήθειαν, δεινότητα: σαφήνειαν autem e duabus constare posse rebus, μέγεθος e sex, itidemque ἥθος e sex virtutibus. Iam computatis singulis virtutibus omissisque eorum generum nominibus, quae e pluribus virtutibus constant, habemus orationis tot numero species, quot recensuisse videtur Theophrastus, ιζ', decem et septem."

sense,⁴¹ and no Theophrastean text provides an example.⁴² Since our sources are not numerous, lack of a Theophrastean example cannot be pressed; nevertheless, Schmidt's interpretation can be simplified and, I think, strengthened if we follow Spengel and give εἶδος a single meaning: namely "kind." The author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* recognized seven kinds of political speeches, and Theophrastus may have considered a larger number, especially if he widened the sphere of rhetoric to include private transactions and social intercourse.⁴³ But did he consider 17 kinds of rhetoric? Indeed, if we take into account both the *artes* of earlier rhetoricians⁴⁴ and the theoretical divisions of philosophers,⁴⁵ 17 may seem too small a number. But whether too small, too large or just right, it is not the reading of the primary manuscripts.

The third solution is that of Usener. He argues that the catalogue of Diogenes contains certain titles that are collective in that they cover works mentioned separately in the catalogue. For example, the title *On Living Creatures*, 7 books (350 no. 1 = 1.115) is found in the first list of the catalogue. According to Usener, this title covers the seven works whose titles immediately precede. Only two of the seven titles refer explicitly to living creatures; but they all share that theme and are brought together under the collective title *On Living*

⁴¹ At *Rhet.* 3.11 1412b20 (τὸ μὲν οὖν εἶδος τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς λέξεως τούτων) εἶδος means "kind" (Cope [1877] vol. 3, p.136) or "species" (Kennedy [1991] p. 252).

⁴² In 78.9 we find ἰδέα, not εἶδος, and in this context ἰδέα should not be attributed to Theophrastus. See the commentary on 78, below, p. 243. Schmidt p. 60 cites Isocrates, *Against the Sophists* 17, where τὰ εἶδη τὰ τῶν λόγων seems to refer to the elements of speech — thought as well as diction and composition (cf. 16).

⁴³ The author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* seems to point the way, when he says that "we use these (kinds) in public debates and in judicial argument concerning contracts and in private intercourse" (ἐν . . . ταῖς ἰδίαις ὁμιλίαις 1 1421b14–15, 19). See also Alcidas, *Concerning Those Who Write Written Speeches* 9; Isocrates, *Antidosis* 204; Plato, *Phaedrus* 261A7–9.

⁴⁴ An *ars* might be quite narrow in scope. For example, at *Rhet.* 2.23 1400a4–5 Aristotle tells us that the whole *ars* of Pamphilus and of Callippus was concerned with a single topic: argument from inducements and deterrents. At 2.23 1399a15–17, we are told that the *ars* of Callippus concerned a different topic: consequences, as well as the possible and other matters. There may have been two short *artes*; but whatever the truth concerning Callippus, it is clear that works of limited content were counted among the *artes*.

⁴⁵ A clear case is the division of argument into enthymeme and example. Aristotle speaks of each as a kind of rhetorical speech (ἐκάτερον . . . τὸ εἶδος τῆς ῥητορείας *Rhet.* 1.2 1356b19–23). Discussion of one or the other can be regarded as an *ars*, so that Theophrastus' work *On Enthymemes* is properly called a τέχνη ῥητορική (673B.4).

Creatures.⁴⁶ Similarly with the rhetorical treatises occurring in the second list, Usener finds a collective title which covers the shorter works. The collective title is *Περὶ τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν εἶδη* 17 — the book number is emended to 17 — and the shorter works are *On the Art of Rhetoric* (666 no. 1), *Rhetorical Precepts* (no. 3), *On Counsel* (no. 11), *On Praise* (no. 12), *On Enthymemes* (no. 6), *On Example* (no. 5), *On the Maxim* (no. 7), *On Non-technical Proofs* (no. 8), *On Style* (no. 17a), *On Solecisms* (no. 18), *On Introductions* (no. 15), *On Slander* (no. 13), *On Clamor* (no. 14), and *On Statement and Narration* (no. 16).⁴⁷ Altogether there are 14 shorter works, each being assigned one book in Diogenes' catalogue. That gives 14 books, but Usener needs 17 to match the number of the collective title. He therefore adds three books to *On Style*, making four, and obtains the overall total he needs, namely 17. That greatly impressed Regembogen, who accepted Usener's argument, remarking that the agreement in number of books cannot be a matter of chance.⁴⁸ That is correct. The agreement is not attributable to chance; but neither is it confirmation of Usener's interpretation. For it depends on emendation (one book *On Style* has been emended to four) and on adopting the reading of inferior manuscripts (17 instead of 61).

The fourth solution is that of Herwig Görgemanns. In private correspondence,⁴⁹ he has suggested deleting *περί* and keeping *ξά'*. In addition, he construes *εἶδη* as a quasi-technical term for self-contained passages. In this usage it occurs in Isocrates' *Antidosis*, where Isocrates says that he plans to quote from his earlier writings. Isocrates calls it absurd not to do so when others use his words and when he has now chosen to make use not only of small portions but also of whole divisions of his speeches: οὐ μόνον μικροῖς μέρεσιν ἀλλ' ὅλοις εἶδεσι . . . χρῆσθαι (74). Here the contrast is between short quotations and longer ones that form coherent wholes. The longer passages are, so to speak, something to look at, specimens for consideration. If *εἶδη* in the Theophrastean title has the same meaning, the title would refer to a collection of excerpts. Deleting *περί*

⁴⁶ Usener's explanation of *On Living Creatures* has been generally accepted, but there are reasons for doubt. See the remarks of Robert Sharples in the commentary to 350 no. 1.

⁴⁷ The order of the list of shorter works is that of Usener.

⁴⁸ "Es ist kaum daran zu denken, dass dabei ein Zufall obwalten könnte." Blum calls the addition of three books to *On Style* "eine höchstwahrscheinliche Korrektur." Wehrli (1983) p. 513 reports Usener's solution without explicit endorsement.

⁴⁹ The correspondence occurred during the academic year 1983–4; confirmation followed in the summer of 1996.

with Görgemanns and taking ξα' with εἶδη, we might translate *61 Specimen Passages of (or from) Rhetorical Arts*. That is an interesting solution; but I hesitate to delete περί, for the title can be translated without removing the preposition: *61 Specimen Passages on Rhetorical Arts*, or keeping the Greek word order, *On Rhetorical Arts*, 61 specimen passages. Furthermore, a unified collection needs a theme, and περί is commonly used to announce a theme. Περί τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν εἶδη ξα' would, then, be a collection of sources useful for developing an understanding of the various rhetorical *artes*. There will have been introductory and programmatic passages drawn from the handbooks of earlier rhetoricians. There may also have been critical assessments taken from, e.g., the dialogues of Plato (the *Gorgias*, *Phaedrus*, and *Sophist*) and Aristotle (*Grylus*).⁵⁰ Theophrastus will have used the collection when lecturing and when composing his own statement on (περί) the art of rhetoric, i.e., when writing the work *Περὶ τέχνης ῥητορικῆς*.⁵¹ All that makes sense; and the number 61 no longer seems absurdly large. But without further examples of εἶδος in the requisite sense, namely "specimen passage," I hesitate to endorse the solution.⁵²

The fifth and sixth solutions come from Walter Lapini. His initial suggestion is that the numeral ξα' was originally two numerals: the first will have reported the number of εἶδη and the second the number of books. The first, which was written out, will not have been ἑξήκοντα, sixty (too large a number, according to Lapini), but rather ἑπτὰ, seven. At some time ἑπτὰ was copied as a numeral, ζ', which then became corrupted to ξ', and combined with α'. Hence, *Περὶ τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν εἶδη ζ' (βιβλίον) α'* was corrupted into

⁵⁰ Such a collection would not be a mindless cut and paste book. In selecting whole passages, Theophrastus would be exercising judgment, and he may have ordered the selections in a significant way. We may compare the work entitled *Introductions*. It may have been primarily a collection of introductions taken from various orators including Demosthenes. If it was, Theophrastus may well have arranged the material under headings. See the commentary on 666 no. 15.

⁵¹ That may be true, even if *Περὶ τέχνης ῥητορικῆς* was a dialogue like the *Grylus*, or a comprehensive account of rhetoric, which began with a chapter on the art (see above, on 666 no. 1). It should, however, be clearly stated that we have no evidence concerning relative times of composition.

⁵² Professor Görgemanns suggests comparing εἰδύλλιον, a diminutive of εἶδος, which is used of a short poem, whose subject is most often pastoral. See LSJ s.v. and F. Gow, *Theocritus* 2nd ed. (Cambridge: University Press 1952) p. lxxi-ii, who notes that in papyri εἶδος occurs in the sense of "document." See F. Preisigke, *Wörterbuch der griechischen Papyrusurkunden* (Berlin: Selbstverlag 1925) vol. 1 col. 420 and vol. 4 col. 657-8.

Περὶ τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν εἶδη ξα΄. There is nothing impossible here, but equally there is nothing that encourages belief. No exact parallel is cited by Lapini,⁵³ and the stages through which the corruption is supposed to have occurred are multiple and problematic.⁵⁴ In any case, Lapini offers a second solution, our sixth, which is quite different. He calls attention to the fact that Diogenes' catalogue lists Περὶ τέχνης ῥητορικῆς α΄ immediately before Περὶ τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν εἶδη ξα΄, and suggests that the latter was a kind of illustrative appendix to the former. Περὶ τέχνης ῥητορικῆς will have been Theophrastus' theoretical treatise on the art of rhetoric, and Περὶ τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν εἶδη will have contained practical examples for the aspiring orator. That is reasonable, but it does not solve the problem of the disputed numeral, ξα΄. To do that, Lapini suggests emending εἶδη ξα΄ to ἐπιδείξεις α΄. The corruption will have arisen through an abbreviation, ἐπιδείξ α for ἐπιδείξεις α. When the abbreviation was written without a break between word and numeral, ἐπιδείξα, the final two letters, ξ and α, were taken together as the numeral ξα΄, and ἐπιδεί became εἶδη. On this suggestion, Περὶ τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν ἐπιδείξεις α΄, *Demonstration Pieces concerning the Arts of Rhetoric*, 1 book, will have been the original entry in Diogenes' catalogue. Again, we have a possibility, which is more ingenious than probable.

There are no texts which can be securely assigned to Περὶ τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν εἶδη ξα΄.

no. 2b Arts] John of Sardis, *On the Preparatory Exercises of Aphthonius* 22.9 (*RhGr* vol. 15 p. 139.7 Rabe) = **678.2**

Literature: Schenkeveld (1996) p. 68–9

⁵³ Lapini p. 194 does cite two titles from Diogenes' catalogue of the writings of Xenocrates (4.13). In both cases, the numeral reporting the number of books has been run together with the numeral reporting the number of verses or lines. As Lapini observes, the numerals are all external to the title and hence not clear parallels for taking ξ΄ or, as emended by Lapini, ζ΄ with εἶδη (i.e. as part of the title) and construing α΄ as a reference to one book (i.e., as external to the title).

⁵⁴ We are asked to accept 1) an original reading ἐπτά, 2) a change to ζ΄, 3) corruption into ξ΄, and 4) ξ΄ and α΄ are collapsed together to form the numeral ξα΄. In addition, there is the problem of the manuscript tradition. Lapini accepts that the three primary manuscripts are dependent on an archetype which had ξα΄. He, therefore, suggests a "prearchetype," which will have been corrupted in the way described.

The title Τέχναι, *Arts*, is problematic. It has been listed as no. 2b along side no. 2a Περὶ τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν εἴδη † ξά', but that now seems incautious. To be sure, the plural Τέχναι invites comparison with the plural τέχνων in 2a; and if 2a is a collective work, as Usener and Regenbogen thought, then 2b might be either an alternative title or refer to a part of the collective work. Nevertheless, title 2a is itself opaque, and the interpretation of Usener and Regenbogen finds little acceptance today. It seems, then, that listing the two titles together as an a–b combination is misleading and contrary to our own guideline as stated in the Introduction: “where there is a substantial difficulty in grouping titles . . . we have preferred to assign different numbers rather than force a decision between different possibilities.”⁵⁵

John of Sardis writes, “Theophrastus in his *Arts* (ἐν ταῖς Τέχναις) divided the encomium in two, for he says that one part of the encomium is qualitative and the other quantitative” (678.2–3). Perhaps the fundamental question is whether we even have a title. I think a bipartite answer may be correct. We do not have Theophrastus’ own title (if he even assigned one⁵⁶), but we do have a title in the sense that John or his source is using Τέχναι (with or without a capital tau) to refer to a Theophrastean text or collection of texts. A similar mode of reference can be demonstrated in the case of Aristotle. For example, Dionysius of Halicarnassus refers to the second book of Aristotle’s Τέχναι (*First Letter to Ammaeus* 11), and Sextus Empiricus refers to the first book of the Τέχναι (*Against the Professors* 2.8). In these and others cases,⁵⁷ the plural Τέχναι refers to what we know as Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, his Τέχνη ῥητορική.⁵⁸ But what is the application to Theophrastus? The title Τέχνη ῥητορική is not attested for him. Perhaps then we should focus on Περὶ τέχνης ῥητορικῆς (666 no. 1), for on one occasion Aristotle refers to his own *Rhetoric* using the preposition περί (*Poetics* 19 1456a34–5: ἐν τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς). The trouble here is that for Theophrastus we have only the title Περὶ τέχνης ῥητορικῆς; no text suggests that the work was a comprehensive treatise like Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. Instead, it may have been a discourse on the

⁵⁵ Text-translation vol. 1 p. 8.

⁵⁶ See the introduction to this section, above p. 52–3.

⁵⁷ For further references, see Schenkeveld (1998) p. 68, who cites among others the neo-Platonists Syrianus (*Scholia on Hermogenes* p. 59.9) and Olympiodorus (*On Plato’s Alcibiades*, pr. p. 71.7), both of whom refer to Aristotle’s Ῥητορικαὶ τέχναι (in the editions, a lower case rho).

⁵⁸ Τέχνη ῥητορική is found in the manuscripts. It is also occurs in the catalogue preserved by Diogenes Laertius (5.24), where it refers to books 1–2. See above on 666 no. 1.

τέχνη, i.e., an introduction to and critique of the art, and not a comprehensive τέχνη, in which John or his source is likely to have found a division of the encomium (678.2–3). But whatever the truth concerning title no. 1, our guideline tells us that title no. 2b should have been listed separately rather than forced into combination with another title.

It may be significant that the title Τέχνηαι is not found in Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean works. For in that catalogue, all the rhetorical works except one (666 no. 2a) are *monobibla*. That suggests that Τέχνηαι (plural) may refer collectively to some or all of Theophrastus' shorter works,⁵⁹ each of which may be called a τέχνη.⁶⁰ Speculating further, we may note that one of the shorter works was *On Praise* (666 no. 12), and guess that it is this work in particular to which John refers. But it is also possible to think of *Rhetorical Precepts* (666 no. 3), for this work may have included directives on encomia and recognized a division into qualitative and quantitative parts (678.2–3).

In addition to text 678, we can assign 677 and 693 to *Arts*. All three texts are taken from John's comments on Aphthonius.⁶¹

no. 3 *Rhetorical Precepts*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.47 = 1.221

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 32, 53; Rose (1863) p. 140; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1525; Di Benedetto (1958) p. 182; Wehrli (1983) p. 499; Sollenberger (1984) p. 327–8; Calboli (1993) p. 30 n. 12

One of the three primary manuscripts of Diogenes Laertius, cod. F, omits the title Παραγγέλματα ῥητορικῆς, *Rhetorical Precepts*, or more literally, *Precepts (of the Art) of Rhetoric*. The title does occur in cod. B and P, so that the omission in cod. A appears to be a simple case of scribal error. A variant title, Παραγγέλματα ῥητορικά, is

⁵⁹ That may be true independently of Usener's speculation concerning the title *On Kinds of Rhetorical Arts*. (Regarding that speculation, see the commentary on 666 no. 2a.) Moreover, we need not think of a collection that was formally edited and published as an inclusive *Art of Rhetoric*, for the phrase ἐν ταῖς Τέχνηαις (or τέχνηαις) may equally refer to an unedited collection of separate τέχνηαι.

⁶⁰ Cf. 673B.4, where it is said that Theophrastus wrote a rhetorical art *On Enthymemes*: τέχνη ῥητορικὴ Περί ἐνθυμημάτων.

⁶¹ We might also assign text 679 to *Arts*, but it can be assigned equally well to *On Praise* (666 no. 12), leaving open the possibility that *On Praise* was one of several *monobibla* referred to by the label *Arts*.

found in the comments of Schmidt and Regenbogen.⁶² It has no relevance to establishing the text of Diogenes.

Rhetorical Precepts occurs in the second list of Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings. That is normal for a rhetorical title. No other source mentions the work. Schmidt suggests that it contained precepts concerning parts of rhetoric that were either omitted from the other works or only mentioned in passing. Usener lists the work under the alleged collective title *On Kinds of Rhetorical Arts* (666 no. 2a).⁶³ Sollenberger thinks that it may have been identical with *On the Art of Rhetoric* (666 no. 1). Regenbogen declares the work "ganz unfassbar." That declaration may be extreme, for the occurrence of παραγγέλματα, "precepts," in the title strongly suggests that the work was a collection of directives for students of rhetoric; and if that is the case, the directives may have been those of Theophrastus himself, or those taken from earlier handbooks, or a combination of both.

In his *Commentary on Aristotle's Topics* 2.2, Alexander of Aphrodisias reports that Theophrastus distinguished between precept and topic: the precept is stated in more common, universal and simple terms; and from it the topic is discovered, for the source of the topic is the precept. E.g., "We must argue from contraries" is a precept, but "If the one contrary has several senses, the other has too" is a topic (123.1–6).⁶⁴ Alexander is citing what Theophrastus says in his *Topics*,⁶⁵ a dialectical work, which we have listed among the logical writings (68 no. 17); but that does not rule out drawing on the text to elucidate a rhetorical title, for dialectic and rhetoric enjoy a close relationship. Aristotle recognized topical argumentation as a part of rhetoric (esp. *Rhetoric* 2.23–4), and Theophrastus will have done the same (cf. 672.1–2). Perhaps, then, *Rhetorical Precepts* contained dialectical precepts for the instruction of the orator. And if that is so, each precept may have been followed by one or more topics. Such an interpretation is, I think, attractive, providing we allow

⁶² Schmidt (1893) p. 53 gives the title as Παραγγέλματα ῥητορικά, but earlier on p. 32 he has Παραγγέλματα ῥητορικῆς. Regenbogen col 1525 gives the title only once and then in the form Παραγγέλματα ῥητορικά.

⁶³ See the commentary on 666 no. 2a.

⁶⁴ See the commentary on 674. Here I add only the following: while Alexander's report concerning the distinction between precept and topic does not explicitly characterize the precept as a directive, the example given does so implicitly by including an imperative element: "must" (δεῖ 123.5).

⁶⁵ Cf. 124A.1 where Alexander refers explicitly to Theophrastus' *Topics*.

that the work may have gone — I would say, almost certainly went — beyond modes of argument to include rhetorical concerns like arrangement, style and delivery. We may compare the “common and well worn precepts,” *communis et contrita praecepta*, listed by Crassus in Cicero’s *On the Orator* 1.137–45. The list does take notice of argument and makes special reference to topics which are specific to judicial, deliberative and epideictic oratory (1.140–1); but it also includes much more: e.g. the tasks of an orator, the parts of an oration, style, memory and delivery (1.142–5). As a result, Crassus can say without exaggeration that the list of precepts covers almost everything the rhetoricians teach: *in his enim fere rebus omnis istorum artificum doctrina versatur* (1.145). I am not suggesting that Crassus’ list corresponds in all matters to what the Theophrastean treatise will have covered. To be sure, there are items which may be described as Peripatetic and even Theophrastean (the recognition of three kinds of oratory and of topics specific to each kind, 1.141, is found in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* 1.3–14; the four virtues of style, 1.144, and the inclusion of delivery, 142, 145, are Theophrastean, **684, 712–13**);⁶⁶ but the list also includes much that is not Theophrastean (stasis theory and memory 1.139–40, 145).⁶⁷ But if certain matters in Crassus’ list are not Theophrastean, the general idea of inclusiveness may correspond to the work of Theophrastus; and the same may be true concerning levels of precepts: general directives and more specific ones. In regard to ornaments of style, Crassus reports that he heard precepts according to which our speech must exhibit four qualities — purity, lucidity, ornateness and aptness — after which he adds that he learned precepts concerning each of these four qualities (1.144). The latter are not dialectical topics whose source is a precept concerning argument (as in **123.1–6**), but the idea of levels is the same. There were general directives concerning the four qualities of style and more specific directives concerning each quality.⁶⁸ That

⁶⁶ In 1.142 and 145, Crassus’ remarks concerning delivery make no explicit mention of either voice or bodily motion, but we can be sure that delivery is to be thought of as including both elements. See 1.114–15, 127–8, 132, 156; and regarding Theophrastus, see the commentary on **712–13**.

⁶⁷ Leeman et al. vol. 1 p. 232 assign Antonius’ list of precepts to the Hermagorean school tradition.

⁶⁸ In 1.144, Crassus does not reserve “precept” for general directives (*praecipitur* is used to introduce the more general directives concerning qualities of style, and *praecepta* occurs with reference to subordinate directives), but that does not vitiate the point I am making concerning levels.

Theophrastus offered a similar range of directives seems to me likely.

Two texts mention rhetorical precepts: **669.2**, **672.1–2**. Both are Ciceronian. We can imagine a connection with *Rhetorical Precepts*, but more we cannot do.

- no. 4 *On Invention*] Georgius Choeroboscus, *On Hephaestion's Handbook* 5.10.2 (p. 240.19–20 Consbruch)

Literature: none

The title *Περὶ εὐρήσεως*, *On Invention*, is found in a short comment by Georgius Choeroboscus, George the Swineherd, on Hephaestion's *Handbook* 5.10.2. Hephaestion says that Glycon invented the meter called Glyconeion,⁶⁹ and George comments as follows:

ιστέον οὖν ὅτι τινὲς εὕρεμά φασιν, ὅπερ οὐ δεῖ. εἴρηται μὲν γὰρ καὶ εὕρησις καὶ εὕρεσις, καὶ Ἀττικοὶ τινες ἐκατέρως φασίν· ἔστι γὰρ σύγγραμμα παρὰ Θεοφράστῳ Περὶ εὐρήσεως· ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦ “ε” ἐν ἰάμβῳ· “οὐχ εὕρεσις τοῦτ’ ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ ἀφαίρεσις” ἐν τοῖς Ἐπιτρέπουσι. καὶ εὕρημα διὰ τοῦ “η”· “εὕρημα δ’ οὐκ οἶσθ’ οἷον εὕρηκας τόδε.” οὐ μὴν διὰ τοῦ “ε” εὕρεμα.

One should know that some people say εὕρεμα (“discovery”), which is not correct. For both εὕρησις and εὕρεσις were used, and some Attic writers use both; for there is a treatise by Theophrastus *Περὶ εὐρήσεως* (*On Discovery* or *On Invention*). But epsilon is used in the iambic line, “This is not εὕρεσις (discovery), but robbery,” in the *Arbitrants*.⁷⁰ And εὕρεμα with eta, “You do not know what sort of discovery it is you have discovered.”⁷¹ Not indeed εὕρεμα with an epsilon.

In this passage, George is primarily concerned with εὕρεμα as an alternate form of εὕρημα. He condemns εὕρεμα, but explains its occurrence (or anticipates doubts concerning its occurrence) by pointing to a cognate word that also has two forms: namely, εὕρησις and εὕρεσις. To document εὕρησις he mentions the Theophrastean title *Περὶ εὐρήσεως*. That is something of a surprise, for εὕρεσις is

⁶⁹ δῖμετρον δὲ ἀκατάκλητον τὸ καλούμενον Γλυκόνειον, αὐτοῦ Γλύκωνος εὐρόντος αὐτό (p. 32.13–14 Consbruch).

⁷⁰ Of Menander, line 180.

⁷¹ Euripides, *Medea* 716.

the common Attic form⁷² and the form regularly used by Aristotle.⁷³ *Περὶ εὐρέσεως* with an epsilon is what we would expect for a Theophrastean title, and that is in fact what the manuscripts have. *Περὶ εὐρήσεως* is an emendation by Caesar. Nevertheless, it is difficult to prefer the manuscript reading to the emendation, for context demands *Περὶ εὐρήσεως* with an eta. Perhaps, then, we should posit serious corruption. For our text is a student's report of what George said in lecture;⁷⁴ the student may have nodded and omitted material at this point. That is possible, but also highly speculative, so that I leave the suggestion to others.

A different concern is that the title is not attested elsewhere. In particular, it does not occur in the catalogue of Theophrastus' writings preserved by Diogenes Laertius. What does occur in Diogenes' catalogue and in other sources as well is the title *Περὶ εὐρημάτων*, *On Discoveries* (1.199 = **727** no. 11). That raises the question whether *Περὶ εὐρήσεως* is an orthographically inept variation on *Περὶ εὐρημάτων*. Or does the title refer to a portion of *Περὶ εὐρημάτων*, perhaps a chapter in which the process of discovery was discussed? In either case, the occurrence of eta in *Περὶ εὐρήσεως* would be a mistake, apparently influenced by the eta in *Περὶ εὐρημάτων*. The mistake may have occurred quite late, but it will have predated George, who accepted it because of his interest in alternative spellings. For our purposes, an important consequence is that *Περὶ εὐρήσεως* would not belong among the rhetorical titles, for *Περὶ εὐρημάτων* was concerned with "firsts" and will have covered rhetoric only in so far as the art of rhetoric, its parts and related items were discovered or invented.⁷⁵

There is, however, a simpler interpretation: namely that the title *Περὶ εὐρήσεως* — with or without eta — refers to a work, or part of a work, in which Theophrastus discussed rhetorical invention, i.e., finding out (*εὐρίσκειν*) what needs to be said or argued in the course of an oration. We may compare text **705**, where Plutarch draws on Theophrastus and characterizes Alcibiades as most capable at find-

⁷² LSJ call *εὐρησις* the "worse form of *εὔρεσις*." Apollodorus Mythographicus 3.3.1 (1st or 2nd cent. A.D.) is cited for its occurrence.

⁷³ See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.3 1112a27, 1112b19, 7.2 1146b8.

⁷⁴ According to the heading in codex Par. Gr. suppl. 1198 fol. 20^v, the commentary on Hephaestion derives *ἀπὸ φωνῆς Γεωργίου*, "from the voice of George," i.e., taken down during lecture.

⁷⁵ See **735** and **736A–C**. Spengel p. 4 n. 8 did include *Περὶ εὐρημάτων* among the rhetorical titles, but he has been adequately refuted by Schmidt (1839) p. 36–7 and Regenbogen col. 1535.

ing out what needs to be said (εὑρεῖν . . . τὰ δέοντα line 2), and as deficient when seeking to express himself with the necessary words and phrases (ὥς δεῖ τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ τοῖς ῥήμασιν line 4). Alcibiades, it seems, was weak in λέξις (line 5),⁷⁶ and strong in invention. That may be correct, but it is also true that the noun εὔρεσις does not occur in **705**, only the cognate verb. Similarly in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* only the verb is found (1.2 1356a1, 2.20 1394a3, 3.17 1418a26).⁷⁷ That is striking, for the Stagirite has the labels λέξις and τάξις, "style" and "arrangement" (3.1 1403b15, 3.12 1414a28–9), but he does not use the noun εὔρεσις with special reference to the ἔντεχνοι πίστεις, i.e., logical arguments, presentations of character and appeals to the emotion (1.2 1355b35–6, a1–2, 3.1 1403b6–18).⁷⁸ That is reason for hesitating before giving a rhetorical interpretation to the title Περί εὐρήσεως, but it is not fatal to the idea. For in Plato's *Phaedrus*, we find the noun as well as the verb in a rhetorical context. I am thinking of Socrates' reply to Phaedrus, after the latter challenges him to deliver not only a better speech than that of Lysias, but also one that is quite different (235D6–8). Socrates objects that some of Lysias' arguments are necessary in any speech on the topic under consideration. "And in the case of such arguments, it is not the finding (εὔρεσις) but the arrangement which is to be praised; but in the case of arguments that are not necessary and that are difficult to find (εὐρίσκειν), the finding (εὔρεσις) is to be praised as well as the arrangement" (236A3–6).⁷⁹ Here we have two occurrences of εὔρεσις, both clearly referring to finding arguments in contrast with arranging them.⁸⁰ I do not want to suggest that simple repetition

⁷⁶ At least in sudden situations, Alcibiades often found the right expression elusive. See the commentary on **705**.

⁷⁷ The verb also occurs at, e.g., 1.4 1359b1, 32, 1.9 1368a16, 1.13 1374b22 and 1.14 1375a4, but in these cases it does not refer to rhetorical invention. Not surprisingly the verb is found in the *Topics*. Especially striking is the occurrence at 8.1 155b5, 7, where finding (εὑρεῖν) a location, a *topos*, from which to attack one's opponent is listed as step one after which come the formulation and arrangement of questions.

⁷⁸ See Schütrumpf p. 95–105, who argues that Ciceronian *inventio* should not be imported into Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Schütrumpf does, of course, recognize that the verb εὐρίσκειν is found at *Rhet.* 1.2 1356a1, but he explains that it is used "to characterize the ἔντεχνος element of the orator's task." It contrasts with χρῆσθαι and should not be construed as "an independent concept in its own right, that of organizing the system of the three *entechnoi* means of persuasion in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*" (100).

⁷⁹ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων οὐ τὴν εὔρεσιν ἀλλὰ τὴν διάθεσιν ἐπαινέτεον, τῶν δὲ μὴ ἀναγκάων τε καὶ χαλεπῶν εὑρεῖν πρὸς τῇ διαθέσει καὶ τὴν εὔρεσιν.

⁸⁰ In what precedes, we get a contrast between content and expression, put in

creates a *terminus technicus*; but it does seem possible that this passage and other precedents⁸¹ as well as the obvious connection between noun and verb, εὑρεσις and εὐρίσκειν,⁸² prompted Theophrastus to use εὑρεσις with special reference to finding or constructing the ἔντεχνοι πίστεις of Aristotelian rhetoric. And if that is the case, Theophrastus may well have written a work entitled Περί εὐρήσεως (whether the title is his or originated later on the basis of the incipit). He may also have formulated a four-part rhetoric in terms of εὑρεσις, λέξις, τάξις and ὑπόκρισις,⁸³ thereby anticipating the Stoics who made a similar division of rhetoric into four parts;⁸⁴ The addition of a fifth part, μνήμη (memory), occurred after Theophrastus; we can only say that it was well established prior to Cicero and the author of the *Rhetoric to Herennius*.⁸⁵

If Περί εὐρήσεως is placed among the rhetorical works, we have no text that can be assigned to it with confidence. That encourages identifying Περί εὐρήσεως with Περί εὐρημάτων. In three texts, the latter is named (728, 730, 734), and other texts may be assigned to it (729, 731–3).⁸⁶ But several rhetorical works are known only by title, and the general paucity of evidence rules out a firm decision.

terms similar to 705: τὰ δέοντα εἰρηκότος . . . ἕκαστα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀποτετόρνενται (234E6–8). If we combine this contrast with that under discussion (236A3–6), we obtain a threefold distinction between finding what needs to be said, arranging the material and choosing the right words.

⁸¹ I am not suggesting that Georgius Pletho is to be believed when he tells us that Theodectes listed εὑρεσις as one of six ἔργα ῥήτορος (*Epitome of Rhetoric*, *RhG* vol. 6 p. 585.6–7 Walz). See Striller p. 34 and 37.

⁸² For the verb, cf. Isocrates, *Against the Sophists* 12: “What has been said by one speaker is not equally useful to the speaker who comes after him; on the contrary, the most skilled speaker appears to be one who speaks in a manner worthy of the subject and is able to find (εὐρίσκειν) something to say which is not the same as what others say.” That recalls *Phaedrus* 235D–236A, in that both passages recognize a difficulty inherent in speaking second: namely, it may not be easy to find something new to say. The phrase “difficult to find,” χαλεπὸν εὐρεῖν, at *Phdr.* 236A may also be compared with a similar phrase in Aristotle’s *Rhet.* 2.20 1393a3–4, where Aristotle tells us that similar incidents that have actually occurred are difficult to find: εὐρεῖν . . . χαλεπόν. The combination of words is, however, quite ordinary Greek, so that a direct connection between the two passages cannot be claimed.

⁸³ Aristotle has the label ὑπόκρισις (3.1 1403b22); Theophrastus made the subject part of rhetoric. See on 666 no. 24.

⁸⁴ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 7.43 = SVF vol. 2 p. 96.3–4, where φράσις occurs instead of λέξις.

⁸⁵ Solmsen (1941) p. 47.

⁸⁶ On 735 and 736A–C, see below p. 161–5 and p. 229–32.

no. 5 *On Example*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.48 = 1.228

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 58–9; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1526; Wehrli (1983) p. 499; Sollenberger (1984) p. 332

The title *Περὶ παραδείγματος*, *On Example*, occurs in the second list of Diogenes catalogue of Theophrastean works. It is found nowhere else. Since the title *On Enthymemes* (666 no. 6) is also attested, it seems reasonable to assume that Theophrastus followed Aristotle and recognized two kinds of rhetorical argument: example and the enthymeme (*Rhetoric* 1.2 1356a35–b10, 2.20 1393a23–4). As is true of several other Theophrastean titles, *On Example* recalls an introductory phrase in Aristotle's (primary) discussion of the same topic: *πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ παραδείγματος λέγωμεν* (*Rhet.* 2.20 1393a26). Perhaps the Theophrastean title reflects a similar incipit,⁸⁷ and if so the work may have been no longer or not significantly longer than chapter 2.20 in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Alternatively, it may have been an extended monograph which went well beyond the distinctions introduced by Aristotle.⁸⁸

Lacking indications to the contrary, I am willing to believe that Theophrastus did not depart significantly from what we read in *Rhetoric* 1.2 and 2.20. Example will have been labeled rhetorical induction (1356b2–5, 1393a26) and divided into two kinds. One kind is based on past facts (*πράγματα προγενομένα*) that the speaker finds or discovers (*εὕρισκειν*). The other involves illustrative parallels (*παράβολαί*) and fables (*λόγοι*) that the speaker produces (*ποιεῖν*).⁸⁹ To explain the class of illustrative parallels,

⁸⁷ Cf. 666 no. 6, 7, 8, 13, 23. These titles all invite comparison with the incipit to Aristotle's discussion of the topic.

⁸⁸ Schmidt (1839) p. 58–9 and Regenbogen col. 1526 believe that Theophrastus developed Aristotle's remarks in *Rhetoric* 2.20. On their view, additional details found in later authors (*To Herennius* 4.45.59, Cicero, *On Invention* 1.30.49 and Aspines, *Art of Rhetoric* vol. 9 p. 517 Walz) but absent in Aristotle are attributable to Theophrastus. Schmidt and Regenbogen may be correct, but the time gap between Theophrastus and the later authors to whom they refer is considerable (two hundred years), so that there is plenty of time for developments to have occurred among rhetoricians who post-date Theophrastus.

⁸⁹ Strictly speaking, it is not necessary that the speaker himself make up the illustrative parallels and fables. They may already exist and be borrowed or taken over by the speaker, but they are not past facts (historical cases) that are similar to whatever needs to be proven. Illustrative parallels and fables are not mentioned in the account of example found in *Rhetoric to Alexander* 8. Fables are mentioned in the brief discussion of example in the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problems* 18.3 (*λόγοι* 916b30, 33; *μῦθοι* 916b36).

Aristotle mentions Socratic comparisons: e.g., choosing rulers by lot is compared with the use of lot to select athletes for competition or a helmsman to steer a boat. To explain fables, he cites stories told by Stesichorus and Aesop. Fables, like parallels, are said to be dependent on the ability to perceive similarity (τὸ ὅμοιον). They are suited to the popular assembly and easier to produce than facts are to find. Nevertheless, facts are recognized as more useful in deliberation, for future occurrences are most often similar (ὁμοιοῦσιν) to what has happened in the past (1393a27–1394a9). In addition, Aristotle tells us that the speaker who lacks enthymemes must use examples as demonstration in order to secure conviction (πίστις), i.e., to persuade the audience that his position is correct.⁹⁰ But if he does have enthymemes, then he should use examples as witnesses, i.e., as an argument that supplements the enthymemes (1394a9–16).

In speaking of example as “rhetorical” induction (1.2 1356b5),⁹¹ Aristotle is telling us not only that example as a mode of argument is common in oratory, but also that example differs significantly from scientific induction as explained in *Prior Analytics* 2.23. For there induction is presented as a method of establishing — acquiring knowledge of — a universal premise by considering all the particular cases. E.g, one establishes the universal premise that every bileless animal is long-lived by considering each and every kind of long-lived animal (68b15–37). In contrast, argument by example, does not involve a consideration of all particular cases and does not lead to a firmly established universal premise that rules out exceptions. That is made abundantly clear in *Prior Analytics* 2.24, where example is illustrated by an argument concerning war with Thebes. It involves four terms.⁹² A stands for bad consequences, B for making war on neighbors, C for Athens making war on Thebes, and D for Thebes making war on Phocis. Aristotle tells us that if we wish to show that making war on Thebes would be bad for the Athenians, i.e., A applies to C, then we must obtain the premise “Making war on neighbors has bad consequences,” i.e., A applies to B. Conviction

⁹⁰ Cf. *Rhetoric to Alexander* 8 1429a22–7.

⁹¹ See also *Posterior Analytics* 1.1 71a9–10.

⁹² In lines immediately preceding the illustrative material, Aristotle explains example as a form of argument in which the (major) extreme (i.e., the first term A) is shown to be applicable to the middle term (B) by means of a term (D) that is similar to the third (C): διὰ τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ τρίτῳ. He adds that it must be known that the middle term (B) applies to the third (C) and that the first term (A) applies to that (D) which is similar to the third (C).

(πίστις) concerning the premise is secured by citing the similar case of Thebes, which suffered bad consequences when it went to war with its neighbor Phocis, i.e., both A applies to D and B applies to D. Once the premise is obtained, it is evident that Athens making war on Thebes will have bad consequences, i.e., A applies to C (68b38–69a13). Three things should be observed. First, the argument does not involve a universal induction (one based on all cases), which firmly establishes the premise “Making war on neighbors has bad consequences.” Rather, the argument produces conviction (πίστις 69a4), and that is different from having scientific knowledge that rules out the possibility of exceptions.⁹³ Second, the argument divides into two stages that may be regarded as two arguments with two conclusions: one leads to the premise concerning making war on neighbors, and the other leads to the desired conclusion concerning war with Thebes.⁹⁴ Third, Aristotle’s illustrative argument is so fully stated that it does not reflect how an orator is apt to use argument by example.⁹⁵ Instead of proceeding through a general principle to reach a particular conclusion, the orator will more than likely make a direct comparison between two particular cases: the case that he wishes to establish and the case that he introduces as an example.

In regard to direct comparison, *Topics* 8.1 may be instructive. Aristotle is considering dialectical arguments, i.e., putting questions effectively, and observes that one should put questions involving similarity (ὁμοιότης), for such questions are convincing (πιθανόν) and the universal escapes notice more readily. A sample argument follows in which knowledge and perception are treated as similar. Finally Aristotle tells us that the procedure under consideration is different from (scientific) induction. For in induction the universal is established from the particulars, while in dealing with similar things the universal, under which the similar things fall, is not established (156b10–17). If I understand Aristotle, he is observing that the

⁹³ Even if one could be certain that all past cases had been surveyed and that all of these cases support the premise “Making war on neighbors has bad consequences,” one cannot be certain that in the future there will not occur a case in which making war on a neighbor has only good consequences.

⁹⁴ Cf. R. Smith, *Aristotle, Prior Analytics* (Indianapolis: Hackett 1989) p. 222: “We want to prove that the war with the neighboring Thebans would be evil for the Athenians, and so we first offer a familiar example (the war of the Thebans with their neighbors the Phocians was an evil for them) to establish the principle ‘war with one’s neighbor’s is an evil’ and then apply this to the particular case at hand.”

⁹⁵ We might say that Aristotle is analyzing the logic of the argument and ignoring how it occurs in practice.

respondent is likely to answer a question concerning similar things in the affirmative, even though the universal premise is never firmly established by induction, i.e., an induction based on all cases. Indeed, the universal premise may only be mentioned in passing, or it may be omitted all together (“it escapes notice more readily”), so that we may speak of direct comparison between two similar things. Perhaps we should say that the universal is implicit in the question,⁹⁶ and if asked the respondent might acknowledge as much. But since the universal is not stated, the respondent may accept the comparison (two similar cases) and not consider the possibility of exceptions. The relevance to rhetoric should be clear. Orators can argue by citing similar cases. And if they choose not to state the universal premise under which the similar cases fall, it may not be missed.⁹⁷ Moreover, not stating the premise may be to the orator’s advantage, for if it is stated, it may become apparent that one or two (even five or six) similar cases are not sufficient to establish firmly the premise in question. And that will encourage an opponent to raise the possibility of exceptions.

Also relevant is the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problems*. The work as it has come down to us post-dates Aristotle and Theophrastus and in places exhibits clear dependence on the latter. In 18.3 the question is why men, who listen to speeches, prefer examples to enthymemes. The answer is straightforward. Men have more difficulty with enthymemes, which proceed through the universal. In contrast, examples involve the particular with which men are familiar. They learn more easily and quickly, and that is enjoyable. Moreover, they take pleasure in learning of similarity (τὸ ὅμοιον), and that is accomplished

⁹⁶ Cf. R. Smith, *Aristotle, Topics, Books I and VIII* (Oxford: Clarendon 1997) p. 113.

⁹⁷ For a rhetorical example, see Plato’s *Apology* 26A–28A. When Meletus says that Socrates is a full blown atheist (26C5–7), Socrates asks Meletus whether anyone believes that there are human things but not human beings, or that there are horse related things and not horses, or that there are flute related things and not flutes. Meletus remains silent, so that Socrates responds to his own questions in the negative (27B7–9). After that Socrates asks whether there is anyone who believes that there are divine things and not divinities. This time Meletus himself replies in the negative (27C1–3), and he is trapped in a contradiction, for Meletus has accused Socrates of teaching new divine things (24C1, 26B5–7). Here no universal proposition is asserted. The similar cases are sufficient to draw from Meletus the negative response that Socrates wants. Putting the argument in the form of question and answer suits Socrates’ usual manner of speaking (27B2), and if the polemical remarks directed at Meletus are removed, the argument can be viewed as a simple exercise in dialectic. But in oratory such arguments need not bring in the opponent. The orator himself can adduce the similar cases and then on his own assert the proposition that he needs for his case.

through example and fable (916b26–36). Here the focus is on the use of example in oratory, and as in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, there is mention of fables. In addition, the pleasure taken by an audience in example is emphasized. That may be Theophrastean, for there is some evidence that audience psychology was a special concern of Theophrastus.⁹⁸ To be sure, no text tells us that the work *On Example* focused on audience psychology, thereby anticipating the *Problems* and informing what we read there, but I would not be surprised if it did.

no. 6 *On Enthymemes*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius 5.47 = 1.198

Literature: Spengel (1828) p. 3; Schmidt (1839) p. 34–6; Usener (1858) p. 20; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1525; Wehrli (1983) p. 498; Sollenberger (1984) p. 312

The title Περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων, *On Enthymemes*, is found not only in the second list of Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean works but also in a preface to Hermogenes' work *On Issues* (673B.4). In the latter place, the Theophrastean work is cited as an example of a title that refers to an *ars* of limited scope. I.e., the work is dedicated to a particular subject, the enthymeme, and does not cover multiple subjects as would be expected were the title unqualified as in *On the Art of Rhetoric*. Nothing further is reported about the Theophrastean work, so that we are left uninformed about its length and the details within it.

The wording of the title, i.e., Περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων, recalls the beginning of Aristotle's discussion of the enthymeme in *Rhetoric* 2.22: περὶ δ' ἐνθυμημάτων καθόλου τε εἰπόμεν τίνα τρόπον δεῖ ζητεῖν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τοὺς τόπους, "Concerning enthymemes, let us first say generally how they are to be sought out and after that the topics" (1395b20–1). That prompts the question whether the Theophrastean title reflects the incipit of a discussion like that offered by Aristotle: one that was relatively general and intended to be supplemented by a discussion of topics or lines of argument.⁹⁹ The question cannot be

⁹⁸ See the commentary on 696 and 711. In the preceding paragraph, I suggested that not calling attention to the universal premise may be wise, for focusing on the universal premise may prompt the auditor to consider the possibility of exceptions. But omitting the universal premise may also be beneficial for a rather different reason. It will give the alert listener the chance to fill in what is missing. And the listener who does that is apt to think himself intelligent and become favorably disposed to the speaker (cf. 696.2–6).

⁹⁹ Aristotle's discussion of topics (*Rhet.* 2.23) follows immediately on his discussion of the enthymeme (2.22).

answered with certainty, but perhaps we can say that Theophrastus is likely to have followed Aristotle in speaking of the enthymeme as a rhetorical syllogism (1.2 1356b4, cf. *Anal. Post.* 1.1 71a10–11) that deals with what is in the main contingent (1357a13–15), i.e., the things about which men deliberate (1357a1–7, 24–8). As such the majority of its premises hold only for the most part (1.2 1357a22–31, 2.22 1396a3)¹⁰⁰ and its conclusions are likewise limited (1.2 1356b17, cf. *Anal. Post.* 1.30 87b22–6). That distinguishes the enthymeme from the scientific syllogism that reaches necessary conclusions on the basis of premises that are themselves necessary (1.2 1357a28–9, cf. *Anal. Post.* 1.4 73a21–5).¹⁰¹ In addition, Theophrastus is likely to have followed Aristotle and warned against creating long arguments that lose clarity because the audience cannot follow them. He will also have warned against stating the obvious, for that creates unnecessary length and gives the impression of loquacity (1.2 1357a3–4, 2.22 1395b24–6). Indeed, Theophrastus will have agreed with Aristotle that an enthymeme should often consist of fewer premises than those that make up the primary syllogism, i.e., the logically complete syllogism (1.2 1357a13–17).¹⁰² The point here is not that an enthymeme is conceptually tied to the omission of a premise.¹⁰³ Rather, one ought not to say what is known, for the listener can supply it for himself (1357a17–19). Having said that, I want to underline that the omission of a premise is not to be deemed unimportant. On the contrary, in a rhetorical context and especially with a view to audience psychology, the omission of a premise is of

¹⁰⁰ Aristotle is careful to note that the enthymeme does not rule out necessary premises; he says that they are few (ὀλίγα 1.2 1357a22).

¹⁰¹ For discussion of *Anal. Post.* 1.4 73a21–5, see J. Barnes, *Aristotle's Posterior Analytics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1975) p. 112–13.

¹⁰² The meaning of the phrase ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμὸς (1.2 1357a17) has been much discussed in the literature. If I understand Aristotle, the phrase refers neither to syllogisms in the first figure (cf. J. Sprüte, *Die Enthymemtheorie der aristotelischen Rhetorik* [Göttingen 1982] p. 130) nor to a deduction in several steps, i.e., to a string of syllogisms in which one syllogism establishes the premises of the next syllogism (cf. 1357a8–9 with Chr. Rapp, *Aristoteles*, *Rhetorik* 2. Halbband [Berlin: Akademie Verlag 2002] p. 191). Rather, the phrase refers to a syllogism in which the premises are fully expressed (Kennedy [1991] p. 42 n. 59). At least that fits well with the explanatory example that immediately follows: there is no need to say that the prize in the Olympic games is a crown, for everybody knows that (1357a17–22). On this example, see Fortenbaugh (2000b) p. 73–4.

¹⁰³ The adverb “often” (πολλάκις 1357a17) is important. Aristotle recognizes that many enthymemes omit a premise that is necessary to the argument, but he does not make omission the defining mark of an enthymeme. The same is, I think, true of Theophrastus.

considerable importance, for it allows the listener to supply something for himself (1357a18–19). And that gives the listener satisfaction and creates a positive attitude toward the speaker,¹⁰⁴ which is important in a genre that aims at persuasion.¹⁰⁵

Again following Aristotle, Theophrastus is likely to have emphasized the importance of possessing the particular facts (τὰ ὑπάρχοντα) about the subject under discussion. Like his teacher, he may have made the point in regard to all three kinds of oratory (deliberative, epideictic and judicial) and offered examples that concern city states, individuals and any other subject that may be under discussion. For example, we cannot properly advise the Athenians whether they should go to war unless we know where their military strengths lie; nor can we praise them unless we know what glorious deeds they have accomplished; nor can we bring accusations against them unless we know what injustices they have committed (2.22 1396a3–b20). One Theophrastean text indicates that the Eresian addressed the issue in regard to epideictic oratory. I am thinking of **679**, which tells us that Theophrastus taught six modes of amplification: deeds, consequences, comparison, previous judgment, critical moments and suffering. The text is most naturally referred to the work *On Praise* (**666** no. 12), but that matters little, for the text makes clear that Theophrastus recognized different kinds of facts from which eulogies can be constructed. And that recognition can be generalized. Theophrastus took account of facts as materials from which arguments can be constructed in all three kinds of oratory. The actual construction of arguments will have been referred to topics. At least, it seems reasonable to think of Theophrastus following Aristotle by continuing his discussion of the enthymeme with a detailed treatment of the topics or lines of argument that orators use to reach a desired conclusion. In this regard, text **675** is of interest. It tells us that Theophrastus spoke of enthymemes based on induction, ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς ἐνθυμήματα (line 16), and from *Rhetoric* 2.23 we know that Aristotle labeled his tenth topic ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς (1398a32). **675** is, however, so problematic that using the text to develop Theophrastean doctrine is risky at best.

¹⁰⁴ See the commentary on **696** and **711**; also above, p. 77 n. 98.

¹⁰⁵ Or in a genre that considers the “possible” means of persuasion (*Rhet.* 1.2 1355b26–7). An understanding of audience psychology including how the omission of a premise may affect the audience is important for discovering the possible means of persuasion.

Since some of the lines of argument listed by Aristotle in *Rhetoric* 2.23 are best analyzed in terms of hypothetical syllogistic, one would like to know whether Theophrastus' work on different kinds of hypothetical syllogisms was carried over to his analysis of topics and enthymemes. No text provides a clear answer, but I would not be surprised if Theophrastus analyzed a topic like Aristotle's fourth, "from the more and the less," in terms of hypothetical syllogistic. Take the first of Aristotle's examples: "If the gods do not know everything, then hardly do human beings" (1397b12–13). Theophrastus might well analyze this example as an argument "from quality" (111E.10–11), i.e., If A is more Q than B, and A is not Q, then B is not Q. Expressed fully the argument might run: "If the gods are more knowledgeable than human beings, and the gods do not know everything, then human beings do not know everything; but the gods are more knowledgeable than human beings and the gods do not know everything; therefore neither do human beings know everything." Such a full statement of the argument is, of course, wordy and its length may make it difficult for ordinary people to follow. That will have been clear to Theophrastus, who in a rhetorical situation would prefer Aristotle's shorter version. After all, the orator will avoid appearing loquacious, and the listener will enjoy supplying what has been omitted.¹⁰⁶

no. 7 *On the Maxim*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.46 = 1.183

Literature: Usener (1858) p. 20; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1524; Wehrli (1983) p.498, 514; Sollenberger (1984) p. 303

The title *Περὶ γνώμης*, *On the Maxim*, occurs only in the catalogue of Diogenes Laertius. Within that catalogue, it is found in the second list, which contains the majority of rhetorical and poetic titles. We have listed *On the Maxim* immediately after the work *On Enthymemes*, thereby indicating a close connection between the two. The connection is suggested by Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, in which the maxim is discussed immediately before the enthymeme (2.21–22). Aristotle defines the maxim as an assertion of a general kind about practical matters: ἔστι δὴ γνώμη ἀπόφανσις . . . καθόλου . . . περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσὶ (2.21 1394a19–25). The definition may be

¹⁰⁶ For further discussion of hypothetical syllogistic and rhetorical argument, see Fortenbaugh (2000b) p. 89–103.

compared with that of Theophrastus, which is preserved by John the Deacon: "The maxim is a general assertion concerning matters of conduct"; γνώμη ἐστὶ καθόλου ἀπόφασις ἐν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς (676.7).¹⁰⁷ In what follows, Aristotle tells us that maxims are the conclusions and the premises of enthymemes (1394a27–8). In referring to conclusions, he is thinking especially of disputed or paradoxical maxims, for these are in need of demonstration (1394b9). "Children ought not to be highly educated" (1394a29–30, b30–1) is a paradoxical maxim, and as such it needs explanation. In Euripides' *Medea* 296–7, the explanation is given in an additional statement introduced by "for" (1394a33–4).¹⁰⁸ Aristotle varies the construction by using a "since"-clause (1394b29–31).¹⁰⁹ Either way,¹¹⁰ the maxim is explained, so that it is no longer in need of demonstration and may become a premise in a further argument concerning the rearing of some particular child or group of children. With all this Theophrastus will have agreed, perhaps adding that when enthymemes take the form of mixed hypothetical syllogisms, the maxim may appear as part of a premise. For an example, I turn to Plutarch, who cites Theophrastus within a discussion of fraternal relations. We are told that Theophrastus expressed himself well, saying that "If the possessions of friends are common, it is especially necessary that the friends of friends be common" (535.1–3). Here the maxim "The possessions of friends are common" is the antecedent of the hypothetical (i.e., conditional) proposition. Add the further proposition "But the possessions of friends are common," and the conclusion follows "It is especially necessary that the friends of friends be common."¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ On the reading ἀπόφασις, see the commentary on 676.

¹⁰⁸ "For (γάρ) apart from the idleness they have acquired, they incur hostile envy from fellow-citizens."

¹⁰⁹ "Since (ἐπεὶ) it is not right to be either envied or idle."

¹¹⁰ Cf. *Rhet.* 3.17 1418b33–8, where Aristotle recognizes a similar variation: a maxim followed by an explanation introduced by "for" is treated as equivalent to a conditional statement, in which an "if"-clause, i.e., the antecedent gives the explanation and the consequent expresses the maxim. See the following note.

¹¹¹ The mixed hypothetical syllogism takes the form "If P, then Q; but P; therefore Q." See the commentary on 674. In the example given above, the antecedent of the hypothetical (conditional) premise expresses a generally accepted maxim, "The possessions of friends are common." As a result, it is not necessary to state the additional proposition "But (in fact) the possessions of friends are common." Moreover, we may replace "if" (εἰ) with "since" (ἐπεὶ) and omit the conclusion "It is especially necessary that the friends of friends be common," for the conclusion is the consequent of the hypothetical proposition, now introduced by "since." See Fortenbaugh (1998a) p. 42–3.

Aristotle discusses the maxim not only in regard to the enthymeme but also in regard to the speaker's age and character, the expression of emotion and the pleasure of the audience. He tells us that the use of maxims is appropriate to older, experienced persons (1395a2–4), that the maxim reveals moral choice (1395b13) and that contradicting a maxim may do the same (1395a24–32). He notes that maxims may be used appropriately in situations that excite anger and fright (1395a8–10) and that contradicting a maxim may convey emotion (1395a21–4). He also notes that listeners are delighted when the speaker states in general terms what they believe concerning particular cases (1395a32–b11). Theophrastus may have taken up all these themes and developed them more fully. The same is true of Aristotle's brief remarks concerning concise expression when explaining a maxim that is not paradoxical but nevertheless unclear (1394b31–1395a2). But having recognized the possibility of fuller treatment, I want to acknowledge that Theophrastus' discussion of the maxim may have been quite short, perhaps little longer than Aristotle's treatment.¹¹²

The preceding discussion has assumed that the Theophrastean work *On the Maxim* was primarily rhetorical. The assumption is, I think, reasonable, but it is entirely possible that the work included sections specially devoted to the maxim in poetry. But even if it did not include such sections, the work will have been useful to persons interested in poetry. Much as Aristotle's discussion includes examples from poets (Homer and Euripides), Theophrastus may have drawn on the poets for illustrative material. And even if Theophrastus drew his examples from the orators, his work will still have been relevant to poetics. We may compare Aristotle's *Poetics*, in which the Stagirite not only explains thought (διάνοια) by reference to demonstration and the expression of maxims (6 1450a6–7) but also makes explicit mention of what has been said in his writings on rhetoric (19 1456a34–5). Similarly, Theophrastus will have recognized that a rhetorical discussion of the maxim can be applied to the speeches of tragedy and other forms of poetry.

¹¹² Aristotle's chapter on the maxim begins with the words *περὶ δὲ γνωμολογίας* (1394a19). The words are grammatically independent of the sentence that follows (editors place a comma after the opening phrase), and they function as a title for the chapter being introduced. Similarly the Theophrastean work *Περὶ γνώμης* may have been of chapter length, and the phrase *περὶ γνώμης* may have opened the discussion. On titles and incipits see above, the introduction to this section on the "Titles of Books."

It is possible that text **676**, i.e., Theophrastus' definition of the maxim (line 7), derives from the work *On the Maxim*, but it could equally well come from *On Enthymemes* (**666** no. 6), in which the maxim *qua* premise may well have been discussed. Text **535.1–3**, mentioned above, on the possessions of friends, contains a maxim, but the text most likely derives from an ethical work, perhaps, *On Friendship* (**436** no. 23a–b).

68 no. *Theses*, 24 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.44 = **1.118**

34, 35 *Theses*, 3 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.49 = **1.248**

& 36 *A Thesis on the Soul*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.46 = **1.176**

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 31–2; Usener (1858) p. 19; Throm (1932) p. 171–9; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1523–4; Wehrli (1983) p. 498; Sollenberger (1984) p. 253–5, 299–300, 350; Fortenbaugh (1994b) p. 23–4 and (1998) p. 196–8

We have here three titles, each of which is found in Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings (**1.118**, **248**, **176**). The first two, Θέσεις κδ' and Θέσεις γ', refer to collections of theses, and the third, Περί ψυχῆς θέσις α', to a single thesis. In the text-translation volumes, the titles are listed together under logic. The numerals with which the titles end have been construed as book or roll numbers: hence the translations: *Theses*, 24 books, *Theses*, 3 books and *A Thesis on the Soul*, 1 book. That accords with previous scholarship and is most likely correct. Nevertheless, it seems prudent to ask whether the numerals might not be taken with the noun that precedes, i.e., with Θέσεις or Θέσις. Such a possibility arose in the case of Περί τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν εἶδη ιξ' (**666** no. 2a), and it seems to arise here as well: i.e., we might translate *24 Theses*, *3 Theses*, *1 Thesis on the Soul*.

Two peculiarities encourage taking the possibility seriously. First, the title Θέσεις γ' is unusual for Diogenes' catalogue. Normally we would be given three numerals from 1 to 3, i.e. α' β' γ', as if three rolls were being counted out. That is the regular practice for numerals under 20.¹¹³ If we ask why the exception, a possible answer is that the numeral γ' does not refer to books or rolls but to the num-

¹¹³ There are fifty-five cases in which numerals under twenty, *re vera* between 2 and 18, are counted out. The case before us is the only exception. Perhaps we should emend the text to read α' β' γ', but equally we should ask whether the exception admits explanation.

ber of theses in a collection. Second, in at least one manuscript the title *Περὶ ψυχῆς θέσεις α'* appears as *Περὶ ψυχῆς θέσεις μία*.¹¹⁴ That reading is printed by Long in the OCT. I do not recommend adopting the reading, for it does not occur in the three primary manuscripts. They have *α'*. Nevertheless, I do recommend asking how the variant arose. A possible answer is that the scribe or someone whom he followed thought that the numeral should be taken with *θέσεις*; and to make that clear, the scribe wrote *μία* instead of *α'*.

It may be helpful to compare four Aristotelian titles that are listed together both in the catalogue of Diogenes and in that of Hesychius.¹¹⁵ In Diogenes' catalogue, the four titles occur as follows *Θέσεις ἐπιχειρητικαὶ κε'*, *Θέσεις ἐρωτικαὶ δ'*, *Θέσεις φιλικαὶ β'*, *Θέσεις περὶ ψυχῆς α'* (5.24);¹¹⁶ in Hesychius' catalogue we read *Θέσεις ἐπιχειρητικαὶ ἐν βιβλίοις κε'*, *Θέσεις ἐρωτικαὶ ἐν βιβλίοις δ'*, *Θέσεις φιλικαὶ ἐν βιβλίοις β'*, *Θέσεις περὶ ψυχῆς ἐν βιβλίῳ α'* (nos. 65–8 Düring). What especially interests me here is the addition of the phrase *ἐν βιβλίοις* (—φ), "in books (book)," in the catalogue of Hesychius. That fits the accepted view that numerals following titles refer to books or rolls, but it should be observed that the phrase never occurs in Diogenes' catalogue and only eight times in the list of Hesychius.¹¹⁷ One wants to know why the phrase is added to only a few titles (8 out of 197). I have no general answer, and can only observe that each of the first three titles before us begins with *Θέσεις* (plural), so that someone might interpret the numeral which follows — *κε'*, *δ'*, *β'* — as the number of theses and not a book number. However, in the fourth title that will not happen, for while it too begins with *Θέσεις* (plural), the numeral that follows is *α'*. Perhaps the compiler of the catalogue added *ἐν βιβλίῳ* for the sake of consistency in reporting the collections of theses; but that is only a guess.

¹¹⁴ The manuscript is V = codex Vaticanus Graecus 1302.

¹¹⁵ The catalogues are found in Diogenes' *Life of Aristotle* 5.22–7 and in the *Life* attributed to Hesychius (p. 82–9 Düring). For the most part the two catalogues are drawn from a common source, probably Hermippus, who is also Diogenes' likely source for his catalogue of Theophrastean works (I follow Düring p. 67–9, 90). The catalogue of Hesychius is longer, concluding with additions not found in Diogenes' list.

¹¹⁶ *Argumentative Theses*, 25 books; *Erotic Theses*, 4 books; *Theses on Friendship*, 2 books; *Theses on the Soul*, 1 book.

¹¹⁷ Nos. 51, 61, 65–8, 122–3 Düring.

The Aristotelian title *Θέσεις περὶ ψυχῆς α'* (ἐν βιβλίῳ α') recalls the Theophrastean title *Περὶ ψυχῆς θέσις α'*. It should be noted that *θέσις* (singular) is the reading of two of the three major manuscripts of Diogenes' *Lives*; the third has *θέσεις* (plural) instead of *θέσις* (singular).¹¹⁸ That raises the question whether we should adopt the reading of the third manuscript. In doing so, we would not only bring the Theophrastean title into line with that of Aristotle,¹¹⁹ but we would also avoid possible confusion concerning the reference of α'. For if *θέσεις* (plural) is read, then α' must be a book number; the reading *μία* is ruled out. That may be appealing,¹²⁰ but I want to call attention to a difference in word order. In the Aristotelian catalogue, *Θέσεις* is the first word of the title. In the Theophrastean catalogue, *θέσις* (reading the singular) comes last; and in that position, it seems to invite connection with the numeral α' in much the same way that *εἶδη* seems to invite connection with *ξά'* in *Περὶ τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν εἶδη ξά'* (666 no. 2a).

A further observation may be of interest. In the Aristotelian title *Θέσεις ἐρωτικαὶ δ'* (ἐν βιβλίῳ δ'), the number four is represented by a single numeral δ' and not by four numerals α' β' γ' δ'. Similarly, in the title *Θέσεις φιλικαὶ β'* (ἐν βιβλίῳ β'), the number two is represented by a single numeral and not by α' β'. That may be compared with γ' in the Theophrastean title *Θέσεις γ'*; it suggests that γ' should be taken as a book number. That may well be correct, but before expressing certainty, we should note a difference between the Aristotelian and Theophrastean catalogues. Whereas the latter is made up of five distinct lists, which appear to represent separate purchases by the library in Alexandria, the former is far more unified. It appears to be the work of a librarian, who ordered the catalogue on the basis of content, avoided strings of numerals for works above nine books and reduced the occurrence of such strings when referring to a smaller number of books. More precisely, in Diogenes' list there are seven cases in which a single numeral represents a number between two and nine; in thirty-two cases the number is counted out.¹²¹ In Hesychius' list no number is represented by a string of

¹¹⁸ Manuscripts F and P have *θέσις*; manuscript B has *θέσεις*.

¹¹⁹ Regenbogen col. 1524 thinks it likely that the Aristotelian and Theophrastean works were one and the same.

¹²⁰ The fact that α' immediately follows *θέσις/θέσεις* may encourage reading *θέσεις*. At least we can imagine a scribe taking notice of α' and changing *θέσεις* to *θέσις*.

¹²¹ My count is based on the catalogue as printed by Düring 1957 p. 41-50. The cases are nos. 28-9, 33, 71-2, 74, 110.

numerals. My guess is that Diogenes' catalogue is a more accurate reflection of the common source; but whatever the relationship to that source, we can say that the occurrence of single numerals, δ' and β', at the end of the two Aristotelian titles, Θέσεις ἐρωτικώνί and Θέσεις φιλικαί, is not as striking as the occurrence of γ' at the end of the Theophrastean title Θέσεις, for there is no parallel in the entire catalogue of Theophrastean works.

Concerning the content of the Theophrastean *Theses*, we can say the following. Theses were questions of a general nature, which were argued both *pro* and *contra*. For example, "Should the wise man marry?" is a thesis. One person argued that he should, while another argued that he should not, or the same person argued both sides of the question.¹²² We are told that Aristotle made theses part of his instructional program,¹²³ and we can be certain that Theophrastus did the same (672). Moreover, both Peripatetics used theses for training students not only in argument but also in style. Cicero makes the point in regard to Aristotle when he says that the Stagiritic trained students in theses, not for the sake of the subtle argumentation of philosophers, but rather for the abundance of rhetoricians (*Orator* 46). That is an exaggeration, which reflects Cicero's own concern with style; but it is correct to the extent that it takes account of the rhetorical function which theses had in the early Peripatos. In regard to Theophrastus, we may cite two reports concerning contemporary reaction to theses written by Theophrastus himself. The first is found in Diogenes Laertius' *Life of Crantor*. Here the Academic philosopher is said to have remarked that the theses of Theophrastus were written with purple coloring (4.27 = 75.1–2). The second report occurs in Athenaeus' *The Sophists at Dinner*. In a letter from the Macedonian Hippolochus to Theophrastus' student Lyncaeus, the latter is said to declare the theses of his teacher sheer happiness (4.5 130D = 76.1–2). Both texts involve a measure of irony, but at the same time both indicate that the theses of Theophrastus were more than flat arguments. They were embellished compositions that could be not only enjoyed but also studied by students who wished to elevate their style.

Some Theophrastean theses were collected, probably by the Eresian himself, and were available to later rhetoricians. For ex-

¹²² My example is based on 486.7–8.

¹²³ See, e.g., Cicero, *On the Orator* 3.80, *Orator* 46 and *Tusculan Disputations* 2.9; cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 5.3.

ample, Theon (1st–2nd cent. A.D.) says that paradeigms of the exercise with theses can be obtained from Aristotle and Theophrastus; he adds that many of their books were entitled *Theses* (74.1–3). Whether the three works listed by Diogenes Laertius in his catalogue of Theophrastean writings were those known to Theon is problematic. Put more generally, we cannot be certain that the three works contained theses written for rhetorical instruction. A *Thesis on the Soul* may have been primarily concerned with the views of earlier philosophers. If so, it is likely to have had a scientific function and lacked rhetorical style. Perhaps one or both of the collections called *Theses* contained examples of dialectical argumentation free of elevated diction and refined composition.¹²⁴ But whatever the truth concerning the works listed by Diogenes,¹²⁵ we can be certain that some Theophrastean theses were intended to instruct students of rhetoric not only in regard to the discovery and formulation of coherent arguments (cf. 135.5) but also in regard to suitable expression.

It is possible that text 486 is derived from a Theophrastean thesis: “Should the wise man marry?”¹²⁶

- 436** *Ethical Characters*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.47 = 1.201
no. 4 and with the order of the (Greek) words reversed 5.48 = 1.241 (with-
a–b out the number of books)

Literature: Usener (1858) p.21; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1500–11; Fortenbaugh (1975) p. 62–82, (1981) p. 245–60, (1984) p. 93–6, (1994b) p. 15–35, (1998b) p. 185–6 n. 11; Sollenberger (1984) p. 254; Matelli (1989) p. 329–86; Sluiter (1992) p. 172–83; Conley (1994) p. 228–30; Rusten (2002) p. 5–23

The title ἠθικοὶ χαρακτῆρες, *Ethical Characters* — henceforth, the *Characters* — occurs twice in the second list of Diogenes catalogue of Theophrastean writings. In the second occurrence, the order of words is reversed, so that Χαρακτῆρες ἠθικοί appears. The position of the two titles within the second list is entirely alphabetical:

¹²⁴ Indeed, all three works listed by Diogenes may have been primarily dialectical in orientation, and for that reason they have their primary listing under logic (68 no. 34–6).

¹²⁵ It is also possible that the two *Theses* were a mixed bag, containing scientific, dialectical and rhetorical theses. In addition, it is conceivable that the two smaller works (in 3 books and in 1 book) duplicated material found in the larger work (in 24 books). See Regenbogen col. 1523.

¹²⁶ See above, p. 86 n. 122, and Fortenbaugh (1994b) p. 24–5.

first eta and then chi. In its second occurrence, the title lacks a book number, which might suggest joining *Χαρακτῆρες ἠθικοί* with the title that follows, thereby forming a single title out of two. But in this case, the suggestion is clearly mistaken. The title that follows, *Περὶ ψευδοῦς καὶ ἀληθοῦς α'* is quite separate and has been assigned to *Metaphysics* (246 no. 5).¹²⁷ The absence of a book number in the second occurrence appears to be a simple scribal error that predates our earliest manuscripts. But why should the *Characters* be listed twice? Pressed to answer, my guess is that the second of Diogenes' lists represents a single purchase by the library at Alexandria and that the purchase contained two copies of the *Characters*, albeit with the words of the title reversed. It may be that the copies were identical, but equally they may have been different versions of same work.

In the text-translation volumes, the *Characters* has been listed among the ethical titles. That is not wrong, for the Theophrastean work brings together thirty unattractive character traits that have obvious connections with the ethical treatises of Aristotle. Several of the traits share the same name as Aristotelian vices, and many seem to fall within Aristotle's category of dispositions in regard to social interaction (*NE* 4.6 1126b11–12). What especially interests me is that the traits described by Theophrastus seem to be conceived of as superficial behavioral regularities. I.e., Theophrastus describes traits that manifest themselves in patterns of behavior that have no necessary connection with *per se* choice — i.e., choosing an action for its own sake — and indeed no tie to a single underlying belief or desire that explains a given trait whenever it manifests itself. Instead, the sketches are marked by a tendency to pile up examples of a given behavioral regularity, while leaving undecided what motivates a man to do what he does repeatedly. Since the matter has been discussed in some detail elsewhere,¹²⁸ I offer here a single example, namely, the sketch of love of wickedness (φιλοπονηρία 29). The name of the character trait suggests that the trait might be conceived of as a propensity to do what is wicked out of love of wickedness, i.e., for the sake of wickedness itself. But what Theophrastus actually presents is quite different. The lover of wickedness, we are told, seeks to associate with persons who have been convicted in court, because he thinks that he will thereby become more experienced and more formidable (29.2). Here we do have a motive, but it is not the

¹²⁷ Classification as a logical work is also possible.

¹²⁸ Fortenbaugh (1975) p. 62–82.

case that the lover of wickedness is presented choosing wickedness for its own sake. Rather, he believes that through association with convicted criminals he will gain experience and become more formidable, i.e., he will acquire power. This motive, however, does not explain everything that the lover of wickedness does. When he supports a wicked man who speaks in the assembly and calls him the watchdog of the people (29.4), he may be motivated by democratic principles. And when he acts as a judge and construes negatively the assertions of both parties (29.5), he seems not to be motivated by a love of evil or democratic principles. Rather, he seems to be a distrustful person, who finds wickedness everywhere. Given this character sketch and other similar ones, an important consequence follows for ethics: whereas moral virtues, as conceived of by Aristotle, are tied to *per se* choice (the generous man gives money because he deems his action a good in itself), vices may lack such a connection. Perhaps the self-indulgent man always chooses pleasure for its own sake,¹²⁹ but there are unacceptable types who simply lack a virtue. Take the unambitious man (the ἀφιλότιμος). His disposition is essentially negative. He lacks a proper desire for honor and therefore can be criticized for not choosing to be honored for noble accomplishments (*NE* 4.4 1125b10–11). But what motivates him is not part of his vice. He may love leisure, but equally he may fear competition, or both. He could also be Theophrastus' stingy man (ἀνελεύθερος), whose character is defined as a lack of ambition when expense is involved (22.1).¹³⁰

The *Characters* relates closely to comedy. That has long been recognized, so that there is a considerable body of scholarly literature, to which I, too, have contributed.¹³¹ Here I want to underline a single but fundamental feature of the relationship between the Theophrastean work and comedy. It is that the superficial traits of character, like those presented in the *Characters*, are typical of comedy. To be sure, comedy is not exclusively concerned with behavioral regularities apart from the desires and beliefs that underlie and explain them. A stage figure like Smikrines in Menander's *Shield* may be said to exhibit *per se* choice. He is presented as a money-

¹²⁹ Cf. *NE* 7.3 1146b22–3.

¹³⁰ Recently scholars have argued forcefully that some, perhaps all, the definitions are spurious. See now J. Diggle, *Theophrastus: Characters* (Cambridge: University Press 2004) p. 17. For the purposes of this brief comment, the issue may be left undecided.

¹³¹ Fortenbaugh (1981) p. 245–60.

lover (123), who calls gain noble (33) and has no other concern besides possession (120). But there are other figures whose motivations are left unexplored and who might not be amusing were their desires and beliefs brought to the surface. That is typical of a minor figure like a cook or a slave. A major figure will be more complicated. His character is likely to be revealed at least to some degree (quite fully in the case of Smikrines), but a figure like Polemon in Menander's *She who is Shorn* demonstrates that the primary trait of a major figure can be treated superficially. Polemon is fundamentally an impetuous person who does everything in a vehement manner. That is clear from the beginning of the play to the end, but what underlies Polemon's impetuosity is not clear, and that allows the play to end on a humorous note. For further discussion, including how Theophrastus may have gone beyond Aristotle (or built on the work of his master) in developing an adequate notion of comic character, see the commentary on the title *On Comedy* (666 no. 22).

A connection between the *Characters* and rhetoric is no less clear. The manuscript tradition indicates that Byzantine scholars (probably during the eighth or ninth century A.D.) incorporated the Theophrastean work within a collection of rhetorical writings whose principal authors are Hermogenes and Aphthonius. The reason for doing so is clear enough. The *Characters* can be used to elucidate what Hermogenes and Aphthonius say about *ethos* and *ethopoia*. In addition, at least one early manuscript indicates that the *Characters* was included in an alternative collection that contained Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*.¹³² Since character figures prominently in the *Rhetoric*, it is reasonable to expect points of contact between the Aristotelian treatise and the Theophrastean work. But the points of contact are limited. That is especially true in regard to persuasion through character, which Aristotle discusses in *Rhetoric* 1.2 and 2.1. Since the focus is on the credibility and trustworthiness of the speaker, offensive patterns of behavior are not under consideration. In addition, Aristotle is concerned with deeper lying explanations. A speaker may call attention to what he has accomplished and even emphasize certain patterns of behavior, but he does so in order to present himself as a wise and virtuous citizen who is motivated by good will towards his audience (εὖνοια 2.1 1378a9).

¹³² See D. Harlfinger and D. Reinsch, "Die Aristotelica des Parisinus Gr. 1741," *Philologus* 114 (1970) p. 30–6; Matelli (1989) p. 359–77 and Conley (1994) p. 228–30.

More closely related to the *Characters* is Aristotle's discussion of narration in *Rhetoric* 3.16. When we read that walking while talking reveals rashness and boorishness (1417a22–3), we may recall that Theophrastus depicts the behavior of the boor (4). Moreover, the idea of walking while talking has a close parallel in Theophrastus' treatment of arrogance, for there the arrogant man is depicted as arbitrating a dispute while walking (24.4). Clearly the sketches of Theophrastus are full of details that might be worked into the narrative part of an oration. Indeed, Theophrastus even shows the way in that he organizes the sketch of cowardice into two distinct episodes that seem ready made for the narrative portion of an oration (25.2, 3–6). But that said, it is important to note that Aristotle ties the depiction of character to choice. He tells us that narration should reveal character and that choice determines character (1417a15–18), i.e., he does not allow us to forget the importance of the beliefs and desires that underlie our behavior.

Some notice should also be taken of *Rhetoric* 2.12–19, where Aristotle discusses the dispositions that are typical of different ages and fortunes. Here, too, details encourage comparison with the *Characters*. When Aristotle tells us that old men are suspicious on account of distrust (2.13 1389b20–1), we may recall that Theophrastus describes the behavior of the distrustful man (18). And when Aristotle tells us that old men are stingy and disdainful of reputation (1389b27, 1390a4–5), we may think of the Theophrastean sketch of stinginess and the definition of this trait as an absence of ambition where expense is involved (22.1). And again, when Aristotle says that old men are indecisive and always adding words like “perhaps” and “maybe” (1389b18–19), we are apt to think of Theophrastus' sketch of irony, where the ironical man is depicted as one who uses expressions like “I don't believe” and “I don't understand” (1.6). But there is a difference. Whereas Aristotle's remarks concerning indecisiveness are preceded by an explanation in terms of previous disappointments and mistakes (1389b14–16), the Theophrastean sketch of irony focuses on surface manifestations and ignores such explanations. Similarly when Aristotle tells us that old men are garrulous, he offers an explanation in terms of memory and the pleasures that accompany remembering (1390a6–11). In contrast, Theophrastus describes the behavior of the garrulous man, but he offers no explanation of the depicted behavior (3).

The above remarks have focused on differences between Theophrastus' depiction of character traits in the *Characters* and Aristotle's treatment of character in the *Rhetoric*. The former focuses on patterns of behavior, while the latter keeps his eye on deeper lying beliefs and desires. It does not follow, however, that Theophrastus was in some important way contradicting his teacher. Rather he understood that behavior invites explanation, and in my opinion he will have recognized that an orator may find it useful first to establish a behavioral pattern and then to supply motives that help his case. Such motives may be quite unfair, but they are likely to be accepted because they often (but not always) explain the pattern in question. For example, an orator may decide to portray an opponent (perhaps a defendant in a lawsuit) as a boaster, for repeated boasting admits various explanations including a concern with reputation, a desire for personal gain, a simple delight in pretension and an urge to make others laugh. And once he has established that the opponent is a boaster, he will impute one or more unworthy motives that are likely to be accepted by the audience (jury).¹³³ The point is not made in the *Characters*, but it may have been made in another work like *On Slander* (666 no. 13).¹³⁴

- no. 8 *On Non-technical Proofs* (or *On Proofs outside the Art*), 1 book]
Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.46 = 1.177

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 32–3; Usener (1858) p. 20; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1525; Wehrli (1983) p. 499; Mirhady (1991) p. 8, (1992) p. 95

The title *On Non-technical Proofs*, Περὶ τῶν ἀτέχνων πίστεων, occurs in the second list within Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean works. If we accept the idea of separate purchases by the

¹³³ Theophrastus portrays the boaster in *Characters* 23. An interesting example from judicial oratory is Dinarchus' characterization of Demosthenes as a μεταβαλλόμενος. I discuss the characterization in Fortenbaugh (1994b) p. 27–8.

¹³⁴ Aristotle comes close to making the same point when he observes that an act can be done from different motives and then cites Diomedes' selection of Odysseus as his companion for a dangerous expedition at night. One person puts a positive construction on Diomedes choice, saying that he deemed Odysseus best for the task. Another attributes an unworthy motive to Diomedes, saying that he chose Odysseus because he considered him worthless and no rival (*Rhet.* 3.15 1416b8–14). Aristotle's example concerns a single action, but the basic idea can be extended to a series of similar actions or pattern of behavior: multiple explanations are possible and some may be complimentary, while others are damning.

library in Alexandria,¹³⁵ then we may suppose that a copy of the work was acquired by the library along with the other rhetorical works appearing in the second list. What is not clear is whether *On Non-technical Proofs* was a substantial work of some length, or a short piece not unlike chapter 1.15 in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. That chapter begins *περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων καλουμένων πίστεων* (1375a22). The word *καλουμένων*, "(so) called," reminds us that Aristotle is using his own terminology, already introduced and explained in 1.2 1355b35–9. The rest of the phrase, excluding the particle *δέ*, is no different than the Theophrastean title. In Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, it announces a discussion that runs less than five columns in Bekker's edition (1375a22–1377b11).

Aristotle distinguishes between technical and non-technical proofs. The technical proofs are three in number: persuasion through the character of the orator, emotional appeal and rhetorical argument. The non-technical proofs are five: laws, witnesses, contracts, the testimony of slaves taken under torture, and oaths (*νόμοι, μάρτυρες, συνθήκαι, βάσανοι, ὅρκοι* 1.15 1375a24–5). Aristotle tells us that we supply or construct the technical proofs. In contrast, the non-technical proofs are there at the outset; rather than provide them, we use them (1.2 1355b35–1356a1). It is clear that Aristotle's notion of non-technical proof is based on Athenian judicial procedure. At a preliminary hearing, documents were assembled which were available to be read out by a clerk during the actual courtroom proceeding. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant (nor the *logographos* of either party, should one be employed) constructed these documents, but each made use of them either to support his own position or to undermine that of the opponent.

Rhetorical discussion of documentary evidence predates Aristotle. Theodorus of Byzantium (fl. 400–380 B.C.) has been named as a forerunner;¹³⁶ most likely discussion began in the fifth century, when arguments based on probability were increasingly used to contradict the testimony of witnesses.¹³⁷ That could take us back to one of the founders of the art, namely Tisias, who is said to have written on probability (Plato, *Phaedrus* 273A–D, cf. 267A), but paucity of evidence prevents more than speculation. A contemporary of Aristotle, Anaximenes, if he is the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, discusses

¹³⁵ On the idea of separate library purchases, which is not accepted by all scholars, see p. 49–50.

¹³⁶ Mirhady (1991) p. 8.

¹³⁷ For a judicious summary statement see Kennedy (1963) p. 88–90.

documentary evidence under the heading ἐπίθετοι πίστεις, “supplementary proofs” (14 1431b9, cf. 7 1428a23). His treatment of the subject is not unlike that of Aristotle; the two may well be drawing on or at least influenced by the same rhetorical handbook(s). Be that as it may, it is clear that discussion of the subject originated independently of Aristotle’s three technical modes of proof, and that Anaximenes continued the discussion without reference to the triad. Since Theophrastus adopted the Aristotelian label “non-technical proofs,” we can assume that he followed his teacher by accepting the distinction between technical and non-technical proofs.

Aristotle’s remarks in *Rhetoric* 1.15 cover two different ways in which documentary material may be handled. First, documents may be used quite specifically: either with reference to the particular charge or to a particular fact relevant to the charge. For example, a law may be read out to make clear the legal basis of the charge, or to show that the law in question is contradicted by a second law, or even contradicts itself (1375b8–9). Similarly, the testimony of a witness may be introduced either to establish a fact important to the charge or some fact that tells against it (1376a12–14). Second, the value of documentary evidence may be dealt with in quite general terms. For example, the importance of abiding by written laws may be underscored by an appeal to an art like medicine. Conversely the superiority of equity may be introduced in order to weaken the authority of written law (1375a27–9). Similarly, the indispensability of witnesses may be emphasized, but so may be the possibility of corruption and false testimony (1376a19–23).¹³⁸

No text tells us that Theophrastus covered these two approaches to documentary evidence. Nor are we told that Theophrastus singled out and discussed Aristotle’s five topics. Nevertheless it seems likely that Theophrastus followed Aristotle in both regards. The fact that he

¹³⁸ In this paragraph, I have spoken first of “using” documentary evidence and then of “dealing with” such evidence. The reasoning behind the shift is as follows. At *Rhetoric* 1.2 1356a1, Aristotle says that we “use” the non-technical proofs. In the Greek text, the verb is χρῆσθαι; and the translation “to use” is common (see, e.g., Rhys Roberts in the Oxford vols. p. 2155 and Kennedy [1991] p. 37; Cope [1877] vol. 1 p. 28 translates “to employ”). I have no quarrel with the translation, providing we keep in mind that “to use” is better suited to (or more natural in) cases in which documentary material is introduced in order to support a claim or a premise within an argument. When documentary material itself becomes the subject of an argument that aims at enhancing or diminishing its value, then a translation like “to deal with” may be preferable. For the translation, see LSJ s.v. χράω C.III.4b.

wrote independent treatises on laws, contracts¹³⁹ and oaths¹⁴⁰ (589 no. 17–19, 21, 22) means that he was well prepared to develop Aristotle's recommendations on these subjects. For example, he may have explained the superiority of equity over written law by calling attention to exceptional situations, which lawgivers ignore (629–30).¹⁴¹ Again, he may have expanded Aristotle's remarks on contracts by listing criteria for determining when a seller is obligated to turn over property and when a buyer is empowered to take it (650.35–43).¹⁴² There are no reports of independent treatises on witnesses and torture, but if Theophrastus followed Aristotle (1376a2–7) and recognized the proverb as a kind of ancient witness, he may have added material from his own work on the subject (727 no. 14).

It is possible that Theophrastus added perspectives omitted by Aristotle. For example, he may have pointed out that the introduction of documentary evidence can serve purposes other than arguing the issue. It may benefit the delivery of the speaker by providing a pause in the oration, and it may provide pleasure to those jurors who enjoy hearing the same statement from multiple witnesses.¹⁴³ In

¹³⁹ Aristotle's section on contracts begins *περὶ δὲ συνθηκῶν* (1.15 1376a33); the Theophrastean title is *Περὶ συμβολαίων*, *On Contracts* (589 no. 21 = 650.1). In both cases the reference is to binding agreements which, when broken, become matters for litigation.

¹⁴⁰ Following Regenbogen col. 1516, we have listed the title *Περὶ ὅρκου*, *On Oath*, among the political titles (589 no.22 = 1.220). Since it occurs in the second list of Diogenes' catalogue along with all but one rhetorical title, there is reason to ask whether it might not be a rhetorical title referring to a work in which Theophrastus discussed how the orator should deal with oaths. The question cannot be answered with certainty, but it should be kept in mind that the second list also contains political titles: *To Cassander On Kingship*, *On Laws* and *On Illegalities* (589 no. 12, 19 and 20 = 1.207, 216 and 217). Moreover, it is likely that Theophrastus' rhetorical treatment of oaths was part of *On Non-technical Proofs*. Perhaps the title *On Oath* refers to a duplicate of a section of *On Non-technical Proofs*, but it seems simpler to believe that *On Oath* was an independent work with a political orientation. Finally, it is well to remember that our division by subject matter may not fit all titles. *On Oaths* may have been an inclusive work that treated the topic from various points of view including ethics, religion, politics and rhetoric.

¹⁴¹ With 629–30 cf. *Rhet.* 1375a28–b2. For discussion of the Theophrastean texts, see Mirhady (1992) p. 166–8 and Fortenbaugh (1993) p. 448–9.

¹⁴² With 650.35–43 cf. *Rhet.* 1376b23. For discussion, see Mirhady (1992) p. 214–29 and Fortenbaugh (1993) p. 451–5.

¹⁴³ Cf. Lysias, *Against Eratosthenes* 61. The speaker, Lysias himself, first says that the jurors know the facts and that witnesses are not necessary. He then has the testimony of witnesses read out, explaining that he needs a rest and that for some of the jurors it is more pleasant to hear the same evidence from as many persons as possible. Whether or not Lysias' need to rest is real, the jurors will not have rejected the idea as an absurdity.

addition, Theophrastus may have done more than list lines of argument appropriate to different kinds of documentary evidence. He may have added examples, historical or fictional, and provided for classroom exercises.¹⁴⁴ But all this is speculation.

I conclude on a sober note. No text can be assigned to *On Non-technical Proofs*; and despite reasons for thinking that Theophrastus may have expanded on ideas put forward by Aristotle, it is possible that he offered little more than a restatement of *Rhetoric* 1.15.

no. 9 *On Judicial Speeches*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.50 = 1.274

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 62–3; Usener (1858) p. 16–17; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1527; Lossau (1964) p. 48; Wehrli (1983) p. 498, 513; Sollenberger (1984) p. 367; Fortenbaugh (1998b) p. 183–4

The title *Περὶ δικάστικῶν λόγων*, *On Judicial Speeches*, occurs in the fourth list of Diogenes' catalogue. That makes it exceptional, for all the other rhetorical titles are found in the second list.¹⁴⁵ If pressed to explain the anomaly, I would suggest that it reflects different purchases by the library in Alexandria. The library first purchased the collection of texts whose titles make up Diogenes' second list. Subsequently it was pleased to purchase a much smaller collection that contained *On Judicial Speeches*, thereby filling a gap in regard to the rhetorical treatises of Theophrastus. That is, however, a guess. The works whose titles appear in Diogenes' fourth list could have been purchased first, and the idea of separate purchases by the library in Alexandria is not accepted by all scholars.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ For attacking the authority of written law, Aristotle lists nine lines of argument (1.15 1375a27–b15). The fourth line is an appeal to the ἔργον of law: a law that is not profitable is no law, for it fails to realize the function of law (1375b3–5). For many students it would be helpful to cite, e.g., the general Epaminondas, who violated the law by refusing to turn over the Theban army to his successor and then led the army to victory over Sparta. He was prosecuted in 369 B.C. and let go without penalty. Whatever his actual defense may have been (see Nepos, *Epaminondas* 8), he might have argued as follows: "If a law leads to harm, it is no law. But the law enjoining me to hand over the army would have led to defeat. Therefore, it is no law." For an example of how the argument might be fleshed out in a school exercise, see Cicero, *On Invention* 1.68–9.

¹⁴⁵ *On Slander* (666 no. 13) also occurs in the fourth list, but it appears in the second list and again in the third list as well.

¹⁴⁶ See p. 49–50.

That Theophrastus wrote a work concerned with judicial oratory is not surprising. Early rhetoricians focused on the court room,¹⁴⁷ and Aristotle treated judicial rhetoric as one of the three major kinds, the others being deliberative and epideictic rhetoric (*Rhet.* 1.3 1358a36–b29). Theophrastus did the same (671), and if the titles *On Counsel* (666 no. 11) and *On Praise* (666 no. 12) refer to works on deliberative and epideictic oratory, then Theophrastus will have provided separate treatises on all three kinds. Problematic is how *On Judicial Speeches* relates to several other works listed by Diogenes: *On Injustices*, *On Slander*, *On Clamor*, *Introductions* and *On Statement of the Case and Narration* (666 no. 9, 13, 14, 15, 16), for all the topics announced in these titles could be discussed in a work on judicial rhetoric. We may compare Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, in which three chapters on the material for prosecution and defense (1.10–12) are followed by one on injustices (1.13). In the later treatment of arrangement, we find discussion of the introduction to a judicial speech and of narration within such a speech (3.14, 16). The discussion of slander includes the refutation of charges of injustice (3.15) and the discussion of interrogation takes note of the clamor that follows upon an evasive answer (3.18).¹⁴⁸ It is possible that Theophrastus discussed these topics both in separate monographs and in *On Judicial Speeches* as well. But equally Theophrastus may have avoided duplication, and when lecturing on judicial oratory he may have made use of several different monographs. If that is what in fact happened, then *On Judicial Speeches* may have been a partial treatment of the topic, perhaps dealing only with material for prosecution and defense, i.e., the material discussed by Aristotle in three chapters of the *Rhetoric* (1.10–12).

According to John of Sardis, Theophrastus dissociated antithesis from encomia and taught that it belongs to speeches of controversy (693). That may suggest that *On Judicial Speeches* contained some discussion of antithesis, but there is little reason to assign John's report to *On Judicial Speeches*. Furthermore, Dionysius of Halicarnassus tells us that Theophrastus named Thrasymachus as the originator of compact expression. A few lines later, Dionysius says

¹⁴⁷ Cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 261B3–4, Isocrates, *Against the Sophists* 19 and Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.1 1354b25–7, with Schmidt (1839) p. 62–3.

¹⁴⁸ Aristotle's chapter on interrogation (3.18) is quite general and is not to be restricted to judicial oratory, but the use of interrogation before and during a trial was certainly in Aristotle's mind when he wrote the chapter. See Cope (1877) vol. 3 p. 210–11 and the commentary on 666 no. 14, below, p. 111–12 with n. 194.

that compact expression is necessary in forensic speeches (695). That too is suggestive: perhaps *On Judicial Speeches* had something to say on the topic. But even if it did, Dionysius is almost certainly drawing on the Theophrastean work *On Style* (666 no. 17a).

no. 10 *On Injustices*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.46 = 1.188

Literature: Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 124–5; Sollenberger (1984) p. 305–7

The title *Περὶ τῶν ἀδικημάτων*, *On Injustices*, occurs in the second list of Diogenes' catalogue. The list is arranged alphabetically and *On Injustices* finds its place among titles beginning with delta. Since *ἀδικημάτων* begins with alpha, the title may appear to be misplaced, but two explanations are possible. First, whoever put the list together focused on the stem of the word *ἀδικημάτων* — *dik*, “just” — and placed the title under delta. Second, that portion of the title that determined the position within the list has been lost. We may compare the opening sentence of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 1.13: τὰ δ' ἀδικήματα πάντα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διέλωμεν (1373b1–2). Here *δικαιώματα* occurs together with *ἀδικήματα*. Perhaps the opening sentence of the Theophrastean work also contained both words, and perhaps the title in its original form did too.¹⁴⁹ We can even imagine that the Aristotelian word order was reversed, so that *δικαιώματα* came first. I.e., the title in its original form was *Περὶ τῶν δικαιωμάτων καὶ τῶν ἀδικημάτων*. And if that was the case, then it is easy to imagine the eye of a copyist jumping from one τῶν to the next, so that *δικαιωμάτων καὶ τῶν* fell out. I prefer, however, the first explanation, not only because it is simpler but also because later in the second list we have a clear example of the stem of the key word of a title governing its position within the list. The title *Περὶ παρانونῶν* — stem *nom*, “law” — is placed under nu immediately after the title *Περὶ νόμων* (1.216–17 = 589 no. 19–20).

The preceding comparison with *Rhetoric* 1.13 together with the fact that all the rhetorical treatises but one occur in the second list suggests strongly that *On Injustices* was a rhetorical treatise. If so, it may have included much that Aristotle discusses in *Rhetoric* 1.10–

¹⁴⁹ In that case, the title would be based on or at least in agreement with the incipit. See above, p. 53.

14. In particular, it may have provided materials for both the prosecution and defense: motives (1.10–11), the condition of the wrongdoer, the kind of person to whom wrong is done and the sorts of wrong that are committed (1.12). In addition, there may have been a classification of unjust and just actions (1.13 1373b1–26),¹⁵⁰ an analysis of being wronged (b27–38), discussion of admitting a fact while denying the charge (1373b38–1374a18) and consideration of exceptional character in relation to just and unjust actions (a18–25). Both equity (a25–b23) and greater and lesser acts of injustice (1.14) may have been picked out for special treatment. But these topics are only possibilities. Theophrastus may have discussed them all, but equally he may have selected some and added others.

In text **530**, the Anonymous commentator on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* tells us that "Theophrastus does not subsume misfortunes under unjust acts, and Aristotle does not seem to do the same," Θεόφραστος . . . τὰ ἀτυχήματα οὐχ ὑπάγει τοῖς ἀδικήμασιν· ἔοικε δὲ μηδὲ Ἀριστοτέλης (lines 4–5). What interests me here is not the overly cautious manner in which the Anonymous expresses himself regarding Aristotle. It is rather that Aristotle distinguishes between unjust acts and misfortunes not only in the *Ethics* (*EN* 5.8 = *EE* 4.8 1135b11–23), but also in the *Rhetoric* within the discussion of injustices (1.13 1374b5–7).¹⁵¹ That might suggest that the report concerning Theophrastus comes from *On Injustices*, which was in the first instance a rhetorical work but also one which contained ethical material. With such a characterization of *On Injustices*, I have no quarrel. It is likely to have been a rhetorical work that overlapped on ethics. However, the first part of the suggestion seems to me unprovable and unlikely as well. In all probability, the report of the Anonymous goes back to an ethical work that is not identical with *On Injustices*.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ In Aristotle's *Rhetoric* the classification is based on two distinctions: one between positive law and common law and another between an individual and the community as a whole.

¹⁵¹ More precisely, the distinction between misfortunes and unjust acts occurs within the discussion of equity, which is part of the larger discussion of injustices.

¹⁵² An ethical treatise like *On the Voluntary* (**436** no. 6) may well have included a section in which Theophrastus distinguished between misfortunes and unjust acts. Of course, Theophrastus may have drawn the same distinction both in an ethical treatise and in a rhetorical one like *On Injustices*. I am only saying that the report of the Anonymous is likely to go back to an ethical treatise.

no. 11 *On Counsel*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.48 = 1.232

Literature: Spengel (1828) p. 4 n. 8; Schmidt (1839) p. 37; Usener (1858) p. 20; Rose p. 148; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1526; Wehrli (1983) p. 499, 513; Sollenberger (1984) p. 334

Theophrastus accepted Aristotle's tripartite division of speeches into deliberative, judicial and epideictic (671). He also wrote a work *Περὶ δικανικῶν λόγων*, *On Judicial Speeches* (666 no. 9). It is reasonable, therefore, to ask whether Theophrastus wrote corresponding works on deliberative and epideictic speeches. In particular, we want to know whether *Περὶ συμβουλῆς*, *On Counsel*, discussed deliberative oratory, and *Περὶ ἐπαίνου*, *On Praise*, (666 no. 12) dealt with epideictic. In both cases a positive answer seems to be correct — both titles are found in the second list, where all but one of the rhetorical titles occurs¹⁵³ — but there are grounds for hesitation and qualification. I return to *Περὶ ἐπαίνου* below (on title no. 12) and take up *Περὶ συμβουλῆς* here.

At issue is the Greek word *συμβουλή*. It is used in reference to counsel or advice offered in a public or civic context like the Athenian *βουλή* and *ἐκκλησία*, but it can also be used in a more inclusive way.¹⁵⁴ We may compare Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 1.3, where three kinds of rhetorical speeches are distinguished, the *συμβουλευτικόν*, *δικανικόν* and *ἐπιδεικτικόν* (1358b7–8). Aristotle characterizes the activity of *συμβουλή* as protreptic and apotreptic, and then explains that both those who give advice in private and those who speak in public always do one or the other (1358b8–10). Here *συμβουλή* is used broadly to cover exhortation and dissuasion in private as well as in public situations, and that may suggest understanding the Theophrastean title broadly. For had Theophrastus wished to make clear that he had written a work exclusively concerned with deliberative oratory in public assemblies, he might have chosen a title like *Περὶ τοῦ συμβουλευτικοῦ (γένους)* or *Περὶ συμβουλευτικῶν λόγων*.¹⁵⁵ Such an argument is by no means foolish, but it must be

¹⁵³ See, above, p. 49 and 96.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. Plato's *Gorgias* 520D–E, where Socrates draws a distinction between offering advice for a fee (*τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συμβουλὰς συμβουλεύειν λαμβάνοντα ἀργύριον* D9–10) and doing so without payment. The former includes technical advice such as how to build a house; the latter covers individual goodness, household management and the governance of a city.

¹⁵⁵ The latter possibility would correspond to *Περὶ δικανικῶν λόγων* (666 no. 9). See Schmidt (1839) p. 37, who interprets *Περὶ συμβουλῆς* widely and con-

weighed against other considerations. Here are three. First, there are many passages in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, where συμβουλή is used with special reference to deliberative oratory. The clearest are those in which συμβουλή is opposed to δίκη (singular and plural 2.1 1377b21–2, 25–6, 30, 3.17 1418b7) or used to express the essence of deliberative speaking in contrast with that of judicial oratory (3.13 1414b4). Similarly at the end of 1.3 in a passage which is transitional to the discussion of deliberative oratory, we find συμβουλή in combination with οἱ ἐπιδεικτικοὶ λόγοι and αἱ δίκαι (1359a28–9). Hence in 1.4 at the beginning of the discussion of deliberative oratory, it is natural to construe συμβουλή narrowly as political counsel (1359a34).¹⁵⁶ Aristotle is turning to the topics on which deliberative orators offer public advice (περὶ ἃ ἀγορεύουσιν οἱ συμβουλευόντες 1359b19).¹⁵⁷ He lists five major topics of debate in a civic assembly: namely, revenues, war, defense, imports and legislation (1359b18–23) and then discusses them one after the other. That does not rule out an occasional reference to private matters, for a topic like happiness concerns the individual as well as the city (1.5 1360b4, 34, 1361a30). But it remains true that Aristotle's primary focus is on deliberation in a political assembly, and that encourages me to believe that the Theophrastean work Περὶ συμβουλῆς was above all concerned with deliberative speeches in a civic context.

Second, we should take notice of the lost Aristotelian work *On Counsel*. It is listed as Περὶ συμβουλίας in the catalogue preserved by Diogenes Laertius (no. 88, p. 46 Düring) and as Περὶ συμβουλῆς in that of Hesychius (no. 80, p. 85 D.). The variation in title does not indicate two different works. In both catalogues, the title comes at the end of the list of rhetorical and poetic titles, and a possible fragment seems clearly related to deliberative oratory (Rose³ fr. 135).¹⁵⁸ From such meager evidence no firm conclusion can be

cludes, "quid impedit quo minus auctorem in hoc libro de consilio dando petendove egisse credamus?"

¹⁵⁶ I do not want to deny that what is said here concerning the subjects of deliberation (neither what is necessary or impossible, nor what occurs by nature or chance is a proper subject of deliberation) applies to the deliberations of individuals as well as to those of political orators. I want only to say that Aristotle's focus is on the latter and that συμβουλή should be interpreted accordingly. The use of βουλευέσθαι four lines later (1.4 1359a38) is another matter. The word seems to be used to widen the discussion to include the deliberations of individuals.

¹⁵⁷ The verb ἀγορεύειν appears to be used in its first meaning: "to speak in the assembly." See Grimaldi vol. 1 p. 93.

¹⁵⁸ Moraux p. 104.

drawn in regard to the Theophrastean work, but perhaps we can say that the works of the two Peripatetics may have been similar in that they were primarily — though perhaps not exclusively — concerned with deliberative oratory.

Third, it is not certain that Theophrastus himself assigned the titles that are found in Diogenes' catalogue. They may be the work of a pupil or other person, who found the word συμβουλή in the incipit or simply chose it as a suitable indicator of the contents. If that is the case, questions concerning Theophrastus' reasons for choosing the title are no longer meaningful, but we should not conclude that the title deserves no consideration whatsoever. For if συμβουλή occurred in the incipit, it may well have been used with special reference to deliberative oratory. We may compare two passages already mentioned above: in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, the final sentence of 1.3 announces a discussion περὶ ὧν συμβουλή (1359a28), and the first sentence of 1.4 concludes with the word συμβουλή (1359a30). And if the title was chosen as suitable to the content, it need not have been a blind guess. Theophrastus may well have used the word συμβουλή throughout the work and done so in much the same way as Aristotle does in the *Rhetoric*, i.e., with special reference to deliberative oratory.

Text **694** might be referred to *On Counsel*, but it can just as well be assigned to *On Style* (**666** no. 17a).

no.12 *On Praise*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.46 = **1.190**

Literature: Usener (1858) p. 20; Wehrli (1983) p. 498; Sollenberger (1984) p. 307–8

Like Περὶ συμβουλῆς, *On Counsel* (**666** no. 11), the work Περὶ ἐπαίνου, *On Praise*, seems in place among the rhetorical treatises. The former will have discussed deliberative oratory, and the latter epideictic. When the two works are combined with Περὶ δικανικῶν λόγων, *On Judicial Speeches* (**666** no. 9), we have three works covering each of the major divisions of oratory. There are, of course, objections to this view.¹⁵⁹ I mention four. First, comparison with *On*

¹⁵⁹ Schmidt (1839) does not include *On Praise* in his discussion of the rhetorical titles. Wehrli (1983) lists it among the rhetorical titles (p. 498) but later tells us that of the three major areas of rhetorical activity Theophrastus made two the subject of independent treatises: i.e., he discussed judicial oratory in *On Judicial Speeches* and deliberative oratory in *On Counsel* (513).

Judicial Speeches suggests a title like *Περὶ ἐπιδεικτικῶν λόγων*, *On Epideictic Speeches*, and not *On Praise*. Second, a full treatment of epideictic oratory should cover blame or censure (ψόγος) as well as praise, but the title *On Praise* gives no indication of that. Third, praise has a place in ethics and politics;¹⁶⁰ the absence of any explicit reference to oratory or the epideictic genre may indicate that the work is ethical or political and not rhetorical. Fourth, praise takes various forms. It occurs not only as prose but also as poetry.¹⁶¹ Hence, we can not be certain that *On Praise* was exclusively or even primarily rhetorical in its orientation. These objections are grounds for hesitation, but they are not decisive. The first is telling only if we believe that coordinate works must have similar titles. Theophrastus may not have shared that premise; in any case, he may not have considered the matter if the works were written at different times. Furthermore, it is not certain who assigned the titles contained in the catalogue of Diogenes Laertius. If they are not attributable to Theophrastus, but rather to someone else who assigned them on the basis of the incipit, then we can say that the opening line or lines of the work referred to praise. That does not prove that the work had a rhetorical orientation, but neither does it disprove such a connection.¹⁶² The second objection presupposes that a title must cover the whole of a subject — in the case before us, blame as well as praise — but that is a false presupposition. Titles often focus on what comes first or is more important.¹⁶³ In addition, a title may be transmitted in abbreviated form. We may compare the title *On Affirmation* (68 no. 3c). It is almost certainly an abbreviation of *On Affirmation and Denial* (68 no. 3a), but it is no less useful for being shorter. The third objection reminds us that praise is a subject that cuts across disciplines, but it does not disprove a rhetorical orientation. We might just

¹⁶⁰ See 467.5–6 on the role of praise in moral education, 518.9–10 on praise resulting from kindness, and 522.1–2 on the discernment looked for in the person who praises and accuses.

¹⁶¹ That ἔπαινος can be used widely to cover praise in various forms needs little or no documentation. Here is one example from Plato's *Laws* that explicitly recognizes the several forms and contexts in which praise and blame, ἔπαινος and ψόγος, occur: ὅσοι τε ἐν ποιήμασιν ἔπαινοι καὶ ψόγοι περὶ τινῶν λέγονται καὶ ὅσοι καταλογάδην εἴτ' ἐν γράμμασιν εἴτε καθ' ἡμέραν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πάσαις συνουσίαις (957C8–D2).

¹⁶² Cf. similar remarks concerning the title *On Counsel*, above on p. 102.

¹⁶³ For example, the title *On the Voluntary* (436 no. 6) does not exclude discussion of the involuntary; rather it gives emphasis to the positive — and in some contexts more important — term.

as well argue that the absence of any explicit reference to ethics and politics indicates that the work is primarily rhetorical. Moreover, the occurrence of the title in the second list of Diogenes' catalogue along with all but one of the rhetorical titles suggests with some force that work was rhetorical in orientation. The fourth objection cannot be dismissed. *On Praise*, like *On Style* (666 no. 17b), may have had much to say that relates to poetics, but prose and in particular epideictic oratory is likely to have taken center stage. At least the few surviving texts that might be attributed to *On Praise* are found in rhetorical contexts. (See the last paragraph of this comment.)

It may be instructive to look at Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. In 1.3 where the threefold division of rhetoric is first introduced, Aristotle speaks of an epideictic branch (ἐπιδεικτικόν 1.3 1358b8) and then explains epideictic in terms of praise and blame (ἐπιδεικτικοῦ δὲ το μὲν ἔπαινος τὸ δὲ ψόγος 1358b12–13). At the end of 1.5, i.e. within the discussion of the materials of deliberative oratory, Aristotle refers to his later treatment of epideictic by using the phrase “on praise” (περὶ ἐπαίνου 1.5 1362a13); and in 1.9, within that later treatment, he uses “praise” and “counsels” together (ὁ ἔπαινος καὶ αἱ συμβουλαί 1367b36), when pointing out how advice given in a deliberative context can become praise through a change in expression. If Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is a fair guide for interpreting Theophrastean titles, these passages provide reason for assigning *On Praise* to rhetoric and for believing that it and *On Counsel* discussed major divisions of the art. Of course, the passage cited from *Rhetoric* 1.5 is concerned with virtue and not vice,¹⁶⁴ so that it seems appropriate to use the phrase “on praise,” omitting any reference to blame. But that should not obscure the fact that Aristotle's discussion of epideictic concentrates on praise. Blame receives little attention; for as the opposite of praise, it can be understood and engaged in by anyone who has already mastered praise (1.9 1368a36–7). The Theophrastean work may have been similar; and if so, the short title *On Praise* is not a misrepresentation.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁴ At 1.5 1362a12–13, Aristotle postpones discussion of virtue until 1.9.

¹⁶⁵ The term “epideictic” is not immediately clear as a generic label for speeches of praise and blame (see Buchheit p. 120–8 and Adamietz p. 98–9). It is not impossible that Theophrastus reflected on this lack of clarity and recognized that the division of epideictic oratory into praise and blame is largely theoretical. The division does create balance with judicial and deliberative oratory in which opposed speeches are the rule — judicial oratory divides into accusation and defense, deliberative oratory into persuading and dissuading — but whole speeches of blame or censure were (and are) rare. To be sure training in the rhetorical schools included both praising and censuring a given subject (e.g., Helen), but in adult civic

In introducing his discussion of the materials of praise and blame, i.e., virtue and vice and the noble and shameful, Aristotle tells us that praise may be devoid of seriousness. He mentions the praise of animals and inanimate objects, and says that the premises needed for frivolous praise are to be acquired in the same way as those for serious praise (1.9 1366a28–32). Aristotle is taking note *inter alia* of sophistic display pieces,¹⁶⁶ and Theophrastus may have done the same in *On Praise*. But in his subsequent remarks, Aristotle all but ignores frivolous praise,¹⁶⁷ and my guess is that Theophrastus gave it equally little space in *On Praise*.

Toward the end of *Rhetoric* 1.9, Aristotle takes up the encomium (ἐγκώμιον) and amplification (αὔξησις). The former is said to concern deeds as against capacity or virtue (1367b26–33);¹⁶⁸ the latter is called most suitable to epideictic oratory (1368a27). We cannot be certain that Theophrastus' work *On Praise* covered these topics, but it is quite likely that it did.¹⁶⁹ More problematic is the relationship of texts

life there was no equivalent. When citizens gathered at, say, a public funeral, the facts concerning the deceased were accepted largely without challenge: e.g., the fallen heroes had faced the enemy and fought to the death without retreat. The deeds were amplified; no opposed speech of censure was expected or permitted. Reflections of this sort may have encouraged Theophrastus to abandon balance and to write a treatise solely on praise. And if that is what he did, then he may have influenced the Stoics, who called the third part of rhetoric "encomiastic" (Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 7.42). But all of this is speculation, and in my judgment the title *On Praise* is most likely an abbreviation that is not intended to eliminate speeches of censure.

¹⁶⁶ E.g., speeches in praise of bumblebees and salt. See Plato, *Symposium* 177B5–6 and Isocrates, *Helen* 12, and cf. *Panathenaicus* 135.

¹⁶⁷ It is a mistake to see a reference to sophistic display speeches in *Rhetoric* 1.3 1358b6: ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ὁ θεωρός. Whether or not the words are genuine, there is no reference to the capacity (δύναμις) of an orator: i.e., to the speaker's ability to display his own talents. Rather the capacity in question is the virtue of the person praised (1.9 1366a36, b4). The greatness of his virtue is made clear; his actions are presented as virtuous (1.9 1367b28–9). The listener is a viewer, because nothing needs to be judged. There is agreement concerning the actions of the subject, so that the task of the orator is to clothe his actions with greatness and beauty (1.9 1368a26–9).

¹⁶⁸ The appropriateness of these lines in their place within 1.9 has been questioned, but wrongly I believe. See the sensible remarks of Grimaldi vol. 1 p. 213.

¹⁶⁹ The idea that Theophrastus wrote a separate rhetorical work *Περὶ αὔξεως*, *On Amplification*, depends upon a single manuscript, Co, which divides the title Ἀριθμητικῶν ιστοριῶν περὶ αὔξεως α' (264 no. 2) in two, and on Meurs, who places a book number between the two halves. That gives Ἀριθμητικῶν ιστοριῶν α' · Περὶ αὔξεως α'. The emended title is accepted by Regenbogen col. 1523, but it is unnecessary. The title as transmitted in the major manuscripts, BFP, makes good sense, so that we have printed it in the text-translation volumes. See Sollenberger (1984) p. 365.

677, **678** and **679** to *On Praise*. The first two are a pair, both taken from John of Sardis' commentary *On the Preparatory Exercises of Aphthonius*. The general subject is the encomium, and the second text refers to Theophrastus' *Arts*. Presumably the first text as well may be assigned Theophrastus' *Arts*, but the interpretation of the title *Arts* is uncertain. John may be referring collectively to (some of) Theophrastus' *monobibla*, one of which may be *On Praise*. (See the commentary on **666** no. 2b.) The third text is from the so-called *Laurentian Epitome* and contains a list of six modes of amplification. No Theophrastean work is mentioned. The list could have appeared in *On Praise*, some other work, or in more than one work.

580 no. 1 *Encomia of Gods*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.47 = **1.195**

Literature: Rose (1863) p. 598; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1511; Henrichs (1972) p. 94–7; Sollenberger (1984) p. 310–11; Gigante (1999) p. 90–1

The title Ἐγκώμια θεῶν, *Encomia of Gods*, occurs in the second list of Diogenes' catalogue. We have assigned it to the section on religion. In a fragment of Philodemus' *On Piety*, we read "... in ... the statement that Athena is wisdom and Zeus intellect. In the *Encomia of the Gods* very many ... " (**581**). In the second half of the fragment, we have the Theophrastean title, albeit with the addition of the definite article. In the first half, Athena is identified as wisdom and Zeus as intellect. That is suggestive in regard to the contents of the Theophrastean work, but it must be underlined that the reference to the *Encomia of the Gods* follows the identification of Zeus and Athena with wisdom and intellect, respectively. In fact, the reference begins a new sentence. More importantly, Theophrastus himself is not named, so that text **581** may not even be a Theophrastean text. Be that as it may, the Theophrastean title recorded by Diogenes seems correctly placed within the section on religion. The work may have been a collection of encomia or a collection together with some commentary. The encomia may have been written in prose or verse,¹⁷⁰ and some may have been less than serious.¹⁷¹ It is possible

¹⁷⁰ Cf. *Rhet.* 2.11 1388b21–2, where Aristotle speaks of praises and encomia by poets and prose-writers.

¹⁷¹ Cf. *Rhet.* 1.9 1366a28–31, where Aristotle refers to non-serious praise of a man, a god, inanimate things and any of the lower animals. Among playful encomia, the best known may be Gorgias' *Helen*, which the sophist calls an encomium of Helen and an amusement for himself (21).

that Theophrastus included encomia of his own within the collection, but no surviving text supports the idea.

In both the *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.12 and the *Eudemian Ethics* 2.1, Aristotle draws a distinction between felicitation, εὐδαιμονισμός, which is appropriate to the gods, and praise and encomium, ἔπαινος and ἐγκώμιον, both of which are directed toward men.¹⁷² Praise is concerned with a man's character, while encomia deal with particular deeds: τὰ δ' ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων (*NE* 1101b32–3), τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον λόγος τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔργου (*EE* 1219b15–16). The same notion of encomium is found in *Rhetoric* 1.9, τὸ δ' ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἔργων (1367b28–9), and if pressed, it might lead one to declare the Theophrastean title a confusion. We call gods blessed and bestow felicitations on them (μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν, *NE* 1101b24), and do not offer them an encomium on the basis of some particular deed or deeds. We may compare the *progymnasmata*, preliminary exercises, with which students of rhetoric began their training. These exercises developed during the Hellenistic period¹⁷³ and regularly distinguish between encomia and hymns. The former eulogize men, while the latter celebrate gods.¹⁷⁴ Nevertheless, caution is called for. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle seems to admit that his distinctions may not stand up. After telling us that encomia are concerned with deeds, he notes that precision in these matters is more the business of those who have made a study of encomia (1101b34–5).¹⁷⁵ Moreover, the writers of *progymnasmata* tell us that the term ἐγκώμιον derives from the custom of eulogizing the gods in a κῶμος, a revel, or in κῶμαι, villages,¹⁷⁶ and the earliest of these writers, Theon, uses the verb ἐγκωμιάζειν with reference to eulogizing heroes and gods as well as mortal men, whether alive or dead.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷² More precisely, felicitation is appropriately bestowed on the gods and the most godlike of men (*NE* 1.12 1101b23–5).

¹⁷³ Cf. Kennedy (1963) p. 270, (1999) p. vi.

¹⁷⁴ Theon, *Progymn.* 8 p. 109.22–4 Spengel, Hermogenes 7 p. 11.18–20, Aphthonius 8 p. 35.27–9.

¹⁷⁵ The catalogue of Aristotelian writings preserved by Hesychius contains a four-part supplement to the catalogue as found in Diogenes. In the third part, we find the title Τέχνη ἐγκωμιστική (no. 178 Düring; the title occurs in the accusative case). Moraux (1951) p. 259–60 deems the title spurious. He suggests that the work in question is based on the *Rhetoric to Alexander* 3 1425b36–1426b21.

¹⁷⁶ For κῶμος see Theon, *Progymn.* 8 p. 109.26–8 Sp., and for κῶμαι, see Hermogenes 7 p. 11.22–4 and Aphthonius 8 p. 35.26–7.

¹⁷⁷ I.e., the earliest of the writers whose work survives, namely, Theon (1st cent. B.C.). See *Progymn.* p. 109.24–6 Sp.

Apparently recognizing a narrow, technical use of “encomium” does not rule out an inclusive, non-technical use,¹⁷⁸ so that the Theophrastean title need not be a confusion. Ἐγκώμια is used in a non-technical sense, and the addition of θεῶν specifies the kind of encomia that are collected in the work.¹⁷⁹

We have mentioned *Encomia of Gods* within the list of rhetorical and poetic titles, because a collection of encomia of divinities could serve as useful models for both students of prose and poetry. That is obvious in the case of students interested in composing or simply analyzing hymns to the gods. In the case of students interested in eulogizing men, the collection could also be helpful. For it would not only exhibit a common subject matter, great deeds in conjunction with superior character, but also bring to the fore stylistic issues like elevated diction and elegant composition.¹⁸⁰

no.13 *On Slander*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.46 = 1.189, 5.49 = 1.252, 5.50 = 1.275

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 63; Usener (1858) p. 13, 16–17, 20; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1524–5; Lossau (1964) p. 48; Sollenberger (1984) p. 307; Fortenbaugh (1998b) p. 184–5, 7

The title Περὶ διαβολῆς, *On Slander*, occurs three times in Diogenes’ catalogue of Theophrastean titles. More precisely, it is found in the second, third and fourth of the lists recorded by Diogenes. If each of the lists represents a separate purchase by the

¹⁷⁸ We may compare Plato. On occasion he distinguishes between encomia and hymns, the former celebrating good men and the latter gods (*Republic* 10 607A4), but he does not always observe the distinction. See, e.g., *Symposium* 177A8–B1, 180C5.

¹⁷⁹ We may compare the title Ἐγκώμια ἢ ὕμνοι. It is found in Hesychius’ catalogue of Aristotelian writings, in the third part of the supplement to Diogenes’ catalogue (no. 180 Düring; the title occurs in the accusative case). The title is followed by the word διαφορά, which Moraux p. 261–2 construes as a gloss added by someone who wished to make clear that encomia and hymns are distinct genre. Düring follows Rose and treats διαφορά as a fragment of a title: namely, Περὶ διαφορᾶς. My preference is to follow Düring and Rose, but whatever the truth concerning διαφορά, it seems to me simplest to construe ἢ as the conjunction “or,” which is used here to introduce an alternative title that clarifies the use of ἐγκώμια. (For this use of ἢ, cf. title 177 Düring, Περὶ ῥήτορος ἢ πολιτικοῦ, where πολιτικοῦ restricts the meaning of ῥήτορος. See Moraux p. 258–9.)

¹⁸⁰ Cf. Theon p. 109.24–6: “Whether one eulogizes (ἐγκωμιάζειν) men who are alive or dead, or heroes or gods, the method of speaking is one and the same.”

library at Alexandria, then it is reasonable to assume that the library possessed three copies of *Περὶ διαβολῆς*. Most likely the copies were duplicates without significant variation.¹⁸¹ It is, however, conceivable that different versions of the work were represented.¹⁸²

We know that rhetoricians of the fifth and fourth century discussed slander. In the *Phaedrus*, Plato has Socrates say that Thrasymachus was “most powerful in slandering and removing slander, whatever the source” (267D2).¹⁸³ The *Rhetoric to Alexander*, most likely the *Ars* of Anaximenes, offers remarks on slander when discussing the introduction (29 1436b38–1437b33, 36 1442a21–b28), and at the very beginning of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, we are told that the contemporary writers of handbooks dealt with topics like slander, pity and anger (1.1 1354a15–18).¹⁸⁴ Later in the *Rhetoric*, in chapters that resemble a handbook,¹⁸⁵ Aristotle remarks that a plaintiff uses the epilogue for slanderous accusation, while the defendant uses the introduction to remove any slander that will prevent him from being well received (3.14 1415a27–34). The *Rhetoric* even contains a chapter devoted to slander, in which lines of argument useful for removing and producing slander are listed (3.15 1416a4–b15).¹⁸⁶ This chapter is introduced by the phrase “on slander” (*περὶ διαπολῆς* 1416a4) and may have formed the basis of the Theophrastean work or (more likely) a portion of the same.

The title *Περὶ διαβολῆς* has been translated “*On Slander*.” That is in line with previous translations: e.g., *De calumnia* and *Über die*

¹⁸¹ Of course, the library may have sold duplicate copies, so that if it did purchase three identical copies, it may have retained only one. On library purchases (the idea is not accepted by all scholars), see the introduction to this section on the “Titles of Books” above, p. 49–50.

¹⁸² The same may be true of *Ethical Characters* (436 no. 4). See above, p. 88.

¹⁸³ Artium script. B 9 no. 6 p. 71: διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολὰς ὁθενδὴ κράτιστος.

¹⁸⁴ The mention of slander in combination with pity and fear recalls *Phaedrus* 267C7–D2, where the same triad is mentioned in connection with the strength of Thrasymachus. The ordering of the triad is, of course, different as are the words used to refer to pity, but it is still tempting to see a connection between the two texts, or between the Aristotelian text and a lost work of Thrasymachus.

¹⁸⁵ I.e., in 3.14–19. On the handbook-like character of these chapters, see, e.g., Fortenbaugh (1992) p. 235–7.

¹⁸⁶ Not surprisingly the lines of argument (τόποι) listed in *Rhetoric* 3.15 exhibit connections with the lengthy survey of lines of argument in 2.23 (e.g., both chapters consider motives and offer the same example: namely Diomedes’ selection of Odysseus for the embassy to Achilles [2.23 1399b28–9, 3.15 1416b12–14]) and with the discussion of apparent enthymemes in 2.24 (e.g., both chapters consider arguing falsely from a consequent and offer the example of being finely dressed which is characteristic of adulterers [2.24 1401b24, 3.15 1416a23]).

Verleumdung.¹⁸⁷ It also calls attention to that kind of accusation — malicious falsehood¹⁸⁸ — which is likely to have been prominent in the Theophrastean work. We should, however, keep in mind that the noun διαβολή and the cognate verb διαβάλλειν cover more than slander.¹⁸⁹ The Greek words can be used to refer to charges that may or may not be false; they can even be used in reference to matters that are not part of any charge or accusation but nevertheless arouse prejudice against a speaker. We may compare the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, in which διαβολή and διαβάλλειν occur in connection with prejudice arising from indisputable facts like the age of a speaker and his physical attributes. In a deliberative setting, youth arouses resentment (29 1437a32–5); and in a court of law, when the charge is violent assault, the physical superiority of the defendant creates a presumption of guilt (36 1442a24–9). Whether Theophrastus discussed prejudice arising from such matters must remain a question; but if Περί διαβολῆς was an extended discussion of the subject, it is likely that he did.

While *On Slander* was most likely a rhetorical treatise,¹⁹⁰ it is at least possible that the title refers to an ethical or political work, or (what is more likely) one that combined rhetorical concerns with those of ethics and politics. Our collection of source-texts provides little guidance, for there is only one text, **445**, in which Theophrastus is named in connection with διαβολή. It is preserved by Stobaeus 3.12.17 and runs as follows: Θεοφράστου· ἐκ διαβολῆς καὶ φθόνου ψεῦδος ἐπ’ ὀλίγον ἰσχύσαν ἀπεμαράνθη, “Theophrastus: As a result of slander and envy falsehood prevailed for a short while (and then) lost its force.” The use of the aorist may refer to a particular

¹⁸⁷ Wehrli (1983) 498. In the Loeb edition of Diogenes Laertius, vol. 1 p. 497, R. Hicks translates “*On Calumny*.”

¹⁸⁸ The connection between διαβολή and malice is common. For a well-known and clear example, see Plato’s *Apology* 20E3, where Socrates says that he possesses no wisdom greater than human wisdom and whoever says that he does lies and speaks to arouse prejudice against him: ὅστις φησὶ ψεύδεται τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει.

¹⁸⁹ See, e.g., Schmidt (1839) p. 63–4, Cope (1867) p. 344 and Kennedy (1991) p. 262–3 n. 192.

¹⁹⁰ In the fourth list of Diogenes’ catalogue, Περί διαβολῆς, *On Slander*, occurs immediately after Περί δίκανικῶν λόγων, *On Judicial Speeches* (666 no. 9). The location seems appropriate, for slander and the need to counter it are common in judicial speeches. That may appear to support classifying *On Slander* as a rhetorical work, but in fact the proximity of the two titles depends entirely upon the alphabetical arrangement of this portion of the catalogue. Subject matter is not a factor.

event, or it may be a gnomic aorist.¹⁹¹ In either case, the sentence could derive from an ethical work — it has been printed among the ethical texts — or from a political work or even one on rhetoric such as *Περὶ διαβολῆς*. For orators and teachers of oratory have long understood that an envious audience is receptive to the falsehoods of slander.

no.14 *On Clamor*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.47 = 1.202

Literature: Usener (1858) p. 20; Sollenberger (1984) p. 314, 448

The title *Περὶ θορύβου*, *On Clamor*, occurs in the second list along with most other rhetorical titles. Almost certainly the work contained discussion of the noise, *θόρυβος*, that an audience sometimes makes in response to the words of a speaker. For a well-known example, I cite Plato's *Apology*, where Socrates admonishes the jurors not to interrupt him with hostile shouts when he speaks in his accustomed manner, seems to boast, and refuses to change his behavior (17D1, 20E4, 30C2, 3). It would, however, be a mistake to think only of hostile jurors. Members of a political assembly or any other kind of gathering can express themselves with noise, and the noise may manifest approval as well as disapproval. For a non-political example, I cite Plato's *Protagoras*, where the listeners greet the answers of the sophist with noisy approbation (334C7, 339D10). And for an inclusive recognition of approval and disapproval in a variety of gatherings, I cite Plato's *Republic*, where Socrates speaks of the multitude that comes together in courtrooms, assemblies, theaters, camps or any other common gathering. The multitude is said to express itself with much uproar, censuring some of the things that are said and done, while praising others (492B5–9).¹⁹² Against this background, we are not surprised to find Aristotle taking note of *θόρυβος*, clamor, in his *Rhetoric*.¹⁹³ He mentions the disapproving uproar that followed Androcles' indictment of the law (2.23 1400a10), and he takes note of a similar response that occurs when an opponent is unable to respond in a straightforward manner to a question (3.18

¹⁹¹ For further discussion, see Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 157, commentary to L7.

¹⁹² The passages cited from Plato exhibit the verb *θορυβεῖν* as well as the noun *θόρυβος*. The verb occurs in the several passages cited from the *Apology* and in the first passage from the *Protagoras*. In the second passage from the *Protagoras* and in that from the *Republic*, we have the noun.

¹⁹³ In the *Rhetoric*, the noun *θόρυβος*, is not found, but the verb *θορυβεῖν* occurs at least five times.

1419a16).¹⁹⁴ He also tells us that enthymemes excite a louder (positive) response than the use of examples (1.2 1356b23), and that syllogisms are most applauded when the audience foresees the conclusion (2.23 1400b29). The latter is of especial interest, for Aristotle explains the response in terms of audience psychology: anticipating the conclusion, the audience is pleased with itself (b31–2). In addition, Aristotle recognizes that speakers may overwhelm the audience with noise (3.7 1408a25). Having nothing to say, the speaker expresses himself with passion, so that the audience shares the passion of the speaker and finds him credible (a20–4). Here, too, Aristotle introduces audience psychology, but he does not collect his thoughts on θόρυβος within a single chapter devoted to clamor.¹⁹⁵

It was Theophrastus, who made clamor into an independent topic. Most likely *On Clamor* was a short work that focused on rhetorical situations, but it is possible that Theophrastus developed the theme in a monograph of some length. In addition to rhetorical situations, the work may have taken account of, e.g., military campaigns and other undertakings in which discipline is important and clamor often a cause or symptom of failure. Be that as it may, one Theophrastean text, **619**, makes reference to clamor. According to Plutarch, Theophrastus reported that the Athenians proposed Demosthenes for a certain prosecution, and when Demosthenes did not accept, a clamor arose. Thereupon, Demosthenes stood up and said, ὑμεῖς ἐμοὶ ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι συμβούλω μὲν, κἂν μὴ θέλητε, χρήσεσθε· συκοφάντη δ' οὐδ' ἂν θέλητε: “Men of Athens, you will have use of my services as a counselor, even if you do not want them, but not as a false accuser, even if you do.” The response is clever and well formed. Antithesis is combined with repetition of an initial dative singular followed by an almost identical “if”-clause

¹⁹⁴ As I read the text of Aristotle, the audience responds negatively to an evasive answer, but a different interpretation is possible. The audience is partial to the speaker who puts the question and responds positively to the discomfiture of the respondent. Perhaps it is unnecessary to decide between these two interpretations, for the response of the audience may be mixed, and the words θόρυβος and θορυβεῖν are neutral in regard to approval and disapproval. As Cope puts it, they “may be used of expressions of either pleasure or displeasure on the part of the audience” (vol. 3 p. 213).

¹⁹⁵ V. Bers, “Dikastic *Thorubos*,” in *Crux: Essays Presented to G. E. M. de Ste Croix on His 75th Birthday*, ed. P. Cartledge and F. D. Harvey (Exeter: Imprint Academic 1985) p. 5 connects Aristotle’s failure to focus on θόρυβος with disdain and comments that this disdain “is consistent with his (Aristotle’s) explicit refusal to treat delivery.” Bers does not mention Theophrastus’ *Περὶ θορύβου*.

(μή is lacking in the second occurrence, thereby creating the anti-thesis). That raises a new possibility: namely, that Theophrastus discussed ways to counter uproar and did so by focusing on clever remarks that are stylistically striking.¹⁹⁶ But that is only speculation, and text **619** has not been included among the rhetorical texts. It is has been assigned to the section on politics.

no. 15 *Introductions*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.48 = 1.229

Literature: Fabricius (1793) p. 454; Schmidt (1839) p. 55–7; Usener (1858) p. 10, 20; Rose (1863) p. 141; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1526; Stark (1958) p. 103; Wehrli (1983) p. 499, 514; Sollenberger (1984) p. 330–1

The title Προοιμίων α', *Introductions*, 1 book, is found in Diogenes' catalogue of titles — more precisely, in the second list, which contains the majority of the rhetorical titles. The reading of the manuscripts is unanimous. Nevertheless, several scholars have wanted to emend the text. Fabricius recommended reading Παροιμιῶν α', *Proverbs*, one book. The change is not great and might be suggested by corruption in the catalogues of Aristotelian writings. In Diogenes' catalogue, Παροιμίαι α' occurs (5.26); in Hesychius the title has been corrupted to Προοιμίων α' (no. 127 Düring).¹⁹⁷ Moreover, παροιμιῶν does occur in the Theophrastean text **737**, where Rose emended by supplying περί. The supplement brings the title into line with that found in two places: in text **738** and in the first list of Diogenes' catalogue (1.148): Περί παροιμιῶν α', *On Proverbs*, one book (**727** no. 14). Whatever we think of Rose's supplement, adopting the suggested reading of Fabricius would mean that Diogenes' catalogue contains two titles concerning proverbs: one in the first list (1.148) and another — the emended title — in the second (1.229). It might then be suggested that the library in Alexandria had two copies of the same book, purchased at different times and therefore listed separately in Diogenes' catalogue. Such speculation may be entic-

¹⁹⁶ In *Rhet.* 2.23 Aristotle not only tells us that uproar ensued when Androcles said, "The laws need a law to set them straight," but also reports what Androcles said to counter the uproar: "Fish need salt, and olive-cakes need oil" (1400a11–13). The response is clever (two parallels are cited that at first hearing are equally incredible), but there is little stylistic embellishment (only parallel construction).

¹⁹⁷ In his *apparatus criticus* Düring recommends correcting Hesychius and reading Παροιμιῶν. On the Aristotelian work see Moraux p. 128–9.

ing, but it should be resisted.¹⁹⁸ Not only is a rhetorical title concerning introductions entirely at home in the second list, but it is also hard to imagine Theophrastus writing on so many rhetorical topics and yet failing to provide his pupils with at least a short work on introductions.

All the other rhetorical titles, except **666** no. 3, begin with περί. That appears to have impressed Usener, who supplied the preposition. He also claimed that <On> *Introductions* was one of fourteen rhetorical works which were brought together under the title *On Kinds of Rhetorical Arts* (**666** no. 2a). Regenbogen has followed Usener both in supplying περί and in interpreting *On Kinds of Rhetorical Arts* as an umbrella title. The supplement may be correct; and if it is, we have two titles, no. 15 (Περὶ) προοιμίων and no. 16 Περὶ προθέσεως καὶ διηγήματος, both of which are appropriate to remarks concerning or comments on parts of an oration. Nevertheless, the supplement has not been accepted by Long (OCT), Wehrli and Sollenberger. Their adherence to the manuscript tradition is, I think, correct and supported by the occurrence of the genitive without περί elsewhere in Diogenes' catalogue.¹⁹⁹ Grammatically the genitive seems to depend on the book number: one book of *Introductions*. Furthermore, the title without περί suits a collection of sample introductions. Already in the fifth century such collections had been put together by, e.g., Thrasyarchus, Antiphon and Critias.²⁰⁰ From the fourth century there survives the ps.-Demosthenic *Exordia*. These collections will have been used primarily by students who studied them both in and outside the class room. To a lesser degree they will have been consulted by citizens preparing to speak in court or assembly.²⁰¹

The title of Critias' collection is Δημηγορικὰ προοίμια, *Introductions for Public Speeches*. The same title is found in the secondary manuscripts of the ps.-Demosthenic *Exordia*.²⁰² It suggests a collection of introductions suitable to deliberative oratory.²⁰³ In con-

¹⁹⁸ Fabricius' suggested change is so speculative and unnecessary, that we have not recorded it in the critical apparatus to the text.

¹⁹⁹ Cf. **727** no. 2, Δειλινῶν α' β', discussed below, p. 150–1.

²⁰⁰ Thrasyarchus ap. Athenaeus, *Sophists at Dinner* 10 416A = *Artium script.* B IX 9, p. 72; Antiphon, cited in the *Suda* s.v. αἰσθέσθαι, ἄμα and μοχθηρός = *Artium script.* B X 13 and 14, p. 80; Critias ap. Hermogenes, *On Types of Style* 2.11 p. 402.6 Rabe = *Artium script.* B XVII 1, p. 119.

²⁰¹ See, e.g., Th. Cole, *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 1991) p. 84–5.

²⁰² The reversal in word order is unimportant.

²⁰³ See, e.g., Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3.12 1413b4–5, 3.13 1414a37 and 3.17 1418a1–2,

trast, the Theophrastean title *Introductions* lacks a qualifying adjective. It is identical with the title of Antiphon's collection, which contained introductions to judicial speeches.²⁰⁴ Since text **680** concerns an introduction to a judicial speech, it may be that the Theophrastean work collected introductions of this kind, but the relevance of **680** to the work *Introductions* is uncertain. I return to **680** in the next paragraph. Here I want to emphasize that the absence of a qualifying adjective need not mean that the Theophrastean work covered all kinds of introductions. In particular, it is most unlikely that the Theophrastean work included introductions to a literary dialogue. We are, of course, told that the introductions to Theophrastean dialogues were entirely foreign to what followed (**44.1–2**), and we can imagine Theophrastus collecting introductions to literary dialogues either for study or use.²⁰⁵ But given the fact that the title *Introductions* occurs in the second of Diogenes' lists along with other rhetorical titles, and that we have another title referring to parts of an oration (no. 16), it seems reasonable to believe that the contents of *Introductions* were rhetorical.

The Theophrastean title does not tell us whether the work contained introductions which Theophrastus himself composed,²⁰⁶ or contained a selection of introductions by others, or offered both. Text **680** may be relevant. It is a passage from Quintilian and begins as follows: "Theophrastus adds that the introduction (may be derived) from the speech, such as seems to be (the introduction to) Demosthenes' *On behalf of Ctesiphon*." After that comes a brief statement of what Demosthenes says in *De corona* 1 (end)–2. If Quintilian is drawing, directly or indirectly, on Theophrastus' *Introductions*, it seems probable that the Theophrastean work did collect introductions written by others, and that these introductions were presented either in full or in abridgment. Furthermore, if Quintilian is correctly reporting a clas-

where δημηγορικός contrasts with δικανικός and ἐπιδεικτικός. For the verb δημηγορεῖν, see 1.3 1358b10.

²⁰⁴ *Artium script.* B X 13 and 14.

²⁰⁵ We might cite Cicero, who had such a collection and embarrassed himself by carelessly using the same introduction twice: first for the third book of the *Academics* and then for *On Glory* (*Letters to Atticus* 16.6). But it does not follow that Theophrastus made a similar collection for use in composing dialogues. It is far more likely that he followed Thrasy-machus, Antiphon and Critias in collecting introductions to orations.

²⁰⁶ On works collecting Theophrastus' own compositions, i.e. samples that he and his students might use (and enjoy), see above p. 86–7 on the *Theses* (**68** no. 34–5) and p. 90–1 on the *Ethical Characters* (**436** no. 4).

sification introduced by Theophrastus — some introductions are “from the speech” — then the Theophrastean *Introductions* will have been more than a simple collection of samples. At very least the samples will have been classified or grouped,²⁰⁷ and it may be that Theophrastus offered extensive commentary, perhaps saying more than Aristotle does in *Rhetoric* 3.14.²⁰⁸ But having said that, I want to underline that text **680** mentions no Theophrastean work, and that the title *Introductions*, as transmitted, suggests a collection of introductions with little or no commentary.

- no. 16 *On Statement (of the Case) and Narration*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.48 = 1.229

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 57–8; Usener (1858) p. 20; Rose (1863) p. 141; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1526; Sollenberger (1984) p. 332–3

The title *Περὶ προθέσεως καὶ διηγήματος*, *On Statement (of the Case) and Narration*, is found in the second list of Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings. The title introduces two topics that Aristotle discusses in two separate chapters in his *Rhetoric*. The statement of the case is discussed in 3.13 and narration in 3.16, though there are comments on narration in 3.13. In the earlier chapter, Aristotle is highly critical of contemporary writers of rhetorical handbooks. He tells us that they divide orations in a ridiculous manner (1414a36), introducing an excessive number of divisions that are pointless (1414b16). Narration is cited as an example. It, i.e., the kind of narration discussed in the handbooks, belongs only to judicial speeches (1414a36–7), and further divisions like post-narration and pre-narration are useless and silly (1414b13–16). Aristotle's own view is quite the opposite: he focuses on the necessary parts of a speech and tells us that they are two: statement and proof (πρό-

²⁰⁷ Titles may announce an organizing principle (e.g., with κατὰ; see the commentary on **666** no. 2a, above p. 59–60), but silence does not rule out arrangement. And when several principles are involved, it may be impossible to mention them within a short title.

²⁰⁸ In *Rhet.* 3.14, Aristotle refers to musical and poetic introductions in order to elucidate those of oratory. Assuming that *Introductions* contained commentary, Theophrastus may have done the same: he may have referred to music and poetry, all the while keeping his remarks focused on the needs of oratory. (Cf. Plato's *Laws* 4 722D6–E1, where the Athenian Stranger refers to musical introductions while discussing the importance of introductions to laws. Oratorical introductions are mentioned at 723A3–4).

θεσις καὶ πίστις 1414b7). He is, however, prepared to recognize four parts: introduction, statement, proof and epilogue. His generosity stops there; he declares four parts to be the maximum (1414b8–9). In the later chapter, Aristotle's topic is narration, which is now conceived of inclusively, so that there is no oddity in discussing narration in epideictic and deliberative speeches. Nevertheless, narration has not become a necessary part of an oration. On the contrary, Aristotle is quite explicit that epideictic speeches may not need narration. It may be sufficient merely to recall the well-known deeds of a famous person (1416b25–8). Still less is narration required in a deliberative speech. There it is said to occur least, for no one engages in narration concerning the future (1417b11–13). All that is intelligible and may well have been accepted by Theophrastus.

A different view is found in the scholarly literature on Theophrastus' work *On Statement (of the Case) and Narration*. We are told that Aristotle does not recognize narration as a part distinct from statement, and that when Aristotle speaks of statement, he understands both statement and narration. That is said to be clear in 3.16, where Aristotle expresses himself with greater precision and uses "narration" for "statement," διήγησις for πρόθεσις.²⁰⁹ That, we are told, is Aristotelian, but not Theophrastean, for the Eresian departed from his teacher and distinguished between statement and narration. The title *On Statement (of the Case) and Narration* is said to make that clear.²¹⁰ But does it? On my reading, the title tells us only that Theophrastus discussed both statement and narration. He may have concluded that the two are one, that they overlap, or that they are quite distinct. Further and more importantly, it is not at all clear that Aristotle uses διήγησις for πρόθεσις. To be sure, the word διήγησις is used throughout *Rhetoric* 3.16, while πρόθεσις does not occur. But from that alone nothing follows concerning Aristotle's use of πρόθεσις, especially in 3.13, where it is used for the statement of the case quite apart from narration. It is, of course, true that the Greek word πρόθεσις literally refers to placing something before or in front

²⁰⁹ Cf. LSJ s.v. διήγησις, where *Rhet.* 3.16 1416b29 is cited for διήγησις meaning "statement of the case," and LSJ s.v. πρόθεσις, where *Rhet.* 3.14 1414b8 is cited for πρόθεσις meaning "statement of a case." The variation between definite (1416b29) and indefinite (1414b8) article is probably not significant, so that LSJ may be thought to agree with the view under consideration. If that is the case, then I am in disagreement with LSJ as well as the scholars named in the immediately following note.

²¹⁰ That is the view of Schmidt (1839), whom Regenbogen and Sollenberger (1984) follow.

of something else, and so used it might include not only a statement of what is going to be proved in the *πίστις* but also a narrative providing background for the proof. But such an inclusive use is explicitly excluded from 3.13. For while *πρόθεσις* is said to be a necessary part of a speech — it is impossible to argue one's case without having first stated it (3.13 1414a32) — narration can be omitted, and that is true even when narration is broadly construed so that it makes sense to speak of narration in an epideictic and deliberative speech. Moreover, Aristotle adds a telling comparison: just as *πρόθεσις* stands to *πίστις*, so *πρόβλημα* stands to *ἀπόδειξις* (1414a34–6). The comparison is with geometry, where *πρόβλημα* refers to the statement of what needs to be demonstrated in the ensuing argument. Similarly, *πρόθεσις* refers to what needs to be proved in the *πίστις*.²¹¹

In 3.13 Aristotle has a special target: namely, those contemporary rhetoricians who divided an oration into more than two parts. Indeed, it is significant that when Aristotle allows four parts (1414b8–9), he does not use the term *διήγησις*. He uses *πρόθεσις* and thereby continues to distance himself from contemporary rhetoricians, who recognize narration as one of the four parts of an oration.²¹² When Aristotle moves on to discuss the several parts of a speech (3.14–19), he is no longer closely focused on contemporary rhetoricians²¹³ and pays little attention to statement. The word *πρόθεσις* does not occur, and to the extent that Aristotle takes notice of stating the case, he does so while discussing the introduction. In-

²¹¹ None of this is meant to deny that statement and narration are closely related. Narration may not only supplement the statement by providing background material but also find its place next to statement in an oration. Cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Lysias* 17, where we are told that the orator typically introduces narration after stating the case. And for the reverse order, see, e.g., Cicero, *On the Orator* 2.80. But neither providing needed background material nor being immediate neighbors is sufficient reason to collapse statement and narration into each other. For completeness' sake, I simply mention my disagreement with Cope (1867) p. 333 and (1877) p. 157, who construes *πρόθεσις* as the genus of *διήγησις*. I prefer Kennedy (1963) p. 113, whose brief but clear account keeps statement distinct from narration.

²¹² Not all contemporary rhetoricians used *διήγησις* to refer to narration. Isocrates may have used *κατάστασις* (*Artium script.* B XXIV 33 Radermacher). In the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, we find *ἀπαγγελία* (30 1438a16, b13.). But variation in vocabulary is compatible with the point I am making: namely, that in 3.13 Aristotle does not embrace, however reluctantly, the fourfold division of the contemporary rhetoricians. He sticks with statement and omits narration.

²¹³ I am not saying that Aristotle totally ignores contemporary rhetoricians. He is prepared to offer occasional criticism (compare "ridiculous" at 3.14 1415b10–11 with 3.13 1414a36), but he also presents his own views in a positive manner.

deed, he compares the introduction of a judicial speech with a dramatic prologue: both provide advance knowledge of the subject (3.14 1415a12–13), and he tells us that the most essential function and distinctive property of such an introduction is making clear the aim or goal of the oration (1415a21–3).²¹⁴ I conclude, therefore, that Theophrastean scholarship has been based on a false reading of Aristotle and that the reading has been combined with an unjustified interpretation of the title *On Statement (of the Case) and Narration*. The resulting claim concerning Theophrastus' independence from Aristotle has little to support it, even though Theophrastus was no slavish follower of his teacher.

Despite my previous criticism of reading too much into the title *On Statement (of the Case) and Narration*, it is, I think, correct that Theophrastus distinguished between statement and narration. He may have discussed the former more fully than Aristotle; in regard to the latter, he may have followed Aristotle and organized his discussion according to the three major kinds of oratory. And given Theophrastus' interest in character portrayal and the expression of emotion, his treatment of these topics is likely to have gone beyond Aristotle's brief remarks in *Rhetoric* 3.16 (1417a15–b10).²¹⁵ But having said that, I want at least to mention the possibility that *On Statement (of the Case) and Narration* went beyond oratory and considered statement and narration in relation to history. We may compare Polybius, who acknowledges that his annalistic method breaks up what might otherwise be continuous narrative. As a result, he disappoints those persons who want the stated subject (πρόθεσις) brought to an end by a continuous exposition and not broken up by myths and tales (μυθικαῖς καὶ διηγηματικαῖς παρεκβάσεσι) or even factual digressions (38.5.3, 6.1).²¹⁶ There is no reason why the

²¹⁴ Problematic is the following statement: "If the subject is clear and of little importance, an introduction ought not to be employed" (1415a23; b33–4). Are we to understand that a simple statement of the case, without the elaboration of an introduction, is sufficient? Or is statement rendered unnecessary and omitted along with the introduction (which would contradict what is said in 3.13)?

²¹⁵ On the portrayal of character, see above, the commentary on the title *Ethical Characters* (436 no. 4). Theophrastus wrote a separate treatise *On Emotions* (436 no. 5). For emotion and delivery, see the commentary on 712 and 713.

²¹⁶ Since διήγημα may be used of tales as against factual narration (e.g., Polybius, *Hist.* 1.14.6 cited by LSJ s.v.) and the adjective διηγηματικός can be used of the fanciful (38.6.1), it may be thought that διήγημα in the Theophrastean title is not to be confused with διήγησις as Aristotle uses it in *Rhet.* 3.14 and 16. The thought is not foolish, but it is not to be embraced in regard to the Theophrastean title. The form διήγημα may be compared with πῶγμα. As the latter sometimes has a more

work *On Statement (of the Case) and Narration* could not have addressed this issue, and scholars who believe that the Theophrastean work *Περὶ ἱστορίας* (727 no. 8) was concerned with the writing of history²¹⁷ may be inclined to take the possibility seriously. My own guess is that *Περὶ ἱστορίας* was concerned with research in the physical sciences, and that *On Statement (of the Case) and Narration* did not devote special attention to narration in historical writing.

It is possible that text 696 derives from *On Statement (of the Case) and Narration*, for 696 concerns persuasiveness and brevity, which are qualities often associated with narration. But there are other possibilities. The text might derive from *Rhetorical Precepts* (666 no. 3) or *On Style* (666 no. 17a). See the commentary on 696.

no.17a *On Style*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.47 = 1.210

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 37–53; Usener (1858) p. 9; Rabe (1890) p. 5–45; Stroux (1912) p. 1–126; Voit (1934) p. 99–104; Kroll (1940) col. 1071–5; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1572–32; Kennedy (1963) p. 273–82; Martin (1974) p. 248–9; Wehrli (1983) p. 498–500, 531; Schenkeveld (1998) p. 67–80; Fortenbaugh (1998b) p. 186–7, (2002b) p. 79–80, (2002c) p. 93–4, 97, 99

The title *Περὶ λέξεως α'*, *On Style*, one book, occurs in the second list of Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings. It is placed alphabetically, being the first of three titles whose significant word begins with lambda (1.210). All three primary manuscripts, BF and P, exhibit *Περὶ λέξεως α'*, but in the case of F the reading is found in the margin. In the body of the text, it is omitted. That is not a good reason to doubt the evidence of the manuscripts and certainly not grounds to follow Usener, who emends the book number to read δ', "4." The emendation enables him to explain the title *On Kinds of Rhetorical Arts*, 17 books — reading ιζ', "17," instead of ξα', "61"

concrete meaning than *πρᾶξις*, so the former may be more concrete than *διήγησις*. But just as it is often hard to detect a clear difference in use between *πρᾶγμα* and *πρᾶξις*, so *διήγημα* and *διήγησις* may be used interchangeably. See Schmidt (1839) p. 58.

²¹⁷ E.g., Regenbogen col. 1526 and Wehrli (1983) p. 498. Cautious and sensible is the comment of Sollenberger (1984) p. 315. In the text-translation volumes, the work appears under "Miscellaneous Items." See the commentary on 697 *ad fin.*

— but his argument is not persuasive and finds no supporters today. See the commentary on 666 no. 2a.²¹⁸

Aristotle discusses λέξις, style, in both *Rhetoric* 3.1–12 and *Poetics* 20–2. In the former, diction and composition feature prominently. There is discussion of unusual words and metaphor, prose rhythm and periodic structure. In addition, a tripartite virtue of λέξις is advanced: namely, clarity combined with elevation and appropriateness. Much the same is found in the *Poetics*. Metaphor receives special attention, clarity is not ignored, and there is recognition that style must be appropriate or risk becoming ludicrous.²¹⁹ Our sources for Theophrastus' views on λέξις are not numerous, but they are sufficient to make clear that Theophrastus followed his teacher and discussed both diction and composition. He added correct Greek to Aristotle's tripartite virtue of λέξις, but Aristotle had already introduced the topic (*Rhetoric* 3.5). More important, he seems to have gone beyond oratory and poetry and discussed the style of history. He named Herodotus and Thucydides as historians who first dared to speak more fully and ornately than their predecessors (697). It is possible, then, that the treatise *Περὶ λέξεως* widened the topic, thereby taking a significant step toward an inclusive account of literary style.

At this point, we should recall that in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle's remarks on λέξις are not restricted to Book 3. In Book 2, chapter 24, he discusses apparent lines of argument including those caused by expression: they are said to be *παρὰ τὴν λέξιν* (1401a1). Two kinds are introduced of which the first involves a comparison with dialectic: "Just as in dialectic one does not go through a syllogism and yet makes a final statement in the manner of a conclusion . . . so in the case of enthymemes speaking in a compressed and antithetical manner gives the appearance of an enthymeme, for such λέξις is the province of an enthymeme. And such an appearance is caused by the form of expression" (*παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως* a7). The second kind is attributed to homonyms and illustrated by several examples, one of which runs as follows "λόγος (speech) is the best thing, because good men are worthy not of money but of λόγος (esteem). For

²¹⁸ Similarly, we should not follow Rabe p. 11–12, who wants to assign five books to *Περὶ λέξεως*.

²¹⁹ There are, of course, contexts in which an inappropriate style may be desirable as a cause of laughter: e.g., in comedy or when making jokes among friends.

‘worthy of λόγος’ is not univocal” (1401a21–3). The two examples from *Rhetoric* 2 have parallels in *Sophistical Refutations* 15 174b8–12 and 4 165b34–8, respectively, and are, I think, sufficient to make a general point. There is a λέξις of argumentation, so that an inclusive account of the subject will take up logical issues as well as those of literary style.²²⁰

There is no surviving Peripatetic work entitled Περὶ λέξεως, in which logical topics are prominent, but there is a fragmentary work that is instructive. I am thinking of the Περὶ λέξεως of Eudemus, who was a fellow pupil of Theophrastus within the Aristotelian Lyceum. From the surviving fragments of the Eudemian treatise, we know that it contained discussion of the dialectical question, the status of the verb “to be” and the so-called third man argument (fr. 25, 26, 28 Wehrli). In addition, it is reasonable to assume that it discussed mistakes attributable to expression.²²¹ The Eudemian work may have been exceptional, but we should remember that the list of Aristotelian works in Diogenes Laertius includes a Περὶ λέξεως in two books (5.24). It is a widely held belief that this work is identical with Aristotle’s discussion of style and arrangement in *Rhetoric* 3.1–12 and 3.13–19. The belief is not foolish. Diogenes’ list also contains a *Rhetoric* in 2 books (5.24). These books are regularly identified with the first two books of our *Rhetoric* in three books. Toward the end of the first century B.C., Andronicus will have combined these two books with those listed under the title Περὶ λέξεως. The latter pair of books became one book and in that way our *Rhetoric* in three books came into existence. We should, however, keep in mind that the editorial work of Andronicus is not well attested and may be more a modern creation than historical fact.²²² In addition, *Rhetoric* 3.1–12 and 13–19 are not well matched; chapters 13–19 may have been an independent handbook that was joined to our *Rhetoric* in order to include a discussion of arrangement. Be that as it may, we should at least allow the possibility that the Περὶ λέξεως in two books listed by Diogenes was a rather full discussion of the topic and that it became the basis of the Eudemian work, which was at least two books long.²²³

²²⁰ For fuller discussion, see Fortenbaugh (2002c) p. 96–8.

²²¹ Cf. fr. 61 Wehrli. For fuller discussion, see Fortenbaugh (2002b) p. 70–5.

²²² See Barnes p. 24–66.

²²³ In the surviving fragments, there are references to the first book (26 and 27 Wehrli) and to books in the plural (25 and 28 W).

The matter is complicated by a remark of Simplicius in his *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories* 4 1b25–2a10. We are told that Aristotle, in the *Methodics*, *Divisions* and *Matters concerning Expression*, Τὰ περὶ τὴν λέξιν, discussed negative expressions and inflections with reference to the categories. We are also told that Τὰ περὶ τὴν λέξιν was judged to be spurious by some persons, but in any case the work was of Peripatetic authorship (65.2–10 Kalbfleisch). How it related to the Περὶ λέξεως listed in Diogenes' catalogue is uncertain, but if the work was not spurious and if it is to be identified with the Περὶ λέξεως listed by Diogenes, then scholars are wrong to identify the work listed by Diogenes with the third book of the *Rhetoric*, for that book nowhere discusses negative expressions and inflections with reference to the categories.

How does all this relate to Theophrastus' Περὶ λέξεως? We must be cautious when describing the contents of the work. Although the texts collected under the rubric "Expression" are largely concerned with rhetorical, poetic and historical style (681–704), it does not follow that they exhaust the topics discussed by Theophrastus. To be sure, Theophrastus' Περὶ λέξεως was only one book in length, but that is compatible with treating λέξις from various points of view, perhaps treating lightly topics already discussed by Aristotle and developing new topics more fully (cf. 72A).²²⁴ Moreover, Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean works lists *Definitions concerned with the Language of Syllogisms*, 1 book, 'Οριστικὰ περὶ λέξεως συλλογισμῶν α' (1.287 = 68 no.11).²²⁵ Apparently, Theophrastus

²²⁴ Text 72A is from Boethius' work *On Aristotle's De interpretatione*. We read: "On all matters about which he (Theophrastus) argues after his master, he touches lightly on those which he knows have been spoken of by Aristotle earlier, but follows up more diligently other things not dealt with by Aristotle." The value of such a general report is hard to determine. By way of contrast, we might cite 700, which is from Cicero's *Orator*. There we read that Theophrastus expressed himself on the same matters as Aristotle and Theodectes, and did so "in even greater detail." But here, too, one wonders how the report should be construed. See the commentary on 700.

²²⁵ The title comes second in the fifth list of the catalogue. The list begins at 1.286 and is quite short; aside from two additions (1.290–1), it is arranged alphabetically. S. White, "Eudemus the Naturalist," in *Eudemus of Rhodes*, ed. I. Bodnár and W. Fortenbaugh = Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities vol. 11 (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction 2002) p. 217 translates the title *Terminology on Expression in Syllogisms* and suggests that the work in question is one by Eudemus and not by Theophrastus. White may be correct, but his characterization of the catalogue seems imprecise (he treats the fifth list as part of the fourth) and the argument for assigning the work to Eudemus is not strong. To be sure the third and fourth lists do exhibit titles which are generally regarded as Eudemian (*Geometri-*

took an interest in the λέξις of logic, and given his interest in hypothetical syllogistic, it is easy to imagine him discussing λέξις with special reference to the hypothetical syllogism. He may, for example, have pointed out that orators are often more effective when they avoid repeating logical formulae, for such formulae may seem artificial and work a negative effect on the audience.²²⁶ I hesitate to continue speculating and simply remark that Wehrli may be correct, at least in part, when he speaks of an accident of transmission in order to explain the difference between the surviving fragments of the Theophrastean and Eudemian *Περὶ λέξεως*.²²⁷ Certainty is quite unattainable.

no. 17b *On the Elements of Speech*] Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Categories*, introduction (CAG vol. 8 p. 10.24 Kalbfleisch) = **683.5–6**

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 38; Usener (1858) p. 9; Rabe (1890) p. 6; Mayer (1910) p. vi, li, 15; Stroux (1912) p. 14, 23–6; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1527; Grube (1952) p. 177; Martin (1974) p. 248–9; Matelli (1994) p. 228–9; Schenkeveld (1998) p. 69–79

The title *Περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου στοιχείων*, *On the Elements of Speech*, is not found in Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings. It occurs only in Simplicius' commentary *On Aristotle's Categories* (683.5–6). Most scholars have thought that the title refers either to the work *Περὶ λέξεως*, *On Style*, as a whole (Schmidt), or to a portion of that work: if *On Style* was composed of four books, then the title will refer to the first book (Usener); but if it was one book in length, then to a portion of that book (Mayer, Stroux, Martin). The

cal Researches, *Astronomical Research* and *Arithmetical Researches* 1.245, 271, 272), but that does not prove wide spread contamination of the final three lists. Indeed some of the titles listed are certainly Theophrastean (e.g., *How Cities may be Best Governed*, *On Piety*, *On Crises*, *On Education*, or *On Virtues* or *On Temperance* 1.264, 277, 279, 284), and the overwhelming majority may well be. Moreover, in the case of 'Οριστικὰ περὶ λέξεως συλλογισμῶν, we can say that the title suits Theophrastus whose interest in logic is well attested. (It has been suggested that the title refers to part of the first book of Theophrastus' *Prior Analytics*; see I. Bochénski, *La Logique de Théophraste* [Fribourg: Librairie de l'Université 1947] p. 28 and Sollenberger [1984] p. 376.) Hence, I prefer to accept the attribution to Theophrastus.

²²⁶ He may have recommended replacing the antecedent in an if-then argument (one "through a continuous proposition") with a relative clause. See Fortenbaugh (2002c) p. 99.

²²⁷ Wehrli (1983) p. 531.

idea that the title refers to the first book of *On Style* may be dismissed along with the idea that *On Style* was composed of four books (see above, on title no. 17a). The idea that the title refers to a portion of a work in one book is more plausible: the title may reflect the opening words, the incipit, of a discrete section. Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that the title has no relationship to *On Style*, for as Schenkeveld has argued, the context in Simplicius is logical: namely, a discussion of Aristotle's *Categories* and in particular the σκόπος, focus, of that work. In this context, it seems likely that the elements mentioned in the title are not the elements of style, e.g., the various items listed by Aristotle in *Poetics* 20 (1456b20–1). Rather the title announces a discussion of the elements of the statement-making sentence, i.e., of the noun and verb (683.7), which are discussed by Aristotle toward the beginning of the *On Interpretation* (2 16a19–3 16b25). Since Theophrastus' work *On Affirmation and Denial* (68 no. 3a) was closely related to that work, it is reasonable to suppose that the title *On the Elements of Speech* refers either to that work as a whole, or more probably to a section therein. Hence, in a new edition of *Sources*, 666 no. 17b should be moved to the section on logic and either be joined to or (preferably) printed immediately after 68 no. 3a–e. And if that is impractical, then notes attached to 68 no. 3a–e and 666 no. 17b might serve to connect the titles.

A different problem is the use στοιχεῖα. In a Theophrastean title, we might expect μέρη instead of στοιχεῖα, for μέρη is the word used by Aristotle, in order to refer to the noun and the verb as parts of the statement-making sentence (*On Int.* 4 16b26, *Poetics* 20 1457a24). In the commentary to 683, I consider but do not accept the possibility that the use of στοιχεῖα is attributable to Simplicius or his source. Here I want only to underline that if the use of στοιχεῖα is attributable to Simplicius or his source, then either the title includes one word not written by Theophrastus, or the title is not Theophrastean at all. We might even suppose that the title is no title at all, in which case, we should print περὶ instead of Περὶ and translate the phrase ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου στοιχείων with “in the (discussion) concerning the elements of speech (or, of the sentence).”²²⁸ But however attractive this last possibility may be, the use of ἐν τῷ, the preposition “in” plus the definite article, suggests that a title is being cited. We may compare the opening sentence of 683, where the phrase ἐν τῷ occurs twice (lines 1–2), both times introducing the title of a work in which

²²⁸ Stroux p. 14, 23–6; and see Schenkeveld p. 71.

Porphry expressed himself with regard to the subject of the *Categories*.

A final concern is the position of the title within its sentence (683.5–6): it occurs before both the reference to Theophrastus and the reference to his associates or (reading *περὶ αὐτῶν*) those who wrote about these things.²²⁹ Here are the relevant words: ὅς ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου στοιχείων ὃ τε Θεόφραστος ἀνακινεῖ καὶ οἱ περὶ αὐτὸν (or αὐτῶν) γεγραφότες. What may cause concern here is the use of τε . . . καὶ, for this construction does not single out Theophrastus as the author of a work entitled *On the Elements of Speech*. As a result, we may again be tempted to say that the title is only an apparent title: one that introduces a topic and is not tied to Theophrastus. Nevertheless, I prefer to think that we are presented with a title. For not only does the phrase ἐν τῷ seem to introduce a title, but also the fact that Theophrastus alone is named suggests that the title is his.²³⁰ But having said that, I want to acknowledge that we can imagine other reasons why only Theophrastus is named: e.g., Theophrastus is given special recognition as the first person to discuss Aristotle's analysis of the statement-making sentence, or Simplicius has abridged his source,²³¹ repeating only the name which enjoyed pride of place.

436 *On Kindness* (or *Grace*), 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.48 = no. 24 1.240

Literature: Arndt (1904) p. 15, 17; Kayser (1906) p. 41–4; Solmsen (1931) p. 262–3; Kroll (1940) col. 1077; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1486, 1523–4; Grube (1961) p. 30–2; Wehrli (1983) p. 491; Fortenbaugh (1984) 114–15; Janko (1984) p. 159–60; Rabbie (1986) p. xlv; Leeman et al. (1989) vol. 3 p. 190; Matelli (1994) p. 228; Innes (1995) p. 319, 323–4, 328–9

In Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean works, *Περὶ χάριτος*, *On Kindness*, is found in the second list, where all but one of the rhetorical and poetic titles are found. However, in the text-translation

²²⁹ On the alternatives, see the commentary on 683.

²³⁰ The suggestion was made to me by Pamela Huby. The occurrence of ἀνακινεῖ in the singular and immediately after Θεόφραστος puts emphasis on the Eresian; but whether it can be said to help tie the title to Theophrastus is doubtful.

²³¹ I.e., Porphyry's lost commentary *To Gedalius*. See "The Sources," above, p. 38 on Simplicius.

volumes the title is placed among those referring to ethical works.²³² The reasons for this placement may be summarized as follows. The Greek word *χάρις* has several meanings, and in one of these, it refers to kindness or service to another person. In that sense, *χάρις* is important to the formation and stability of a human community. In another, related sense, it refers to gratitude for services rendered.²³³ That, too, is important to maintaining community among men. Hence, some cities placed a sanctuary of the Graces, *Χαρίτων ἱερόν*, in a prominent place where it would remind the citizens of the importance of reciprocal exchange (Arist., *NE* 5.5 1133a3–5). Moreover, *χάρις* in these senses plays a role in the establishment and maintenance of friendships between individuals (*Rhet.* 2.4 1381b35–7). It is not surprising, therefore, that Aristotle mentions *χάρις* when discussing friendship (*NE* 9.7 1167b24), and that the discussion of *χάρις* follows that of friendship in Arius Didymus' summary of Peripatetic ethics (Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.7.23 p. 143 Wachsmuth). Most likely Theophrastus, too, will have recognized a close connection between *χάρις* and friendship, so that Regenbogen (col. 1486) is doing nothing foolish when he suggests that the work *Περὶ χάριτος* was part of Theophrastus' three volume work *Περὶ φιλίας* (436 no. 23a). Furthermore, two texts indicate how Theophrastus treated *χάρις* from an ethical point of view. On the one hand he recognized its benefits, saying that *χάρις*, is not to be regretted, for it bears noble fruit in the praise of those who are well-treated (518.8–10). That is *χάρις* in the sense of kindness to others. On the other hand, he expressed misgivings about *χάρις*, when he says that a man ought to obtain honors as a result of his deeds and not ἐξ ὁμιλίας καὶ χάριτος (519.1). Here *χάρις* may refer to favors done for others ("as a result of association and favor"), or it may refer to a charming, ingratiating manner ("as a result of one's manner and charm"). Either way, the point being made is political and ethical.

²³² The second list of Diogenes' catalogue is not lacking in ethical titles, so that the presence of *Περὶ χάριτος* in the second list does not tell against assigning the work to ethics. The same can be said of assigning the work to politics.

²³³ See LSJ s.v. II.1–2. Aristotle's treatment of *χάρις* in *Rhetoric* 2.7 largely focuses on showing kindness or disinterested service to another. That is true of the definition of *χάρις* (1385a17–19) and much of the subsequent discussion (1385a20–b10), but the opening questions (1385a16–17) and a later statement concerning the sources for producing *χάρις* (1385a30–2) seem to concern feeling gratitude. For brief remarks see Fortenbaugh (2002a) p. 107–8. A fuller treatment by David Konstan is forthcoming.

Misgivings concerning χάρις can take us from politics and ethics to rhetoric, for in a well-known passage in the *Gorgias*, Plato has Socrates characterize rhetoric as a knack for producing a certain gratification and pleasure (ἐμπειρία χάριτος τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας 462C6–7), which may be compared with cookery (D8–E4) and placed under the general heading of flattery (463B1). Without considering what is best, rhetoric deceives the listener through pleasure (464D1–2). Here χάρις is paired with ἡδονή and conceived of as a kind of gratification.²³⁴ By saying what the audience wants to hear, the orator pleases the audience and wins its assent, whether for good or bad. The orator may engage in outright flattery, showering the audience with predicates of praise and speaking glowingly of policies favored by the audience. He may also ingratiate himself in ways that are less obvious. For example, he may satisfy the audience's hunger for abuse. In *On the Crown*, Demosthenes complains that the Athenians exchange the advantage of the city for the pleasure and gratification derived from invective (τῆς ἐπὶ ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἡδονῆς καὶ χάριτος τὸ τῆς πόλεως συμφέρον ἀνταλλαττόμενοι 138), and in the *Third Philippic*, he scolds the Athenians for laughing at invective (54). For an example of pleasing abuse, I turn to Demosthenes' speech *On the Embassy*, where we are told that Philocrates brought on laughter by saying: "No wonder, men of Athens, that Demosthenes and I disagree, for he drinks water, and I wine" (46). Here we have not only verbal abuse but also an attractive mode of expression. The final words, οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ὕδωρ, ἐγὼ δ' οἶνον πίνω combine the unexpected with brevity, balanced phrases and antithesis (water vs. wine), and together these stylistic features enhance the abuse. It becomes both more pleasing and more stinging. That is of some interest, for Aristotle not only recognizes the value of a pleasing style — albeit with some reluctance²³⁵ — but also calls attention to the way in which a clever mode of expression creates an effective jibe (3.11 1412a27–b3, 12–13). Later Peripatetics were no less aware of the importance of style and its connection with jibes. I cite Demetrius Rhetor, who was not himself a Peripatetic, but whose work exhibits considerable Peripatetic influence. He characterizes the elegant style as charming, χαριεντισμός and recognizes different kinds or levels of charm, χάρις: some kinds of charm are rather dignified, but there are other kinds of charm that are closer to

²³⁴ LSJ s.v. IV.

²³⁵ *Rhetoric* 3.1 1404a4–12.

comedy and similar to jibes (128). In addition, Demetrius tells us that beautiful words make style charming, εὐχάρης, and in this context cites Theophrastus' definition of beauty in a word (173 = 687). That does not prove that Theophrastus expressly recognized χάρις, charm, as an important feature of style, still less that he explicitly connected χάρις with jibes. But it does strongly suggest that during the Hellenistic period, Peripatetics came to regard χάρις as a feature of rhetorical style. And it at least raises the question whether Theophrastus may have been first to focus on χάρις as an important ingredient in good style.²³⁶ If he was the first, then his discussion may have been recorded in *Περὶ χάριτος*, but equally the discussion may have been a part of *Περὶ λέξεως* (666 no. 17a). Indeed, the title *Περὶ χάριτος* might refer to a section of *Περὶ λέξεως*. All this is, of course, speculation.

In the preceding paragraph, I have focused on χάρις as a quality of rhetorical style, but we should not forget that χάρις can characterize verse as well as prose. Again, Demetrius Rhetor is instructive, for after telling us that the elegant style is charming (χαριεντισμός), he draws a distinction between charm that is more dignified and charm that is more ordinary. The former is referred to the poets, and the latter is described as closer to comedy (128). And when Demetrius turns to χάρις in subject matter, he mentions gardens of the nymphs, marriage songs, loves and generally the poetry of Sappho (132). Perhaps we can say that if the Theophrastean work *Περὶ χάριτος* dealt with style, it may have been inclusive and considered style from both a rhetorical and a poetic point of view.

A further possibility is that the title *Περὶ χάριτος* refers to a section or chapter within the work *Περὶ παθῶν*, *On Emotions* (436 no. 5). Aristotle discusses χάρις among a string of emotions in the second book of the *Rhetoric* (2.7). That may be thought to speak for assigning a rhetorical orientation to the Theophrastean work, but it is not clear that the Aristotelian discussion of emotions was originally composed for inclusion in the *Rhetoric*.²³⁷ Moreover, *Περὶ χάριτος*

²³⁶ I am not suggesting that prior to Theophrastus the stylistic features that produce χάρις had been totally ignored. On the contrary, in his discussion of urbanity (τὰ ἀστεῖα), Aristotle had already called attention to features like metaphor, quickness or brevity and surprise (*Rhet.* 3.10 1410b13, 20–1, 3.11 1412a18–19, b23), all of which are discussed by Demetrius Rhetor as contributing to χάρις (137, 152, 142). Rather, my suggestion is that Theophrastus may have been first to discuss these and other features under the label χάρις, i.e., as stylistic features that are productive of χάρις.

²³⁷ See Fortenbaugh (1996) p. 174–80.

as a discussion of emotion would be useful both in regard to ethics (doing and returning kindnesses) and in regard to rhetoric (emotional appeal on the basis of past kindnesses).

Given our ignorance concerning the orientation of *Περὶ χάριτος*,²³⁸ it would be reckless to assign any text to the work. The definition of beauty in a word (**687**) is most plausibly assigned to *On Style*,²³⁹ though Theophrastus may have discussed the topic in more than one place.

no. 18 *On Solecisms*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.48 = 1.233

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 44–5; Usener (1858) p. 20; Rabe (1890) p. 41–2; Stroux (1912) p. 10; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1523; Sollenberger (1984) p. 334–5

The title *Περὶ σολοικισμῶν*, *On solecisms*, occurs in the second list of Diogenes' catalogue (1.233). No other text mentions the title let alone reports its contents. According to Usener, the title refers to one of 17 books that together made up the collective work *On Kinds of Rhetorical Arts* (**666** no. 2a). But his argument is too imaginative and has no support among scholars today. See above, the comments on **666** no. 2a and 17a.

Judging from the title of the work and from Aristotelian precedents, *On Solecisms* will have concerned improprieties of speech and been relevant to both logic and rhetoric. In *Sophistical Refutations*, Aristotle considers arguments that lead a respondent into solecism, i.e., make him use a barbarous mode of expression, *τῇ λέξει βαρβαρίζειν* (3 165b20–1).²⁴⁰ Subsequent discussion focuses on grammatical errors that involve case-endings. E.g., the fact that the neuter pronoun *τοῦτο* has the same ending in the nominative and

²³⁸ A work *Περὶ χάριτος* is listed by Diogenes Laertius among the works of Theophrastus' pupil Demetrius of Phalerum (5.81 = 1.90 SOD). Wehrli thinks that the work was ethical in content (vol. 4 p. 61), but as Rabbie makes clear, his argument is circular (xliv). We can only say that both Theophrastus and Demetrius wrote a work entitled *Περὶ χάριτος*. Whether the two works were alike in content and what that content was remains a matter of conjecture.

²³⁹ See the commentary on **687**.

²⁴⁰ Distinguishing between a barbarism and a solecism is neither Aristotelian nor Theophrastean. Rather, the distinction originated in the Stoa. See Diogenes Laertius 7.59, where barbarism is defined as a style contrary to the usage of well-respected Greeks, and solecism is said to be an incongruously constructed sentence. For some comment see Volkmann p. 396 n. 1, Kennedy (1963) p. 294–5 and Schenkeveld (1994) p. 281–2.

accusative may mislead a respondent into using a masculine noun in the accusative when the nominative is wanted (14 173b26–174a8). And the fact that a noun like ἐπιστήμη calls for an attributive genitive may confuse a respondent so that he uses the genitive with the cognate verb ἐπίστασθαι (32 182a38–b2). In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle illustrates committing a solecism with an example that turns more on the strict sense or meaning of a word than on the conventions of grammar. The person who speaks of both sound and color, and uses only the verb “seeing” commits a solecism, for “seeing” in the strict sense is appropriate only to color. Better would be “perceiving,” which applies to both sound and color (3.5 1407b18–21). What unites these texts from the *Rhetoric* and *On Sophistical Refutations* is the notion of speaking good Greek, ἐλληνίζειν (*Soph. el.* 32 182a14, 34, *Rhet.* 3.5 1407a20). Aristotle recognized its importance in both dialectical and rhetorical argument, and Theophrastus will have done the same. Indeed, in the case of rhetoric, he recognized speaking good Greek, ἐλληνισμός (cf. *sermo purus et Latinus* 683.1) as one of four virtues of λέξις, style or expression.

There is one other passage in the *Rhetoric* that should not be passed over without at least being mentioned. I am thinking of a passage in which Aristotle discusses the character of wealthy individuals. He says that such persons are ostentatious and vulgar, σαλάκωνες καὶ σόλοικοι, because they are continually focused on what they love and admire, i.e., wealth. Here there is an offense against standards, but it does not involve grammar or the meaning of a word. Rather, it is an offense against tasteful behavior, and one that may not involve saying anything. It is, I think, quite unlikely that *On Solecisms* took account of such offences. It will have focused on errors in speech. Of course, verbal mistakes can have social consequences, and that suggests that there may have been at least some small connection between *On Solecisms* and, say, the dialogue concerning *Social Interaction* (436 no. 32). But if *On Solecisms* is to be connected with another work of Theophrastus, the obvious choice is *On Style* (666 no. 17a). Conceivably *On Solecisms* formed a part of that work, but most likely it was an independent treatise of no great length.

246 no. 1 *On Numbers*] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.50 = 1.285

Literature: Meurs (1640) p. 628; Schmidt (1839) p. 46; Usener (1858) p. 12, 16; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1523; Wehril (1983) p. 499; Sollenberger (1984) p. 375–6

The title *Περὶ ἀριθμῶν*, *On Numbers*, occurs at the beginning of the fifth list in Diogenes catalogue of Theophrastean writings. In the text-translation volumes, it has been placed among the titles on mathematics (246) and referred to in both the list of rhetorical and poetic titles (666) and the list of musical titles (714). The primary reason for referring to *On Numbers* within the list of rhetorical and poetic titles is that reading ἀριθμῶν has been challenged. Citing Cicero, who says that Theophrastus wrote in greater detail on prose rhythm (*Orator* 172 = 700), Meurs suggests that ἀριθμῶν ought to be emended to read ῥυθμῶν.²⁴¹ Usener, following Meurs,²⁴² actually prints ῥυθμῶν in his edition of Diogenes' catalogue. Usener recognizes only four lists in Diogenes' catalogue and believes that printing ῥυθμῶν is in line with the alphabetical arrangement of the fourth list. The emended title is found between Προτρεπτικός and Ὅριστικά περὶ λέξεως συλλογισμῶν, i.e., between titles, whose significant word — according to Usener — begins with pi and sigma, respectively (1.284 and 286). The significant letter in *Περὶ ῥυθμῶν* is rho, and that letter comes between pi and sigma.²⁴³ That is clever, and Regenbogen and Wehrli have chosen to follow Usener. Nevertheless, Usener's emendation does not achieve perfect alphabetical order. He thinks that the fourth list ends with *Περὶ φύσεως* (1.289) and therefore is forced to regard *Περὶ οὐρανοῦ* and *Πολιτικοῦ* (1.287–8) as exceptional additions. Furthermore, as Sollenberger points out, Προτρεπτικός ends the fourth list and *Περὶ ἀριθμῶν* begins a new list, i.e., a fifth list that runs to *Περὶ φύσεως* (1.289).²⁴⁴ Pace Usener, the entire fifth list is alphabetical, for the organizer of the list judged Ὅριστικά to be the significant word in the title Ὅριστικά περὶ λέξεως συλλογισμῶν. It is, therefore, not surprising that recent editors have chosen to print *Περὶ ἀριθμῶν*. We are no exception.

A secondary reasons for referring to *On Numbers* within the list of rhetorical and poetic titles is that number is essential to rhythm. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle recognizes that prose needs limitation in order not to be unpleasant and unintelligible. He says that everything is limited by number and then tells us that the number of the structure of expression is rhythm: ὁ δὲ τοῦ σχήματος τῆς λέξεως ἀριθμὸς

²⁴¹ I am grateful to Michael Sollenberger for checking Meurs' comment, p. 644, on the title *Περὶ ἀριθμῶν*.

²⁴² See the *apparatus criticus* to Usener's edition of the catalogue, (1858) p. 12

²⁴³ Usener (1858) p. 16.

²⁴⁴ At the end of the fifth list come two additional titles, *Περὶ καρπῶν* and *Περὶ ζώων* (1.290–1). Usener puts square brackets around the two titles.

ῥυθμός ἐστιν (3.8 1405b27–9). Theophrastus will have followed his teacher in recognizing an essential connection between prose rhythm and number, but in my judgment, it is unlikely that a treatise entitled *On Number* had rhythmical clausulae as a fundamental concern.

Much the same can be said concerning a connection with music. Analyzing musical intervals in terms of mathematical ratios was a common idea in the time of Theophrastus, and we can imagine him discussing these ratios in a work entitled *On Number*. But that said, we should remember that Theophrastus rejected the idea that pitch is a quantitative property of sound and held that differences in pitch are essentially qualitative (716). In my judgment, that tells against construing *On Number* as a musical treatise or even one in which musical issues occupied a prominent place.²⁴⁵ To be sure, the title may not be Theophrastean in origin, and it may be based on the incipit, in which number was mentioned. But it would be stretching the imagination to believe with conviction that “number” as it may have appeared in the incipit and as it does appear in the title was and is used with special reference to musical intervals. More likely the treatise under consideration focused on mathematical issues concerning number.

no. 19 *On Meters*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.47 = 1.214

Literature: Regenbogen (1940) col. 1523; Wehrli (1983) p. 499; Sollenberger (1984) p. 323–4

The title Περὶ μέτρων, *On Meter*, is found in the second list of Diogenes’ catalogue. No other text cites the work in question. With hesitation Regenbogen places the work among the musical texts. The idea is not foolish, for the noun μέτρον is not restricted to poetic meter; it can be used widely of various kinds of measure.²⁴⁶ Moreover, Diogenes’ second list contains two other musical titles (*Harmonics* and *On Music* 1.179 and 213 = 714 no. 1 and 3),²⁴⁷ and in the time of Theophrastus many persons concerned with musical theory

²⁴⁵ It is, I think, significant that Porphyry cites Theophrastus’ work *On Music*, when he reports his arguments against quantitative analysis (716.4).

²⁴⁶ For a fun example, see Aristophanes’ *Clouds* 638–40, where Socrates asks Strepsiades whether he would like to learn about μέτρα, rhythms, or words. Socrates means the meters of poetry, but Strepsiades understands μέτρα to mean measures of corn and the like.

²⁴⁷ A third musical title, *On Musicians*, is found in the third list (1.260 = 714 no. 2).

(Pythagoreans, Platonists and Peripatetics including Aristotle) embraced a quantitative analysis of differences in pitch. Nevertheless, Theophrastus himself preferred a qualitative analysis, and in the absence of further evidence, it seems prudent to construe *Περὶ μέτρων* as the title of a work on meter (hence Wehrli's translation of the title "Über die Versmasse"). Theophrastus may have discussed the structure of different meters and their connection with different forms of poetry (e.g., epic is written in a single meter, hexameter, while tragedy admits several; cf. Aristotle, *Poet.* 5 1449b11, 6 1449b34–5). Perhaps he discussed the pleasure that meter brings to poetry and drew a comparison with prose rhythm, which, albeit different from metrical verse, is nonetheless a source of pleasure to the listener (cf. *Poet.* 6 1449b29, *Rhet.* 3.8 1408b27). Be that as it may, a relationship between *Περὶ μέτρων* and one or both of the works *Περὶ ποιητικῆς* (666 no. 20 and 21) seems certain.

no. 20 *On (the Art of) Poetry*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.47 = 1.223

no. 21 another (work) *On (the Art of) Poetry*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.48 = 1.230

Literature: McMahon (1917) p. 43–4; Rostagni (1922) p. 105; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1532; Dosi (1960) p. 599–672; Wehrli (1983) p. 499, 514; Janko (1984) p. 50

The titles *Περὶ ποιητικῆς* and *Περὶ ποιητικῆς ἄλλο*, *On (the Art of) Poetry* and another (work) *On (the Art of) Poetry*, occur in the second list within Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings, but they do not occur next to each other. To be sure, both are found among the titles listed under *π* (*π*), but six titles come between them. That contrasts with the two ethical titles *Περὶ ἡδονῆς ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης* and *Περὶ ἡδονῆς ἄλλο*, *On Pleasure, like that of Aristotle* and another (work) *On Pleasure* (1.116–17 = 436 no. 26 and 27a), which occur together in the first of Diogenes' lists. It also contrasts with another pair of ethical title *Περὶ παιδων ἀγωγῆς* and *ἄλλο διάφορον*, *On Bringing up Children* and another (work) with a different treatment (1.281–2 = 436 no. 10 and 11), which occur together in the fourth of Diogenes' lists.²⁴⁸ Whether the separation of the titles concerning poetry has special significance is doubtful. One

²⁴⁸ On the ethical titles, see Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 100 and 118–19.

would like to know whether the titles referred simply to two copies of a single work *On Poetics* (perhaps one was corrected or expanded), or to two quite different works? Did one work follow Aristotle's *Poetics* closely, while the other did different things, possibly departing in some important way(s) from Aristotelian doctrine? According to Diogenes' list of Aristotelian works (5.24), the Stagirite's work *On Poetry* was two books long. (The second book on comedy is now lost.) Each of the Theophrastean works is listed as one book. That suggests that the Theophrastean works were shorter, but how much shorter is not clear.²⁴⁹

The Latin grammarian Diomedes reports a Greek definition of tragedy that is explicitly attributed to Theophrastus. He also reports Greek definitions of epic, comedy and mime, but without specific attribution. That these three definitions are also Theophrastean is often asserted and perhaps correctly so, but there are some grounds for hesitation. See the commentary on text **708**. Most likely the definition of tragedy was originally found in one of the works *On Poetry*. Indeed, Theophrastus may have offered an inclusive survey of the different poetic genre, and in this context defined and discussed epic, tragedy, comedy and mime. But it is not impossible that all four works were defined in *On Comedy* (**666** no. 22) as part of an introductory section that marked off comedy from other kinds of poetry.

It has been said that Theophrastus saw poetry as antithetical to truth and that he drew a sharp distinction between philosophy on the one hand and rhetoric and poetics on the other.²⁵⁰ If Theophrastus did hold such views, he may have advanced them in various places including one or both of the works *On Poetics*. But did he hold the views in question? Concerning the first view, that poetry is antithetical to truth, the evidence is weak. Dionysius of Halicarnassus' essay *On Lysias* 14 is cited: Theophrastus is said to have believed that Lysias pursued τὸ ποιητικόν more than τὸ ἀληθινόν (**692.2–3**). In this context, poetry is not being put forward as the antithesis of truth.

²⁴⁹ There are no certain answers to the questions posed in this paragraph. The judgment of Regenbogen, *Περὶ ποιητικῆς* and *Περὶ ποιητικῆς ἄλλο* "bleiben ganz unfassbar" (col. 1532), is stark but only slightly overstated. In contrast, Dosi p. 623–53 attempts to reconstruct the treatise, addressing both the order in which the material was presented and the substantive issues discussed by Theophrastus. Dosi's reconstruction is certainly interesting, but it is bold and builds on conjecture. Text **708** provides material for some reasonable guesses, but there is little else that offers a firm footing.

²⁵⁰ Dosi p. 613, 621, 671 and Janko (1984) p. 50.

In fact, there is no reference to truth, i.e., factual or philosophic truth. Rather the contrast is between realism and overdone wording. The latter is characterized as poetic. A sustained use of antithesis, balanced structure and similarities in sound has its place in poetry, but it is not appropriate to serious oratory, e.g., when Nicias, as a prisoner of war, addressed his captors. Emotional effect is done away with, and the listener is lost (692.14–16).²⁵¹ The idea of losing one's audience takes us to the second view, i.e., that philosophy is to be sharply distinguished from rhetoric and poetics. In this case, the relevant text is found in Ammonius' *Commentary on Aristotle's De interpretatione* 4 17a1 (CAG vol. 4.5 p. 65.31–66.10 Busse = 78): Theophrastus is said to have distinguished between the sentence in relation to the hearers and to the facts. The former is the concern of rhetoric and poetics, while the latter is the concern of philosophy. There is, of course, a contrast here, but we should not ignore the context. The statement-making sentence is under consideration — λόγος is used in a quite specific sense (78.1, 11) — and Ammonius is almost certainly drawing on Theophrastus' work *On Affirmation and Denial* (68 no. 3a). Theophrastus wants to focus on one aspect of the statement-making sentence: namely, that it asserts or denies that something is the case and as such is either true or false. Toward that end he draws a distinction between the sentence in relation to the facts, which is said to be the concern of the philosopher, and the sentence in relation to the hearers, which is said to be the concern of poetry and rhetoric. The latter includes stylistic matters, which are irrelevant to the truth or falsity of the sentence, but which have an effect on the listener. Nothing, however, is said about λόγοι in general. To be sure, stylistic matters are associated with poetry and rhetoric, but it is not said or even suggested that poetry and oratory are opposed to statement-making sentences and more generally to truth. On the contrary, poems and orations are full of statement-making sentences that have truth value, and poems and orations taken as wholes — connected or extended λόγοι — may deal with all kinds of truths either by advancing formal arguments — both deduc-

²⁵¹ The speech of Nicias as prisoner of war was written after his death in Sicily. It is an exercise or display piece, but that does not mean that the speech fails as an example of pursuing poetic effect on an inappropriate occasion. The imagined situation is a serious one in which a playful style has no place (unless one aims to be ridiculous and to arouse laughter, not pity, in the audience). For further discussion, see the commentary on 692.

tive and inductive (enthymemes and examples) — or building a case in a less structured manner. Theophrastus would agree.²⁵²

More interesting is the claim that Theophrastus departed from Aristotle by explaining epic, tragedy and comedy in terms of μῦθος, ἱστορία and πλάσμα. Aristotle, we are told,²⁵³ wanted plots that are universal, i.e., plots that contain events that are possible and connected in ways that are probable. He recognized that Homer, the standard for epic, did not always exclude the improbable, but he justified the exceptions in terms of pleasure.²⁵⁴ Theophrastus' approach is said to have been more empirical. He looked at what the poets actually offer and abandoned Aristotle's single standard in favor of a division into three. Epic was referred to μῦθος, stories which make room for the marvelous and impossible. Tragedy was explained in terms of ἱστορία, events that are true or at least part of legend. And comedy was connected with πλάσμα, plots that are imaginary but nevertheless probable or likely. The trouble here is that no text names Theophrastus in connection with this triad.²⁵⁵ An argument can be developed, but it is based on what is found in scholia and Latin grammarians. Perhaps the triad was developed in the post-Aristotelian Peripatos, but that it originated with Theophrastus cannot be demonstrated.

137 *In Reply to Aeschylus*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.50 = no. 42 1.270

Literature: Regenbogen (1940) col. 1541; Wehrli (1983) p. 499; Sollenberger (1984) p. 364–5; Sharples, *Commentary* vol. (1998) p. 29

The title Πρὸς Αἰσχύλον, *In Reply to Aeschylus*, occurs at the beginning of the fourth list in Diogenes catalogue of Theophrastean works. The work is not referred to elsewhere, so that no text helps identify the Aeschylus named in the title. Regenbogen places the work among the *atakta*, i.e., treatises whose field or subject matter cannot be determined. Sollenberger suggests that the Aeschylus in question could be either the well-known tragedian (first half of the fifth century B.C.) or a pupil of the mathematician Hippocrates

²⁵² For further discussion, see the commentary on 78.

²⁵³ See Rostagni p. 118–21, cf. 129; also Dosi p. 605, 613, 620, 627, 632, 655, 664–5.

²⁵⁴ See *Poetics* 24 1460a11–18 on Achilles' pursuit of Hector.

²⁵⁵ Janko (1984) p. 50.

(second half of the fifth century), who wrote inter alia on comets. Wehrli assigns the work to poetics, thereby suggesting that its subject was the tragedian.²⁵⁶ In contrast, Sharples sees the work as one on natural science. That is most likely correct. I add only that its position in Diogenes' catalogue — it occurs immediately before *Astronomical Research* (137 no. 43) — depends entirely on the alphabetical arrangement of the fourth list and not on related subject matter.²⁵⁷ It is, of course, true that Theophrastus' pupil Demetrius of Phalerum wrote a monograph on Antiphanes, most likely the poet of Middle Comedy (Diog. Laert., *Lives* 5.81 = 1.102 SOD). There is no reason why Theophrastus, too, could not have written a monograph on a single poet, but it seems significant that the title of the work by Demetrius begins with περί, "on," while the title of the Theophrastean work begins with πρός. The latter suggests a reply to Aeschylus, and if that is correct, it seems reasonable to suppose that Theophrastus is reacting negatively to some astronomical view or the like.²⁵⁸

- no. 22 *On Comedy*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.47 = 1.208; Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 6.79 261D = 709.1

Literature: McMahon (1917) p. 43–6; Kroll (1921) col. 1208, 1214, 1270; Rostagni (1922) p. 137–8; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1532; Fortenbaugh (1981) p. 245–60; Wehrli (1983) p. 499, 514; Janko (1984) p. 48–52

The title Περί κωμῳδίας, *On Comedy*, occurs in the second list of Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings. The title is cited in only one other place: namely, in Athenaeus' *The Sophists at Dinner* (709.1). There it is mentioned as the source of an anecdote concerning the Tirynthians, who were disposed to excessive laughter and as a result unable to accomplish serious business. Wishing to be freed

²⁵⁶ An anecdote concerning the tragedian Aeschylus is reported in 553, but doubt is expressed whether Theophrastus or Chameleon is the source of the anecdote. Moreover, reference is made to *On Pleasure* and not to a monograph concerning Aeschylus (line 2).

²⁵⁷ The work *Astronomical Research* may be that of Eudemus and therefore erroneously included in Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean works.

²⁵⁸ We may compare Aristotle's *Meteorologica* 1.6, where the Stagirite reports and rejects the view of Hippocrates and Aeschylus concerning the tail of a comet (342b35–343b7). We should, however, keep in mind that the preposition πρός does not always introduce opposition. It may express various relationships, so that the Theophrastean title need not announce an attack on Aeschylus, though in this case it probably does. See Sollenberger (1984) 226–7, 365.

of this condition, the Tirynthians consulted the oracle at Delphi and were told that they should perform a sacrifice without laughing. When they failed to do so, they realized that a long-standing habit is incapable of being cured. How Theophrastus used this anecdote in the work *On Comedy* is not reported. In the commentary on 709, I have set out four possibilities that need not exclude each other. 1) Theophrastus may have wished to illustrate the fact that humorous traits are often foibles that are not vicious in themselves. 2) Or he may have wanted to elucidate comic plot, or 3) to call attention to the educational benefits of comedy, or 4) to recommend comedy for its cathartic effect regarding laughter.

The definition of comedy preserved by Diomedes, “a story of private affairs involving no danger” (708.9–10), is attributed vaguely to the Greeks. On the whole, scholars assign it to Theophrastus. The assignation may well be correct, but there are some grounds for hesitation. See the commentary on 708, where I also call attention to the fact that the definition omits any reference to worthless individuals and therefore contrasts with Aristotle’s notion of comedy as an imitation of persons who are worse than we are (*Poetics* 2 1448a4, 17). The omission appears to reflect the development of comedy in the fourth century A.D. and in particular the plays of Menander, who studied under Theophrastus (18 no. 12).

Scholars have long recognized a connection between Theophrastus’ *Characters* and New Comedy. The connection is important, for the *Characters* presents thirty sketches of humorous traits, most of which (twenty-eight by my count²⁵⁹) are not tied to a particular motive or goal. Theophrastus’ focus is on superficial behavioral regularities and not on the desires and beliefs that underlie and explain such regularities. An example is loquacity, which is defined as a lack of self-control in speech (7.1).²⁶⁰ Theophrastus offers a string of examples of loquacious behavior, some of which suggest that the loquacious man desires to exhibit his own importance (e.g., 7.2, 7.6), but there is no suggestion that a desire to appear important is essential to loquacious behavior. And rightly so, for there is no one reason why some people talk incessantly. We can imagine a person who is frightened of being left alone and for that reason finds it difficult to cease speaking. Or the loquacious person may suffer

²⁵⁹ Exceptions are distrust (18) and flattery (2).

²⁶⁰ Today the definitions are most often deemed late additions to the text (see above, p. 89 n. 130). For our purposes, the status of the definitions is not of special significance.

from too much hot black bile (ps. Aristotle, *Problems* 30.1 954a34), so that his physiological condition is the cause of his unbroken chatter. Or a combination of these factors may underlie his behavior.

We are not told that Theophrastus' interest in superficial behavioral regularities influenced his understanding of comic character. Indeed we are not told that he discussed comic character from any point of view. But if he did discuss comic character — as is likely in the work *On Comedy* — then he may well have taken note of behavior regularities in respect to both minor and major characters. In regard to minor characters, the cook in Menander's *Samian Woman* may serve as an example. He is made fun of for being a chatterer (283–5, 292–4), but his loquacity is never explained. We are never taken below the surface, so that the cook attracts no independent interest, and when he fails to reappear later in the play his disappearance is not noticed. More interesting are major characters who are portrayed in terms of a behavioral regularity. An example is the soldier Polemon in *She who is Shorn*. He is called vehement (8), and much of the play concerns his impetuosity. Nevertheless, the trait is left unexplained and that permits Menander to construct a clever ending. When Polemon is enjoined to give up being a soldier, so that he will not act impulsively in the future, Polemon responds in a typically impulsive manner. The spectator smiles, realizing that the injunction is based on a misperception. Abandoning military life will do no good, for Polemon's vehemence is not dependent on that mode of life. Rather, a physiological condition underlies his vehemence, and to change that is the work of a surgeon or a god.²⁶¹

In the *Poetics*, Aristotle connects tragic character with *προαίρεσις*, moral choice (6 1450b8–10, 15 1454a17–19). The connection is readily intelligible. Aristotle believes that tragedy imitates men of good or better character (2 1448a18, 15 1454b9) and that good choice reveals good character (15 1454a19). Typically the good man chooses virtuous action as something noble; he chooses it for its own sake. We do not know whether Aristotle also associated comic character with choice, but it has been assumed that he did.²⁶² Be that as it may, there is good reason to deny a necessary tie between comic character and choice. Polemon may again serve as an example. His character is that of vehemence, which manifests itself throughout his behavior. If his vehemence is innate, as it seems to be,

²⁶¹ For further discussion including analysis of Knemon's character in the *Grouch*, see the commentary on 709.

²⁶² Cooper p. 46, 185, 202.

it is not something that can be chosen or not chosen. Of course, there are comic characters who do manifest choice in their actions. An example is Smikrines in Menander's *Shield*. He is presented as a lover of money (123) who wishes to possess everything (119–20). He calls the gain of plunder noble (33) and has no other concern beside possession (120). Such a character, when his desires are frustrated, is likely to evoke laughter in the theater. But the figures on the comic stage are not all of this kind. Nor are they the most interesting figures. More intriguing is a figure like Polemon, whose character gives rise to a subtle ending that delights the intelligent spectator. Theophrastus will have recognized that, and in my judgment, he is likely to have discussed the matter in the work *On Comedy*.

Since I have discussed comic character at length elsewhere,²⁶³ I limit myself to one additional comment. In the *Tractatus Coislinianus*, comic character is exemplified by buffoonery, irony and boastfulness (sec. 7 p. 52 Kaibel, p. 66 Koster, sec. XII p. 38 Janko). These traits are dissociated from choice in Aristotle's *Eudemean Ethics* (3.7 1234a25), but not in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In Theophrastus' *Characters* two of the traits, irony and boastfulness (1 and 23), are presented as behavioral regularities. That is suggestive, for Theophrastus' ethical theory appears to be closely related to that of the *Eudemean Ethics*.²⁶⁴ Since there are reasons to think that the *Eudemean Ethics* may be the later of the two Aristotelian works,²⁶⁵ can it be that Aristotle's understanding of traits like buffoonery, irony and boastfulness changed over time, so that he came to think of them as behavioral regularities? If so, Theophrastus may be viewed as developing the thought of his teacher and applying it to comedy. Perhaps in the work *On Comedy*, Theophrastus set forth a doctrine of comic character that gave serious consideration to behavioral regularities apart from deeper lying motives and desires.

no. 23 *On the Ludicrous*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.46 = 1.184; Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 8.40 348A = 710.7–8

Literature: Arndt (1904) p. 15–17, 35; Kayser (1906) p. 41–4; Mittelhaus (1911) p. 49–50; Grant, M. (1924) p. 34–7, 71; Kroll

²⁶³ In my article "Theophrast über den komischen Charakter" (1981).

²⁶⁴ See my article "Arius, Theophrastus and the Eudemean Ethics," in *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus* = Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities vol. 1, ed. W. Fortenbaugh (New Brunswick: Transaction 1983, reprint 2002) p. 203–23.

(1913) p. 87, (1940) col. 1077; Solmsen (1931) p. 262–3, (1941) p. 45, 188; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1524; Dosi (1960) p. 637; Wehrli (1983) p. 498, 514; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 125, (1998b) p. 188; Janko (1984) p. 48; Rabbie (1986) p. xliii–lix; Leeman et al. (1989) vol. 3 p. 190–200

The title *Περὶ γελοίου*, *On the Ludicrous*, is found in the second list within Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings. That is the same list in which *Περὶ κωμωδίας*, *On Comedy* occurs. The title announces a discussion of the laughable. It is natural to associate the discussion with comedy, for Aristotle regarded comedy as an imitation of the *geloion* (*Poetics* 4 1448b37, 5 1449a34–6)²⁶⁶ and discussed the topic in the lost second book of the *Poetics* (*Rhetoric* 1.11 1372a1–2, 3.18 1419b5–6). Nevertheless, it is possible and perhaps probable that the Theophrastean discussion went beyond poetics and included topics proper to rhetoric and ethics. We may compare Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, where the utility of the ludicrous in debate is recognized (3.14 1415a35–7, 3.18 1419b2–5), and the *Ethics*, where the ludicrous in social interaction is discussed (4.8 1127b33–1128b4).

Although the Greek word for laughter, *γέλως*, is cognate with *γελοῖον* — reflecting the fact that the *geloion* provokes *gelôs* — it is unlikely that *On the Ludicrous* discussed all kinds of laughter. For not all laughter is a response to the ludicrous. I am thinking of, e.g., laughter caused by tickling or a blow to the diaphragm.²⁶⁷ In such cases, laughter is not a matter of finding something funny or absurd; rather the laughter is a physical reaction to bodily disturbance. Of course, a person watching someone else being tickled, may find the event ludicrous and may respond by laughing. But that is not the same as laughing because one is being tickled. Rather it is a response grounded on a certain judgment or thought, which may or may not be correct. Laughter grounded on a belief is an emotion like anger and fear, and as such it may have been discussed not only in *On the*

²⁶⁵ See A. Kenny, *The Aristotelian Ethics* (Oxford: University Press 1978).

²⁶⁶ Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.8 1128a23 and the *Tractatus Coislinianus* sec. 3 p. 50 Kaibel, p. 64 Koster, sec. IV p. 24 Janko.

²⁶⁷ On laughter caused by tickling, see Aristotle, *Parts of Animals* 3.10 673a2–10 and ps. Aristotle, *Problems* 35.2 964b30–2 and 35.8 965a23–32; and on laughter caused by a blow to the diaphragm, see Aristotle, *Parts of Animals* 3.10 673a11–12, ps. Aristotle, *Problems* 35.6 965a14–17 and the Hippocratic *Epidemics* 5.95, 7.121. For discussion see Fortenbaugh (2000a) p. 96–7.

Ludicrous but also in the work *On Emotions* (436 no. 5 = 1.155). Indeed, the latter work is perhaps the more likely place for a detailed discussion of laughter in terms of grounds, object and (pre)disposition.²⁶⁸

The kinds of things which people find ludicrous are diverse. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle suggests a tripartite division into men, speech and deeds (*anthrôpoi, logoi* and *erga*), and refers to the *Poetics* for an analysis (1.11 1371b35–1372a2). That analysis is lost with the second book of the *Poetics*. In the *Tractatus Coislinianus*, we find a twofold classification of the sources of laughter: namely, expression and things (*lexis* and *pragmata*).²⁶⁹ Listed under expression are homonymy, synonymy, repetition, paronymy, the diminutive, alteration, and figure of speech. Under things come assimilation, deception, the impossible, the possible and inconsequential, things contrary to expectation, base character, vulgar dance, taking what is most worthless, and reasoning which is disjointed and inconsequent (sec. 3 p. 51 Kaibel, p. 64–5 Koster, sec. V p. 24 Janko).²⁷⁰ In *On the Ludicrous*, Theophrastus may have introduced one of these frameworks in order to organize his discussion; but however he proceeded, Theophrastus is likely to have made clear that the *geloion* takes various forms, occurs in various situations and can be both deliberate and involuntary.²⁷¹

Although I am inclined to believe that the work *On the Ludicrous* offered an extended treatment of the *geloion*, it should be observed that the title, taken by itself, may refer to a quite short discussion of the subject. We may compare Aristotle's brief remarks (c. 1/5 of a Bekker column) on the ludicrous in *Rhetoric* 3.18. The remarks are introduced by the words *περὶ δὲ τῶν γελοίων*. The particle *δέ* is transitional, and the phrase *περὶ τῶν γελοίων* is only loosely tied to the sentence which follows.²⁷² It functions as a title or

²⁶⁸ The thought that something ludicrous has occurred is the efficient cause of laughter *qua* emotion and that which gives the laughter direction, so that the person laughing may be said to laugh at someone or something. For fuller discussion of laughter as an emotion, see Fortenbaugh (2000a) esp. p. 97–103.

²⁶⁹ I have translated *pragmata* with “things,” because the English word is vague and inclusive, as is the Greek word, which includes actions, character, physical features and generally whatever is not covered by *lexis*, “expression.”

²⁷⁰ I report the two lists as found in the *Tractatus* itself (a photo of the manuscript is provided by Janko [1984] between pages 8 and 9) without reporting subdivisions and without considering how the lists might be corrected.

²⁷¹ See the introduction to the section on “The Ludicrous” p. 376.

²⁷² In the Oxford translation, the words are punctuated as an independent sentence: “As to jests.”

heading.²⁷³ The arrangement and wording are probably Aristotelian, but it is not impossible that an editor introduced the words *περὶ δὲ τῶν γελοίων*, when combining related material. The immediately preceding discussion of interrogation is also introduced by a heading, *περὶ δὲ ἐρωτήσεως* (3.18 1418b39),²⁷⁴ and both that discussion and the remarks on the ludicrous (1419b2–9) may be viewed as supplemental to the discussion of proof, *pistis*, in 3.17.²⁷⁵

Only a single text, apart from Diogenes' catalogue, refers explicitly to Theophrastus' treatise *On the Ludicrous*. The text in question, **710**, tells us that Theophrastus took note of a proverb, "No rotten fish is large," and explained how the cithara-player Stratonicus used that proverb — he spoke the words separately — in order to make fun of an actor named Simycas (lines 7–10). Perhaps we can infer that the work *On the Ludicrous* was more than a simple collection of witticisms; it contained explanatory material including historical and lexical observations, and it may have treated the proverb as one division of the *geloion*.²⁷⁶ If a second text, **711**, can be assigned to *On the Ludicrous*, we can add that the work contained a definition of the jest and exhibited an interest in audience psychology. Furthermore, it is possible that one or more of the sayings printed among the ethical texts — especially **453** which recommends that jests delight the listener and not be an embarrassment to the speaker — should be assigned to *On the Ludicrous*. Finally text **31** reports a jest made by Theophrastus. It may derive from *On the Ludicrous*, though other possibilities are more likely. Nevertheless, even if all these texts report material originally found in *On the Ludicrous*, none of these texts says anything about the length of the Theophrastean work. It remains possible that *On the Ludicrous* was not a substantial treatise, but rather a limited discussion: not as brief as Aristotle's discussion in *Rhetoric* 3.18, but still short enough so that it might become a chapter in a composite work on rhetoric or poetics.²⁷⁷

²⁷³ Cf. 2.21 1394a19, *περὶ δὲ γνῶμολγίας*, discussed above, p. 82 n. 112, in the commentary to **666** no. 7.

²⁷⁴ Here too there is only a loose tie to the sentence which follows, so that the Oxford translation renders the Greek with an independent sentence: "Next as to Interrogation."

²⁷⁵ Cope vol. 3 p. 210.

²⁷⁶ Janko (1984) p. 48 sees in **710.7–11** the suggestion that "Theophrastus listed proverbs as one type of comic resource, just as did Demetrius" Rhetor in *On Style* 156.

²⁷⁷ I.e., it may have been similar in length to Aristotle's discussion of the ludicrous in the (now lost) second book of the *Poetics*. Cf. the title *On Slander* (**666** no. 13); the work referred to may have been of chapter length like Aristotle's discussion of slander in *Rhetoric* 3.14, or it may have been considerably longer.

We should be equally cautious concerning the influence the work may have had both within and outside the Peripatos. In particular, we should hesitate before following those scholars who attribute a work *On the Ludicrous* to Demetrius of Phalerum.²⁷⁸ Demetrius was indeed a pupil of Theophrastus, but pupils do not do everything their teachers do.²⁷⁹ Similarly we should hesitate before claiming that Theophrastus' *On the Ludicrous* is the basis of Cicero's discussion of wit in *On the Orator* 2.216–90.²⁸⁰ We can speak of Peripatetic influence, but we should not make the leap to Theophrastus, for while Cicero distinguishes between verbal figures and those of thought, Theophrastus seems to have recognized no such distinction.²⁸¹

no. 24 *On Delivery*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.48 = 1.236

Literature: Westermann (1833) p. 170; Schmidt (1839) p. 61; Diels (1886) p. 32–4; Striller (1886) p. 35; Kayser (1910) p. 327–58; Stroux (1912) p. 70; Krumbacher (1920) p. 32–4; Kroll (1940) col. 1071, 5; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1526–7; Solmsen (1941) p. 45–7, 188–9; Matthes (1958) p. 213–14; Kennedy (1963) p. 282–4, (1994a) p. 87; Lucas (1968) p. 197; Calboli (1969) p. 263–6; Wehrli (1983) p. 499, 514; Sollenberger (1984) p. 338–9; Fortenbaugh (1985a) p. 269, 281–3; Wöhrle (1990) p. 39–46; Matelli (1995) p. 1092–9

Prior to Theophrastus, delivery was not much discussed. Aristotle tells us that the subject had not been taken up by rhetoricians and had only lately become part of the art of tragedy and rhapsody (*Rhet.* 3.1 1403b22–7). Since Aristotle's own remarks on delivery are few, scattered and often disapproving,²⁸² it is tempting to believe that the title *On Delivery* (Περὶ ὑποκρίσεως) refers to a work which was truly “epoch-making,”²⁸³ i.e., a careful, inclusive and sympathetic treatment of the subject.

²⁷⁸ Arndt p. 15, Grant p. 34, Regenbogen col. 1524 and Kroll (1940) col. 1077.

²⁷⁹ There is no textual evidence to support attributing a work Περὶ γελοίου to Demetrius Rhetor. Grant p. 64 n. 60 cites Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 8.40 348A, but Demetrius is not named, only Theophrastus (= 710.7). See Rabbie p. xliv and Leeman et al. p. 191.

²⁸⁰ See Arndt p. 35.

²⁸¹ Rabbie p. xlviii–lix and Leeman et al. p. 193–200. See also the commentary on 692, below, p. 298–9.

²⁸² See the introduction to section IV.10 on “Delivery.”

²⁸³ Kroll (1940) col. 1075.

Our evidence is, however, quite limited.²⁸⁴ The title is found only in the catalogue of Theophrastus' writings preserved by Diogenes Laertius (1.236). The two texts that explicitly report a Theophrastean view or remark concerning delivery (712, 713) mention no particular treatise. Furthermore, the author of the *Rhetoric to Herennius* (1st cent. B.C.) says that no one had written diligently on the subject (*nemo de ea re diligenter scripsit* 3.19). This statement has suggested to some scholars that Theophrastus' work was short and lacked specific precepts concerning the use of voice and bodily movement.²⁸⁵ I am inclined to withhold judgment. Certainly the fact that Diogenes Laertius lists *On Delivery* as a work in one book need not imply lengthy treatment. The work may have been a short *opusculum* or part of a larger work. Indeed, the *Rhetoric to Herennius* may offer a close parallel. The author tells us that the entire subject should be treated carefully (*non neglegenter videtur tota res consideranda* 3.19), but what he offers runs for only nine sections within the third book (3.19–27). These sections contain advice on different uses of voice and bodily movement. There is a clear recognition that rules for voice and bodily movement should work together (3.26). Correspondence between delivery and content is also recommended (3.24, 26). In the end, however, the author acknowledges that his remarks are at best a beginning; he leaves the rest to practice (3.27).²⁸⁶ That Theophrastus' discussion was equally brief seems to me possible.

Two caveats should be expressed. First, being equally brief is not the same as being identical in content. In particular, the detailed rules given in the *Rhetoric to Herennius* 3.23–7 almost certainly belong to a period later than Theophrastus.²⁸⁷ Second, we may believe that Theophrastus' treatment of delivery was short and lacking in specific precepts and still wonder whether the statement "no one has written diligently on the subject" (3.19) is altogether accurate.²⁸⁸ For

²⁸⁴ Paucity of evidence encouraged Kayser to suggest that the title *On Delivery* refers to an ethical treatise similar to *On Flattery* (436 no. 25). The view finds no acceptance today and has been adequately rejected in the scholarly literature. See, e.g., Regenbogen col. 1527 and Fortenbaugh (1985a) p. 281.

²⁸⁵ Schmidt (1839) p. 62, Stroux p. 70.

²⁸⁶ Cf. Cicero, *On the Orator* 1.145, where Crassus concludes his list of well-worn precepts common to all the rhetoricians (1.137), saying that he had tasted certain brief precepts on delivery and memory and done so with much practice: *de actione et memoria quaedam brevia, sed magna cum exercitatione praecepta gustaram*.

²⁸⁷ See Kroll (1940) col. 1075 and H. Caplan, in the Loeb edition (1954) p. 194–5 note c.

²⁸⁸ Cf. Matthes p. 214 and Calboli (1969) p. 264–5.

after Theophrastus, delivery continued to be discussed both within and outside the Peripatos. Within the school, Demetrius of Phalerum took up the subject with reference to both Demosthenes and Isocrates (fr. 134–9 SOD). Hieronymus of Rhodes, who began his career as a Peripatetic, is said to have commented on the latter (fr. 38A–B White). Outside the school, delivery was discussed by rhetoricians like Athenaeus (Philodemus, *Rhet.* 1.193.15–16 Sudhaus)²⁸⁹ and Plotius Gallus. The latter is said to have written on gesture (Quintilian 11.3.143), but whether he wrote prior to the composition of the *Rhetoric to Herennius* is uncertain. In addition, the Rhodian School of rhetoricians opposed Asianist excesses and may well have influenced the moderate recommendations set forth in the *Rhetoric to Herennius*.²⁹⁰ Here, however, we should probably think of oral instruction involving declamatory exercises rather than extensive written texts.²⁹¹ In the absence of further evidence, the matter is best left undecided.

Cicero has given us two discussions of delivery. The earlier (55 B.C.) is found in *On the Orator* 3.213–27 and the later (46 B.C.) in *Orator* 55–6. Both have been said to derive from Theophrastus' work *On Delivery*.²⁹² Certainty here is quite impossible, and much depends on what kind of derivation is being claimed. Without attempting a full discussion, I offer the following observations. The case for a Theophrastean origin depends largely on the earlier account. For the later discussion is shorter, offered only in passing²⁹³ and largely a repetition of material already presented in the *De oratore*.²⁹⁴ The argu-

²⁸⁹ Athenaeus, 2nd c. B.C., is said by Quintilian to have been the rival and almost the equal of Hermagoras (3.1.16). See Krumbacher p. 35 and Kennedy (1963) p. 320–1.

²⁹⁰ Krumbacher p. 42–4.

²⁹¹ What Cicero says concerning the Rhodian rhetorician Molo seems significant. He first characterizes Molo as a practical advocate and an outstanding writer (of speeches); then he praises Molo as an attentive teacher who was able to restrain his youthful excesses (*Brutus* 316). There is no mention here of long or short treatises on delivery and related subjects. That does not mean that Molo taught entirely without notes, but it does suggest that he and other Rhodian rhetoricians failed to produce the kind of treatise which would have satisfied the author of the *Rhetoric to Herennius*.

²⁹² Stroux p. 70, Kroll (1940) col. 1075, Regenbogen col. 1526, Kennedy (1972) p. 121.

²⁹³ It is something of an extra, being preliminary to the discussion of style requested by Brutus (52, 54).

²⁹⁴ In regard to repetition the following cases may be mentioned: Demosthenes assigns first, second and third place to delivery (*De or.* 3.213, *Or.* 56); facial expression is an image of the soul and the eyes informants (*De or.* 3.221, *Or.* 60);

ments for connecting the earlier discussion with Theophrastus seem to be three. First, Theophrastus is mentioned by name within the discussion (3.221 = **713.7**). Second, the discussion contains material that can be described as Theophrastean. Third, Theophrastus is named earlier within the discussion of prose rhythm (3.184 = **701.7**) and may have influenced much of what is said concerning style. It seems reasonable to believe that Cicero continued to draw on Theophrastus when he turned to delivery. In response to the three arguments, we can say, first, that the mention of Theophrastus in a single passage (3.221) tells us little about Cicero's knowledge of the Eresian let alone his use of *On Delivery*. What the passage contains is a clever remark which may have been preserved in later handbooks more for its wittiness than for any instructional value. Second, the Theophrastean elements present in the account of delivery are so sensible and so widespread within the rhetorical tradition that Cicero may have them from many different sources including his own experience. The most obvious example is the division of delivery into voice, gesture and facial expression (3.216, 220, 221). This threefold division was almost certainly given formal recognition by Theophrastus; but each of the elements already appears in Aristotle,²⁹⁵ and together they were taken up by rhetoricians of the Hellenistic period (cf. *Rhetoric to Herennius* 3.19, 26).²⁹⁶ Third, the account of style does indeed contain Theophrastean elements, but that does not tell us where Cicero got them. He may have drawn on an intermediary;²⁹⁷ and he may have done the same when writing on delivery. In saying that, I am not suggesting that Theophrastus made no connection between style and delivery. He will have done so.²⁹⁸

ineptitude in facial expression should be avoided (*De or.* 3.222, *Or.* 60); facial expression comes second after voice (*De or.* 3.223, *Or.* 60); innate excellence in voice is desirable (*De or.* 3.224, *Or.* 59).

²⁹⁵ See the introduction to section IV.10 on "Delivery."

²⁹⁶ To take another example, the recognition that voice has three aspects (3.216) may be Theophrastean, but it is also Aristotelian (*Rhet.* 3.1 1403b28–30) and will have been part of rhetorical instruction in the Hellenistic period (cf. *De or.* 1.145).

²⁹⁷ Certainty seems quite elusive. See "The Sources" on Cicero, p. 11–12 and my article "Cicero as a Reporter" forthcoming in *Rhetorica* 23.1 (2005).

²⁹⁸ Aristotle had discussed the matter briefly with special reference to asyndeton and repetition (*Rhet.* 3.12). Demetrius of Phalerum, Theophrastus' pupil (**18** no. 5), pointed out how long periods impede delivery (fr. 134 SOD), and Hieronymus of Rhodes regarded unbroken smoothness as unsuited to live debate (38A–B White). Theophrastus will have taken up these points and almost certainly added more including the use of stylistic devices to support stage delivery. The playwright Menander, another of his pupils (**18** no. 12), will have benefited from these discussions and perhaps provided his master with examples.

Rather, I am saying that a reference to Theophrastus in a single passage concerned with prose rhythm (3.184) has little or no bearing on the question what source or sources stand behind Cicero's remarks on delivery.

There is, then, no strong argument for believing that Cicero had a first-hand knowledge of Theophrastus' work *On Delivery*. Perhaps he did read through the work on some occasion, but I doubt that he drew directly on it when writing *On the Orator* and *Orator*. Pressed to state the primary source of Cicero's views on delivery, I would opt for the Rhodian school and most especially Molo, who offered Cicero instruction first in Rome (81 B.C.) and then on Rhodes (78 B.C.).²⁹⁹ It may be that on one of these occasions Cicero became acquainted with Theophrastus' ideas on delivery. For in opposing the excesses of Asianism, the rhetoricians of Rhodes seem to have embraced elements of Peripatetic doctrine including the importance of restraint in delivery.³⁰⁰ Again, there is no certainty here.

Since the earliest discussions of delivery concerned tragedy and epic, it is quite possible that Theophrastus' work included remarks on the performance of actors and rhapsodists.³⁰¹ In fact, text **713** speaks of the actor who turns his back on the audience, though here the reference to acting seems intended to illustrate poor delivery by an orator.³⁰² It is also possible that the work *On Delivery* had something to say about musical performance, if only in passing or by way of example. Indeed, we know that Theophrastus took notice of the bodily movements of an *aulos*-player named Andron (**718**), but he may have done so in *On Musicians* (**714** no. 2) and not in *On Delivery*.³⁰³

²⁹⁹ In 79–8 B.C. Cicero went to Greece and Asia Minor suffering from poor health and intending to correct faults in his delivery. When the principal teachers of Asia failed to satisfy him, he turned to Molo, who taught him moderation so that he returned to Rome with improved delivery and better health (*Brutus* 316).

³⁰⁰ Krumbacher p. 38–41, 44–7.

³⁰¹ Krumbacher p. 32 and Fortenbaugh (1985a) p. 281–3.

³⁰² Illustrating oratorical delivery by reference to the stage is likely to have been common (see, e.g., Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3.12 1413b25–7). Indeed, the first teachers of delivery were actors, and fourth century orators like Aeschines and Demosthenes learned much from theatrical performance. The former actually performed on the stage (Demosthenes, *Or.* 18.265, 19.246); the latter took lessons from actors (ps. Plutarch, *Lives of the Ten Orators* 845B; Plutarch, *Demosthenes* 7.1–2; Photius, *Library* 265 493b4–8). I would add only that helpful comparisons could be made in both directions.

³⁰³ Text **718** is printed among the texts on music. Since no Theophrastean writing is mentioned, it cannot be excluded that the text derives originally from *On Delivery*. It seems, however, more likely that the text is drawn from a musical work like *On the Musicians*. But whatever the truth concerning **718**, musical

While no text names *On Delivery*, **712** and **713** can be assigned to that work with some certainty.

727 *Afternoon (Discussions)* 2 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.46 = no. 2 **1.185**

Literature: Usener (1858) p. 15; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1534; Sollenberger (1984) p. 232–3, 304

The title Δειλινῶν occurs in the second list of Diogenes' catalogue. The genitive may be explained by the book number that follows, α' β' = 2: "two books of *Afternoon (Discussions)*." In filling out the translation with "Discussions," we are making a suggestion. Others might prefer "Lectures" or even "Essays."³⁰⁴ Usener identified the work with Ἀκροάσεως α' β', which occurs in the first list of Diogenes' catalogue (5.42 = **1.82** = **727** no. 1). He changed the singular to plural, so that the title runs Ἀκροάσεων α' β', two books of *Lectures*.³⁰⁵ Combining the two titles, we get Ἀκροάσεων δειλινῶν α' β' two books of *Afternoon Lectures*. Usener's emendation has some appeal, but it lacks manuscript support and has not been adopted in the text-translation volumes.

Several sources tell us that Aristotle taught rhetoric in the afternoon in competition with Isocrates: Philodemus, *On Rhetoric* col. 48.35.21–36.5 (vol. 2 p. 50 Sudhaus = no. 31 Düring); Quintilian, *Oratorical Education* 3.1.14 (= 32d D); and Syrianus, *Scholia on Hermogenes* vol. 4 p. 297 Walz (= vol. 2 p. 59 Rabe = 33 D).³⁰⁶ The morning was reserved for more exacting philosophic subjects. It is, then, natural to ask whether the title *Afternoon (Discussions/Lectures)* refers to a collection of materials used by Theophrastus in afternoon classes, and whether this materials was largely or even exclusively rhetorical. A positive answer is tempting — I think that it

performance may have been touched on in various treatises including one or both of the works *On Poetics* (**666** no. 20 and 21). Cf. Aristotle's *Poetics* 26 1461b30–2, where the Stagirite compares the exaggerated motions of actors with those of *aulos*-players. At 1462a7–8 he refers to the excessive use of gesture by a singer named Mnasiheus of Opuntium.

³⁰⁴ Sollenberger p. 125 prefers "Lectures," while Hicks in the Loeb edition translates "Essays."

³⁰⁵ Usener p. 4, 15.

³⁰⁶ See also Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 20.5.5 (= 76f Düring), who speaks of afternoon lectures but does not mention rivalry with Isocrates.

is likely to be the correct answer — but we must not forget that no source tells us that Theophrastus divided his teaching plan in the way Aristotle did,³⁰⁷ and the idea of rivalry with Isocrates is only applicable to Aristotle.

³⁰⁷ In *Tusculum Disputations* 2.9, Cicero tells that he divided his day so that rhetorical exercises occurred in the morning. No connection is made with Aristotle (at best with Philo), and we should not assume that the Cicero's division reflects the practice of some Peripatetic.

IV. The Texts

1. Rhetorical Writings

This section discusses reports concerning Theophrastus' writings on rhetoric. The reports are quite general and therefore not readily included under one of the specific sections that follow. The value of such reports depends upon a number of factors. They may be presented as sober fact and derive from first hand acquaintance with the writing or writings in question. Or they may be derivative, so that their reliability depends on a secondary source that may or may not be identifiable. Moreover, a report may be part of a dialogue and adapted to suit the persona of the speaker within the dialogue. In addition, reports may be motivated by self-serving considerations. The author may wish to impress the reader with his knowledge of the ancients and to capture the reader's attention by citing important writers like Aristotle and Theophrastus. In such cases, the accuracy of the report may (but need not) be affected by the author's intentions. Each report needs to be evaluated both individually and, where appropriate, together with other reports by the same author.

667 Cicero, *On the Orator* 1.43 (BT p. 18.8–13 Kumaniecki)

668 Cicero, *On the Orator* 1.55 (BT p. 23.3–9 Kumaniecki)

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 17, 54; Stroux (1912) p. 2–3, 13; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1522; Leeman et al. (1981) vol. 1 p. 124–5, 147–8

Texts **667** and **668** occur early in Cicero's dialogue *On the Orator*. Crassus has claimed that oratory is of great importance for political activity in the forum (1.31–2), for leisured discourse apart from the forum (1.32) and for the very creation, organization and protection of civic life (1.34–5). Scaevola opposes this view, questioning the

importance of oratory both for the existence of the state (1.35–40) and for the discourse of leisure time (1.41–4). In regard to the latter, Scaevola finds allies among the Pythagoreans, the physicists and the philosophers. He says that members of the Academy would force Crassus to contradict himself and the Stoics would ensnare him with their logic. Scaevola then cites the Peripatetics, saying that they would establish their claim to teach “the supports and embellishments of speaking” (*adiumenta atque ornamenta dicendi*). That is the first part of text **667**; and just as the preceding remarks concerning the Academy and Stoa represent a standard view of those schools,¹ so the depiction of the Peripatos is advanced as common and unobjectionable.² Indeed, Cicero’s early and unoriginal work *On Invention* contains a close parallel: *Aristoteles autem, qui huic arti plurima adiumenta atque ornamenta subministravit, . . .* (1.7).³ In the second part of **667**, both Aristotle and Theophrastus are said to have written better and at greater length than all the teachers of rhetoric. Mentioning Aristotle and Theophrastus together is common in Cicero (in addition to **667** and **668**, see **51**, **385**, **669**, **672**, **699**, **702**). That they wrote more than the rhetoricians appears to be an exaggeration attributable to the dramatic context. But see **670**, where Quintilian makes a similar statement.

The second text, **668**, comes from Crassus’ reply. He allows that style is the peculiar possession of the orator; other subjects belong to specialists in other fields. In the sections immediately preceding **668**, Crassus makes the point in regard to human nature. Style adapted to the feelings and thoughts of men (*oratio . . . hominum sensibus ac mentibus accommodata*) belongs to the orator, but a scientific psychology belongs to the philosopher (1.53–4). It is in this context that Crassus refers to Aristotle and Theophrastus, stating that

¹ For the Academy, see *On the Or.* 1.84 and *Acad.* 2.3.7; for the Stoa, see *On the Or.* 1.83 and *Tusc.* 5.76.

² Cf. *Luc.* 115, where the Peripatetics are said to claim kinship with the orators and to have instructed famous men who ruled the state.

³ “Aristotle, however, who furnished the most supports and embellishments for this art, . . .” The combination of *adiumenta* and *ornamenta* is not peculiar to the language of rhetorical theory. See *De or.* 2.171, where argument “from effect” is illustrated by a fragment of an otherwise unknown speech (Leeman et al. vol. 3 p. 112): *si aerarii copiis et ad belli adiumenta et ad ornamenta pacis utimur, vectigalibus serviamus* (“if we use the resources of the treasury for the supports of war and for the embellishments of peace, let us be slaves to taxes”). On *ornamenta* as desirable qualities of style, see *De or.* 1.144, where Crassus says that he has heard the traditional precepts *de orationis ipsius ornamentis* and then lists the same four virtues of style which are associated with Theophrastus in *Or.* 79 = **684**.

they have written “on the matters under consideration” (*de quibus rebus* 668.1). This initial prepositional phrase is not entirely clear. Does it refer to controlling the feelings of men (53) or to a suitable manner of speaking (54). Forced to choose, I might prefer the latter alternative; but it may be better to say that the phrase is not closely tied to what immediately precedes. For it appears to refer generally to rhetorical matters and to introduce Crassus’ reply to earlier remarks by Scaevola in 1.43 = 667. Whether such a jump backwards makes for lively dialogue or only confuses the reader need not concern us. The important point is that Cicero has Crassus pick up an earlier assertion by Scaevola and turn it around. The latter had spoken of Peripatetics, who not only claim to teach the supports and embellishments of speaking but also cite Aristotle and Theophrastus as prolific writers on the subject. Now we hear from Crassus that the two founders of the Peripatos do not claim rhetorical subjects as their own; instead they acknowledge that these matters belong to the orators.

The fact that Cicero is writing a dialogue and developing a dramatic opposition between two of his characters is reason to assess cautiously what is said about the Peripatos, but it does not follow automatically that one or both speakers must be making a false report. In regard to the remarks of Scaevola (667), we can, I think, say that certain Peripatetics of the late second and early first century B.C. may well have claimed rhetorical instruction for themselves. In the context of the *De oratore*, Staseas comes to mind. This Peripatetic is mentioned by Crassus as a Greek who might be summoned to present a contemporary view of rhetorical practice (1.104). He is described as a leader in his field (*in illo suo genere omnium princeps*) and is likely to have spoken often about the accomplishments of early Peripatetics such as Aristotle and Theophrastus.⁴ Turning to Crassus (668), we can say that he does not err in referring to the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus. What seems shaky is the conclusion he draws from the Peripatetic practice of labeling works in accordance with contents. Certain treatises are called rhetorical, because they discuss matters essential to the success of an orator (ῥήτωρ). That is correct, but it does not follow that the Peripatetics failed to claim these subjects as their own. What they did not claim — Demetrius of Phalerum aside⁵ — is to deliver artful orations in

⁴ In Cicero’s *De finibus*, Staseas is mentioned as a source of knowledge about Peripatetic ethics (5.8), and among the older Peripatetics Aristotle is referred to by name (5.7).

⁵ See 52B = fr. 73 Wehrli = fr. 119 SOD.

courts of law or in the assembly. For speaking in a civic gathering is one activity, composing a treatise on the art of rhetoric (τέχνη ῥητορικὴ) is another.

Between **667** and **668** occurs text **51**. Theophrastus is named along with Aristotle and Carneades as persons who were eloquent, pleasant and ornate.⁶

669 Cicero, *On Divination* 2.4 (BT p. 78.16–20 Giomini)

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 17, 54; Leeman et al. (1981) vol. 1 p. 125; Runia (1989) p. 29, 33–4; Long (1995) 39, 54

Text **669** comes from prefatory remarks to Book 2 of *On Divination* (44 B.C.). Cicero wants to bolster his reputation as a loyal servant of the state, and toward this end he explains his intense literary activity as a form of public service: when participation in political activity became impossible, he chose to benefit his fellow-citizens by writing on philosophic subjects (2.1, 4–5). Cicero mentions five works which have been recently completed (45 B.C.), the present work in progress and one which is planned (2.1–3).⁷ He then jumps backward in time (54 B.C.) and speaks of *On the State*, telling us that the subject is important, appropriate to philosophy and one discussed by Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus (2.3 = **592**). He continues by naming three recent works (45 B.C.)⁸ and then concludes his survey with *On the Orator* (55 B.C.), *Brutus* and *Orator* (46 B.C.). This addition of rhetorical titles to a list of philosophic writings is justified by an appeal to Aristotle and Theophrastus. They are said to have been outstanding not only in refined judgment but also in verbal resources (*excellentes . . . cum subtilitate tum copia*) and to have joined precepts on speaking with philosophy (*cum philosophia dicendi . . . praecepta coniunxerint* 2.4 = **669**).

The Latin word *copia* has been translated by the phrase “verbal resources.” That is an interpretation, for *copia* can be used in regard to subject matter as well as expression or style.⁹ A clear example is provided by *On the Orator* 3.142. Here Cicero has Crassus say that the philosopher who conveys an abundance of material and of lan-

⁶ See above, p. 10–11 n. 22.

⁷ *Hortensius*, *Academics*, *On Ends*, *Tusculan Disputations* and *On the Nature of Gods* have been completed; *On Divination* is in progress and *On Fate* is planned.

⁸ The works are *On Consolation*, *On Old Age* and *Cato*.

⁹ Leeman et al., vol. 1 p. 71.

guage (*qui copiam . . . rerum orationisque tradat*) may be called an orator. In our text, however, there can be little doubt that *copia* is used with special reference to verbal expression. The *cum-tum* construction sets up a contrast with judgment and looks forward to joining precepts on speaking with philosophy.

Cicero likes to associate himself with famous philosophers¹⁰ and has already introduced Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus as persons who wrote on the state (2.3). As a result we are not surprised when Cicero mentions the two Peripatetics in regard to rhetoric, for both were well-known as philosophers who offered instruction in the subject. But that is not the whole story. In particular, we should keep in mind that Cicero had a life long interest in the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy; and in this regard, he repeatedly refers to the early Peripatetics as philosophers who wrote on and gave instruction in rhetoric. Already in *On Invention* (written between 90 and 80 B.C.), the young Cicero reports that Aristotle not only surveyed the works of the earlier writers of *artes* (2.6) but also wrote on the subject himself. His successors are said to have been like him in that they gave the greatest attention to the most important parts of philosophy and yet left numerous precepts on speaking: *ab hoc (Aristotele) . . . qui profecti sunt, quamquam in maximis philosophiae partibus operae plurimum consumpserunt, sicuti ipse (Aristoteles) . . . fecerat, tamen permulta nobis praecepta dicendi reliquerunt* (2.7). Here Theophrastus is not named, but Cicero (following his teachers) would certainly want to include him among those who both wrote on philosophy and left precepts on speaking.¹¹

Twenty-five to thirty-five years later, in *On the Orator*, Cicero again exhibits interest in the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric, though this time the emphasis shifts from writing on both subjects to uniting the disciplines in the ideal statesman-orator. I cite the third book, where Crassus lists well-known Greeks who combined learning with eloquence (3.137–40). In response to Isocrates' success in attracting students, Aristotle is said to have brought ornament and brilliance to his entire teaching: *ornavit et illustravit doctrinam illam omnem* (3.141); and to have joined practice in style to the acquisition of knowledge: *rerumque cognitionem cum*

¹⁰ At his Tusculan villa, Cicero had two gymnasia, of which the upper one was called the Lyceum and the lower the Academy. The dialogue of *On Divination* is placed in the Lyceum (1.8, 2.8).

¹¹ In *On Invention* 1.61 = 674.5–6, Theophrastus is named together with Aristotle as someone who gave special attention to deductive argument.

orationis exercitatione coniunxit (3.141). Crassus also says that Aristotle was summoned to Macedonia to provide Alexander with precepts on action and speaking: *agendi . . . praecepta et eloquendi* (3.141). After that comes the passage cited above in which we are told that the philosopher who conveys verbal resources may be called an orator and the orator who combines wisdom with eloquence may be called a philosopher (3.142).

In the last years of his life, Cicero exhibited a similar interest in uniting rhetoric and philosophy. We may compare the *Tusculan Disputations* (45 B.C.), in which Cicero tells us that Aristotle, moved by the fame of Isocrates, taught young people to speak and to join wisdom with eloquence: *dicere docere . . . adolescentes et prudentiam cum eloquentia iungere*. Cicero adds that he has always believed that philosophy in its most perfect form is able to discuss the most important questions fully and ornately: *hanc . . . perfectam philosophiam semper iudicavi, quae de maximis quaestionibus copiose posset ornateque dicere* (1.7). Months later (44 B.C.) in our text from *On Divination*, Cicero introduces the same theme. To justify counting his rhetorical works among his philosophic treatises, he cites Aristotle and Theophrastus, who joined to philosophy precepts on speaking.

The phrase *dicendi praecepta*, “precepts on speaking,” suggests a rule-oriented approach to rhetorical instruction. We know that Aristotle’s early course of lectures included specific directives,¹² and there is no reason to believe that the development of a more philosophic rhetoric led to the suppression of all practical instruction. In the case of Theophrastus we have the title *Rhetorical Precepts* (Παραγγέλματα ῥητορικῆς 666 no. 3). It is possible that Cicero knew of the work, but that he ever had it in hand seems unlikely.

670 Qunitilian, *Oratorical Education* 3.1.15 (OCT vol. 1 p. 131.20–3 Winterbottom)

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 54; Cousin (1935–6) vol. 1 p. 161–4; (1975–80) vol. 2 p. 115–17, 255, 261; Kroll (1940) col. 1080–2; Adamietz (1966) p. 76; Matelli (1989) p. 335

¹² The earliest portion of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, i.e. 3.13–19, is marked by the use of the second person imperative (see Fortenbaugh [1996] p. 171–2), but it is more than a string of rules. As Cicero uses the word *praecepta*, it is closely related to *ars* and may refer to instructional material that includes but is not restricted to bald directives. Cf., e.g., *De oratore* 1.14, 137 with 148 and 2.76.

In his introductory remarks to Book 3, Quintilian expresses concern that what he is about to say will not be pleasing to his readers, for it will involve a dry exposition of rules (3.1.2). Moreover, most of the rules are not original but traditional, and also unacceptable to certain authorities and their students (3.1.5). It is in this context — a recognition of infinite disagreement among authorities (3.1.7) — that Quintilian offers a survey of earlier rhetoricians (3.1.8–21), of which our text is a part. The survey is disappointing: it is hardly more than a list of names and does little to highlight the differences that might render Quintilian's remarks unacceptable to a particular group of rhetoricians.¹³ Whether Quintilian had one or more sources at hand when he wrote the survey is problematic. He does mention Cicero's *Brutus* (3.1.12),¹⁴ but that work cannot have been Quintilian's source throughout.¹⁵ In fact, Quintilian may have depended more on his memory than on written materials.

That Theophrastus wrote diligently on rhetoric is not news. Of greater interest, though still not news, is the statement that after Theophrastus it was the philosophers — especially the leaders of the Stoa and the Peripatos—and not the rhetoricians, who wrote (*scripserunt* is understood) with greater zeal. Kroll cautions that Quintilian may be influenced by the fact that the *artes* of the rhetoricians were by their nature perishable; in contrast the treatises of philosophers tended to be preserved by the schools. That may be true in general, but the Peripatos seems to have been a special case. Strabo tells us that the Peripatetics after Theophrastus were without a proper library; they were unable to do philosophy in a systematic way and spent their time on rhetorical exercises (37 v. 18–21). Certain details of Strabo's story may be questioned,¹⁶ but concerning a general

¹³ It is possible that Quintilian would have expanded the survey, if he had not been under pressure to release his work for publication (*To Trypho* 1–3), but it is more likely that he would have let the survey remain as we have it. He was after all primarily interested in setting forth a program of education, and for that purpose historical details were of secondary importance.

¹⁴ The reference is to *Brutus* 27, where Cicero speaks of certain speeches of Pericles that were in circulation. Quintilian is critical of Cicero, saying that the speeches attributed to Pericles lack the eloquence for which the Athenian was well-known. While the criticism may be fair, Quintilian fails to take notice of the fact that Pericles was an orator (politician), not a rhetorician, and therefore not an appropriate subject within his survey. Clearly Quintilian is not at his best in this portion of his work.

¹⁵ See Cousin (1935–6) vol. 1 p. 163–4.

¹⁶ See above, p. 51–2 n. 12 and 13.

philosophic decline and an increase in rhetorical instruction the story is likely to be correct.

In saying that the philosophers wrote more keenly on rhetoric than the rhetoricians themselves, Quintilian seems to be thinking generally of *artes* (3.1.8, 10, 11) and in particular of those *artes* that formed the basis of rhetorical instruction in the Stoa and the Peripatos. (Cf. 3.1.14, where Quintilian refers to Aristotle's afternoon lectures.) If that is correct, then we should not confuse this passage with other passages in which Quintilian complains that the better/best part of his subject matter has been lost to philosophers (1.pr.14, 17; 10.1.35). In making that complaint, Quintilian is thinking especially of ethics and politics. He wants the perfect orator to be a morally good person who understands political affairs (1.pr.9–10), and for that reason he is prepared, albeit reluctantly, to draw on philosophers who have written on these matters (1.pr.11).

Quintilian speaks of the leaders of the Stoics and Peripatetics but names no one. Following Cousin, Kroll and Adamietz, we may list as leaders of the Stoa Cleanthes (*SVF* vol. 1 p. 110, fr. 491–2) and Chrysippus (*SVF* vol. 2 p. 95–110, fr. 288–98), and for the Peripatetics Demetrius of Phaleron (fr. 156–73 Wehrli = 1, 130–48 SOD) and Hieronymus of Rhodes (fr. 50–2 Wehrli = 37–9 White).

In the apparatus of parallel texts, reference is made to Michael Psellus' work *On the Characteristic Style of the Theologian* 6 (*BZ* t. 20 1911 p. 51.107–9 Mayer), in which Theophrastus is listed along with Chrysippus as someone who discussed the style of individual authors and did so at a time that predated Gregory of Nazianus (c. 330–390 A.D.).¹⁷ The mention of Theophrastus along with Chrysippus in a passage that conveys little information about the Eresian encouraged us to relegate the reference to the apparatus of parallel texts to **670** (Chrysippus and Theophrastus were “leaders of the Stoics and the Peripatetics” [line 3]). That may have been economical, but given the fact that Psellus' text is not to be found in all libraries, we might better have printed the text and assigned it its own number. Be that as it may, I give the text here, including more lines (106–12) than those mentioned in the apparatus.

ὄθεν ὅσοι τῶν πρὸ τοῦ Θεολόγου χρόνων εἰς χαρακτηριστικὴν κρίσιν
τοῖς ἰδολογήσασιν ἐληλύθασιν, ἠὺτυχήσασιν, καὶ οὐτε Διονύσιον

¹⁷ During the Byzantine period, Gregory of Nazianus was frequently referred to as the “Theologian.” That explains the occurrence of “Theologian” in the title of Psellus' work.

μέμφομαι, Λυσίαν καὶ Δημοσθένην ἐν πρώτοις θέμενον, οὔτε Θεόφραστον τὸν Ἀριστοτέλους ἑταῖρον, οὔτε Χρύσιππον τὸν φιλόσοφον, οὔτε τὸν κριτικὸν Λογγίνον, οὔτε τὸν Λήμιον Φιλόστρατον, Λεσβώνακτάς τινας καὶ Ἑρμοκράτεις, Εὐδόξους τε καὶ Δίωνα καὶ εἴ τινας ἄλλοι πρὸ ἐκείνων γέγονασι παρὰ τοὺς λοιποὺς εὐδοκιμηκότες.

For which reason, those writers were fortunate who lived at a time earlier than the Theologian (Gregory) and were subjected to stylistic analysis by critics who wrote on individual authors. I do not find fault with Dionysius (of Halicarnassus) for placing Lysias and Demosthenes in the front ranks, nor with Theophrastus the colleague of Aristotle, nor with the philosopher Chrysippus, nor with the critic Longinus, nor with Philostratus from Lemnos (for placing in the front ranks?) persons like Lesbonax (of Mytilene) and Hermocrates (of Phocaea), Eudoxus (of Cnidus) and Dio (Chrysostom), and any others who prior to those may have become well respected compared with the rest.

Except for one difficulty the Greek text runs smoothly enough. The exception is how to construe the string of names that follows the mention of Philostratus. At first reading it appears that Lesbonax, Hermocrates, Eudoxus and Dio are being named as critics who wrote on individual authors. If that is correct, Psellus has made a serious error, for Lesbonax and the others were not critics but orators of the second sophistic age.¹⁸ On second reading, it seems to me more likely that Psellus has expressed himself poorly and that we should understand ἐν πρώτοις θέμενον from above (Dionysius placed Lysias and Demosthenes in the front ranks).¹⁹ Hence, in the translation I have added in parentheses “for placing in the front ranks.” But that does not remove every difficulty (see below), and for that reason, I have added a question mark, thereby acknowledging that the interpretation is open to doubt.

As indicated by the title of Psellus’ work, the larger context is a monograph on Gregory of Nazianus. In the opening chapters, Psellus tells us that Gregory alone brings together in his writings all the virtues of style that occur separately in the works of other prose authors: philosophers, historians and orators (1–2). Psellus says that he is captivated by the charm of Gregory (3), marks off four kinds of words (4) and declares Gregory’s selection and arrangement of words superior to that of well respected orators and philosophers: namely, Lysias, Isocrates and Demosthenes, the Socratic Aeschines and Plato (5). After that comes the text printed above. Psellus recognizes that critics who predated Gregory cannot be expected to have

¹⁸ That is the view of Wilson (1983) p. 170.

¹⁹ That is how Mayer (1911) p. 78 construes the passage.

assigned him the highest rank, and in this context he names Theophrastus and Chrysippus as well as Dionysius, Longinus and Philostratos. The fact that Theophrastus is named immediately after Dionysius has encouraged speculation. According to Mayer, Dionysius will have drawn upon Theophrastus when writing *On the Ancient Orators*, and in the lost beginning to the second book, i.e., to the essay on Demosthenes,²⁰ he will have followed Theophrastus in presenting the doctrine of three styles: plain, middle and grand. Indeed, Dionysius will have named Theophrastus and made clear that he discussed the authors who are subsequently introduced to illustrate the three styles: namely, Gorgias and Thucydides (1), Lysias (2) and Thrasyarchus, Isocrates and Plato (3–7). Moreover, when Dionysius discusses the middle style, he names Thrasyarchus as the first to use that style and appeals to the authority of Theophrastus (3 = 685). Such speculation has its appeal, but on reflection Mayer's thesis is not to be accepted. Theophrastus did not cite Thrasyarchus as the inventor of the middle style as we find it in writers of the first century B.C. Rather Theophrastus credited Thrasyarchus with originating the mean between excessive and deficient style in all forms of oratory (see the commentary on 685). Moreover, Psellus seems to be engaged in a display of learning that falls short of careful scholarship. The mention of Chrysippus seems to be at best an inaccurate reminiscence, perhaps based on a reference to the Stoic in Dionysius' work *On Literary Composition* 4.²¹ In addition, if we construe the list of names that follows on that of Philostratus as I have done above, then what is said about Philostratus is faulty. He does discuss Hermocrates, Eudoxus and Dio (*Lives of the Sophists* 2.25, 1.1, 7), but there is no discussion of Lesbos. However, if we believe that the list of names is intended to introduce additional critics and not orators, then Psellus' error can only be described as gross confusion. We must, therefore, be cautious in evaluating the words of Psellus. In particular, the words of Psellus do not establish or even support the claim that Theophrastus originated the doctrine of three styles and elucidated this doctrine by discussing Gorgias, Thucydides, Lysias, Thrasyarchus, Isocrates and Plato.

²⁰ When Mayer (1911) p. 76 refers to the lost beginning of the second book, he is referring to the material lost at the beginning of the essay on Demosthenes. At the end of the introduction to *On the Attic Orators*, Dionysius tells us that the work will have two parts: the first dealing with Lysias, Isocrates and Isaeus and the second with Demosthenes, Hyperides and Aeschines.

²¹ Mayer (1911) p. 77 admits as much.

2. The Inventor of the Art of Rhetoric

In Homer's *Iliad*, Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, says that he was sent to Troy to instruct his pupil in speech and deeds (9.442–3). Presumably the instruction in speech proceeded by example. We can imagine Phoenix reciting model speeches and encouraging Achilles to pay attention when the chieftains spoke in counsel. He might point especially to Nestor who is depicted by Homer as one who knows how to present a persuasive character before arguing his case (260–84) and to deliver his words in a pleasing manner (1.247–9).²² Such know how is impressive and it may win the day, but it does not in itself constitute a developed art that can be written down and made the basis of a formal curriculum in persuasive speech. Such an art came later, and if our sources are not misleading, it did not arise until the fifth century, when Corax and Tisias are credited with composing a handbook that could be circulated among students and would be referred to later in the fourth century by Plato and Aristotle.

The historical Corax is a shadowy figure whose floruit can be assigned to the middle of the fifth century. He is said to have been influential at Syracuse during both the tyranny and the subsequent democracy (*Artium script.* A V 16, B II 23), but the reports are late and probably more fanciful than factual.²³ In all probability, Corax enjoyed a close relationship with Tisias, but that he was the teacher of Tisias (A V 16, B II 9, 12) is open to doubt.²⁴ Indeed, we may even doubt that Corax and Tisias were two different people.²⁵ Be that as it may, Plato does not mention Corax by name, though he almost certainly alludes to him at *Phaedrus* 273C8–9.²⁶ Aristotle does name

²² See Fortenbaugh (1992) p. 211–14.

²³ On the various reports, see Kennedy (1963) p. 59, K. Schöpsdau, *Antike Vorstellungen von der Geschichte der Griechischen Rhetorik*, Diss., Saarbrücken 1969, p. 12–13, 17–18, 26 and K. Heldmann, *Antike Theorien über Entwicklung und Verfall der Redekunst = Zetemata* vol. 77, München 1982, p. 22–4.

²⁴ Hermeias, in *Platonis Phaedrum* 273C8 reverses the relationship (p. 251.8–9 Couvreur, cf. p. 238.13 *ad* 267A6), but that is certainly an error, either of Hermeias or of a scribe (see B II 12). On the relationship between the two, see Spengel p. 33, W. Stegmann, "Tisias," *RE* vol. 5A (1934) col. 139 and Kennedy (1960) p. 58–61.

²⁵ See Kennedy (2001) p. 94, who suggests that "Corax" is a nickname given to Tisias by persons who resented his "cawing."

²⁶ Socrates first says that Tisias seems to have discovered a hidden *technē* (273C7–8) and then adds "or another person whoever he happens to be and from wherever he delights in deriving his name" (C8–9). That appears to be a reference to Corax, who was pleased to have acquired his name from a bird of prey — namely, the crow. See Spengel p. 33 and R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedrus*, Cambridge 1952, p. 153 n. 4.

Corax, but only once in our *corpus Aristotelicum*, i.e., in *Rhetoric* 2.24. This chapter contains a discussion of the apparent enthymeme, including arguments that confuse what is probable in an unqualified way with what is probable in some particular way or case. Aristotle tells us that the *techne* of Corax was composed of this kind of argument and then gives the example of a weak man charged with assaulting a strong man and *vice versa* (1402a17–20).²⁷

In *Sophistical Refutations* 34, Aristotle offers an account of the origins of rhetoric. Here he names Tisias, not Corax. The account is quite brief — rhetoric is introduced primarily as a foil to dialectic — and makes no claim to go back to the very beginning. Tisias is referred to as coming after the first inventors (μετὰ τοὺς πρῶτους 183b32) and listed along side of Thrasymachus and Theodorus. All three are considered well-known practitioners (εὐδοκιμοῦντες 183b29) who have built on the work of unnamed pioneers. These pioneers might be thought to include Corax,²⁸ but it seems more likely that Aristotle would want to group Corax together with Tisias, as he seems to have done in the *Collection of Arts*. This Aristotelian work has not survived; but if we can rely on what Cicero says at *Brutus* 46, then Corax was named together with Tisias as the first to have written an *ars* and *praecepta*. Of course, Cicero does not refer

²⁷ At *Phaedrus* 273B3–C4, Plato attributes to Tisias an example of reasoning based on probability. The example is similar but not identical to that attributed to Corax by Aristotle. In the latter case, two men are charged with assault: a weak man for whom an argument based on simple probability is useful, and a strong man for whom the simple argument is not sufficient. In the former, we have a single charge brought by a strong man against a weak man and a contrast between telling the truth and arguing on the basis of probability. In both cases the attribution may be correct; both Sicilians may have composed an *ars* and both may have concerned themselves with arguments based on probability.

Assuming that Corax did compose an *ars*, we are still left with the question whether that *ars* included various kinds of arguments based on probability or was limited to a single kind. Aristotle's words in *Rhet.* 2.24 suggest the latter. He says that "the *ars* of Corax was put together from this *topos* (ἔστι δ' ἐκ τούτου τοῦ τόπου ἡ Κόρακος τέχνη συγκευμένη 1402a17); and after giving the example of the weak and the strong man, he adds, "and similarly also in the other cases" (ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων 1402a20–1). That seems to be a reference to similar cases of the same kind. Cf. 1.12 1372a21–4.

²⁸ The pioneers might also be thought to include Empedocles, for according to Diogenes Laertius 8.57 (cf. 9.25 and Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians* 1.6), Aristotle (fr. 65 Rose³) in the *Sophist* said that Empedocles discovered rhetoric (*Artium script.* B I 1). Since the *Sophist* seems to have been an early dialogue, it is likely that the mature (or, a more mature) Aristotle — perhaps as a result of work on the *Collection of Arts* — did not hold this view. But that does not tell us how to understand the reference to pioneers at *Sophistical Refutations* 183b32.

to the Aristotelian work by title, and he may not have had the work before him when he wrote the relevant portion of the *Brutus* (he may be relating what he found in a Latin summary); but allowing that, it still seems likely that the *Collection* included a discussion of (or material from) both Corax and Tisias.²⁹

736A Dunchad, *Glosses on Martianus Capella* 5.433 p. 214.2 Dick (p. 40.24–7 Lutz)

736B John Scotus Eriugena, *On Martianus Capella* 5.435 p. 214.12 Dick (p. 110.14–16 Lutz)

736C Remigius of Auxerre, *On Martianus Capella* 5.435 p. 214.12 Dick (vol. 2 p. 70.18–21 Lutz)

Literature: Usener (1870) p. 605–7, (1873) p. 434–5; Manitius (1911) p. 331–2, 335–7, 513–4, 525–6; H. Rabe, *Prolegomena sylloge* = *RhGr* vol.14, Leipzig 1931, p. viii; Lutz (1939) p. xx–v, 227–33 and (1944) p. xxiii–vi; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1542; Préaux (1953) p. 456; Kennedy (1963) p. 60; Schmitt (1971) p. 255–6; Sheldon-Williams (1973) p. 3

We have here texts from three commentaries on the *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii* of Martianus Capella. The work of Martianus is from the fifth century A.D.,³⁰ the three commentaries belong to the Carolingian Renaissance of the ninth century. The lemma given in **736A** occurs two sections earlier in Martianus than the lemmata given in **B** and **C** (5.433 and 435). The distance is not great (7 lines); each of the commentators is considering the introduction to the account of rhetoric in Book 5. In that introduction, Rhetoric is personified as a woman who is physically imposing, bears arms and has a full range of rhetorical powers (426–8). Demosthenes and

²⁹ In *On Invention* 2.6, where Cicero does make clear reference to the *Collection* (*ac veteres quidem scriptores artis . . . unum in locum conduxit*), Tisias alone is named as the inventor of rhetoric (fr. 136 Rose³). Silence here concerning Corax is to be noted but not pressed, for Cicero (perhaps seventeen or a few years older when he wrote the *De inv.*) is almost certainly regurgitating what he had learned from teachers and handbooks. Direct acquaintance with the *Collection* is unlikely. For discussion of Cicero's knowledge of the *Collection*, see Fortenbaugh (1989) p. 42, 45–6 and the literature mentioned there.

³⁰ O'Meara p. 21 dates the work between 410 and 429 or 439 A.D. D. Shanzer, *A Philosophical and Literary Commentary on Martianus Capella's De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii Book 1* (Berkeley: University of California 1986) p. 28 puts the work in the 470s or 480s.

Cicero are presented as her followers (429–31), and a string of distinguished Greek and Roman orators are placed behind them (432). Finally Tisias is introduced and placed before the orators and Rhetoric herself. He is described as bearing an emblem and staff of precedence (*signum ac praeuiam virgam gestans*) on top of which there is a crow with a golden beak (*corax oris aurati* 433). Tisias is then further described (434), after which we are told that the gods believed Rhetoric to be a most noble woman: either a relation of Apollo, if she is Greek, or if Roman, then descended from the family of Corvinus (*si Romulea, de gente Corvini* 435). There is no doubt that Martianus is playing with the name Κόραξ. It is at once the proper name of a Sicilian closely identified with Tisias and with the beginnings of rhetoric, and also the common word for a crow or raven. The man Corax is introduced as a bird on top of Tisias' staff (433), and Rhetoric is associated with the family of Corvinus (435), i.e. the Valerii, because the name *Corvinus* can be understood as the adjectival form of *corvus* (the "crow"). Indeed, the name goes back to a fabulous victory in the year 349 B.C., when Marcus Valerius defeated a gigantic Gaul in single combat thanks to the intervention of a crow which pecked out the eyes of the Gaul. As a result of that victory, Marcus and through him the family acquired the cognomen "Corvus" which is also given as "Corvinus."³¹

In the introduction to this section,³² we observed that Aristotle regarded Corax as one of the inventors' of the art, and that he credited Corax with composing a technical manual whose focus was argument based on probability. All three commentators on Martianus state that Corax invented the art of words, and all three support the statement by reference to Theophrastus. Apparently Theophrastus was in agreement with Aristotle concerning the founder(s) of the art, and we can easily imagine him explaining that Corax's invention took the form of a written manual in which probability was central. The explanation would be important, for no Aristotelian passage supports the unqualified assertion that Corax invented the art of words. He may have been the first to write a handbook for teaching and study, but he was not the first to offer instruction in speaking

³¹ The story is told by various authors. See, e.g., Livy, *From the Founding of the City* 7.26.1–5, 12; the form "Corvinus" occurs at 7.32.15 and 40.3. For discussion of the variations in the story and the two forms in which the cognomen occurs, see H. Volkmann, "Valerius (Corvus)," *Pauly's Realencyclopädie* vol. VIIA (1948) col. 2413–5.

³² See above, p. 163–5.

well. Already in the *Iliad* we find Phoenix presenting himself as a teacher of words (9.442–3).

The commentators do not say that Corax invented the “art of rhetoric” (ῥητορικὴ τέχνη). Rather they present him as the inventor of the “art of words” (τέχνη λόγων). The occurrence of the Greek phrase τέχνη λόγων may be significant. For the label “art of rhetoric” does not occur before Plato (*Gorg.* 449A4–5). The older label for an *ars* seems to have been “art of words,”³³ so that our texts may reflect a certain sophistication in the way Corax’s contribution is described. It is tempting to suppose that the sophistication goes back to Theophrastus, but that supposition — while attractive — is not thereby proven.

In evaluating the report of the three commentators, we should keep in mind that they do not represent three independent sources. At least, Remigius seems to have drawn on Dunchad and Eriugena; and Eriugena either drew on Dunchad or more probably used the same source.³⁴ Whatever the precise relationship, it is clear that we are dealing with a common tradition. Furthermore, none of the commentators (including Dunchad) is drawing directly on Theophrastus. That is, I think, clear from the Greek they quote. It includes a reference to the *Robe* of Theophrastus — ἐκ τοῦ Πέπλου Θεοφράστου — which has been taken over verbatim from an intermediate source. Theophrastus himself would not have written “from the Peplos of Theophrastus.” Those are the words of an excerptor, who collected material from a work known as the Peplos of Theophrastus. Moreover, both Dunchad and Eriugena translate the Greek phrase, just as they translate the subsequent report concerning Corax and the art of words.³⁵ The simple explanation is that they are translating everything they took from their source. Or possibly Dunchad translated everything, and Eriugena followed him, giving both the Greek and the Latin. Remigius drops the translation and adds a foolish comment: namely, that Corvinus and Corax — i.e., the Roman (4th cent.

³³ For the Greek phrase, see, e.g., Plato, *Phaedrus* 266C3 and 271C2; for discussion, see Th. Cole, *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 1991) p. 98 and Kennedy (1997) p. 3.

³⁴ Manitius p. 336–7, 525; Lutz (1939) p. xxiii–v, 227, 232–3; (1944) p. xii, xxiii.

³⁵ In the editions of Lutz, the Greek text is broken up because the Latin translation is given piecemeal. Whether that reflects the manuscripts that Lutz used is unclear to me, but it seems not to be true of the Leiden manuscript B.P.L. no. 88, in which the Latin translation is given above the Greek. See Préaux p. 456.

B.C.) and the Sicilian Greek (5th cent. B.C.) — are one and same person who passed on the rules of Theophrastus to the Latins (C.2).³⁶

In all three texts, the *Robe* (Πέπλος 727 no. 10) of Theophrastus is cited as the source of the report concerning Corax. That is problematic, for the *Robe* is not mentioned in the list(s) of Theophrastean works preserved by Diogenes Laertius (1.68–291). In fact, it is mentioned only by authors of the ninth century.³⁷ That Theophrastus actually wrote such a work is, therefore, open to doubt. We may compare the work of the same title attributed to Aristotle in the book-list preserved by Hesychius (no. 105 and 169 Rose³). This work seems to have been a handbook of mythology written in prose to which epigrams were later added. It is not mentioned in Diogenes' list of Aristotelian works (5.22–7) and is likely to be spurious, though perhaps based on a collection of material put together by Aristotle or under his direction.³⁸ The Theophrastean *Robe* may also have been a handbook of some sort; but on the basis of the surviving fragments, we can say only that it included information concerning origins (582) and discoveries/inventions (735 and 736ABC). Like the Aristotelian *Robe*, the Theophrastean work is probably best regarded as spurious, though perhaps based (in part) on material contained in Theophrastus' two books *On Discoveries* (727 no. 11).³⁹ If that is correct, what the commentators on Martianus offer us is an extremely short excerpt drawn from an intermediate source which

³⁶ The confusion may have been encouraged by the fact that Marcus Valerius Messalla Corvinus (64 B.C.–8 A.D.) was considered an accomplished orator and on occasion marked off from other members of the family by the name *Messalla orator* (e.g. Plinius, *NH* 35.8). A different suggestion is offered by Usener (1870) p. 606: namely, that Remigius misread a gloss on Θεοφράστου. He misread *proprium* as *proprium*, which he then connected with τέχνην glossed as *artem*. That confusion will have produced the idea that Corax passed on the “rules of Theophrastus.” Whatever the correct explanation in regard to text C, it seems clear that Remigius had difficulty with Greek sources. See Manitius p. 514.

³⁷ The fact that the *Robe* is cited by commentators of the ninth century encourages the view that the work survived into the ninth century (cf. Manitius p. 337). That is certainly possible, but if the commentators under discussion are dependent on an intermediary, as argued in the preceding paragraph, then the *Robe* itself need not have survived or been readily available to Carolingian scholars.

³⁸ See Rose p. 563–6, C. A. Forbes, “Πέπλος” no. 2, *RE* vol. 19 (1938) col. 561–2 and Moraux (1951) p. 196. Sheldon-Williams p. 3 thinks that the *Robe* attributed to Theophrastus is in fact the *Robe* of Aristotle and that “the attribution to Theophrastus may be due to the fact that, in the context of rhetoric, Theophrastus' name was often associated with that of Aristotle.”

³⁹ See Usener (1870) p. 607, who also suggests that the *Robe* may have been a Byzantine fabrication written in verse sometime before the middle of the seventh century.

drew on other books including a handbook known as the *Robe* of Theophrastus. That does not mean that the excerpt cannot be taken seriously. I think it can, but I am certainly not inclined to say that there was a “flowering of interest” in the *Robe* of Theophrastus during the Carolingian Renaissance.⁴⁰ At least the commentators on Martianus seem to have known that work only through an intermediary and were in no position to judge its authenticity.

3. Three Kinds of Rhetoric

Speakers address different kinds of issues or topics and do so in quite different circumstances. Civic affairs and matters of public policy are debated in assembly before persons whose primary concern is with choosing an advantageous course of action. Questions of justice and injustice are argued in court before judges and jurors who decide for either the plaintiff or the defendant. Virtuous citizens are praised by respected leaders at public gatherings; the audience is inspired and may feel pleasure, but no practical decision is required. The variation in subject matter means that no one expertise or particular body of knowledge will be sufficient for all occasions; and the difference in audience, especially the reason that brings it together, rules out a single mode of argumentation. Empirical considerations including the speaker’s own record as an adviser have special force in the assembly, when it considers which course of action will be most advantageous. In contrast, compelling demonstrations and well-timed emotional appeals are used effectively in persuading a jury to vote condemnation or acquittal. Again, the magnification of good character and outstanding achievement is basic to public praise. The deeds of the subject are taken as evidence of virtue, which in turn is amplified by comparison with other persons of note.

These differences might be developed and added to, but they are, I think, sufficient, to indicate why writers on rhetoric have been inclined to make a threefold classification fundamental to their art. Aristotle is no exception, and his distinction between deliberative, judicial and epideictic rhetoric (*Rhetoric* 1.3 1358b6–8) is still widely accepted. There is nothing here to lament; we should, however, be aware that

⁴⁰ Schmitt p. 256. In fairness to Schmitt, it should be added that earlier he recognizes two possibilities: either the Carolingian writers had access to a Greek manuscript of the *Robe*, or they knew Greek excerpts *via* an intermediary (p. 255); but he prefers the former and seems to accept the *Robe* as genuinely Theophrastean.

this tripartite division had to be worked out. It was not an organizing principle of the earliest *artes*. There the focus was on judicial oratory. In the lost *Collection of Arts*, Aristotle reported that the earliest writers, Corax and Tisias, composed an *ars* in response to increased judicial activity in Sicily (fr. 137 Rose³ = Cicero, *Brutus* 46);⁴¹ and in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle tells us that the writers of handbooks concentrated on the courts to the neglect of deliberative oratory (1.1 1354b25–7). Aristotle is engaging in overstatement;⁴² but he does not seem to be guilty of gross misrepresentation. We may compare Plato's *Phaedrus*, where the eponymous interlocutor says that rhetoric found its principal application in lawsuits (*Phaedrus* 261B3–4).⁴³

Although the Aristotelian division into deliberative, judicial and epideictic oratory goes beyond the courtroom, it is not intended to cover all speech. In particular, it is not a response to Plato's call for a rhetoric applicable in both public and private gatherings (*Phaedrus* 261A8–9).⁴⁴ Aristotle is primarily concerned with political or civic oratory,⁴⁵ and in that respect he is properly compared with the Platonic Gorgias, who explains rhetoric as “the ability to persuade by words the jurors in a court of law, the councilmen in a council, the assemblymen in an assembly and (similarly) in any other gathering which may be a political gathering” (*Gorgias* 452E1–4).⁴⁶ Neverthe-

⁴¹ For further discussion of Corax and Tisias, see the commentary on “The Inventor of the Art of Rhetoric” p. 163–9.

⁴² Aristotle wants to diminish the accomplishments of his predecessors. He first asserts that the business of the assembly is finer than that of the law courts, and then tells us that the writers of handbooks say nothing about the former: οὐδὲν λέγουσι (1.1 1355a25–6).

⁴³ *Phaedrus* does recognize that rhetoric has application in deliberative assemblies; but he is explicit that it is used especially in court cases. He adds that he has heard of no further uses (261B3–5).

⁴⁴ Cf. Plato, *Sophist* 222C9–D6 and see the “Summary” p. 418–19.

⁴⁵ For this reason, Kennedy's (1991) translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* carries the subtitle “A Theory of Civic Rhetoric.” I do not claim that Aristotle's discussion of three kinds of rhetoric avoids all mention of private meetings. When deliberation is divided into exhortation and dissuasion, Aristotle justifies the division by sighting the practice of those who offer advice both in private and in public (1.3 1358b8–10). Nevertheless, the reference is not intended to take the discussion into the private sector (as called for in Plato's *Phdr.* 261A8–9); it is intended only to support the division of deliberation into exhortation and dissuasion. Earlier in 1.3 when Aristotle first picks out deliberative oratory, he does so by identifying the listener as a member of the assembly (1358b4–5); and later when he argues that deliberation is concerned with advantage and not questions of justice, the example he introduces is drawn from foreign policy (1358b33–7). On references to private matters in *Rhet.* 1.5, see the commentary on 666 no. 11, above p. 101.

⁴⁶ Gorgias was, of course, interested in non-political persuasion. Even in the

less, the tripartite classification of Aristotle is not identical with the division attributed to the sophist by Plato. For the division of Gorgias extends to political gatherings of all kinds.⁴⁷ In contrast, Aristotle's classification is not open-ended. The third class is labeled epideictic and restricted to praise and censure (*Rhetoric* 1.3 1358b12–13). Neither classification is wrong. Gorgias wants to attract students; he offers instruction in all areas and describes rhetoric accordingly. Aristotle introduces a threefold division because he wants to classify the materials most needed by political speakers. These are the specific premises (ἰδία προτάσεις), which orators draw upon when urging a course of action, speaking in court and delivering a eulogy (1.2 1358a33–5, 1.3 1359a6–7, 26–9).

The division of political oratory into deliberative, judicial and epideictic occurs at the beginning of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* (1.1 1421b6–7). The treatise is roughly contemporary with Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and may have influenced its composition. Alternatively, the influence may be in the opposite direction. Perhaps a third possibility is more likely. The division was current among rhetoricians in the first half of the fourth century, and both Aristotle and the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* have it from the schools. Be that as it may, Aristotle's tripartite division became part of the later tradition. Theophrastus made use of it (671, cf. 673A.3–4), as did rhetoricians after him. It was, however, frequently modified, occasionally in ways that might not please the Stagirite.⁴⁸ At least, authors like Cicero and Quintilian tie epideictic oratory to the delectation of the audience. The tie may be defensible, but it is not Aristotelian and in my judgment not Theophrastean.

Gorgias, Plato has him illustrate the power of rhetoric by its ability to persuade patients to take medicine (456B1–5). The comparison I am making is with the sophist's focus on political gatherings at *Gorgias* 452E1–4.

⁴⁷ We may think, for example, of ambassadorial speeches. See Demetrius of Phalerum fr. 157 Wehrli = 130.13–15 SOD.

⁴⁸ See D. Hinks, "Tria Genera Causarum," *Classical Quarterly* 30 (1936) p. 174–5. He thinks that the true Aristotelian scheme is preserved only in Alexander (*RhGr* vol. 3 p. 1.7–2.7 Spengel), who has it from Caecilius of Calacte (fr. *8 Ofenloch, who cites Angermann p. 38). Noteworthy is the explicit recognition that the classification is one of political speeches (p. 1.9–11 Sp.). Hinks is highly critical of Cicero for making delectation the goal of epideictic and at the same time limiting its subject matter to encomium and invective, as in the *Classification of Oratory* 10.

671 Quintilian, *Oratorical Education* 3.6.104–7.1 (*OCT* vol. 1 p. 106.25–31 Winterbottom)

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 51; Mayer (1910) p. 14 n. 2; Cousin (1935–6) vol. 1 p. 191–5, (1975–80) vol. 2 p. 128–30, 188–9; Solmsen (1941) p. 180–1; Buchheit (1960) p. 127 n. 1; Kennedy (1963) p. 280; Grube (1965) p. 104; Adamietz (1966) p. 154–6, 196; Martin (1974) p. 197–8; Innes (1985) p. 252; Parsons (2001) p. 162

After discussing *stasis* theory, Quintilian turns to the three kinds of oratory or “causes” as he prefers to say (3.3.15, following Cicero, *On Invention* 1.12, *On the Orator* 1.141, *Topics* 91). Text **671** contains the final sentence of the transition and the opening of the discussion of epideictic oratory, which is said to be concerned with praise and blame. In putting forth this characterization, Quintilian is recalling earlier remarks (3.4.12). He then goes on to mention Aristotle and Theophrastus. On the one hand, naming these Peripatetics is stylistic and rhetorical. Quintilian is starting a new portion of his work and thinks it impressive (attention-getting) to mention well-known ancients. We may compare the earlier discussion of kinds of causes: Aristotle is mentioned at the outset (3.4.1); or we may cite the way Quintilian introduces his remarks on reading poetry: Theophrastus is named at the beginning (10.1.27 = **707**). On the other hand, the mention of Aristotle and Theophrastus is substantive and appropriate. Quintilian has just related epideictic oratory to praise and blame and that occasions a reference to the two leaders of the Peripatos, for both had characterized epideictic in terms of praise and blame. In regard to Aristotle, we have the evidence of the *Rhetoric* (1.3 1358b12–13, 27–8, 38). In the case of Theophrastus, no rhetorical treatise survives, but we can point to **673A**, **677**, **678**.

The two Peripatetics are said to have dissociated epideictic from practical oratory and relegated the whole of it solely to listeners. This report is not entirely wrong. At least in the case of Aristotle, we can say that he marked off epideictic from deliberative and judicial oratory, stating that the latter kinds of oratory are addressed to persons who make a decision (κρίνειν 1.3 1358b4), but the former kind is not. It is addressed to an observer (θεωρός 1.3 1358b2).⁴⁹ In

⁴⁹ The occurrence of θεωρός at 1358b2 is unproblematic. That is not true of the second occurrence at 1358b6. The most recent editor of the *Rhetoric*, R. Kassel (1976), deletes the entire phrase ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ὁ θεωρός (1358b5–6) as an awkward intrusion into an otherwise clear argument. See his *Der Text der*

other words, Aristotle drew a distinction between ἀκροαταί (1358a37) and used this distinction to mark off epideictic from other forms of oratory.⁵⁰ Hence when Quintilian speaks of the whole of epideictic having been relegated *solely* to listeners, he expresses himself awkwardly — deliberative and judicial oratory are also directed toward listeners — but he can be understood as making a simple point: namely, that for Aristotle and Theophrastus, epideictic oratory is addressed to persons who have no decision making role and therefore need do nothing more than listen.

According to the translations of Cousin and Butler, Quintilian says that Aristotle and Theophrastus characterized epideictic oratory as “reserved solely for the delectation of audiences.”⁵¹ That is an error. There is no word for “delectation” or “pleasure” in the Latin text. Of course, the earlier discussion of kinds of causes does mention pleasure: Quintilian observes that persons who defend the threefold division of causes divide listeners into three kinds, of which one kind comes together for pleasure (*unum quod ad delectationem conveniat* 3.4.6). But this earlier mention of pleasure does not justify supplying it in the translation of our passage. Moreover, to supply it is to make Quintilian attribute to the leaders of the Peripatos a view they did not hold. In his discussion of epideictic oratory in the first book of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle divides epideictic into praise and blame, which he says are directed toward the noble and shameful (1.3 1358b12–13, 27–8, cf. 1.9 1366a23–5). He makes passing reference to noble and good things that are pleasant (1.9 1366a34, 1367a18), but he does not say that an epideictic speech aims at pleasing the audience.⁵² For

aristotelischen Rhetorik: Prolegomena zu einer kritischen Ausgabe (Berlin 1971) p. 124–5. For an alternative view, see Buchheit p. 123. Whatever is decided concerning 1358b5–6, the contrast between θεωρός and κριτής at 1358b2–3 is secure.

⁵⁰ An anticipation of Aristotle’s distinction may be seen in Thucydides, *History* 3.38.4,7, where Cleon is made to fault the members of the Athenian assembly for being spectators θεαταί. By associating the members of a deliberative assembly with judgment and dissociating them from observation, Aristotle is clarifying and reinforcing Cleon’s criticism.

⁵¹ Such is the English translation of H. Butler, *LCL* (1920) vol. 1 p. 465. Cousin, *Budé* (1975–80) vol. 2 p. 189, has: “réservé tout entier au seul plaisir des auditeurs.” Cf. Grube (1965) p. 104.

⁵² Aristotle does recognize that praise and blame can occur without being serious (*Rhet.* 1.9 1366a29), and in such cases he would undoubtedly recognize that pleasing the audience is a major concern of the orator. But he is equally clear that praise and blame may be earnest (*ibid.*) and therefore is not tempted to explain epideictic in terms of pleasure. Similarly the *Rhetoric to Alexander* 35 1440b5–1441b29 does not characterize epideictic oratory as providing the audience with pleasure.

he does not regard pleasure as a defining mark of epideictic; and as far as I can tell, there is no reason to believe that Theophrastus departed from Aristotle and tied epideictic to the delectation of the listener. This is not to overlook the fact that the tie to delectation is found in Cicero (*On the Or.* 2.341, quoted below; *Or.* 37, quoted below; *Classification of Or.* 69, 72) and that it may be earlier than any Ciceronian text. But that hardly justifies translating our text in such a way that the tie finds its origin in the early Peripatos.⁵³

Our text closes with an observation on etymology that is intended to support the preceding characterization of epideictic oratory. The observation is Quintilian's and recalls earlier remarks in 3.4. There Quintilian objects to rendering ἐπιδεικτικόν with *demonstrativum*, for in his opinion the Greek term implies display: *sed mihi ἐπιδεικτικόν non tam demonstrationis vim habere quam ostentationis videtur* (3.4.13). Quintilian appears to be influenced by Cicero, who in the *Orator* speaks of epideictic oratory having acquired its name from the fact that it is composed for viewing and pleasure: *quod (sc. genus) Graece ἐπιδεικτικόν nominatur, quia quasi ad inspiciendum delectationis causa comparatum est* (37).⁵⁴ There is, however, no corresponding passage in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and there is no good reason to think that either Aristotle or Theophrastus would endorse deriving ἐπιδεικτικόν from ἐπίδειξις conceived of as a display aimed at the delectation of the listener, i.e., a pleasant but idle show divorced from all practical concerns.⁵⁵

In the section immediately following our text (a section not printed in the text-translation volumes), Quintilian introduces Roman practice as a kind of counterexample to Aristotelian and Theophrastean theory. The Romans, he says, have given epideictic a

⁵³ It might be suggested that in 3.4.6 Quintilian is presenting an early Peripatetic view, so that we must take seriously the possibility that Theophrastus defined epideictic by reference to the pleasure of the audience. That seems to me unlikely. When Quintilian speaks of persons "who defend" the threefold division of causes, he makes no explicit reference to the ancients. More importantly, in setting out the arguments of the defenders, Quintilian relates epideictic to *past* time and draws a contrast with deliberative oratory which is referred to the future (3.4.7). That is not Aristotelian (*Rhet.* 1.3 1358b13–18, despite the qualification that follows in b18–20), and it would be remarkable if it were the position of Theophrastus.

⁵⁴ Cicero's explanation considers the listener and Quintilian's looks to the orator, but the difference is not significant: the "ostentatious" orator presents his speech and himself for "inspection" by the listener. And both Cicero and Quintilian regard this display as aimed at the delectation of the audience (Cic., *Or.* 37 and Quint. 3.4.6).

⁵⁵ In regard to Aristotle, see Buchheit p. 120–8 and Adamietz p. 98–9.

place in practical affairs: funeral orations are frequently a public duty; and in court cases witnesses may be the subject of praise and blame; the defendant may be supported by persons who praise him (3.7.2). The implication is that Greek practice and Aristotelian-Theophrastean theory make no room for these activities. But that is a false contrast. For Greeks as well as Romans, the funeral oration could be a civic occasion (cf., e.g., Thucydides, *Histories* 2.35.1–8); and in his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle states clearly that both deliberative and judicial oratory make room for subsidiary matters including the noble and shameful, i.e., praise and blame (1.3 1358b24–9). Theophrastus will have done the same. If one asks why Quintilian introduces such a mistaken contrast, the answer seems to be that he is influenced by Roman writers and in particular by Cicero. For in the work *On the Orator*, Cicero first makes Antonius say that Aristotle has treated epideictic oratory with great clarity (2.43)⁵⁶ and then later has him introduce a contrast between Greeks and Romans. The former are said to have written speeches of praise more for reading and delectation or enhancing an individual (*magis legendi et delectationis aut hominis alicuius ornandi*), than for beneficial use in the forum. The latter, however, are said to use speeches of praise in the forum, either as brief testimonies or as funeral orations (2.341).

We must conclude that our text and what follows upon it convey very little information concerning either Aristotle or Theophrastus. In regard to the Eresian, it remains possible that Quintilian knew some relevant work, say, *On Praise* (666 no. 12) or the *Arts* (666 no.2b = 678), and that he had the work in mind as he wrote; but it is, I think, more probable that Quintilian has added Theophrastus' name

⁵⁶ After mentioning judicial and deliberative oratory, Antonius takes note of epideictic: *nam illud tertium* (epideictic), *quod et a Crasso tactum est* (in 1.141) *et, ut audio, ille ipse Aristoteles, qui haec maxime illustravit, adiunxit, etiamsi opus est, tamen minus est necessarium* (2.43). According to Leeman et al. vol. 2 p. 242, the pronoun *haec* refers to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in its entirety and not to the question of three genera discussed in *Rhet.* 1.3. Leeman may be correct; but after *illud tertium*, it is, I think, more natural to construe *haec* as a reference to the three genera. In saying that, I do not want to suggest that Cicero must have had *Rhet.* 1.3 in mind, when he composed 2.43. Dramatically (through the phrase *ut audio*) Antonius is distancing himself from first hand knowledge of Aristotle (cf. 2.4); and when writing 2.43, Cicero may not have had a particular Aristotelian passage in mind. Cf. *On Invention* 1.7. There in a work written some thirty-five years before *On the Orator*, Cicero tells us that Aristotle held a doctrine of three genera. Cicero is reporting the tradition and not what he knew through personal study of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

without focusing on any particular treatise.⁵⁷ Similarly, it is possible that Quintilian has taken the adjective *πραγματικός* from Theophrastus, who used it to characterize deliberative and judicial oratory in contrast to epideictic,⁵⁸ but it is more likely that Quintilian has added the adjective on his own. Indeed, the form *πραγματικός* speaks for the latter alternative. It is not found in Aristotle and is unlikely to have been used by Theophrastus. For both Peripatetics, *πρακτικός* would be the normal term. In contrast, *πραγματικός* is found several times in Quintilian.⁵⁹ Especially relevant is a passage in the second book, where Quintilian mentions people who restrict the material of rhetoric to one part of life. He says that they assign rhetoric the area of morals concerned with affairs, and then adds “i.e. *πραγματικόν*”: *rhetorice . . . dicunt in una aliqua parte (vitae) ponendam, eique locum in ethice negotialem adsignant id est πραγματικόν* (2.21.3). Here the Greek word *πραγματικός* appears to be Quintilian’s own gloss on *negotialis*. The same can be said, with even more certainty, of our Theophrastean text.

In the apparatus of parallel texts, we have referred to a papyrus in the Hancock Museum, Newcastle on Tyne, inv. no. AREGYPT 522. It was unpublished at the time that the text-translation volumes went to press, but has recently (2001) been published by Peter Parsons, who dates the papyrus to the second century A.D.⁶⁰ Only two fragments survive. The smaller is little more than a scrap. The larger contains two columns, but is itself quite fragmentary, especially the second column of which only the beginnings of 37 lines remain.

⁵⁷ Quintilian may be reporting what a secondary source says concerning Theophrastus. That source may have named a Theophrastean work, but equally it may not have. What I find most unlikely is that Quintilian had in mind a specific Theophrastean work that he himself had inspected.

⁵⁸ Using the adjective would emphasize the practical or businesslike nature of rendering a judgment (*κρίνειν* Arist., *Rhet.* 1.3 1358b4) and put a more constructive face on the idea of combat (*ἀγών* 3.12 1413b15, 17, cf. *Ad Alex* 35 1440b13).

⁵⁹ Elsewhere in book three, *πραγματικός* occurs in connection with stasis theory: 3.6.35 (Apollodorus), 57 (Hermagoras) and 59 (explaining Cicero’s confusion in *On Invention* 1.14). See Matthes p. 149–51 and Kennedy (1963) p. 310–11.

⁶⁰ Parsons p. 154, who adds “perhaps the first half” of the second century. I cannot judge the papyrological arguments for dating the papyrus, but I am uneasy about pushing the date of the papyrus into the first half of the second century. For the four staseis of Hermagoras are mentioned in lines 31–4 of column 1, and the *floruit* of Hermagoras is often placed in the middle of the century (see, e.g., Kennedy [1963] p. 303 and Hanns Hohmann, “Stasis” in *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*, ed. T. Sloane [Oxford: University Press 2001] p. 741).

Some 21 lines are totally lost. Our interest is in column 1, which runs as follows.⁶¹

	αὐτὸς ἐπειδὴν περὶ τῶν κ[ε-]	20]. υνειπε[.]νοις . [...
	φαλαίων εἶπω εἰς ἕκαστο[ν]	]ν ἐγκαλεῖ κα... [.] .
	αὐτῶν ἀφορμὰς παραδιδῶ[.....]της διαιρέσεως. οι
4	πολλὰ ἂν τις ἐγκαλέσας αἰτιά-	] . ειπων δὲ πρὸς τοὺς
	σαιτο μὴ κεφάλαια παραδιδόν-	24]α ἀρκεῖν ἐπὶ τοὺς
	τα. τίνων δέ φασι μνημονεύε . . [.....]ας μεταβαίνει τὰς
	τῶν ἐκθεμένων τοὺς τόπους;	]οις οὐκ ἤκιστα αυ
8	οὐ γὰρ ὅσοι διεῖλον εἰς τὰ τρία	] . νται φαμενονοι
	γένη τὸν λόγον καὶ τοὺς τό-	28] . σε . [οισουκηκιστα]
	πους οὕτως ἐξέθεντο οὐδ' ἄ-	] . σε . [.] ουληθησανκαι
	κολουθεῖ πάντως καὶ τούτοις	] υς παραδοῦναι το
12	..]ηται ὁ γοῦν Θεόφραστος	] . ασανειναι κατα-
	...] . ων κοινῶν εἰπὼν το-	32	στοχαστι]κὴν ὀριστικὴν κα-
] α' ἐπὶ τοὺς περιαιρε-		τὰ συμβεβηκὸς μεταλημπτι-
] . βας ιδίους φησι δυ-		κὴν] ντες οἱ τὰς στά
16] εν καὶ τούτους] . σεφασαν
].ναγεσθαι λε.[...]	36] . σο . [] υτα
]αρμοζοντα.[...].] . [] . [
]ων μιμνης.[...]	

The lost portions of the column make interpretation difficult.⁶² We can, however, say that lines 31–4 refer to the four *staseis* of Hermagoras of Temnos,⁶³ and that the *kephalaia* mentioned in lines 1–2 and 5 almost certainly refer to the headings into which each stasis divides. The *aphormai* mentioned in line 3 are the starting points for constructing arguments. If line 4 begins a new sentence with asyndeton and if the last word in line 6 is μνημονεύειν, then we might translate lines 1–7 as follows: “When I speak about the *kephalaia*, I provide starting points for each of them. A person might be critical and complain at length if I do not provide *kephalaia*. But whom do they say that they recall as having set out the *topoi*.” The last sentence is quite uncertain. One wonders who “they” are and whether φασι is the main verb or parenthetical.⁶⁴ And should we construe τόπους as a simple variant for

⁶¹ The text is that of Parsons p. 158.

⁶² Throughout my brief exposition, I am dependent on Parsons, who acknowledges the considerable help that he received from Malcolm Heath and Tobias Rheinhardt.

⁶³ On the papyrus in line 33, there is a stroke above the second mu in μεταλημπτικὴν. Parsons p. 165 suggests that the stroke may be intended to delete the mu and thereby restore the classical Attic spelling of Hermagoras’ fourth *stasis*, i.e., the *stasis* of “objection” or what Quintilian 3.6.46 labels *translativa*.

⁶⁴ See Parsons p. 162.

ἀφορμάς (line 3)? Cf. Alexander, son of Numenius, ap. the Anonymous Seguerianus, *The Art of Political Speech* 169: τόπος μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὡς Ἀλέξανδρός φησιν, ἀφορμὴ ἐπιχειρήματος ἢ ἀφορμὴ πίστεως [εἰ], ὅθεν ἄν τις ὁρμώμενος ἐπιχείρημα εὖροι. “A *topos* then is, as Alexander says, the starting point of an epicheireme or the starting point of a proof, from which one finds an epicheireme” (text and translation Dilts-Kennedy [1997] p. 46–7).⁶⁵

What comes next is of especial interest to us. For here in lines 8–10 we almost certainly have a reference to the division of oratory into three kinds and the distribution of *topoi* between these kinds. The following is a translation: “For not everyone who divided the speech (of oratory) into three genera also set out the *topoi* in this way.” The author is telling us that not every one who distinguished between judicial, deliberative and epideictic oratory divided the *topoi* into three discrete classes corresponding to the three kinds of oratory. What follows in lines 10–12 (beginning with οὐδ’ ἀκολουθεῖ) is less than clear, not least because letters are lost at the beginning of line 12. If τούτοις in line 11 has the same reference as ὅσοι in line 8, the author is developing what has just been said. Parsons suggests reading φανῆναι at the beginning of line 12 and translating lines 10–12 with “nor does it follow at all (without exceptions?) that they took this view.”⁶⁶ I.e., they do not believe that each of the *topoi* should be assigned to one and only one of the three classes.

Theophrastus is named in line 12. He seems to be introduced as an example of someone who divided oratory into three genera but did not divide all *topoi* into three classes corresponding to the three kinds of oratory. Rather, he recognized both common *topoi* (κοινῶν, line 13) and specific *topoi* (ιδίους, line 15).⁶⁷ The latter are divided into three classes according to the genera of oratory, but the former are not peculiar to a one kind of oratory and therefore are called “common.” If we restore lines 12–15 so that they read: ὁ γοῦν Θεόφραστος | [περὶ τ]ῶν κοινῶν εἰπὼν τό[πων κᾶτ]α ἐπὶ τοὺς περὶ αἰρε[τ]ῶν μετ[α]βὰς ιδίους φησι . . .,⁶⁸ then we may translate: “At

⁶⁵ See also Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Topics* 2 = 122B, where in line 1 the τόπος is explained as an ἀρχὴ καὶ ἀφορμὴ ἐπιχειρήματος. But in the Theophrastean definition of the τόπος, line 4, ἀρχή and στοιχεῖον occur, not ἀφορμή.

⁶⁶ Parsons p. 163, who comments that reading φανῆναι leaves no room for an article with the infinitive.

⁶⁷ We may follow Parsons p. 163 and read τόπων at the end of line 13 and the beginning of 14.

⁶⁸ All the supplements are suggested by Parsons p. 163.

least Theophrastus, having spoken of the common *topoi* and having proceeded to the specific *topoi* concerning things to be chosen, says . . .” Regarding the second half of this text-segment (in particular, the words τοὺς περὶ αἰρετῶν . . . ἰδίους), we may compare Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* 1.6 1362a20–3, where the Stagirite is discussing deliberative oratory. He says that one must grasp the στοιχεῖα, i.e., the ἴδια προτάσεις (cf. 1.2 1358a35) concerning the good and useful, after which he goes on to define the good as what is chosen (αἰρετόν) for its own sake and for the sake of which we choose (αἰρούμεθα) other things.”⁶⁹

If the above is correct, we have confirmation of what we have already surmised on the basis of **671**: Theophrastus followed Aristotle in recognizing three kinds of oratory (*Rhet.* 1.3 1358b6–8). In addition, we have evidence that Theophrastus, like Aristotle, recognized that some *topoi* are specific to one kind of oratory, while others are common to all three kinds. It is, of course, true that in *Rhetoric* 1.2 Aristotle reserves τόπος for the common starting points. He contrasts the κοινοὶ τόποι with the ἴδια προτάσεις or εἶδη that are specific to one kind of oratory (1358a10–32). But in *Rhetoric* 2.22, Aristotle varies his terminology and speaks of the ἴδια προτάσεις as τόποι (1396b28–1397a1).⁷⁰ Perhaps Theophrastus preferred the language of 2.22 and chose not to speak of ἴδια προτάσεις or εἶδη. But that is speculation, which is not strongly supported by the papyrus under consideration. For what the author reports is not a detailed quotation of some Theophrastean text. Indeed, it is not a quotation at all,⁷¹ so that the author may be using his own preferred terminology. That need not affect the substance of the report, but it would mean that the papyrus is not an entirely accurate reflection of Theophrastus’ own choice of words.

⁶⁹ In regard to περὶ αἰρετῶν, “concerning things to be chosen” (lines 14–15), Parsons p. 163 and 164 notes that the phrase relates to the first division of Hermagoras’ *stasis* κατὰ συμβεβηκός. (On p. 163 “Hermocrates” occurs, but that is a simple slip for “Hermagoras” which is found on p. 164.) Parsons aptly cites Quintilian 3.6.56 where the division is characterized as *de appetendis et fugiendis, quae est pars deliberativa*, “concerning things to be sought or avoided, which belongs to the deliberative oratory.” (Cf. Kennedy [1963] p. 310.) I add only that the phrase in question is quite general. It can be used apart from *stasis* theory and indeed has no special tie to rhetoric. It is quite at home in ethics.

⁷⁰ Hence I agree with, e.g., Kennedy (1991) p. 189 against Watson p. 392, who tells us that Aristotle never used the phrase “special topics,” i.e., “specific topics” of the εἶδη. Cf. Cope (1877) vol. 2 p. 233.

⁷¹ As Parsons p. 161 and 163 points out the author seems to be summarizing and not quoting Theophrastus.

Since the Theophrastean portion of the papyrus concerns *topoi* as the starting points of arguments, our text relates to invention, and that suggests assigning this text to the work *Περὶ εὐρήσεως* *On Invention*. (666 no. 4). But it is by no means certain that *On Invention* is the correct translation of the title. The work may concern “firsts,” so that a translation like *On Discovery* might be preferred. See the commentary on 666 no. 4. Moreover, reference to the genera of oratory together with some discussion of the *topoi* (both specific and common) would be equally at home in other Theophrastean works like *On Kinds of Rhetorical Arts*, *On Enthymemes* and *On Judicial Speeches* (666 no. 2a, 6, 9). There is no certainty here.

4. Invention

The word “invention” comes from the Latin *inventio*. The corresponding word in Greek is εὐρεσις. In rhetorical theory, invention is the discovery of the material and arguments necessary for a persuasive speech. Put simply, invention is the process by which a rhetorician or orator determines what he must say (ὅ δεῖ λέγειν) as against how he ought to express himself (ὡς δεῖ λέγειν). It is a matter of content and not style. In the Hellenistic period, invention came to be viewed as the first of five tasks that an orator must accomplish if he is to win the day. He first excogitates the points he wishes to make and the arguments needed to support them;⁷² then he considers the arrangement of this material, after which he considers style, i.e., he selects words and phrases that suit the material and the occasion. Once these three steps are completed, he memorizes his speech, and finally he delivers it in an appropriate voice and with fitting gestures.⁷³

Such a five-step analysis is useful for introducing the beginning student to rhetorical theory, but it needs qualification. Clearly memorization may be partial (one memorizes the gist of what one wants to say but not the exact words in which the speech will be delivered), or it may be altogether absent when one speaks extemporaneously. In the latter case, an observable pause between determining what ought to be said and expressing oneself in appropriate

⁷² In using the word “excogitate,” I am imitating Cicero, *On Invention* 1.9, who uses *excogitatio* in order to define invention.

⁷³ In addition to *On Invention* 1.9, see, e.g., *On the Orator* 1.142, 187 and 2.79. For a fuller statement of the five steps beginning with invention and ending with delivery, see Watson p. 390–1.

words and phrases can have a negative effect. For the orator who does pause may seem deficient in rhetorical skill, and (what is worse) he runs the risk of losing his audience (cf. 705). Moreover, even when time permits step by step preparation, invention cannot be neatly separated from arrangement. For speeches have different sections — introduction, narration, proof and epilogue — and these sections determine at least in part what must be said.⁷⁴ In the introduction, the orator attempts to capture the attention and goodwill of his audience; he therefore considers, during the process of invention, how best to achieve these goals. Similarly, in thinking about what should be said at the end of a speech, the orator does not ignore the goals of a well thought out epilogue. E.g., he considers how best to summarize his case and to excite one or more emotions that may help him win the day. Finally, there is no compelling reason why the process of invention can not be broken up, so that orator considers first, say, the proof: not only the issues and arguments that will be most effective, but also the order in which the arguments are best presented and the appropriate wording for giving each argument maximum force. He might then tackle narration, paying special attention to economy of style (cf. 696), and subsequently focus on the content and style of the introduction and the epilogue.

Turning now to Aristotle, we can say that the *Rhetoric*, as it has come down to us, gives pride of place to invention. It is the subject of Books 1 and 2, while Book 3 takes up style and arrangement. Memory is not mentioned, and delivery is treated briefly at the beginning of Book 3, but only to be dismissed as an unwanted necessity. Aristotle does not use εὑρεσις to refer to invention.⁷⁵ Rather he speaks of ἔντεχνοι πίστεις, technical or artistic means of persuasion, and recognizes three distinct kinds: persuasion through argument, through the character of the speaker and through the listeners (1.2 1355b35–1356a20).⁷⁶ Persuasion through argument is most important to Aristotle and receives the longest treatment. In Book 1 he divides rhetoric into three genera — deliberative, epideictic and judicial — and considers in detail the materials specific to each genus. In doing so, he is providing the orator with premises that are specific to a particular genus. In the second half of Book 2, he discusses the common topics, i.e., general lines of argument that can be filled in,

⁷⁴ Cf. M. Heath, "Invention," in *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period*, ed. S. Porter (Leiden: Brill 1997) p. 91.

⁷⁵ But Aristotle does use the cognate verb; see the commentary on 666 no. 4.

⁷⁶ On ἔντεχνοι πίστεις, see the commentary on 666 no. 8.

so that an argument appropriate to the orator's cause is created. In the first half of Book 2, Aristotle discusses persuasion through character and through the listeners. Persuasion through character is treated briefly.⁷⁷ In contrast, the treatment of persuasion through the hearers involves a lengthy discussion of different kinds of emotional response. Theophrastus is likely to have discussed invention in a similar manner. It is true that no rhetorical text focuses on persuasion through character or through the listeners, but given Theophrastus' demonstrable interest in character and emotion,⁷⁸ it is highly unlikely that he ignored their importance in regard to persuasive speech. Whether Theophrastus used εὔρεσις as a technical term for invention can be left undecided.⁷⁹

672 Cicero, *On Ends* 5.10 (BT p. 160.17–23 Schiche)

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 29–30; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1524; Fortenbaugh (1994b) p. 23; Long (1995) p. 53–5

In Book 5 of *On Ends*, Cicero has Piso present the view of the old Academy and the Peripatetics on the ends of goods (*veteris . . . Academiae de finibus bonorum Peripateticorumque sententia* 5.8). Cicero is explicit that the view derives from the Academic Antiochus,⁸⁰ with whom Piso is said to have been studying for several months (5.8). Piso begins his presentation by reporting a threefold division of Peripatetic philosophy: one part is said to investigate nature, another logic and a third living well (5.9–11). Piso's subsequent discussion of the end or highest good (beginning 5.12) belongs to the third division. His remarks on the second division are our text **672**.

The tripartite division of philosophy is presented as common to the Peripatetics and almost all the other schools (*fere ceterum* 5.9).

⁷⁷ Persuasion through character has already been discussed in 1.2 1356a5–13, but the treatment there is even briefer and somewhat different from the later account. See Fortenbaugh (1996a) p. 147–68.

⁷⁸ Regarding character see the commentary on **436** no. 4, above p. 87–92, and on emotion see **436** no. 5 and **438–48** with discussion in Fortenbaugh (1985b) p. 209–29.

⁷⁹ See the commentary on **666** no. 4, above p. 69–72.

⁸⁰ Antiochus of Ascalon, born between 130 and 120 B.C., rejected the scepticism of the Middle Academy in favor of the more positive doctrine of the Old Academy. He was an eclectic philosopher who emphasized agreement between the Academy and Peripatos. He saw the originality of the Stoics more in terminology than in substance. Cicero heard his lectures in Athens in 79–8 B.C.

That may be the view of Antiochus, but the division is not Aristotelian⁸¹ and almost certainly not Theophrastean. It appears to have originated in the Old Academy with Xenocrates and to have been taken over by the Stoics: Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoa will have adopted it from his Academic teacher Polemon.⁸² Furthermore, it is Stoic to recognize dialectic and rhetoric as subdivisions of logic (Diog. Laert. 7.41). This subdivision is reflected in the first sentence of our text: precepts concerning dialectic and rhetoric are mentioned together under the rubric of logic. What gives pause is the reference to Aristotle and Theophrastus (*ab isdem*).⁸³ For while Aristotle repeatedly emphasizes the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric (e.g. *Rhetoric* 1.1 1354a1–6, 1355a8–10, 34–6, b6–11; 1.2 1356a30–3, 1358a2–32), he analyzes ethical and emotional modes of persuasion, and describes rhetoric as an offshoot not only of dialectic but also of ethics-politics (*Rhet.* 1.2 1356a25–7, 1.4 1359b8–11).⁸⁴ In regard to Theophrastus the evidence is meager; it seems safest to assume that he followed Aristotle and did not anticipate the Stoics by making rhetoric a part of logic.

If we ignore the Stoic framework within which Piso makes his remarks, we can say that his initial statement is unobjectionable: Aristotle and Theophrastus did pass on precepts not only for dialectic but also for oratory.⁸⁵ In regard to Aristotle, we may cite the *Topics* and the chapters on topics in the *Rhetoric*. For Theophrastus we

⁸¹ At *Topics* 1.14 105b19–29 Aristotle does divide propositions and problems into three classes: ethical, logical and physical, but he adds that the nature of the three classes is not easy to define. It is not clear how this division relates to rhetoric; in any case, Aristotle never makes it fundamental to his philosophy.

⁸² See Cicero, *On Ends* 4.3–4 and the discussion of Baltes (H. Dörrie and M. Baltes, *Der Platonismus in der Antike* Bd. 4, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog 1996) p. 203–9.

⁸³ The phrase *ab isdem* occurs again in 5.11 = 590.2, referring as before to Aristotle and Theophrastus.

⁸⁴ If we recognize a development in Aristotle's rhetorical thought and accept *Rhetoric* 1.1 as an early text (see, e.g., Fortenbaugh [1996] p. 165–88), we might say that Aristotle's early position, with its emphasis on argument and rejection of emotional appeal, encourages treating rhetoric together with dialectic as part of an inclusive logic. Aristotle's mature view would then be significantly different in that it makes room for emotional and ethical persuasion and is not easily lumped together with dialectic as a coordinate part of logic. Alternatively we might say that 1.1 advances an "ideal" rhetoric according to which rhetoric and dialectic are coordinate arts, and that what follows in 1.2 is a more realistic and inclusive rhetoric that resists classification as a subdivision of logic.

⁸⁵ Cf. *On the Orator* 2.152, where the "not only-but also" construction may be said to anticipate our text. Aristotle alone is mentioned.

have no surviving treatises; but we can be certain that he followed his teacher in training students to argue both sides of a thesis (135), not with a view to Arcesilian scepticism, but in order that students might learn to set forth the possible arguments — *quidquid . . . dici posset* — on any topic (cf. Arist., *Rhet.* 1.2 1355b26–7). Indeed, Theophrastus composed books entitled *Theses* (68 no. 34–6) that will have been used in part at least for rhetorical instruction.⁸⁶

What follows Piso's initial statement may raise an objection. We are told that Aristotle was first to institute the practice of speaking on both sides of particular issues. Out of context, the assertion seems quite false. For even though Aristotle claimed to have discovered the art of dialectic,⁸⁷ both the literature of the fifth century and reports by later authors make clear that the sophists and early rhetoricians paid attention to arguing both sides of an issue.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, Piso's assertion can be explained in two ways. First, we should take Piso's remarks in context. In 5.9–11, the focus is on the Peripatetics. Even the Academics are peripheral; Arcesilaus is mentioned only to make clear what the Peripatetics were not doing. In this context, it may be acceptable to speak of Aristotle as first and authoritative, *princeps*, in regard to the practice of speaking on both sides of an issue. Second, the same assertion is made in the introduction to the second book of the *Tusculan Disputations*. There Cicero speaks in his own voice; and using words reminiscent of 672,⁸⁹ he tells us that Aristotle first and later those who followed him practiced arguing both sides of every issue. Theophrastus is to be counted among those who followed Aristotle. But what especially interests me is the way in which Cicero explains his approval of arguing both sides of an issue. He says that the practice provides not only a way to discover the prob-

⁸⁶ The Theophrastean *Theses* will have contained opposed arguments. See above, p. 86, the commentary on titles 68 no. 34–6.

⁸⁷ In *Sophistical Refutations* 34 183b35, 184b1–2, Aristotle claims to have discovered dialectic; nothing was there for him to build upon. Cf. *Rhetoric* 1.1 1354b21–2, where Aristotle lays claim to the enthymeme, asserting that his predecessors had nothing to say concerning the technical modes of proof.

⁸⁸ For example, Diogenes Laertius reports that Protagoras was the first to say that there are two opposed arguments concerning every issue (*Lives* 9.51); Plato says that Tisias considered how each side ought to argue, when a weak but brave individual is charged with assaulting a person who is strong but cowardly (*Phaedrus* 273B3–C4); and in the *Tetralogies* attributed to Antiphon, we have examples of opposed judicial speeches on three different charges.

⁸⁹ I am thinking of the words *consuetudo de omnibus rebus in contrarias partes disserendi* and *dicendi exercitatio*.

able truth but also the best exercise in speaking (2.9). In this portion of the *Tusculans*, Cicero is arguing that philosophy should be well written, and with that in mind he cites Aristotle as the first to establish a useful exercise: one that sharpens both dialectical and rhetorical skills. There may be some exaggeration here, but not much. For the Peripatetic school under Aristotle combined philosophical and rhetorical training. Put simply, the leader of the Peripatos recognized that arguing an issue *pro* and *contra* provided students with practice not only in argumentation but also in style.⁹⁰ Text 672 is less clear regarding the rhetorical benefits of arguing both sides of every question. Oratory is mentioned only in the first line, and there is no reference to style; but that is, I think, attributable to abbreviation. Piso is summarizing; he is not saying anything different from what Cicero says more fully in *Tusculans* 2.9.

The phrase *de singulis rebus*, “of (concerning) particular matters,” may excite criticism, if it is taken to refer to hypotheses in contrast with theses, i.e., if we think that Piso is excluding general issues in favor of debates about individuals in given circumstances. But such an interpretation would be mistaken. For the adjective *singuli* implies only separateness (separate matters); it is neutral regarding levels of generality and specification. Moreover, in *On Ends* 4.6, Cicero recognizes that the Academic-Peripatetics offered exercises both on general issues apart from persons and circumstances and on issues involving unique persons and circumstances. Cicero has not forgotten that when writing 5.10. He has Piso tell us that the Peripatetics offered exercises “on this or that subject,” on single subjects which may be either theses or hypotheses.

The mention of precepts, *praecepta*, in line 2 makes one think of the title *Rhetorical Precepts* (666 no. 3), but there is little reason to believe that Cicero or his source, Antiochus, is drawing on or referring to this work. In fact, the word *praeceptum/a* is used frequently by Cicero. It occurs in the very next section with reference to directives for living well (*bene vivendi praecepta* 5.11). In regard to rhetoric, we may compare 4.5, where we are told that the Academics and Peripatetics left many precepts in their treatises (*praecepta in artibus*) and examples in their orations/discourses.

⁹⁰ See above, p. 86–7, the commentary on 68 no. 34–6.

- 135** Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Topics* 1.2 101a26 (CAG vol. 2.2 p. 27.11–18 Wallies)

Literature: Throm (1932) p. 177–8; Fortenbaugh (1994b) p. 24–5; Van Ophuijsen (1994) p. 150–1, (2001) p. 30–1, 150–1

In *Topics* 1.2, Aristotle encourages the study of dialectic by stating three ways in which it is useful: for training, for encounters⁹¹ and for the philosophic sciences (πρὸς γυμνασίαν, πρὸς τὰς ἐντεύξεις, πρὸς τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας). In regard to training, Aristotle says that the benefit is obvious, for if we possess a method, we shall be able to argue more easily about a proposed subject. After that, Aristotle discusses the benefits for encounters and for the philosophic sciences (101a27–31). In his commentary on the *Topics*, Alexander of Aphrodisias discusses each of the three ways listed by Aristotle. He begins with training and offers a bipartite explanation that applies to exercises within the Platonic Academy. First, “by training, he (Aristotle) means that which occurs in argument addressed to others in question and answer form — as a form of training they try, receiving certain problems from their interlocutors, to assist these by producing argumentative attacks through what is approved” (p. 27.8–11, transl. Van Ophuijsen). Here Alexander is thinking especially of Socratic cross-examination within the Academy: one person (student or instructor) puts questions to another person concerning a view held by the latter and in that way trains the latter to examine his own views.⁹² The second explanation is our text **135**. It, too, concerns training within the Academy: a thesis is propounded (θέσεώς τινος τεθείσης) and the participants (students) exercise their capacity for invention, i.e., for discovering arguments (τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἐπιχειρήσεις εὐρητικόν) by arguing the issue. The student may argue one side of the issue, he may attack or defend the propounded thesis, or he may speak on both sides, and in so doing he learns how to deal with any controversial thesis that may be put to him.

In offering the second explanation, Alexander emphasizes arguing both sides of a dispute (lines 1, 6 and 8). That has a consequence for how we translate ἐπιχειρήσεις (lines 1, 5 and 8). Although ἐπιχειρήσεις may mean “attack,” translating “argumentative attack”

⁹¹ Apparently, “encounters” with the many (cf. *Rhet.* 1.1 1355a28–9), i.e., the general public outside the Academy.

⁹² Van Ophuijsen (2001) p. 150.

may be misleading,⁹³ for in dealing with a set thesis, students may attempt to establish it as well as to refute it (κατασκευάζοντες as well as ἀνασκευάζοντες, line 6), or they may attempt both (τὴν εἰς τὰ ἀντικείμενα ἐπιχείρησιν line 8). Hence, in the lines in question, I prefer to translate ἐπιχείρησις with “argument” and to construe εἰς (lines 1 and 8) as expressing relationship, whether positive or negative.⁹⁴

Alexander tells us that among the ancients training of the second kind occurred without books, for such books did not yet exist (line 3–4). He notes, however, that books of the kind in question were written by Aristotle and Theophrastus and were in existence in his own day (ἔστι, present tense, line 7). These books do not survive, but the report is not to be doubted.⁹⁵ Moreover, there can be little doubt that the books contained sample arguments, pro and con, on a set thesis. That some instructions or commentary accompanied the arguments is a possibility. But even if the collections contained only sample arguments, they will have been intended to illustrate certain principles of invention and arrangement. We may compare Plato’s *Phaedrus*, where we find two opposed speeches concerning love (237B7–241D1, 243E9–257B6). While the speeches themselves may be appreciated without commentary, they were written to illustrate the importance of beginning with a clear notion of one’s subject⁹⁶ and of avoiding a disorderly jumble of arguments.⁹⁷

We have listed the Theophrastean titles referring to theses under logic (68 no. 34–6), but a connection with rhetoric cannot be ruled out. Indeed, Theophrastus, following Aristotle, will have incorporated theses into rhetorical instruction with a view not only to improving a student’s capacity for invention (discovering arguments) but also developing a command of appropriate style. For more on the subject, see the commentaries on 68 no. 34–6 and 672.

⁹³ Here I am disagreeing with Van Ophuijsen (2001) p. 30–1.

⁹⁴ See LSJ s.v. IV.

⁹⁵ An earlier mention of books of theses by Aristotle and Theophrastus is found in Theon (1st c. A.D.), *Preliminary Exercises* 2 = 74.

⁹⁶ In fact, the importance of beginning with a clear notion of one’s subject is made explicit at the beginning of Socrates’ first speech 237B7–C5. Later in the dialogue, Socrates criticizes Lysias for failing to begin his speech (it precedes the first speech of Socrates [230E6–234C5]) with a definition (263D7–264A8).

⁹⁷ On the disorderly arrangement of Lysias’ speech, see 264B3–8 with Fortenbaugh (1994b) p. 21–2.

673A Excerpts from codex Parasinus 3032 (*RhGr* vol. 14 p. 232.4–8 Rabe)

673B Marcellinus (?), *Prefatory Remarks on Hermogenes' On Issues* (*RhGr* vol. 14 p. 292.24–293.2 Rabe)

Literature: Spengel (1828) p. 3–4 n. 8; Schmidt (1839) p. 34; Rabe (1908) p. 566–73, 584–5, (1931) p. lx–lxix; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1525; Matelli (1992) p. 43–70, (1994) p. 230; Conley (1994) p. 225–6

The excerpts from codex Parasinus 3032 appear as Prolegomena 14 in Rabe's collection of *Prefatory Remarks on Hermogenes' On Issues* (p. 228–37). The immediately preceding preface, i.e., Prolegomena 13 (p. 183–217) is closely related. In Rabe's edition, Pr. 14 is equipped with references to corresponding portions of Pr. 13. Both consider the notion of *logos*, and both recognize a division of *logos* into internal and external reason or discourse: λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λόγος προφορικός. In Pr. 13, the former is defined as διάνοια ἀνθρώπου ἐν τῷ διαλογίζεσθαι, τί λέγειν ἢ πράττειν δεῖ, “human thought involved in considering what one ought to say or do” (p. 184.6–7), and the latter as δῆλωσις ἀνθρώπου διανοίας διὰ φωνῆς, “revealing human thought through speech” (p. 185.1–2). There is brief discussion of these definitions, after which Pr. 13 takes up technical *logos* (p. 185.4–9) and advances a division into theoretical and practical *logos* (p. 185.9–186.16). A fivefold Peripatetic division of *logos* and six additional divisions attributed to the Stoics follow (p. 186.17–188.5). Finally Pr. 13 returns to the distinction between λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λόγος προφορικός. We are told that the former was put in order by Lollianus and Theophrastus as well as others, and that the latter is divided between the two arts of grammar and rhetoric: ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν ἐνδιάθετον λόγον ἄλλοι τε κοσμοῦσι καὶ Λολλιανὸς καὶ Θεόφραστος. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν προφορικὸν λόγον δύο τέχναι διείλοντο, ἥ τε γραμματικὴ καὶ ῥητορικὴ. (p. 188.6–9).

In Pr. 14, the definitions of λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λόγος προφορικός differ little from those in Pr. 13. The former is defined as ἔννοια ἀνθρωπίνη, καθ' ἣν τι λέγειν ἢ πράττειν ἡμῖν προσγίνεται, “human thinking, whereby it occurs to one to say or do something,” and the latter as δῆλωσις ἀνθρώπου δαινοίας διὰ φωνῆς ἐν ἄνθρωπον, “revealing human thought through articulated speech” (p. 229.2–3, 229.4–5). As the references in Rabe's edition make clear, there is also similarity in what follows. The distinction

between theoretical and practical logos is developed at considerable length (p. 229.8–231.28), but there is no corresponding report concerning the fivefold Peripatetic division of logos and the six Stoic additions. After a brief statement saying that difference in degree does not produce change in species or kind (p. 232.1–3),⁹⁸ Pr. 14 returns to the distinction between λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λόγος προφορικός. We read: “Internal reason is ordered by the technical writings of Lollianus and Theophrastus on epicheiremes and enthymemes. They explain the sorts of enthymemes that ought to be used by the person who acts as prosecutor and engages in deliberation and speaks in praise” (p. 232.4–8). That is our text **673A**. Thereupon follows a remark concerning external reason that is omitted in the text-translation volumes: “External reason is ordered by grammar and rhetoric; grammar prevents faults and rhetoric provides ornament in diction and good rhythm in composition (p. 232.8–12).”⁹⁹

Two textual problems merit brief mention. First, in lines 2–3 of **673A**, Rabe, *RhGr* (1931) p. 232.6–7 has supplied γεγραμμένοι αἱ διδάσκουσιν. The supplement is not found in Rabe’s earlier publication of the Greek text in *RhM* 64 (1909) p. 569.13. The supplement makes the text easier to read and has a parallel in Sopatros (*RhG* vol. 5 [1833] p. 2.32 Walz). Second, the τέχναι of Lollianus and Theophrastus are said to concern epicheiremes and enthymemes (lines 1–2), but in what immediately follows, there is no mention of epicheiremes. The τέχναι are said to teach the sorts of enthymemes that ought to be used (line 3). That prompted Rabe to suggest supplying καὶ ἐπιχειρήμασι after ἐνθυμήμασι. See the *apparatus criticus* in *RhGr* p. 232. Rabe did, however, resist expanding the printed text, and we should too. The omission has a parallel in Sopatros (p. 2.23–4 W).

The distinction between λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λόγος προφορικός is almost always attributed to the Stoa on the basis of texts like Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.65 and Ptolemy, *On the Criterion and the Commanding Faculty* 6 and 8 (both second century A.D.). Of a different mind is Elisabetta Matelli, who suggests

⁹⁸ If I understand **438** and *Research on Plants* (**384** no. 1) 1.1.5–6 correctly, Theophrastus would be uncomfortable with the unqualified statement that difference in degree does not produce difference in kind. Along with other factors, it can determine difference in kind. See Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 145–6.

⁹⁹ Rabe’s text involves a supplement (p. 232.9–11), which need not concern us. There is a close parallel in Sopatros, *RhG* vol. 5 p. 2.26–7 Walz.

that the distinction should be attributed to Theophrastus.¹⁰⁰ Matelli is quite correct that the distinction is implicit in writings that predate the Stoa. It can be found, e.g., in Aristotle, and in many ways it is a matter of common sense. People frequently think before they speak. And in regard to rhetoric, there is an obvious difference between preparing and delivering an oration. What is at issue is who first formulated the distinction in terms of λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λόγος προφορικός. That person may have been Theophrastus, but in my judgment, the only textual support for referring the distinction to him is what we read in Pr. 13 and 14,¹⁰¹ and that support is not compelling. In both prefaces, the distinction is introduced long before Theophrastus is named (Pr. 13 p. 184.1–2 vs. 188.7 and Pr. 14 p. 228.24 vs. 232.5), and when Theophrastus is named, the distinction is not attributed to him. In Pr. 13, Theophrastus is mentioned after Lollianus as one among others who give order to internal reason. Similarly in Pr. 14, Theophrastus is named after Lollianus; their technical writings are said to concern epicheiremes and enthymemes and to order internal reason. That leaves quite undecided who first formulated the distinction between λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λόγος προφορικός. Perhaps the fact that Lollianus enjoys pride of place tells us that we hear of Theophrastus only because he is cited by Lollianus (second century A.D.),¹⁰² but again that tells us nothing about the origin of the phrases in question. Nor does the absence of any reference to the Stoa.¹⁰³ Such an argument from silence would be telling only if the passages in question were concerned with the

¹⁰⁰ Matelli (1992) p. 67–8.

¹⁰¹ Matelli (1992) p. 56–63 does cite Theon of Smyrna (2nd c. A.D.), *On the Utility of Mathematics for Reading Plato* p. 72.24–73.11 Hiller, but in my judgment, the passage does little to support her position. Fifteen different senses of the word λόγος are attributed to the Peripatetics. The first is that which occurs in the phrase λόγος προφορικός, and the second is that which occurs in λόγος ἐνδιάθετος. The former is attributed to the νεώτεροι, the younger Peripatetics. The plural suggests that no one person is being referred to, and (despite the considerations advanced by Matelli p. 63) Theophrastus seems to be excluded by the adjective “younger.” Moreover, the list contains one use of λόγος that is certainly Stoic in origin: i.e., λόγος σπερματικός. Matelli thinks that it is listed because philosophers in the second century were prepared to adopt ideas developed in a rival school. In particular, the Peripatetics took over the notion of λόγος σπερματικός from the Stoa. But if that explains the occurrence of λόγος σπερματικός in Theon’s list, why can’t a similar explanation be given of the occurrence of λόγος προφορικός and λόγος ἐνδιάθετος in Theon’s list? The phrases were formulated in the Stoa and subsequently taken over by certain Peripatetics.

¹⁰² Matelli (1992) p. 67.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

original formulation of the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος–λόγος προφορικός distinction. What we can conclude is that Theophrastus contributed to the technical analysis of internal *logos* and that he did so in writings on the epicheireme and the enthymeme. He did, of course, have much to say about external *logos* (he wrote on expression and delivery), but even that is not stated explicitly in the two prefaces. We are told only that grammar and rhetoric deal with external *logos*.

Text **673B** is taken from still another preface to Hermogenes' work *On Issues*: namely, Pr. 17 in Rabe's collection. The preface is thought to be a revision of a preface by Marcellinus.¹⁰⁴ **673B** comes from a section of the preface in which the author announces and then addresses seven concerns: 1) Hermogenes' goal in writing *On Issues*, 2) the usefulness of the work, 3) its authenticity, 4) its position in relation to Hermogenes' *Preliminary Exercises* and *On Types of Style*, 5) the method of instruction, 6) the title of the work, and 7) the work's application to different kinds of oratory (p. 287.28–293.13). **673B** occurs within the discussion of the title. Persons who give the title as *On the Art of Rhetoric* are criticized, for that title suggests a work dealing with all areas of the art. That does not correspond with Hermogenes' intention; he offers no discussion of, e.g., introduction and narration. In contrast, persons who give the title as *On Issues* are reporting correctly the Hermogenic title (p. 292.13–24). At this point, **673B** begins. We are told that Hermogenes intended to make clear that his work concerns only deliberative and judicial speeches; he wished to mark off the work from other rhetorical *artes* (p. 292.24–7 = lines 1–3). As an example of other *artes* the author of Pr. 17 cites Hermogenes' *On Types of Style* and then mentions *artes* by other people. Theophrastus is said to have written an *ars* *On the Enthymeme*, Alexander, the son of Numenius, and Lollianus are said to have written *artes* *On Rhetorical Starting-Points* and Aspinus is said to have written *On Introductions and Proofs* (p. 292.27–293.2 = lines 3–7). It is clear that the author of the preface is not interested in the Theophrastean work *per se*. Rather, he cites the Theophrastean title simply as an example of a title that refers to an *ars* of limited scope and thereby avoids the mistake of persons who refer to Hermogenes' work by means of the unqualified title *On the Art of Rhetoric*.

On the basis of **673B**.4, Spengel p. 3–4 thinks that Theophrastus wrote a work whose full (proper and original) title was Τέχνη

¹⁰⁴ See the "Sources" on Prolegomena 17, above p. 35.

ῥητορικὴ περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων, *Art of Rhetoric concerning Enthymemes*, and that this title has been split in two in the catalogue of Diogenes Laertius. In 5.48 = 1.234 Περὶ τέχνης ῥητορικῆς occurs, and in 5.47 = 1.198 Περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων occurs. That is highly imaginative and ignores the position of περὶ in **673B.4**, where it appears only once: after ῥητορικὴ and before ἐνθυμημάτων. The work mentioned in **673B.4** is almost certainly the work that Diogenes lists as Περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων (1.234 = **666** no. 6).¹⁰⁵

674 Cicero, *On Invention* 1.61 (*BT* p. 48.3–12 Stroebel)

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 18–19, 24–7; Kroll (1936) p. 10, 16–17; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1525; Solmsen (1941) p. 169–72; Matthes (1958) p. 203–8; Michel (1960) p. 181–5; Kennedy (1963) p. 316–17, (1994a) p. 120–1; Calboli (1969) p. 240; Martin (1974) p. 104–5; Fortenbaugh (1989) p. 40–1 and (1998a) p. 25–46; Runia (1989) p. 28, 34; Klein (1994) col. 1251–5; Calboli Montefusco (1998) p. 20–4

In Cicero's youthful¹⁰⁶ work *On Invention* there is a discussion of proof (*confirmatio*), whose contents are a survey of sources from which arguments may be drawn (1.34–43), a classification of arguments as either necessary or probable (1.44–50) and accounts of both induction and deduction (1.51–6 and 57–77). In discussing deductive argument, Cicero recognizes two competing analyses: one into five parts and another into three (1.57–60); he expresses his preference for quinquepartite analysis and offers reasons for this preference (1.61–7). After that Cicero gives examples of arguments that differ in number of parts (1.68–75), adds brief remarks on how to handle arguments (1.75–6) and claims to have written about argument more accurately and diligently than others (1.77).

In our text, **674** = 1.61, Cicero expresses his preference for dividing deductive arguments into five parts. He tells us that all who take their start from Aristotle and Theophrastus have adopted this division, and draws a distinction between Socrates and the Socratics on the one hand and Aristotle, Theophrastus and elegant rhetoricians

¹⁰⁵ What kind of work is referred to by the title Περὶ τέχνης ῥητορικῆς (Diogenes Laertius 5.48 = 1.234) remains problematic. See the commentary on **666** no. 1.

¹⁰⁶ The exact date of composition is uncertain, but it is unlikely to be later than 80 B.C. and could be earlier by as much as ten years. See above, p. 10, the "Sources" on Cicero.

on the other. The former are said to have practiced induction, while the latter were given to deduction. There is a minor textual difficulty here. In the list of persons partial to deduction, the Peripatetics are named awkwardly between Aristotle and Theophrastus. Recent editors have deleted the reference to the Peripatetics, and we have done the same in the text-translation volume (line 6). Most likely the reference to the Peripatetics is a misguided addition by someone who felt the need to balance the preceding reference to the Socratics ("Socrates and the Socratics") with a similar reference to the followers of Aristotle ("Aristotle and the Peripatetics").

It is clear from the reasons offered in favor of five parts (1.62–6) and from the summary survey of these parts (1.67) that Cicero is thinking primarily of deductive arguments in which the first premise is hypothetical and the second categorical. I.e., he is thinking of mixed hypothetical syllogisms of the if-then variety — "If P, then Q; But P; Therefore Q." — of which the following is an example: "If I was in Athens on the day on which the murder was committed in Rome, I could not have been involved in the murder; But I was in Athens on that day; Therefore I was not involved" (1.63, cf. 1.45). When a supporting argument is given for each of the premises, then the total number of parts reaches five: 1) the *propositio* or first premise, "If P, then Q," 2) the *propositionis approbatio* or argument establishing the truth of the first premise, 3) the *assumptio* or second premise, "But P," 4) the *assumptionis approbatio* or argument establishing the truth of the second premise; 5) the *complexio* or conclusion, "Therefore Q."¹⁰⁷

Aristotle promised discussion of the hypothetical syllogism (*Prior Analytics* 1.44 50a39–b2); his students seem to have fulfilled the promise.¹⁰⁸ Philoponus tells us that Theophrastus, Eudemus and the other pupils of Aristotle wrote lengthy treatises on the subject

¹⁰⁷ In the summary survey of parts (1.67), the *propositio* is said to be that "which briefly sets forth the source from which the entire force of the argument ought to flow," and the *assumptio* is described as that "through which one assumes what is pertinent to showing (or proving the case), (deriving it) from the *propositio*." In a mixed hypothetical syllogism of the if-then variety, the *propositio* does contain the force of the argument: *if* the antecedent is granted, *then* the consequent follows. And the *assumptio* is taken "from the *propositio*." What was the antecedent in the *propositio* is asserted categorically in the *assumptio*.

¹⁰⁸ See, e.g., C. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendland* (Leipzig: Hirzel 1855) vol. 1 p. 375–89 and J. Barnes, "Theophrastus and Hypothetical Syllogistic," in *Theophrastus of Eresus: On his Life and Work*, ed. W. Fortenbaugh, P. Huby and A. Long = RUSCH 2 (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction 1985) p. 125–41.

(111B.5–8). No such treatise has survived, but there is good evidence for Theophrastus' interest in the subject (111A–E, 112A–C). His work as well as that of Eudemus and other early Peripatetics will have influenced not only the development of Stoic logic but also the teaching of Hellenistic rhetoricians. The latter are Cicero's source, and his statement of reasons for preferring a quinquepartite analysis of deduction appears to follow one of these rhetoricians closely, either his teacher or the author of an available handbook. The statement takes the form of three mixed hypothetical syllogisms of the if-then variety,¹⁰⁹ and the mode of deductive argument under consideration is of the same kind. Three examples are given, of which one has been reported in the preceding paragraph. It begins: "If I was in Athens" (1.63). The other two examples are also mixed hypotheticals: "If one ought to wish to be wise, it is fitting to study philosophy; But one ought to wish to be wise; Therefore it is fitting to study philosophy" (1.65) and "If wisdom is to be sought above all, folly is to be avoided above all; But wisdom is to be sought above all: Therefore folly is to be avoided above all" (1.66).

Following the lead of Aristotle, Theophrastus will have discussed hypothetical syllogistic in a logical treatise, namely the *Prior Analytics* (68 no. 6a–c), which is cited in 112B.1. In addition, there may have been discussion in *On the Analysis of Syllogisms* (68 no. 9a–c). We should also keep in mind the dialectical treatises: *Topics*, *The Reduction of Topics*¹¹⁰ and *Preliminaries to the Topics* (68 no. 17–19).¹¹¹ These works have not survived, but there are interesting reports in Alexander's *Commentary on Aristotle's Topics*. In particular, we are told that Theophrastus drew a distinction between the precept and the topic (παράγγελμα and τόπος). The precept is said to be more general and the source of the topic; and the topic is characterized as the source of the epicheireme (ἀρχή ἐπιχειρήματος), i.e., the source of the

¹⁰⁹ The statement of reasons proceeds in three steps of which the first two are strikingly well-formulated mixed hypothetical syllogisms (1.62–3 and 1.64–5). The third step needs to be fleshed out, but it is hypothetical in structure (1.66). See Fortenbaugh (1998a) p. 36–8.

¹¹⁰ Schmidt (1839) p. 23, 42 thinks that the title 'Ανηγγμένων τόπων (68 no. 18a) is corrupt. He emends τόπων to read λόγων and says that the title refers to the same work as 'Ανηγγμένων λόγων εἰς τὰ σχήματα (68 no. 18b). On his interpretation, the work in question considered the transformation of unadorned prose into rhetorical figures. Such a use of ἀνάγειν seems unlikely; his view has no supporters today.

¹¹¹ Also relevant are the works entitled *Epicheiremes* (68 no. 22–3), discussed briefly in the last paragraph of this comment.

dialectical syllogism.¹¹² For example, the directive “One must argue from the contraries” is a precept, and the proposition “If the one contrary (of a pair) belongs to the one contrary (of another pair), the other contrary also belongs to the other contrary” is a topic (123.1–8). The latter is called an element or fundamental principle (στοιχείον) from which one can argue about every set of contraries (122A–B). The idea here is clear enough. If we are debating the merits of contrary states like war and peace, we may find it useful to introduce a second set of contraries such as harm and benefit. We can then argue in favor of peace by first advancing the premise “If war is harmful, peace is beneficial,” then asserting that “War is in fact harmful,” and finally concluding that “Peace is beneficial.” That is a mixed hypothetical syllogism, whose conditional premise is drawn from a general topic concerning pairs of contraries.¹¹³

The evidence set forth in the preceding paragraph is not massive; but it is, I think, sufficient to show that Theophrastus had occasion to introduce — or, more positively, did introduce — mixed hypothetical syllogisms into his treatises on dialectic. He may even have offered general remarks on hypothetical syllogistic; or failing that, he may have referred to discussion in his *Analytics*. But what about rhetoric? No surviving fragment or report shows that Theophrastus made a similar use of the hypothetical syllogism in his rhetorical treatises. We can, however, learn something from Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. For there the topics are introduced as the elements or fundamental principles of enthymemes (στοιχεῖα ἐνθυμημάτων 2.22 1396b21, cf. 2.26 1403a18), i.e. the principles of rhetorical syllogisms;¹¹⁴ and the subsequent discussion of individual topics (2.23) makes clear that the topics are sources of argument just as they are in dialectic. The first topic discussed by Aristotle is instructive. It concerns contraries and contains the example “If war is the cause of present evils, peace must put things right” (1397a11–12). That is a conditional hypothetical involving two sets of contraries, as are the

¹¹² In *Topics* 7.11 162a16, Aristotle defines the epicheireme as the dialectical syllogism. From the available evidence (122B and 123), it appears that Theophrastus would define the epicheireme in the same way.

¹¹³ The example is in line with 122B.6 and 123.7–8, but it is not found in either text. I have introduced it in order to make clear the connection between these texts and Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* 2.23 1397a7–19, esp. a11–12. See the next paragraph.

¹¹⁴ For the enthymeme as the rhetorical syllogism, see *Rhet.* 1.1 1355a6–8 and 2.24 1400b37.

next two examples put forward by Aristotle (1397a13–19).¹¹⁵ All that is line with Theophrastus' approach to topics in dialectic. That the Eresian adopted a different approach in rhetoric is improbable. In the work entitled *Rhetorical Precepts* (666 no. 3), Theophrastus may have explained the precept, or one kind of precept, as a directive concerning topics; and in the treatise *On Enthymemes* (666 no. 6) or in a special chapter within a larger rhetorical work,¹¹⁶ he may have characterized the topic as the starting point of the rhetorical syllogism. He will have used the hypothetical form in setting out arguments;¹¹⁷ and like Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 2.23 1398a28–9), he may have made reference to his own *Topics* and possibly to the *Analytics*.

More problematic is whether the analysis into five parts goes back to the early Peripatetics. It is not found in any Aristotelian treatise,¹¹⁸ but it may have been developed by Theophrastus. If it was, Theophrastus may have done so in a rhetorical context. For the orator must often ask himself whether one or the other or both premises need supporting arguments, and that raises the question whether these supporting arguments are to be analyzed as parts of the premises or as separate parts. Theophrastus may have chosen the latter alternative, and his reason may be that given by Cicero: "Whatever

¹¹⁵ One runs "If we should not be angry at those who do wrong involuntarily, we should not feel gratitude toward those who do good under constraint." The other is "If lies win belief, many truths are not believed." The first recurs in Cicero, *On Invention* 1.46.

¹¹⁶ Unfortunately we know too little about the two *Arts* (666 no. 1 and 2a–b) to make any firm claims in regard to these treatises.

¹¹⁷ Caveat: I am not saying that all arguments were set forth as mixed hypothetical syllogisms. Nor am I suggesting that every topic was directly concerned with logical form. We may compare the discussion of topics in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. The tenth topic, "from induction," is elucidated by four examples of which only one is presented as an "if-then" conditional. It is not said or implied that the other three examples should be converted to a similar form (2.23 1398a32–b19). And in the nineteenth topic, "that for the sake of which," i.e. the motive, Aristotle seems to be giving mischievous advice unrelated to logical form (2.23 1399b19–30, cf. 3.15 1416b8–14). Theophrastus' work on hypothetical syllogistic may well have made him partial to that kind of argument, but there is no reason to believe that he lost interest either in other kinds of argument or in non-logical approaches to persuasion.

¹¹⁸ A passage like *Rhet.* 1.2 1357a7–10 ("it is possible to form syllogisms and to draw conclusions on the one hand from premises that have been previously established by syllogism and on the other from premises that have not been so established but are in need of a syllogism because they are not generally accepted") may be said to encourage analysis into five parts (proof of the major and proof of the minor premise must be added to the two premises and the conclusion). But a passage that encourages analysis into five parts is different from a passage that explicitly recognizes and endorses such an analysis.

is able to be joined to and separated from something cannot be the same as that to which it is joined and from which it is separated" (1.62). The trouble here is lack of evidence. Theophrastus is cited by John the Deacon within a comment on supplemental argumentation (675.16–17); but that is a different matter,¹¹⁹ and the reference to Theophrastus is hard to interpret. We must, I think allow the possibility — in my opinion the probability — that the doctrine of five parts postdates Theophrastus, and that its association with him derives from his known interest in hypothetical arguments. Indeed, later rhetoricians who identified themselves with the Peripatos may have been eager to create a connection with Aristotle and Theophrastus, thereby gaining authority for an analysis, which Cicero describes as controversial (1.57).¹²⁰

The *Rhetoric to Herennius*, which was composed at roughly the same time as *On Invention*, contains a discussion of five-part argumentation (2.27–30). That has prompted scholars to compare the two works and to posit a common source.¹²¹ We should, however, observe caution, for the account of quinquepartite argument in *To Herennius* differs significantly from that found in *On Invention*. To be sure, the first and fifth parts have the same name in both works, but there is little else which is the same.¹²² In *To Herennius*, the *propositio* is not the first premise of the argument, as it is in *On Invention*; rather it is the statement of what will be proven or shown to be the case. The second part, called the *ratio*, sets forth a reason for believing what has been stated in the *propositio*. It is presented as a single part; the idea of two distinct premises, fundamental to the discussion in *On Invention*, is not even hinted at. Third comes the *rationis confirmatio*, which is said to lend strength to the reason given in the *ratio*. That invites comparison with the *propositionis approbatio* and the *assumptionis approbatio* described in *On Invention*; but there is no suggestion that the *rationis confirmatio* should be regarded as divisible into two parts, each supporting a different

¹¹⁹ Adding a supplemental argument, which will not be missed if omitted, is not the same as giving an argument, which is needed to establish a premise. See the commentary on 675.

¹²⁰ Kennedy p. 317 suggests that the advocates of three part analysis were Stoics, and that Hermagoras preferred five parts. Even if Hermagoras was a champion of five parts, I see no strong reason to deny a connection with rhetoricians who claimed affiliation with the Peripatos. Cf. Matthes p. 208

¹²¹ For a survey of the scholarly literature, see Calboli (1969) p. 239–40.

¹²² Pace Matthes p. 206, whose attempt to relate the parts of the two works is complicated and quite wrong in the case of *exornatio*, the fourth part in *To Herennius*.

premise of the primary argument. The fourth part, *exornatio*, is said to be used “for the sake of adornment and enrichment, after the argument has been established” (2.28). There are occasional references to embellishment in *On Invention*,¹²³ but they are incidental to the discussion of quinquartite deduction. Each part is conceived of as a step in the argument; none is recommended for use, once the argument has been completed.¹²⁴ Fifth is the *complexio*, in which the parts of the argument are brought together. To judge from the subsequent example (2.30), two parts are relevant: the *propositio* and the *ratio*. The *complexio* states that what was announced in the *propositio* is now beyond doubt and must be acknowledged. That, too, differs from the corresponding part in *On Invention*, for it involves the *propositio* as defined in *To Herennius*. It does not state as fact what was the consequent of a hypothetical first premise.

Equally striking is a difference in orientation. In *On Invention*, Cicero is concerned primarily with a controversy concerning the correct analysis of deductive arguments (1.57, 61–7). In contrast, the author of *To Herennius*, is concerned with how arguments are ornately and completely handled (2.27). When the parts are listed, relative size is noted: “summarily,” “briefly subjoined,” “with many arguments” (2.28); and the subsequent example exhibits an increase in size through the first four parts (2.28–9). The largest is the *exornatio* (2.29), whose stated purpose is to adorn and enrich the argument (2.28).¹²⁵ It seems clear, then, that the two authors have

¹²³ E.g., 1.50 *inventam exornari et certas in partes distingui et suavissimum est et summe necessarium*; “The embellishment of an argument, once it has been discovered, and the dividing of it into parts are (tasks) most agreeable (to the audience) and especially necessary”; and 1.58 *rationibus variis et copiosissimis verbis adprobari putant oportere*; “They think that (the first premise) ought to be proven by a variety of reasons and with the greatest possible fullness of expression.”

¹²⁴ In *To Herennius*, it is stated explicitly that the fourth part, the *exornatio*, finds its place after the argument has been established (*confirmata argumentatione* 2.28; cf. 2.46: the *exornatio* serves to amplify and to enrich the argument; it is faulty if conclusive arguments have not been previously presented). That is not the doctrine of *On Invention*. There each of the first four parts has a role to play in establishing the truth of the conclusion. And if the *propositio* or the *assumptio* or both are obvious and therefore need no proof, then either or both of the *approbationes* can be omitted (1.62–6). In *To Herennius*, there is recognition that the *exornatio* may be omitted, but the reason is different. The subject is not grand enough to sustain embellishment: *est cum exornatio praetermittenda est, si parum locuples ad amplificandum et exornandum res videtur esse*; “Occasionally the *exornatio* is to be omitted, (namely) when the subject matter is too meager to be amplified and embellished” (2.30).

¹²⁵ The illustrative *exornatio* in 2.29 exhibits an obvious concern with style. There

different interests; and this difference may explain how quinquartite deduction came to be presented so differently in two contemporaneous works. E.g., if division into five parts has its origins in the early Peripatos or among rhetoricians who took their start from Aristotle and Theophrastus, then what we find in *To Herennius* 2.27–30 may contain modifications of the original division by one or more rhetoricians who introduced changes in accordance with their own interests and the needs of their pupils.¹²⁶ But there is no certainty here; indeed, it remains quite possible that the difference between the two works reflects two independent sources: one that has roots in an early Peripatetic analysis of deduction; and a second that is concerned with embellishment and of quite different ancestry.

Up to now I have mentioned the epicheireme (ἐπιχείρημα) only in connection with dialectic: the topic was said to be the source of the epicheireme (123.3–4). More ought to be said, for the author of *To Herennius* uses the term, i.e. the Latin form *epichirema*, inclusively to cover arguments which are to be sought for or avoided (2.2), and Quintilian applies it explicitly to deduction as discussed in *On Invention*. He says that some persons use the Latin *ratio* for the epicheireme, but Cicero uses *rationationem* which is better (5.10.6). Quintilian is, of course, correct that Cicero uses *rationationem*: it is used together with *inductio* in order to distinguish two modes of argumentation: *per inductionem* and *per rationationem* (1.51, cf. 56–7). But Cicero himself never introduces the Greek term; and Quintilian's later remarks on Cicero's account of five-part deduction undermine his credibility. For Quintilian progressively confuses Cicero's account with that found in *To Herennius*. First, *ratio* replaces *propositionis approbatio* as the name of the second part. Next, the first part becomes a statement of intent, *intentio*; it sets forth the subject of inquiry: *de quo quaeratur*. Finally, the *propositionis approbatio* and the *assumptionis approbatio* are collapsed into a single part, the *confirmatio primae ac secundae partis*, thereby making room for the *exornatio* (5.14.5–6). It serves no purpose to beat up on Quintilian; I want only to underline that both he and the author of *To Herennius* must be used with care, when elucidating Cicero's account of quinquartite deduction. The fact that they both use the word *epichirema* is of great interest; but we cannot automatically apply it to Cicero, and still less can

are anaphora (repetition of *si*), parallel lists of attributes, similarly phrased rhetorical questions (*cui [qui] mirum videbitur*), a full blown analogy with animals.

¹²⁶ See Kroll p. 7–8, 16–17, who expresses himself with considerable caution.

we assume a direct connection with discussions of the epicheireme in the early Peripatos.

Concerning the early Peripatos, we have very little evidence. In Aristotle's *Topics*, the epicheireme is said to be a dialectical syllogism (7.11 162a16), and arguments directed toward a thesis are often called ἐπιχειρήματα.¹²⁷ But it would be false to say that Aristotle makes the epicheireme a central feature of his dialectic. That may have been done by Theophrastus, who wrote two works entitled *Epicheiremes* (Diog. Laert. 5.43, 49 = 68 no. 22, 23 FHS&G). These works are now lost, and no later author describes their contents. They may have been collections of dialectical arguments without commentary, or they may have contained some discussion. Perhaps Theophrastus also discussed the epicheireme in one of his rhetorical treatises, but no text says that. In any case, it is, I think, unlikely that Theophrastus ever made ἐπιχείρημα into a *terminus technicus* for deductive rhetorical argument. That is a later development which may be related to quinquupartite analysis, or not. Much is possible, and little is certain.

- 675** John the Deacon, *On Hermogenes' Concerning Method* 5, cod. Vat. Gr. 2228 f. 428^r v. 25 – 428^v v. 9 (RUSCH vol. 3 [1988] p. 296–7 Fortenbaugh)

Literature: Rabe (1908) p. 137–8; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1525; Fortenbaugh (1988) p. 296–301

Our text is taken from the commentary of John the Deacon on the pseudo-Hermogenic treatise *Concerning Method*. It begins with a lemma taken verbatim from that treatise: “Supplemental argumentation (ἐπενθύμησις) is supplying an enthymeme, which when not added is not missed, but when added benefits the whole” (lines 1–2 = *On Method* 5 p. 418.15–17 Rabe). Next comes a brief explanation, which is little more than a paraphrase: supplemental argumentation is “supplying an enthymeme for thoughts already advanced, and when not added (the enthymeme) is not desired, but when added it helps the case greatly” (lines 3–5). After that we are offered a string of examples taken from Aristotle's discussion of topics in *Rhetoric*

¹²⁷ See Bontiz, *Index Aristotelicus*, s.v. ἐπιχείρημα and Klein col. 1252, who points out that the definition of the epicheireme at *Topics* 162a16 occurs awkwardly in its context and may be a later interpolation.

2.23. In the middle of the examples, there occurs the statement: “Furthermore, Theophrastus has called them enthymemes based on induction” (lines 16–17).

There are several textual problems that should be noted. One is found in the statement concerning Theophrastus. The reading of the manuscript is: ἔτι καὶ ταῦτα Θεόφραστος ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς ἐνθυμήματος κέκληκε. The genitive ἐνθυμήματος cannot be correct. Rabe chose to read ἐνθύμημα, dropping the last three letters τοῦ. We have preferred ἐνθυμήματα, for the plural seems better suited to the preceding plural pronoun ταῦτα, and the change in ending, from τοῦ to τα, leaves the tau of the manuscript reading.

Other textual problems worth noting reflect the fact that John offers examples which are drawn from Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* (see the *apparatus criticus*). Διοκλῆς (line 15) is problematic, for in the *Rhetoric* the name is Ἀνδροκλῆς (1400a9). Nevertheless, John may have written Διοκλῆς, copying it correctly from his source.¹²⁸ The words καὶ Ἰταλιῶται Πυθαγόραν (lines 21–2) occur awkwardly both in John’s text and in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* (1398b14–15), where they have been bracketed by Kassel in his edition of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. We have not bracketed them, for they are not completely unintelligible. An alert reader might supply τετιμῆκασιν from what precedes (line 19 and Aristotle 1398b11); moreover, it may be the omission of words rather than an intrusion, which renders the text awkward. Finally the sharp break after ἔτι καὶ νῦν (line 23) is also found in the *Rhetoric* (1398b16). In what precedes, the examples adduced support the general proposition that everybody honors the wise. In what follows, the examples concern the legislation of wise men and the happiness of cities. At very least a general proposition concerning happiness has fallen out: e.g., “When philosophers are in charge of the laws, a city enjoys happiness.” For that reason, we have marked a lacuna.¹²⁹

That John is following a source is not in doubt. The same source was used by Gregory of Corinth, who also wrote a commentary on the work *On Method*. That explains why some of John’s text is found

¹²⁸ See the next paragraph.

¹²⁹ Kassel regards the examples concerning happiness as a later addition possibly by Aristotle. If the examples are by Aristotle, it seems reasonable to assume a lacuna in which a general proposition was put forward. If the examples were inserted by someone else, it is still reasonable to suppose that a general proposition has been lost. For the shift in subject, from honor to happiness, is too striking to go unnoticed.

in Gregory (see the *apparatus criticus*). It is noteworthy that both John and Gregory reproduce material from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 2.23, and yet neither acknowledges that he is reproducing material taken from the *Rhetoric*. We cannot be certain that the common source failed to mention Aristotle, but it seems likely that it did. Otherwise we are left wondering why John would name Theophrastus and not do the same regarding Aristotle.¹³⁰

The fact that John has reproduced material taken from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* has two related consequences. First, we can be certain that the Theophrastean material conveyed is no more than one sentence: "Thèophrastus has called them enthymemes based of induction" (lines 16–17). What precedes is taken from Aristotle (lines 14–16 = topic no. 21, 1400a9–11) and what follows is too (lines 17–26 = topic no. 10, 1398b10–19). Second, we can reject the idea that John, through his source, is drawing on a Theophrastean commentary, in which Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is extensively quoted. Initially, the idea has some appeal, for it would explain why Theophrastus is named in the middle of material found in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. But on reflection, the idea fails, for if the Aristotelian material had been excerpted by Theophrastus and then passed to John through an intermediary, the Aristotelian material in John's text should not exhibit the same faults which are found in our manuscripts of the *Rhetoric* (especially the sharp break after ἔτι καὶ νῦν). But the same faults are exhibited, and that strongly suggests that the excerpts were made long after Theophrastus, at a time when the available manuscript(s) presented a text identical to that which has been transmitted to us.

The sentence mentioning Theophrastus is introduced by ἔτι καὶ (line 16). In what precedes, transition from one example to another is marked by καὶ πάλιν (lines 7, 9 and 14). Moreover, the examples which precede are taken progressively from *Rhetoric* 2.23 (topics 11, 14, 19 and 21). With the mention of Theophrastus, that progression is broken by a jump backwards (to topic 10). In addition, a topic is named, "based on induction," although none had been named previously. All that is puzzling as is the reference of ταῦτα, "them." The pronoun might be thought to pick up the preceding four examples;¹³¹ but in that case, Theophrastus will have used the label ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς,

¹³⁰ John's next comment on general statements (676) also involves considerable Aristotelian material without any reference to Aristotle.

¹³¹ Cf. the use of ταῦτα in line 26.

“based on induction,” in an unusual and confusing way. The label is used by Aristotle to refer to the tenth topic introduced in *Rhetoric* 2.231398a32, and there is good reason to think that it is being used here in the same way. For what follows is an example given by Aristotle in order to illustrate the tenth topic.

The example has been altered in a significant way. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle adduces six cases to show that everybody honors the wise. They are listed one after the other without break (1398b10–16). In John’s text, the first case, “the Parians have honored Archilochus,” is stated separately (dependent on the participle “having said”), after which the other five cases are introduced (by the finite verb “he adduced”). Since the example follows on the name of Theophrastus, it might be thought that the alteration is attributable to Theophrastus; but that would be a mistake. For not only are we dealing with an example taken from Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* at a later date, but it also seems clear that the alteration has been made by a commentator on the work *On Method*. He wanted to make the Aristotelian example a better illustration of supplemental argumentation; and toward that end, he restructured the example so that the last five cases have the appearance of being supplemental arguments that will not be missed if omitted. But such an alteration is not entirely successful. For citing a single case concerning Archilochus is not sufficient to establish the general proposition “All men honor the wise.” The later cases (or other similar cases) are needed and will be missed if omitted. Aristotle does not indicate otherwise,¹³² and there is no reason to think Theophrastus would have thought a single case sufficient.

Before leaving Aristotle’s tenth topic, I want to call attention to the second example. It concerns the selection of people for special tasks and differs from the first and third examples in that it does not begin with a universal proposition, after which particular cases are adduced in support of the universal proposition.¹³³ Instead, two cases

¹³² In the example concerning wise men, Aristotle separates all six cases by means of καί, “and.” He does not mark off the first case as if it were primary and sufficient to establish the general proposition. It is, of course, true that in discussing the use of paradigms in *Rhetoric* 2.20, Aristotle recognizes a special situation in which one case may be sufficient: namely, when the use of paradigms supplements an argument by enthymeme (2.20 1394a15–16). But in the material under consideration, there is no mention of a preceding enthymeme. Rather we are presented with an induction, in which several cases are adduced and none is recognized as sufficient.

¹³³ The first example begins with the proposition “In all places, women determine the truth concerning children (1398a33) and the third case begins with “All

are cited (men do not entrust their horses to persons who have mistreated the horses of others, and similarly with ships), after which we read, “then if this is similarly true in all cases (ουκοῦν εἰ ὁμοίως ἐφ’ ἁπάντων), so too in securing one’s own safety, one ought not to make use of persons who have failed to protect the safety of others” (1398b5–9). What interests me here is not so much the failure to spell out the universal premise, as the fact that a universal induction of all cases is referred to in an almost apologetic manner (by means of an if-clause), after which a particular conclusion is drawn: men ought not to employ security guards who have failed others in the past. Here in the second example and only here, does the topic based on induction have two parts: the first renders the implied universal acceptable and the second draws a particular conclusion. That is in line with “example” in the technical sense, παράδειγμα, as explained by Aristotle in *Prior Analytics* 2.24.¹³⁴ In contrast, the first and third examples of the tenth topic do no more than adduce cases that support the universal proposition, thereby giving the impression that the tenth topic is a line of argument that aims only at rendering credible a particular universal proposition. How Theophrastus would have responded to this apparent inconsistency is nowhere made clear.

Is there anything positive that we can say about the Theophrastean material contained in John’s text? Very little, I fear. We have a single sentence in which Theophrastus is named. Assuming that there is only one textual difficulty and that it can be corrected as discussed above,¹³⁵ perhaps we can say that Theophrastus followed Aristotle (2.23 1398a32–b19) and discussed induction as one among several topics. Theophrastus will have adopted the Aristotelian label ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς, and he probably gave examples like those found in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. He may have done that in the work called *Topics* (68 no. 17), but equally he may have done so in a rhetorical treatise like *On Enthymemes* (666 no. 6), for topics are lines of argument on which enthymemes are based.¹³⁶

men honor the wise” (1398b10). The fourth example concerning happiness lacks a beginning. There seems to be a lacuna at 1398b16.

¹³⁴ See the commentary on the title *On Example*, 666 no. 5.

¹³⁵ At risk of eliminating all possibility of comment, I want to acknowledge that the single sentence naming Theophrastus could involve more corruption than I have acknowledged. At least, I can imagine a lacuna between ἔτι καὶ ταῦτα Θεόφραστος and ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς ἐνθυμήματα (-τος) κέκληκε. In that case, Aristotle could be the subject of the second half, while the first half would contain nothing but the name of Theophrastus and the pronoun “them.”

¹³⁶ Cf. Arist., *Rhet.* 2.22 1397a1–4 with Kennedy (1991) p. 190.

- 676** John the Deacon, *On Hermogenes' Concerning Method* 5, cod. Vat. Gr. 2228 f. 428^v v. 9–34 (*CP* vol. 81 [1986] p. 137–8 Fortenbaugh)

Literature: Rosenthal (1897) p. 317–20; Mayer (1910) p. 143; Cousin (1935–6) vol. 1 p. 432–3; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1525; Grube (1952a) p. 174; Kennedy (1963) p. 278; Wilson (1983) p. 190; Fortenbaugh (1986) p. 135–40; Calboli Montefusco (1993) p. 19–20; Conley (1994) p. 219

Like **675**, text **676** is taken from the commentary of John the Deacon on the pseudo-Hermogenic work *On Method*. The text begins with a lemma, “It is clear what general statements are” (line 1 = *On Method* 5 p. 418.17 Rabe), after which we are told why the author of *On Method* does not say what general statements are. The explanation is that everyone knows that general statements are maxims, and everyone calls general statements maxims (lines 1–4). There follow two definitions of the maxim, one from the *Rhetoric to Alexander* and the other attributed to Theophrastus (lines 4–7). Next we are told that some maxims are paradoxical, some in agreement with accepted opinion, and some disputed. Those that are paradoxical or disputed are said to be in need of demonstration; those that are already known are said to be in agreement with accepted opinion and not in need of supplemental arguments (lines 8–11). The remainder of the text is devoted to illustrations.

The definition of the maxim attributed to Theophrastus (line 7) involves two textual problems. The first concerns the word ἀπόφασις. That is the reading of the manuscript and also the reading of Gregory of Corinth, who comments on the same passage in *On Method*. John and Gregory are following the same source, so that it seems reasonable to believe that the common source had ἀπόφασις. Wimmer, however, has printed ἀπόφανσις, which occurs in Aristotle’s definition of the maxim in *Rhetoric* 2.21 1394a22. That is some reason to make the change, as is the fact that ἀπόφασις is often restricted to negation,¹³⁷ which would be inappropriate in a general definition of the maxim. Nevertheless, ἀπόφασις can be used inclusively to cover both assertion and negation;¹³⁸ and for that reason, we have printed the reading of the manuscript.

¹³⁷ In this use, ἀπόφασις is opposed to κατάφασις. Cf., e.g., **68** no. 3a, **81A.3** and **86.4**.

¹³⁸ LSJ s.v. B.3, where Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.7 1365b27 is cited, though here Kassel reads ἀπόφανσις.

The second textual problem concerns *πρακτικοῖς*, which occurs in the manuscript of John and in one manuscript of Gregory. A different manuscript of Gregory has *πρακτέοις*, which is printed by Walz in his edition of Gregory and by Wimmer, who is following Walz. Both readings are possible. The latter, *πρακτέοις*, might be preferred because it reflects the fact that many maxims are concerned with courses of action that ought to be chosen or avoided.¹³⁹ The former, *πρακτικοῖς*, might be preferred as more inclusive and therefore appropriate to maxims that are descriptive rather than prescriptive. An example occurs in our text: "There is no mortal man who is free" (line 22). Since *πρακτικοῖς* occurs in John's manuscript, it is likely to have been the reading of the common source (it is exhibited by one manuscript of Gregory), and since it makes good sense, we have preferred it.¹⁴⁰

Wimmer and Rosenthal, who knew only the text of Gregory, thought that we had more Theophrastean material than the definition of the maxim. In his collection of fragments, Wimmer printed the immediately following division of maxims into those that are paradoxical, in agreement with accepted opinion, and disputed. Rosenthal argued that the fragment should be extended to include the illustrations that follow, and his argument has been accepted by Mayer, Cousin, Regenbogen and Grube. The trouble here is that assigning more material to Theophrastus is plausible only as long as we ignore the fuller text of John. Most striking is the occurrence of two definitions of the maxim in John's text: the first is attributed to Aristotle (it is found in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*) and the second is that of Theophrastus (lines 4–7). Gregory omits the former, and by mentioning only Theophrastus, he gives the impression that what follows is Theophrastean as well. But the impression is misleading. The common source included the definitions of both (pseudo-) Aristotle and Theophrastus, and it may have given others as well. What follows, then, may be from Theophrastus, but it may also be of different origin. And if one looks closely at John's text, it seems clear that the material is taken from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 2.21.

Both John and Gregory say that maxims may be paradoxical, in agreement with accepted opinion, and disputed (lines 8–9).

¹³⁹ Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.21 1394a24–6, 1395b14–16.

¹⁴⁰ Other textual problems (*see the apparatus criticus*) do not affect the interpretation of Theophrastean material and have been discussed elsewhere. See Fortenbaugh (1986) p. 139.

Rosenthal thought that this threefold division was a departure from Aristotle and attributable to Theophrastus. It is true that Aristotle treats together maxims that are paradoxical and disputed; both are said to be in need of demonstration. But that is not enough to establish a significant difference with John. For in what follows, John immediately brings together paradoxical and disputed maxims as those in need of demonstration and therefore different from those that are in agreement with accepted opinion and not in need of supplemental arguments (lines 9–11). That is Aristotelian, and it is taken with only minor variation in wording from *Rhetoric* 2.21 (1394b8–12). What comes after that in John, the example of a maxim that agrees with accepted opinion (lines 12–13), also comes next in Aristotle (1394b13–14); and allowing for some jumping back and forth, the same is true for the remainder of John's text (see the *apparatus criticus*). The reasonable conclusion is that none of the discussion of kinds of maxim is attributable to Theophrastus. John, through his source, is drawing on Aristotle, so that the only information we get concerning Theophrastus is how he defined the maxim.¹⁴¹

The text **676** is most naturally assigned to the work *On the Maxim* (**666** no. 7), but there are other possibilities. *On the Enthymeme* (**666** no. 6) comes to mind, for Aristotle discusses the maxim in relation to the enthymeme (*Rhet.* 2.21 1394a26–8), but it is also possible that Theophrastus discussed the maxim in relation to style¹⁴² and did so in a work like *On Style* (**666** no. 17a).

- 677** John of Sardis, *On the Preparatory Exercises of Aphthonius* 8 (*RhGr* vol.15 p. 132.18–24 Rabe)

Literature: Buchheit p. (1960) 146 n. 2, 224 n. 1, 231 n. 1; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 219

¹⁴¹ Wilson p. 190 has doubted that we even have Theophrastus' definition of the maxim. In his judgment, "a slip of the pen" on the part of the author or scribe has introduced a reference to Theophrastus, where a reference to Aristotle would be in place. That seems to me wrong. For as John's text makes clear, Theophrastus is not cited alone. He is mentioned along with (pseudo-)Aristotle; and both are mentioned, because their definitions of the maxim make explicit mention of the general or universal (lines 5–7), which relates the definitions to the lemma taken from *On Method* (line 1). Of course, Aristotle could have been cited, for he too defines the maxim by mentioning the general (*Rhetoric* 2.21 1394a23), but the Aristotelian definition is more like an explanation. It is wordy; and for that reason alone it might be passed over. In any case, the treatment of Aristotle not only in **676** but also in **675** is remarkable. He is drawn on extensively but not cited by name.

¹⁴² Cousin (1935–6) vol. 1 p. 435 and Kennedy (1963) p. 278.

Our text comes from a commentary by John of Sardis on the *Preparatory Exercises* of Aphthonius. The latter was a sophist from Antioch. He studied under Libanius and was active at the end of the fourth or beginning of the fifth century A.D. The lemma with which the text begins is taken from Aphthonius' discussion of the encomium (ἐγκώμιον) and more precisely from the discussion of headings under which an encomium should be constructed. The headings number six: introduction, *genos*, upbringing, actions, comparison and epilogue (*RhGr* vol. 2 p. 36.9–19 Spengel).¹⁴³ Our text is concerned with the fourth heading, that of actions, which is said to be the most important (p. 36.12–13). As happens in the case of *genos* and upbringing, the heading of actions is subjected to division (p. 36.13–14). After that each of the divisions is elucidated by two or more examples (p. 36.14–16). In the lemma of our text, we have not only Aphthonius' division of actions into those relating to soul and body and fortune but also his examples elucidating the first member of the division (p. 36.13–15).¹⁴⁴

John, who was probably bishop of Sardis at the beginning of the ninth century A.D., begins his comment on the lemma by referring to the leaders of the early Peripatos. He tells us that "Aristotle divides the encomium three ways" and that the same division "appears correct both to Theophrastus and in reality." To spell out the three ways, he adds "from soul, from body, from external things,"¹⁴⁵ and to elucidate each member of the division, he gives examples of virtues of the soul, of the body, and of external things. The tripartite division that John attributes to Aristotle and Theophrastus recalls the Academic-Peripatetic division of goods into those of the soul, those of the body, and those that are external. The division is older than Plato and may be Pythagorean in origin.¹⁴⁶ Plato makes repeated use of it, and so

¹⁴³ See Kennedy (1983) p. 63, (1999) p. vii.

¹⁴⁴ A translation of the relevant portion of Aphthonius' text will be found in Kennedy (1999) p. 84.

¹⁴⁵ I say "he adds," for the preposition ἀπό, "from," is used often by John when he wants to indicate a source from which praise can be drawn. Cf., e.g., p. 136.6–8: ἔτι ἐροῦμεν ἀπὸ χρόνου ὅσον ἐβίωσε, πολλὴν ἢ μέτριον· ἐκάτερον δὲ ἀφορμὴν ἐγκμίων δίδωσι, and p. 137.25–138.1: εἰκότως δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ παίδων ἐγκωμιάζομεν. For other examples, see p. 138.10, 12, 14, 18, 23. Aristotle and Theophrastus are more likely to have used the preposition ἐκ (Arist., *Rhet.* 1.9 1367b22, 1368a12, 33, 35 and Theophr. 673.1–3), which is also used by John at p. 138.15.

¹⁴⁶ See Iamblichus, *Protrepticus* p. 24.3–25.2 Pistelli and F. Dirlmeier, *Die Oikeiosis-Lehre Theophrasts = Philologus Supplementband* 30 (1937) p. 28.

does Aristotle.¹⁴⁷ Both philosophers recognize the superior value of goods of the soul and that is sometimes reflected in a bipartition of goods: those that are divine versus those that are human, or those of the soul versus those outside the soul.¹⁴⁸

This difference in value is recognized by John half a page before our text in a comment on the importance assigned by Aphthonius to the heading of actions. John tells us that goods like good birth, strength and wealth are “from without” (ἐξώθεν), while actions belong to the mind (τῆς γνώμης). He adds that some goods of the former kind are omitted from an encomium, but actions are always included (p. 131.24–132.6). The idea here is straightforward. An encomiast celebrates men of virtue, i.e., men of principle and wisdom who manifest their excellence in actions. The honoree may be able to claim good-birth and he may enjoy wealth, but these are the gifts of fortune (p. 132.10–11), and in themselves they do little to establish the worth of the honoree (p. 132.6). When such goods can be tied to virtue, e.g. when riches have been used prudently and for the benefit of others, then the encomiast will take account of them; but when that is not possible, he may choose to ignore them.

Returning now to our text, we should consider John’s statement that Aristotle and Theophrastus divide the encomium three ways: from the soul, from the body, and from external things. At first reading, this statement might be thought to report a division of the encomium *qua* genus into three specific kinds: that which celebrates excellence of soul, that celebrating bodily goods, and that doing the same with external things. Some support for such an interpretation might be found in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.12, where we read that an encomium concerns deeds, equally both those of the body and those of the soul (1101b32–4), but no Aristotelian text offers a threefold division of the encomium.¹⁴⁹ Moreover, context tells against such an interpretation, for John is commenting on Aphthonius’ division of actions. Unless he is wildly off the mark,

¹⁴⁷ For passages, see Dirlmeier, *Aristoteles*, *Nikomachische Ethik* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1964) p. 281–2.

¹⁴⁸ See Plato, *Laws* 1 631B6–D2 and Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics* 2.1 1218b31–2.

¹⁴⁹ In the upper apparatus of parallel texts to 677.2, the following is stated: “A tripartite division of the encomium is not found in the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle, but a bipartite division occurs at *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.12 1101b33–4.” The second half of this statement now seems to me misleading. For the division of the encomium that John attributes to Aristotle is not a division of the genus encomium into three coordinate species. Rather it is a division useful for constructing the encomium based on the traditional threefold classification of goods.

John is reporting a Peripatetic division of goods that can guide the encomiast as he sets forth the actions of an honoree. The encomiast is to focus on goods of the soul and record actions that manifest these goods. He will not forget bodily and external goods, but he will relate them to actions that demonstrate excellence of soul.

Aristotle's discussion of the materials of epideictic oratory in *Rhetoric* 1.9 is largely compatible with this interpretation. Virtue and virtuous action are primary,¹⁵⁰ but external goods are not forgotten. Liberality is defined as a disposition to do good with money (1366b15), and magnificence is called a virtue in expenditures (1366b18). There are however, two striking differences between Aristotle and John. First, Aristotle never explicitly connects the construction of an epideictic oration with a tripartition of goods. Indeed, he all but ignores bodily goods in *Rhetoric* 1.9.¹⁵¹ Second, Aristotle's notion of the encomium is not that of John or Aphthonius. Aristotle distinguishes the encomium from praise (ἔπαινος), restricting the former to deeds or accomplishments, and connecting the latter with virtue (1367b26–9).¹⁵² For Aphthonius and John, praise is a brief statement, like "Themistocles is a good general,"¹⁵³ and the encomium is a speech produced in accordance with the art.¹⁵⁴

Perhaps we should construe John's reference to Aristotle as a reference to the pseudo-Aristotelian *Rhetoric to Alexander*. For that work presents a view of the encomium similar to that of Aphthonius and John. It is the positive side of epideictic oratory (1 1421b7–10), and its subject is virtue and virtuous action (35 1440b20–1, 1441a27, b3–8). There is even passing reference to health, a bodily good (3 1426a9–

¹⁵⁰ Virtue and vice, the noble and shameful are said to be the points of reference for men engaged in praise and blame (1366a23–5). The individual virtues are defined (1366b9–22), and we are instructed to praise a man by saying that he takes pride in what he himself accomplishes and not in what belongs to him on account of fortune (1368a5–6).

¹⁵¹ The bodily goods listed by John — size, strength, swiftness, beauty, and health (677.5) — are not directly referred to in *Rhetoric* 1.9. War and dangers are mentioned, but not in regard to physical demands. They are simply situations in which the virtuous man acts courageously (1366b5–13). We hear of bodily pleasures, but such pleasures are not in themselves bodily goods, though they may be dependent on both bodily and external goods: namely, on health and property. In any case, bodily pleasures are mentioned only to delimit the sphere of temperance, which is a good of the soul (1366b13–15).

¹⁵² Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.12 1101b31–4 and *Eudemian Ethics* 2.1 1219b8–16.

¹⁵³ John p. 121.6–7, cf. 132.13–14.

¹⁵⁴ Aphthonius p. 35.29–30: τὸν μὲν ἔπαινον ἐν βραχεὶ γίνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἐγκώμιον κατὰ τέχνην ἐκφέρεσθαι.

10, cf. 35 1441a35–7).¹⁵⁵ Furthermore, John's comment on the importance of action, i.e. his recognition of two classes of goods (p. 131.24–132.11), has a parallel in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*. Discussing the structure of the encomium, the author tells us that the introduction should be followed by a division of goods into those which are outside virtue and those which are in virtue itself. The two classes are then divided into specific goods, and we are told that the goods belonging to the class of virtues are justly eulogized, while those outside are suppressed (1440b15–22). The specific goods cited in the division of goods outside virtue include the three examples given by John (good birth, strength and wealth; 1440b18–19, p. 132.2),¹⁵⁶ and the idea of suppressing goods outside virtue recalls John's statement that some are omitted from an encomium, for they contribute nothing (1440b20–1, p. 132.5–6). These similarities are striking, but there are also differences. In the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, the bipartite division of goods is assigned a place between the introduction and the genealogy; in John the same division occurs within his comment on the heading of actions (1440b14–24, p. 132.1–132.5). Furthermore, an explicit tripartite division of goods is not present in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*; in contrast, John not only introduces such a division but also refers it to Aristotle and Theophrastus.

At this point, we may think that John's source is ultimately Theophrastus. In text 678.2, John considers a division of the encomium into qualitative and quantitative parts, and refers to the *Arts* of Theophrastus (666 no. 2b). There is no mention of Aristotle. Perhaps, then, the reference to Theophrastus in our text is to his *Arts*. We might even suggest that Theophrastus referred to Aristotle and that this reference was at a later date transformed into a primary reference to Aristotle and a secondary reference to Theophrastus. Be that as it may, it is unlikely that John ever read a Theophrastean treatise.¹⁵⁷ What he reports concerning both Aristotle and Theophrastus has been taken from an intermediary source which is now lost.

¹⁵⁵ At 3 1426a9–10, we are told that devotion to exercise results in health, which is a bodily good. At 35 1441a35–7, we are told that sturdy endurance in physical exercise can be taken as an indication of later performance in the rigors of philosophy. Here the physical performance not only manifests a good bodily condition, like strength, but also indicates a good disposition of the soul, like tenacity or perseverance, which will be needed for the labors of philosophy.

¹⁵⁶ A fourth example, beauty (1440b18), is missing in John.

¹⁵⁷ The possibility that John read a Theophrastean work for himself and drew on it directly when composing his commentary is not to be taken seriously. On John's sources, see Kennedy (1983) p. 276, (1999) p. 136.

One more Peripatetic work should be mentioned. It is the Τέχνη ἐγκωμιαστική, *Art of the Encomium*. This work is listed in Hesychius' catalogue of Aristotelian writings. More precisely, it occurs in the third part of the so-called appendix,¹⁵⁸ immediately after the *Rhetoric to Alexander* (no. 178 p. 88 Düring).¹⁵⁹ This portion of the appendix has been thought to record the holdings of a Hellenistic library, perhaps one in Rhodes or Pergamon; but the idea can be neither proved nor disproved.¹⁶⁰ It is certainly possible that John's reference to Aristotle goes back to the *Art of the Encomium*; but there can be no certainty, for the work has disappeared without trace.

In conclusion, it may be helpful to refer to the *Rhetoric to Herennius*. This work belongs to the beginning of the first century B.C. and reflects developments in Hellenistic rhetoric. What interests me is that the work contains a discussion of epideictic oratory in which the Academic-Peripatetic division of goods plays an important role.¹⁶¹ The division is given explicit recognition at the outset (3.10), and the primary importance of virtues of the mind, *virtutes animi*, is clear throughout the treatment of the introduction (3.11–12). In discussing how the life and accomplishments of the honoree ought to be presented, the author tells us that the encomiast should first set forth the virtues of mind, and then make clear how these virtues have been revealed in the use of bodily and external goods (3.13). What follows is organized by reference to bodily and external goods (3.13–15). In closing this portion of his discussion, the author says that it should now be clear how the tripartite division of praise is to be handled. He then adds the proviso that it is not necessary to make use of all three parts of the division (3.15). Two things merit attention. First, the proviso recalls John's statement that some bodily and external goods are omitted (p. 132.5). It also recalls the statement in the *Rhetoric to Alexander* that goods outside the soul are suppressed (3.35 1440b21–2). Second, the author speaks of a tripartite division of praise (*tripartitia divisio laudis*), much as John speaks of Aristotle dividing the encomium three ways (τὸ ἐγκώμιον τριχῶς διαίρει). That may be significant. In the *Rhetoric to Herennius*, the tripartite division appears early, influences the discussion of the introduction and finds special application in regard to

¹⁵⁸ I.e. the second part of the catalogue (no. 140–97 p. 187–9 Düring), which does not share a common source with the catalogue of Diogenes.

¹⁵⁹ See Moraux p. 259–60.

¹⁶⁰ Düring p. 91.

¹⁶¹ Solmsen (1941) p. 176 and Calboli (1969) p. 260 n. 22.

the honoree's life: his *genos* and education as well as his adult behavior. Given this inclusive application, it makes sense to speak of a division of praise and not of actions. I want to suggest that the same may be true of the division attributed to Aristotle. In its original context it may have covered more than the actions of a mature honoree. We may compare the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, in which the twofold division of goods into those outside and those within virtue precedes the discussion of genealogy and childhood (35 1440b15–23; 1440b24–1441a20). If some lost Aristotelian or pseudo-Aristotelian work introduced the tripartition of goods at a similar point, John's report may be quite correct, albeit out of place. Tripartition is said to divide the encomium, because it governs the entire speech. It is relevant to the presentation of adult actions, but it also guides the encomiast as he introduces his subject and presents the genealogy and early education of the honoree.

Since 677 is closely related to 678 and since 678 makes explicit reference to the *Arts* of Theophrastus, it seems reasonable to refer 677 to the *Arts*. But in doing so we should keep in mind that the title *Arts* is in itself problematic. See the commentary on 666 no. 2b.

- 678** John of Sardis, *On the Preparatory Exercises of Aphthonius* 8 (*RhGr* vol. 15 p. 139.5–24 Rabe)

Literature: Van Ophuijsen (1994) p. 146–7

John is discussing Aphthonius' headings for the construction of encomia. See the commentary to 677. Our text concerns the fifth heading, namely, that of comparison. The lemma (lines 1–2) is Aphthonius's entire characterization of the heading (*RhGr* vol. 2 p. 36.17–18).¹⁶²

¹⁶² The translation of the lemma is similar to the translation of Aphthonius' words printed in *Readings from Classical Rhetoric*, ed. P. Matsen, P. Rollinson and M. Sousa (Carbondale 1990) p. 276. "Noble" (καλόν) is supplied from the opening definition: "Encomium is a speech setting forth the noble (καλῶν) qualities belonging to some person" (*RhGr* vol. 2 p. 35.25–6 Spengel). We should compare the immediately preceding discussion of the *koinos topos* where comparison is referred to in almost the same wording as our lemma: "You will introduce a comparison resulting from juxtaposition, attaching the greater (evil) to the accused" — ἐποίσεις τὴν σύγκρισιν ἐκ παραθέσεως, συνάγων τῷ κατηγορουμένῳ τὸ μείζον (p. 32.30–1), where "evil" is supplied from the definition of the *koinos topos* (p. 32.20–1). In the subsequent example, the subject, the tyrant, is associated with the greater evil, harming all the citizens (p. 34.15–20). Regarding the

After giving the lemma, John tells us that Theophrastus divided the encomium into a qualitative and a quantitative part (lines 2–3). Reference is made to Theophrastus' *Arts* (666 no. 2b), and the division of the encomium is reported in a manner (λέγει γάρ . . .) that suggests that John is giving us Theophrastus' own words, albeit in indirect discourse (line 3). That may be the case,¹⁶³ for the terms τὸ ποιόν and τὸ ποσόν have a Peripatetic ring. In addition, the adjectives occur together in Aristotle's brief remarks on narration in epideictic oratory. He tells us that the rhetorical art is concerned with demonstrating the occurrence, quality (ποιόν) and quantity (ποσόν) of actions; he recognizes that the occurrence is often not in doubt and goes on to talk of dividing the narration into portions: e.g., one portion making clear that a man is courageous and another that he is wise or just (3.16 1416b20–4). Earlier in the discussion of the materials of epideictic oratory, the terms are not found, but the idea is clearly present, for Aristotle first discusses virtue and virtuous actions (1.9 1366a23–1368a10) and then offers remarks on amplification (1368a10–37).

After reporting Theophrastus' division of the encomium, John goes on to explain it. First, we learn that the qualitative part involves reference to *genos*, training and actions, while the quantitative part is said to be a matter of comparison (lines 4–7). Next, the subject's essential nature is contrasted with an accidental relationship to some juxtaposed person (lines 7–11). Finally, we are offered an abstract overview of the two parts of an encomium (lines 11–16). All that is clear enough, but is it Theophrastean? Certainly John's wording has a Peripatetic flavor. The use of ἀποδεικνύοναι (line 7), διδάσκειν (line 15) and ὁ δεινός (lines 11–12) recalls Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (e.g., 3.1 1403b12, 1404a6, 12, 3.15 1416a23),¹⁶⁴ but caution is in order.

encomium, the example supplied by Aphthonius is similar: the subject, Thucydides, is associated with the nobler, reporting the truth (p. 38.7–11).

¹⁶³ Although John may be correctly reporting Theophrastus' words, he is almost certainly dependent on a secondary source. It is, therefore, uncertain whether the indirect discourse has been introduced by John or was already present in the secondary source.

¹⁶⁴ At first reading, the occurrence of μέσον in line 14 might seem to introduce the middle term of the categorical syllogism (cf. *Prior Analytics* 1.4 25b33, 35) and therefore to add to the Peripatetic flavor of John's text, but on closer reading, it is clear that μέσον has nothing to do with the categorical syllogism. The phrase ἐκ τοῦ προαχθέντος εἰς μέσον is well translated by Kennedy (1999) p. 161: "from comparison with the one brought into the discussion." Our translation "as a result of the person introduced into the middle" is more literal, but in meaning it is no different as long as one understands "middle of the demonstration (or argument),"

For the mention of *genos*, training and actions (lines 4–5) is a reference to Aphthonius' second, third and fourth headings, which John had discussed earlier (p. 128.23–139.4). In referring to *genos* and actions (headings two and four), John uses Aphthonius' terms, γένος and πράξεις; and in referring to training (the second heading), John uses a term, ἀγωγή, which he had used to elucidate what Aphthonius calls upbringing, ἀνατροφή (p. 130.13–21).¹⁶⁵ Furthermore, the use of καί twice (lines 4, 7) to mark a new step in the explanation of the fifth heading is almost certainly attributable to John. At the first καί, he seems to leave Theophrastus behind and to strike out on his own, using a vocabulary that is reminiscent of the Peripatos but not restricted to any particular member of that school or even to the school itself. That may be disappointing, but at least our text reports Theophrastus' bipartite division of the encomium, perhaps in the Eresian's own words.¹⁶⁶

Since text **678** refers to the *Arts* of Theophrastus (**666** no. 2b), it is natural to assign **678** to the *Arts*, but it is unclear how we should understand the title. Grouping it together with *On Kinds of Rhetorical Arts* (**666** no. 2a) seems to have been an error. Perhaps *Arts* refers collectively to a group of Theophrastean works and in particular to *On Praise* (**666** no. 12), but there are other possibilities. See the commentary on **666** no. 2b. .

679 *Laurentian Epitome* 11 (*RhGr* vol. 1 p. 215.3–7 Hammer)

Literature: Mayer (1910) p. 141–2; Cousin (1935–6) vol. 1 p. 426–31; Grube (1952a) p. 177; Stark (1958) p. 101–2; Kennedy (1963) p. 277–8

Our text comes from an epitome preserved in a single Florentine manuscript. The epitome carries the title *From the (Writings) of Longinus*, but the attribution to Longinus is disputed.¹⁶⁷ Further-

drawing on ἀποδείκνυμεν in line 7. Moreover, the reasoning in question calls for analysis in terms of a hypothetical syllogism: If A is Q (“admirable,” θαυμαστός in line 11) to the same degree (παραπλήσιος in line 14) that B is Q, and A is highly Q, then B is highly Q; But A is Q to the same degree that B is Q, and A is highly Q; Therefore B is highly Q. For Theophrastus' interest in hypothetical syllogistic, see the commentary on **674**.

¹⁶⁵ In commenting on Aphthonius' heading of ἀνατροφή, John first introduces παιδευσίς (p. 130.15) and then identifies παιδευσίς with ἀγωγή (p. 130.19–21).

¹⁶⁶ For more on comparison, see the commentary on **679.3**: ἐξ ἀντιπαραβολῆς.

¹⁶⁷ See “Sources” p. 28–9.

more, the twenty-four sections of the epitome exhibit no clear order. Our text (sec. 11) concerns sources of amplification recognized by Theophrastus. It is preceded by a brief statement concerning failure attributable to natural deficiency (10), and it is followed by a remark on the style of Aristides (12). That tells us nothing about the context in Longinus or pseudo-Longinus, from which the compiler of the epitome took our text.

Since our text presents a list of sources of amplification, it is best interpreted by reference to similar lists in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and in the pseudo-Aristotelian *Rhetoric to Alexander*. In the former work, Aristotle acknowledges that amplification occurs in all three kinds of oratory; but he calls it most suited to epideictic oratory (2.18 1391b30–1392a7), and he concludes his discussion of that kind of oratory by listing different modes of amplification (1.9 1368a10–26). In the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, the author defines encomiastic oratory and its opposite in terms of amplification (3 1425b36–9); in what follows, he provides a list of ways in which an orator can amplify his subject (3 1426a20–b12).¹⁶⁸ It seems, therefore, likely that the original Theophrastean context was a discussion of epideictic oratory, but we cannot rule out references to deliberative and judicial oratory, or even a general discussion of amplification.

The list of sources recognized by Theophrastus begins with deeds: ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων, “from the deeds.” Pride of place reflects the importance of accomplishments in establishing and magnifying the worth of an honoree (or subject of attack in vituperation). What exactly Theophrastus recommended under this heading is not stated in our text, but we can form an idea from the techniques of amplification listed by Aristotle and the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*. According to the latter, the encomiast should make clear the many things that the honoree has accomplished (3 1426a22, b7–9).¹⁶⁹ Similarly, the former recommends calling attention to the many occasions on which the honoree has been successful in the same way (1.9 1368a14). In addition, the encomiast is advised to make clear the forethought with which the honoree acted (*Rhet. to Alex.* 3 1426a35–7, b1; cf. *Rhet.* 1.14 1375a7), and to say that he acted alone

¹⁶⁸ Like Aristotle, the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* acknowledges that amplification is used in other kinds of oratory, but he says that it is most effective in encomium and censure (3 1426b18–21).

¹⁶⁹ Crediting the subject with many achievements, πολλά, has pride of place in the list in the *Rhet. to Alex.* 3 1426a22. That corresponds to the position of the Theophrastean heading “from the deeds.”

or was the first to accomplish the action or actions under consideration (*Rhet.* 1.9 1368a11; cf. *Rhet. to Alex.* 3 1426a38).

The second source, ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, “from the consequences,” refers to results, including civic responses to the accomplishments of the honoree. We may compare Aristotle’s list, where there is mention of the encouragements and honors that have been established on account of the honoree (1.9 1368a15–19, cf. 1.14 1375a4). In regard to the third source, ἐξ ἀντιπαραβολῆς, “from comparison,” Aristotle’s example is comparison with persons of reputation (1.9 1368a19–24).¹⁷⁰ The author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* advises comparison with what is smallest in the same class. He illustrates the idea by reference to the medium sized man who appears taller when standing next to smaller persons (3 1426a28–32). The same author provides an example of the fourth source, (ἐκ) κρίσεως, “from (previous) judgment.” We are told to introduce something that has been judged great and to put our case beside it, running through the most impressive points on our side and the least impressive on the other (3 1426a24–8). We are also told that if something has been judged a great good or evil, then we can introduce the opposite and it will appear to be an equally great evil or good (3 1426a32–5). For the fifth source, ἐκ τῶν καιρῶν, “from the critical moments,” we can cite Aristotle’s list, where he gives the same heading in fuller form, ἐκ τῶν χρόνων καὶ τῶν καιρῶν, “from the times and the critical moments,”¹⁷¹ adding that the actions in question should be contrary to what might be expected (1.9 1368a12–13).¹⁷²

The sixth source, (ἐκ) τοῦ πάθους, “from the suffering” or “from the emotion” has no clear counterpart in the two lists of techniques of amplification for epideictic oratory, but Aristotle’s discussion of magnification in judicial oratory does contain suggestive examples. We are told that an injustice will appear greater if the person who suffers (ὁ παθών) cannot obtain justice or has suffered something so awful that he kills himself (1.14 1374b30–1375a2). Similarly in epideictic oratory, an act of generosity appears greater if the benefi-

¹⁷⁰ When comparison with persons of reputation is not possible, then comparison with others is recommended, for superiority suggests excellence (1.9 1368a24–26).

¹⁷¹ Kennedy (1991) p. 86 translates “from the historical contexts or the opportunities of the moment.”

¹⁷² Cf. *Rhet.* 2.7 1385a21, where we are told that an act of kindness is great when performed in a crisis that is great and difficult.

ciary is presented as suffering extreme deprivation.¹⁷³ Again, Aristotle tells us that a crime is magnified if the report arouses terror rather than pity in the listener (1.14 1375a7–8). So too in an epideictic speech, a report that has strong emotional impact adds importance to the deed in question. These examples do not help us decide whether the sixth heading refers to suffering or emotion, but in many cases the difference may be of little importance. For great suffering arouses strong emotion, so that the orator who aims at emotional effect may choose to describe in detail the suffering that is the occasion for an act of beneficence.

We should take at least passing notice of Mayer's claim that our text presents only four modes of amplification. The claim is not entirely without grounds, for ἐκ, "from," is twice omitted (before κρίσεως and τοῦ πάθους) and that may mislead us into thinking that only four sources are listed. In particular, we may think that the third and fourth are one, and that the same is true of the fifth and sixth. In the case of the third and fourth sources, Mayer's claim is made more acceptable by reading (συγ)κρίσεως in line 3, for that would give us a simple variant on ἀντιπαραβολῆς, or introduce a closely related kind of comparison.¹⁷⁴ It is, however, much better to keep the manuscript reading, i.e., κρίσεως. We may compare the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, who distinguishes between amplification based on a previous judgment (κεκριμένον, κέκριται 3 1426a24, 33) and that which is based on comparison (ἀντιπαραβάλλειν 1426a29). Theophrastus made the same distinction, though he may have departed from the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* by bringing all cases of previous judgment under a single heading.¹⁷⁵ Perhaps we should fault the compiler of the epitome for twice dropping ἐκ and varying δέ with καί, but such variation may also be seen as welcome relief from monotonous repetition.

¹⁷³ Cf. *Rhet.* 2.7 1385a20, where an act of kindness is said to be great if it is directed toward someone who is in extreme need.

¹⁷⁴ In Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, ἀντιπαραβάλλειν (1.9 1368a20), συγκρίνειν (1368a21) and παραβάλλειν (1368a25) are used synonymously. Grube explains ἐξ ἀντιπαραβολῆς καὶ (συγ)κρίσεως with "comparisons with other cases generally or with other persons." If I understand him correctly, he is not recognizing a difference in meaning between the two Greek nouns but merely indicating two kinds of comparison both of which fall under the third and fourth headings construed as one.

¹⁷⁵ In the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, both the second and fourth mode of amplification concern previous judgment (3 1426a24–8, 32–3).

It has been suggested that Theophrastus offered a more formal classification of techniques of amplification than Aristotle did. That may be true in regard to the fourth source, i.e. previous judgment, which is absent from Aristotle's list and appears twice in the *Rhetoric to Alexander* (3 1426a24–8, 32–5); but we must be careful not to assume too much. In particular, we should not assume that Theophrastus intended to present sources that are independent of each other. The critical moment and suffering can be two aspects of one event,¹⁷⁶ and comparison seems to overlap all the other categories.¹⁷⁷ Furthermore, it is not clear that Theophrastus' six categories are exhaustive. The author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* introduces conjecture as a distinct category and illustrates it by a probability argument concerning a person's future wishes: "Whoever cares for his friends is also likely to honor his parents; and whoever honors his parents will also wish to benefit his fatherland" (3 1426b5–7). Theophrastus may have thought that conjectures of this kind belong under the heading "from the deeds," but he may have simply ignored such cases.

The author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* includes at the end of his list an instruction concerning presentation: "One ought to consider whether the deed appears greater when divided into parts or stated as a whole; and whichever is greater, in that way one ought to state it" (3 1426b9–12). No example is provided, but the instruction probably concerns the presentation of an accomplishment that has proceeded through several stages. Instead of saying, e.g., that the honoree has successfully completed an embassy, we may magnify the accomplishment by reporting it in stages: a dangerous trip, a hostile reception, a skillful speech, a dramatic return home. In regard to the Theophrasteian headings, the instruction can be brought under the label "from the deeds," and viewed as a directive concerning the handling of content. Much as it is useful to report many deeds

¹⁷⁶ When Aristotle lists the things that make an act of kindness great, he includes both extreme need and critical moments (*Rhet.* 2.7 1385a19–21). The list is presented as a disjunction, but there is no need to understand the disjunction as exclusive. Extreme need and the critical moment can combine to magnify an act of kindness.

¹⁷⁷ E.g., the man who does many things does more than other people; and if his deeds result in the establishment of honors, his deeds have effected a greater response than those of most people. In regard to previous judgment, the *Rhetoric to Alexander* offers a clear example: we are told to introduce something that has been judged favorably and to compare (παράβάλλειν) it with our case in a way that tells in our favor (3 1426a24–8).

(1426a22, b8), so it is helpful to report a single deed in a way that makes it seem many. It is, however, a short step from this directive to one concerned with style or expression. We may compare Aristotle's comment on asyndeton in *Rhetoric* 3.12. There he tells us that the use of a conjunction makes the many one; if it is removed, the reverse occurs. What is one becomes many, and that involves amplification (αὐξησις). Aristotle gives an example, "I came, I talked, I entreated," and then makes a similar point about naming. If a person is named frequently, many things seem to have been said. Aristotle cites Homer who named Nireus several times and as a result succeeded in amplifying (αὐξεν) his importance (1413b31–1414a7). Whether Theophrastus discussed these modes of amplification is not reported. I am prepared to believe that he did do so on some occasion (in some treatise); but I want to underline that our Theophrastean text only raises the question. It makes no clear statement concerning stylistic modes of amplification.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁸ Hence I am uneasy when Kennedy (p. 277) cites our passage as evidence for a Theophrastean discussion of stylistic amplification. I am made even more uneasy by Mayer (p. 142) and Cousin (p. 427–31), who trace back to Theophrastus the fourfold division of amplification set forth by Quintilian within his discussion of style (*Oratorical Education* 8.4.1–28). Here the worry is more than a general lack of evidence for a Theophrastean treatment of stylistic amplification. It is also the fact that Theophrastus' six sources line up poorly with the four categories recognized by Quintilian: augmentation (*incrementum*), comparison (*comparatio*), reasoning (*rationatio*) and accumulation (*congeries*). Only Theophrastus' source "from comparison" has a clear counterpart in Quintilian's second category. Mayer and Cousin are able to deal with "from (previous) judgment" by emending the Greek text and collapsing it into "from comparison." In regard to "from the deeds," both Mayer and Cousin admit that there is no clear counterpart in Quintilian. They suggest that it can be covered partially by remarks concerning choice of word (*nomen* 1); but they also acknowledge that such a source might better carry the heading ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων, "from the words." For the other three Theophrastean sources, Mayer and Cousin look within Quintilian's category of reasoning. "From the consequences" is identified with the subcategory "from what follows" (*ex insequentibus* 17). "From the critical moment" and "from the suffering (or emotion)" are referred to the subcategories of "what precedes" (*quae antecesserunt* 18) and "reference" (*relatio* 21). In some contexts, such changes in heading and organization may be unimportant, but here we are concerned with a system of classification, that of modes of amplification, so that the changes cannot be easily dismissed. Furthermore, we should not ignore the fact that Quintilian's first category, that of augmentation, has no obvious Theophrastean counterpart (perhaps it is a part of "from the deeds"), and his fourth category, that of accumulation, is clearly without a counterpart. Mayer and Cousin think of accumulation as Quintilian's own contribution to a framework that is Theophrastean in origin; but the presence of a category that is admittedly non-Theophrastean, together with other difficulties already noted, should make us hesitate before claiming that Quintilian's treatment of stylistic amplification is, in some important way, Theophrastean.

The Aristotelian passage discussed in the preceding paragraph ends with the comment that Homer achieved amplification by false reasoning (διὰ τὸν παραλογισμόν 1414a6). Repeated mention of Nireus' name misleads the audience into believing that many things are being said about Nireus. That raises a further question: whether Theophrastus took account of misleading uses of amplification. He had plenty of reason to do so. In addition to the Aristotelian passage, we may cite the *Rhetoric to Alexander* on comparison. We are advised to place the greatest accomplishments of the honoree alongside the least achievements of others (35 1441a27–32). Sometimes that may be fair to all parties, but it can easily become unfair exaggeration. Our text provides no indication how Theophrastus viewed such cases. My guess is that he will have preferred comparisons that are a fair measure of the honoree's worth, and yet recognized that exaggeration and unfair comparison may have a place depending on the moment, the *καιρός*. Our text does mention the *καιρός*, but only as a source of amplification. It is the critical moment in which the honoree found himself when he acted. It is not the critical moment confronting the orator and therefore is no evidence for Theophrastus' attitude toward misleading uses of amplification. Still less is it evidence that Theophrastus defined rhetoric in terms of the *καιρός*.¹⁷⁹

Our text may come from *On Praise* (666 no. 12) or *Arts* (666 no. 2b). For completeness' sake, I mention a third, albeit remote, possibility. The fourth list of Diogenes' catalogue contains the title 'Αριθμητικῶν ἱστοριῶν περὶ αὐξήσεως α', *Arithmetical Researches concerning Increase*, 1 book (1.272 = 264 no. 2). A single secondary manuscript divides the title in two: 'Αριθμητικῶν ἱστοριῶν · Περὶ αὐξήσεως α', *Arithmetical Researches; Concerning Increase*, 1 book; and Meurs supplied α', "1 book" after "*Arithmetical Researches*." If the division and supplement are accepted, we have one title referring to a work on mathematics (probably a work of Eudemus mistakenly listed among those of Theophrastus¹⁸⁰)

¹⁷⁹ In his article "Theophrasts Definition der Rhetorik," Stark (1958) p. 101–2 seems to run together the critical moment in which an orator addresses his audience and the critical moment in which someone other than the orator did something noteworthy. The former is what concerned Alcidas when he championed the ability to speak extemporaneously. The latter is what Theophrastus recognized as a source of amplification (679.3). Out of context the deeds of an honoree may seem ordinary, but when they are presented as a response to a particular crisis, then their true magnitude can be appreciated.

¹⁸⁰ A work entitled *Arithmetical Research* is assigned to Eudemus by Porphyry, *On Ptolemy's Harmonics* p. 115.4–5 Düring = Eudemus, fr. 142 Wehrli.

and a second that could refer to either a work on mathematical increase or one on rhetorical amplification.¹⁸¹ If the latter possibility is correct and there existed a work *On Amplification*, our text could be assigned to it. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to reject the assignment: the division into two titles is not present in the primary manuscripts, and a separate title *Περὶ αὐξήσεως* is not attested elsewhere.¹⁸²

680 Quintilian, *Oratorical Education* 4.1.32 (*OCT* vol. 1 p. 191.22–6 Winterbottom)

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 56–7; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1526; Grube (1965) p. 104; Winterbottom (1970) p. 80; Goodyear (1973) p. 40; Cousin (1975–80) vol. 3 p. 26, 214–15

Our text is found within Quintilian's discussion of the parts of a judicial speech (cf. 4.pr.6) and in particular within his discussion of the introduction (4.1). Quintilian has told us that the purpose of the introduction is to produce goodwill, attention and openness to instruction (4.1.5) and has taken up sources for arousing goodwill (4.1.6–33). The sources are considered under three headings: the persons involved in the case (4.1.6–22), the case itself (4.1.23–9) and other matters loosely related to the persons and the case (4.1.30–2). The discussion of other matters is also tripartite. First, there is discussion of relationships like kinship, friendship and civic affiliation (4.1.30). Second, Quintilian mentions various circumstances that happen to surround a trial but are not, strictly speaking, part of the case, like the time or location of the trial, and public opinion concerning the courts of law (4.1.30–1). Third, Quintilian cites Theophrastus for the introduction *ab oratione* (4.1.32). That is our text, after which occurs a brief, awkward comment on the negative effect of manifest confidence (4.1.33).¹⁸³

The phrase *ab oratione* is irritatingly vague. Is the *oratio* in question the preceding speech of an opponent, or is it the speech being introduced? Cousin chooses the first alternative and translates “tiré d'un discours <antérieur>.” Winterbottom observes that the

¹⁸¹ The fourth list does contain two rhetorical titles: *On Judicial Speeches* (1.274 = 666 no. 9) and *On Slander* (1.275 = 666 no. 13).

¹⁸² See Sollenberger (1984) p. 365.

¹⁸³ The beginning of 4.1.33, especially the transition from arousing goodwill to securing attention, is difficult and probably corrupt. See Winterbottom p. 80–1.

vagueness of the Latin text could be removed by adding *adversarii*, “of the opponent,” but he rejects the idea, saying that such an addition would not only spoil the clausula but also introduce “a type of exordium that appears later seemingly as a new kind” — namely, at 4.1.54, where Quintilian says that an attractive form of introduction is that which draws material from the speech of an opponent.¹⁸⁴ The latter consideration might be telling, were the two passages located within the same portion of Quintilian’s discussion of the introduction; but they are not. Our Theophrastean text is located within the discussion of the ways in which goodwill is aroused (4.1.6–32) or within the larger discussion of goodwill, attention and openness to instruction (4.1.6–40). These discussions, along with our text, end well before the later passage cited by Winterbottom (4.1.54). In fact, the later passage occurs within a separate account of the easiest way to compose introductions. This account begins at 4.1.52, where Quintilian indicates that he is adding to previous remarks: i.e., offering a new perspective and not totally new material. Hence we are not surprised when at 4.1.55 Quintilian mentions confidence (*fiducia*) for the second time. He had touched on it earlier at the beginning of 4.1.33 and now offers expanded remarks. The situation with Quintilian’s remarks on taking material from the speech of an adversary may well be similar. The idea is first introduced at 4.1.32, immediately before the initial mention of confidence, and then brought up again for further discussion at 4.1.54, immediately before the second passage dealing with confidence. I am, therefore, not disturbed by the suggestion that our Theophrastean text anticipates later discussion, nor do I find repetition grounds for denying that the reference of *ab oratione* at 4.1.32 is to the speech of the opposing advocate. But having said that, let me be clear that I am not proposing to emend the text by adding *adversarii*. Winterbottom is certainly right to reject such an emendation.

Should we, then, put daggers around *oratione*, as Winterbottom does? Or should we follow Handley, who has suggested reading *orationis ratione*, “the plan of the speech” being introduced by the orator. Goodyear has called for further consideration of Handley’s suggestion, and with good reason, for similarity between words, i.e. between *orationis* and *ratione*, offers a ready explanation of corruption. Nevertheless, it seems to me entirely possible and even prob-

¹⁸⁴ The Latin text runs: *multum gratiae exordio est quod ab actione diversae partis materiam trahit.*

able that *ab oratione* is the correct reading. For the phrase may well be a label or shorthand reference — the sort of abbreviation that often gives rise to opacity. We may compare the list of sources of amplification given in 679. No one has proposed emending or putting daggers around κρίσεως in line 3, though by itself the phrase ἐκ κρίσεως is just as vague as *ab oratione*. Perhaps, then, Quintilian is correctly reproducing (or translating) a label that he found in a source. And if that is the case, the opacity would derive from the source and might be Theophrastean in origin.

I now want to consider the introduction to Demosthenes' speech *On the Crown*. For after telling us that Theophrastus adds the introduction *ab oratione*, Quintilian — following Theophrastus¹⁸⁵ — offers an example taken from the speech *On behalf of Ctesiphon*, i.e. *On the Crown*, delivered in 330 B.C. At the very beginning of the speech, Demosthenes prays for two things: first, that the jurors have as much goodwill toward him as he has had toward them (ὅσῃν εὖνοιαν ἔχων ἐγὼ διατελῶ τῇ τε πόλει καὶ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν, τοσαύτην ὑπάρξαι μοι παρ' ὑμῶν 1); and second, that his opponent not determine how he is heard (μὴ τὸν ἀντίδικον σύμβουλον ποιήσασθαι περὶ πῶς ἀκούειν ὑμᾶς ἐμοῦ δεῖ 1); that each speaker be allowed to arrange his own speech according to his own discretion (καὶ τῇ τάξει καὶ τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ, ὥς βεβούλεται καὶ προήρηται τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων ἕκαστος, οὕτως ἔἶσαι χρήσασθαι 2). Demosthenes is responding to Aeschines, who spoke first and argued that Demosthenes should be required to address the charges in the order in which they were presented (*Against Ctesiphon* 202–5). Demosthenes claims that such a restriction is prohibited by the jurors' oath and proceeds to argue as he thinks best. For our purposes, the important point is that Demosthenes is taking his start from the speech of the opponent (the ἀντίδικος mentioned in section 1 of *On the Crown* = the *accusator* in line 3 of our text), and that suggests interpreting the phrase *ab oratione* in terms of the opponent.

An objection should not be ignored. In praying that he be permitted to reply as he chooses (ὥς βεβούλεται καὶ προήρηται 2 = *suo . . . arbitrio* in line 2), Demosthenes is thinking of the arrangement (τάξις) of his own speech. He intends first to address slander and only later to take up the actual charges (cf. 9). His words, then, look in two directions — toward the speech of the opponent and toward the plan of the speech being introduced — and do not remove

¹⁸⁵ I return to this point below.

all doubt concerning the interpretation of *ab oratione*. As far as it goes, that is correct, but we should not forget the context in which Demosthenes is cited: namely, within a discussion of sources for arousing goodwill. More precisely, our text occurs as a kind of supplement (*adicit*¹⁸⁶) to the discussion of matters only loosely related to the persons involved and the case itself. While that category is not well defined, the example from Demosthenes seems appropriate. For at the beginning and end of the introduction to *On the Crown*, Demosthenes prays for goodwill (1, 8), and in between he turns the speech of Aeschines, his abuse and slander (3, 7), into a reason why the jurors ought to remember their oath and listen with goodwill.¹⁸⁷ In other words, the speech of Aeschines becomes the basis of Demosthenes' appeal for goodwill; and that supports construing the phrase *ab oratione* as a reference to the speech of the adversary.

The argument of the preceding two paragraphs assumes that Quintilian is following Theophrastus when he refers to Demosthenes. Here some caution may be in order, for it is at least possible that the reference to Demosthenes has been provided by Quintilian. He may have cited Theophrastus for the general category of introductions *ab oratione* and then on his own supplied the example drawn from Demosthenes. Certainly Quintilian knew the Greek orators from his own reading and was not dependent upon Theophrastus or any other intermediary for his examples. We may compare 3.6.3, where Aeschines, *Against Ctesiphon* 206 is cited inappropriately; the error is Quintilian's alone. Nevertheless, it is far more likely that Quintilian is following Theophrastus throughout our text,¹⁸⁸ perhaps without noticing that the example from Demosthenes is not entirely at home in his discussion of goodwill. For in the introduction to *On*

¹⁸⁶ In using the phrase *adicit Theophrastus*, Quintilian is not saying that Theophrastus anticipated him by picking out the class of related matters (*adiuncta* 4.1.30) and assigning the speech (of the opponent) to this class. Rather the phrase is used colloquially to introduce what is taken from Theophrastus and added to Quintilian's own class of related matters.

¹⁸⁷ Demosthenes says that his opponent has been given the opportunity to speak abusively; in reply he must speak about himself and in doing so risks offending the jurors and losing their goodwill (3–4). He calls attention to the fact that a plaintiff gains strength through slander, and for that reason a defendant needs jurors who listen with goodwill (5–7).

¹⁸⁸ If that is the case, one might ask whether there are other places within Quintilian's discussion of the parts of a judicial speech where Theophrastus is Quintilian's source. A possibility is the reference to Aeschines, *Against Ctesiphon* 207 ff., in the discussion of perorations at 6.1.20; but it is no more than a possibility.

the Crown, Demosthenes is appealing for disinterested goodwill, a fair hearing such as the jurors' oath requires (2, 6–7).¹⁸⁹ In contrast, Quintilian views the introduction as an opportunity to win over the minds of the jurors (4.1.2, 25), to further one's case by gaining favor (4.1.9, 23) and to strengthen a prejudice where that may be beneficial (4.1.20).¹⁹⁰

In conclusion, we should ask whether our text can be assigned to a particular treatise. *Introductions* (666, no. 15) comes to mind, but here we must be careful, for that work may have been a simple collection of sample introductions, void of comment and lacking even careful arrangement. Alternatively the samples may have been arranged under headings like "from the speech." In that case, both the label "from the speech" and the Demosthenic example may derive, perhaps *via* an intermediary,¹⁹¹ from *Introductions*. If we emend the title to read *On Introductions*, then the work may have contained a full discussion of introductions, and *On the Crown* may have been cited to illustrate introductions derived "from the speech."¹⁹² I am, however, inclined to reject the emendation. See the commentary on 666 no. 15.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. Isocrates, *Antidosis* 21–2. For further discussion see Fortenbaugh (1992) 240–4.

¹⁹⁰ Quintilian even recognizes the value of attacking one's opponent in order that the minds of the jurors may be alienated from him (4.1.14 cf. 4.1.29). It is, of course, true that *On the Crown* contains harsh attacks on Aeschines (beginning already in 10–11); but in the introduction proper, Demosthenes' appeal is for equal treatment.

¹⁹¹ See the discussion of "Sources," above, p. 114–16.

¹⁹² In the preface to his discussion of the parts of a judicial speech, Quintilian first tells us that he will take up the introduction, narration, proof and epilogue (4.pr.6) and then adds that some persons have preferred to write about each part separately. They were frightened that undertaking all the parts at once would prove too great a burden, and therefore published several books, each dealing with one part (4.pr.7). To whom is Quintilian referring? If he is thinking *inter alios* of Theophrastus, then text 680 may derive from a treatise devoted entirely to the introduction. But we must not build too much on what Quintilian says in the preface. He is interested in magnifying his own undertaking, and toward that end he is quite prepared to refer generally to "frightened" writers on the parts of an oration and to do so without having a particular set of predecessors in mind. Moreover, it is not clear that all or even most writers on individual parts are frightened. A teacher like Theophrastus might prefer to treat the parts of an oration separately for pedagogical reasons. A series of works could represent a lecture series, in which the several lectures followed one after the other in a coherent way. Alternatively he might write a single treatise, e.g. on statement and narration (666 no. 16), provide his students with a collection of samples, e.g. a collection of introductions (666 no. 15) and treat all the parts of an oration within a course of lectures (666 no. 2a).

5. Expression

Expression or style, λέξις, is an integral part of speech communication. Whether we communicate orally or in writing, words are chosen (diction) and put together in ways that facilitate understanding (composition). Communication may take place at the level of everyday discourse. Ordinary words are selected, and their arrangement is conventional, so that understanding is easy. But communication may rise above the ordinary through the use of a refined vocabulary and artful arrangement. In that case speech, spoken or written, becomes elegant, and when appropriate, then pleasing. How one regularly achieves such speech is a primary concern of writers on λέξις.

Concern with λέξις is as old as Greek literature itself. Not only do the Homeric poems exhibit elegance, but in later centuries they supplied stock examples of the grand, middle and plain style in oratory.¹⁹³ In addition, Phoenix is said to have been sent to Troy to teach Achilles to be a speaker of words and doer of deeds (9.442–3). In regard to words, we should think of oral instruction in which sample speeches were presented for imitation and variation. The introduction of written texts was a later development, made possible by the advance of literacy during the fifth century. To be sure, a rhetorician like Gorgias continued to deliver model speeches orally, but some, perhaps many, of the speeches were written down for close study by his pupils. They could study not only the arguments of the master but also his use of antithesis, balanced clause, homœoteleuton and other stylistic devices. In addition, the fifth century saw the appearance of handbooks, some of which were concerned either partially or entirely with matters of style. Thrasymachus, a contemporary of Gorgias and best known for his role in Book 1 of Plato's *Republic*, is said to have written handbooks as well as display speeches (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Isaeus* 20). He is also credited with being the first to achieve a mean in prose (685), to exhibit compression (695), and to make use of a paeonic rhythm (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.8 1409a1–3). His display pieces will have contained examples of his innovations, and his handbooks may have combined further examples with brief directives for their use. But in regard to paeonic rhythm, we should keep in mind what Aristotle says: namely, that while Thrasymachus and others used the paeon, they were unable to say what it is (1409a3). Apparently the rhythm went unnamed, and in

¹⁹³ See, e.g., Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 6.14.7 with Kennedy (1963) p. 36.

all probability, it received little or no explicit recognition in a handbook of the fifth century.¹⁹⁴ Be that as it may, Plato tells us that Protagoras wrote on *Correct Diction* (*Phaedrus* 267C4–6), that Polus composed a *Muse's Treasury of Phrases* (267B10),¹⁹⁵ and that Licymnius produced a *Treasury of Words* (267C2). The mention of Licymnius is of some interest, for he seems to have been a poet as well as a writer on matters of style.¹⁹⁶ His work on words is likely to have included material relevant to both poetry and rhetoric, but whatever the truth concerning the work of Licymnius, it is clear that a work on λέξις need not be confined to the style of a single genre.

At the end of the fifth century, most handbooks were little more than collections of examples; although in some cases, the examples will have been organized under headings and perhaps accompanied by brief comments of a practical nature. From these beginnings, fuller treatments of λέξις developed in the fourth century. Isocrates, who was critical of the early writers of handbooks (*Against the Sophists* 19–20), appears to have written one himself. It is lost, but from what we do know of the work, it covered a variety of stylistic matters including the avoidance both of hiatus and of the same syllable at the end of one word and the beginning of the next, the proper use of conjunctions, word choice and rhythm (Syrianus, *Commentary on Hermogenes' On Ideas* p. 28 Rabe = *Artium script.* B XXIV 22).¹⁹⁷ The pseudo-Aristotelian *Rhetoric to Alexander*, which is preserved, contains a discussion of style. The topics include kinds of words and their arrangement, the construction of twofold statements, clarity, and antithesis, balanced clauses and similarity in sound. Prose rhythm is not mentioned (23 1434b33–28 1436a13). A much fuller and more satisfactory account is found in Book 3 of

¹⁹⁴ The so-called Μεγάλη τέχνη, which is attributed to Thrasymachus in a scholion on Aristophanes' *Birds* 800 (= *Artium script.* B IX 2), may have included more than the normal fifth-century handbook, but it is unlikely to have devoted space expressly to the use of the paeon in prose rhythm. Kennedy (1963) p. 69 suggests that it included the "Ἐλεοί mentioned by Aristotle at *Rhetoric* 3.3 1404a14 (cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 267C7–D1).

¹⁹⁵ According to the *Suda*, s.v. Πῶλος (= *Artium script.* B XIV 1), Polus wrote περὶ λέξεως, "on style." The prepositional phrase seems to be descriptive and not a title. It may refer to a quite short treatment of some particular feature of style. Certainly we should not think of an ambitious treatment of style in its many aspects. Antisthenes, too, is credited with writing on style (Diog. Laert. 6.15 = *Artium script.* B XIX 4). See Kennedy (1963) 171–2.

¹⁹⁶ In *Rhetoric* 3.12 1413b13–14, Aristotle cites Licymnius as a dithyrambic poet.

¹⁹⁷ Isocrates' pupil Ephorus wrote a Περί λέξεως, which included *inter alia* some discussion of pitch accent. See the commentary on 682, below, p. 240.

Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. A tripartite virtue of style is set forth: clarity together with elevation and appropriateness (3.2 1404b1–4, 3.12 1414a22–4).¹⁹⁸ Being unobtrusive in the use of stylistic devices is also emphasized (3.2 1404b18), and both diction, e.g., unusual words and metaphors, and composition, especially prose rhythm and periodic structure, are discussed in detail. Style is also discussed in Aristotle's *Poetics* 20–2, and many of the same topics are taken up. Diction, especially metaphor, receives attention (21 1457b1–1458a7), virtue of style is discussed in terms of clarity and elevation (22 1458a18–b11), appropriate moderation is recommended and being obvious is connected with being ludicrous (1458b12–15).

Theophrastus will have discussed all or most of these topics in his work *Περὶ λέξεως*. His fellow pupil in the Lyceum, Eudemus of Rhodes, also wrote a *Περὶ λέξεως*. It is lost, but the surviving fragments make clear that Eudemus discussed a variety of matters more closely allied to logic than to rhetoric and poetics: the dialectical question, the status of the verb “to be” in a categorical or predicative premise and sophisms based on *λέξις*. That Theophrastus took notice of such matters in his *Περὶ λέξεως* is at least a possibility. See the commentary on **666** no. 17a.

- 735** Martin of Laon, *Glossary = Greek-Latin Glossary of Laon*: cod. Laon 444, fol. 289^v (Usener, *Kl. Schr.* vol. 1 p. 192)

Literature: Miller (1880) p. 181, Heylbut (1884) p. 158; Usener, *Kleine Schriften* vol. 1 (1912) p. 192;¹⁹⁹ Lutz (1939) p. 227–8; Sheldon-Williams (1973) p. 3; O'Meara (1988) p. 16–17

Text **735** is found in a Laon codex that was copied in part by Martin of Laon (ninth century A.D.). Theophrastus' *Peplos* is cited for a report concerning the invention of letters, i.e., the alphabet. In the text-translation volumes, **735** is printed in the section on “Discoveries and Beginnings.” It is placed immediately before three texts that refer to the *Peplos* and have the invention of rhetoric as their subject (**736A–B**). We have placed a reference to **735** at the beginning of the section “On Expression,” for the invention of letters not only

¹⁹⁸ See the commentary on **684**, below, p. 267–8.

¹⁹⁹ The material on text **735** in Usener's *Kleine Schriften* vol. 1 p. 192 is an addition to an article entitled “Lectiones Graecae,” which was originally published in *Rheinisches Museum* 25 (1870).

facilitated record keeping and communication in general but also made possible the careful study of expression. Moreover, in the *Poetics*, Aristotle lists the letter first among the parts of expression. It is called a στοιχεῖον, an “ultimate element,” and defined as an indivisible sound (20 1456b20–2). In what follows, Aristotle explains that letters may be vowels, semi-mutes or mutes (1456b25–6); he also takes note of the fact that the introduction of a long vowel creates a lengthened word (21 1457b35–1458a1)²⁰⁰ and refers to letters when explaining difference in gender (1458a8–17). In the *Poetics*, Aristotle does not discuss the invention of letters, but he seems to have done so elsewhere. See below.

Text **735** begins by citing Theophrastus’ *Peplos* as its source. The *Peplos* is also cited as a source in **582** and **736A–C**. All are ninth-century texts. If there was a genuine Theophrastean work entitled *Peplos*, Carolignian scholars are likely to have known and used it through an intermediary. More likely, however, the *Peplos* was spurious, though it may have contained material collected from various Theophrastean works including the two books *On Discoveries* (**727** no. 11). See the commentary on **736A–C**.

Theophrastus’ name is explained as *deum intelligens*, “understanding god” (lines 1–2). A contemporary explanation (ninth century A.D.) by John Scotus Eriugena is *deum exponens*, “setting forth god” (**6**). Roughly nine centuries earlier, Cicero explained the name in terms of Theophrastus’ *divinitas loquendi*, “divine manner of speaking” (**5B.2**, cf. **1.30–1**), and Strabo spoke of Theophrastus’ ζῆλος τῆς φράσεως, “keenness for speech” (**5A.3**).

The first people to invent letters are said to have been the Egyptians. Second were the Phoenicians, after whom letters were called Phoenician (lines 3–4). There is nothing surprising here. The Greeks recognized the great antiquity of Egyptian civilization, including the use of hieroglyphics in writing. They also knew that their own system of writing was a later development. It involved a true alphabet²⁰¹ and had its origins among the Semites to the East. I cite the oligarch Critias, c. 460–403 B.C., who tells us that the Phoenicians invented letters (*ap.* Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 1 28C = 88B2 D–K), and the historian Herodotus, c. 485–425 B.C., who attributed to Cadmus the transfer of letters westward (*Histories* 5.58), as does the

²⁰⁰ On the lengthened word, ἐπεκτεταμένον, cf. **Append. 9.83–6**.

²⁰¹ By “true alphabet” I mean a system in which letters represent individual sounds within a language. Cf. Aristotle, *Poetics* 20 1456b20–2, cited above.

Laon codex (line 4–5).²⁰² In addition, a scholion on Dionysius Thrax reports that Aristotle followed Herodotus and credited Cadmus with bringing the invention of the Phoenicians to the Greeks (*GG* 1.3 p. 183.2–5 Uhlig = fr. 501 Rose³).²⁰³

The idea that sixteen letters, ΑΒΓΔΕΙΚΑΜΝΟΠΡΣΤΥ, were brought to Greece from the East and that two sets of four letters, ΖΘΧΦ and ΗΞΨΩ, were added later by Palamedes and Simonides (lines 6–7) is not peculiar to Theophrastus. Citing Demetrius of Phalerum among others, Victorinus tells us that the same sixteen letters were brought to Greece from Phoenicia and that eight were added later (*Ars grammatica* 1.4.95–6 = Dem. Ph. fr. 147 SOD).²⁰⁴ We are not told that the eight letters were added four at a time, but it is a reasonable guess that Demetrius followed his teacher Theophrastus and spoke of two sets of four. In the case of two scholia on Dionysius Thrax, guessing is not necessary. The same sixteen letters are listed as the invention of the barbarians and the same two sets of four letters are credited to Palamedes and Simonides (*GG* 1.3 p. 185.3–7 [with 184.9–10] and p. 191.29–32). The only differences between the scholia and the Laon codex are relatively minor. In both scholia, the letters invented by Palamedes are mentioned after those invented by Simonides (that reverses the order of the Laon codex) and in both scholia, letters are described as long, double and aspirate (that is not true of the Laon codex). Furthermore, in one scholia, there is the additional comment that some people credit Epicharmus, as against Palamedes, with the invention of ΖΘΧΦ (p. 185.6–7). The reference to Epicharmus is of some interest, for it may remind us of what Pliny the Elder says about the invention of the alphabet and in particular about Aristotle. After telling us that in his judgment the Assyrians always had letters, Pliny recognizes two groups of which one holds that letters were invented in Egypt, while the other assigns their invention to Syria. Both groups are said to believe that Cadmus brought sixteen letters to Greece and that Palamedes and Simonides

²⁰² Herodotus 5.58, like the Laon codex (line 4), takes note of the fact that the Phoenicians gave their name to the letters of the alphabet.

²⁰³ The details of the development of the Greek alphabet are still a matter of scholarly debate. See, e.g., J. Healey, *The Early Alphabet* (Berkeley: University of California 1990); B. Powell, *Homer and the Origin of the Greek Alphabet* (Cambridge: University Press 1991); and R. Woodward, *Greek Writing from Knossos to Homer* (Oxford: University Press 1997).

²⁰⁴ The list of letters in Victorinus is corrupt, but the total number of sixteen is firm, and convincing emendations bring the list into agreement with that found in the Laon codex.

added four each.²⁰⁵ Thereupon Pliny names Aristotle and says that he assigned eighteen letters to the ancient alphabet and preferred Epicharmus to Palamedes as the inventor of Ψ and Z (*Natural History* 7.192 = fr. 501 Rose³). That differs from the scholion on Dionysius, in which the lyric poet is mentioned in connection with the letters $Z\Theta X\Phi$.²⁰⁶ Moreover, if Pliny is correct and Aristotle did assign eighteen letters to the ancient alphabet, then Aristotle will have been in disagreement with Theophrastus. At least in the Laon codex, Theophrastus is said to have put the number at sixteen. How much one should make of this difference between Aristotle and Theophrastus is difficult to say. It is, however, of some interest that in three passages Pliny records a difference between the two regarding an invention: namely, in regard to the invention of bronze (7.197 = **731**), of towers (7.195–6 = **732**) and of painting (7.205 = **733**).²⁰⁷ Since Theophrastus wrote two books *On Discoveries* (**727** no. 11), it is easy to imagine him investigating certain inventions with care and coming to different conclusions than Aristotle. But even if such speculation is correct, it would be rash to generalize and to conclude that Theophrastus made a point of disagreeing with his teacher.

- 681** pseudo-Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Metaphysics* 14(N).6 1093a20–6 (CAG vol. 1 p. 834.5–11 Hayduck)

Literature: Usener (1870) p. 590–2; D'Angour (1999) p. 109–19

²⁰⁵ The manuscripts vary concerning the letters included in the two sets of four, and different editors print different sets of four. (In the Teubner, $ZY\Phi X$ and $\Psi\Xi\Omega\Theta$ are printed; in the Loeb we find $Z\Psi\Phi X$ and $Y\Xi\Omega\Theta$. For the manuscript readings see the *apparatus criticus* in the Teubner edition.) Given the ease with which Greek letters can be wrongly copied in a Latin manuscript, it may be prudent simply to note the fact that variation exists both in the manuscripts and in the printed editions.

²⁰⁶ Hyginus, *Fabulae* 272.1 connects Epicharmus with two letters, but they are Π and Ψ , not Ψ and Z , which Aristotle is said to have attributed to Epicharmus. In the *Suda* s.v. "Epicharmus" (no. 2766, *LG* vol. 1.2 p. 393.28 Adler), Epicharmus is said to have been the inventor of the long letters H and Ω .

²⁰⁷ In **733** Pliny reports that according to Theophrastus the originator of painting in Greece was Polygnotus (*Natural History* 7.205). Kennedy (1957) p. 99–100 thinks that the Theophrastean work in question is *On Style* (**666** no. 17a), in which differences in literary style were compared to differences in artistic style. Since Kennedy believes that the Theophrastean discussion was not historical in orientation, he suggests that the remark was merely parenthetical. That is possible, but it is, I think, more likely that the Theophrastean source is the two volume work *On Discoveries* (**727** no. 11), in which a historical claim about painting would be central to a chapter or section and not parenthetical.

Alexander of Aphrodisias, who was active at the end of the second and the beginning of the third century A.D., wrote a commentary on the whole of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Only a portion survives, i.e., the commentary on Books 1–5 (A–Δ) which is printed in Volume 1 of the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*. The commentary on Books 6–14 (E–N) that follows in Volume I is, in its present form, of a much later date. While scholars are divided as to who the author may have been, it seems certain that he is later than Simplicius, who belongs to the sixth century. Perhaps the author was Michael of Ephesus, who was active a full nine centuries after Alexander, i.e., at the beginning of the twelfth century.²⁰⁸ How much of the commentary on Books 6–14 preserves material that goes back to Alexander is uncertain. In any case, text **681** is a comment on Book 14 (N) and therefore not directly attributable to Alexander. An all but identical parallel text occurs in Syrianus' commentary on the *Metaphysics*. Syrianus belongs to the fifth century, so that his commentary predates that of pseudo-Alexander.²⁰⁹ Most likely pseudo-Alexander has taken **681** from Syrianus, so that the text should have been printed under the name of Syrianus, and mention of pseudo-Alexander should have been reserved for the apparatus of parallel texts.

In *Metaphysics* 14(N).5–6 1092b8–1093b21, Aristotle is highly critical of Pythagorean number-lore. Following a section in which he argues that the number seven cannot explain *inter alia* why there are seven vowels and seven Pleiads (1093a7–20), Aristotle turns to the double consonants, Ξ, Ψ and Ζ, and rejects the idea that these sigmatic compounds are three because the number of musical concords is three. His own position is that they are three because there are three regions of the mouth in which a consonant is combined with sigma (1093a20–7). Aristotle does not identify the musical concords to which the Pythagoreans appeal, but the two commentators, ps.-Alexander and Syrianus, do so: Ζ is referred to the fourth, Ξ to the fifth and Ψ to the octave (ps.-Alex. p. 833.4–5 Hayduck; Syr. p. 191.27–8 Kroll). The commentators also specify the three regions of the mouth in which the double consonants are pronounced. Ps.-Alexander first lists the region outside the teeth, the vault (or roof) of the mouth and the teeth themselves (p. 833.32–3), after which he

²⁰⁸ For further details, see the discussion of Syrianus and pseudo-Alexander above in the section on "The Sources," p. 36 and 46–7.

²⁰⁹ A dissenting view has been advanced by Leonardo Tarán. See "The Sources" on Syrianus and pseudo-Alexander.

cites Archinus, who speaks of the tip of the tongue, the flat of the tongue along the teeth and the convex region (or roof) of the mouth (681.2–6). Syrianus cites Archinus without first listing three regions of the mouth (p. 191.30–5). D’Angour p. 119 suggests that the words ἀκρόν, πλάτος and κυρτόν (681.3, 4 and 6) are “quasi-technical terms for different areas on the tongue (i.e. tip, middle and back).” He may be correct concerning the quasi-technical status of the words, but κυρτόν refers to the roof of the mouth (the hard palate) against which the tongue is placed when the letter ξ is pronounced.²¹⁰ To be sure, both ἀκρόν and πλάτος are qualified by τῆς γλώττης (line 3: the tip of the tongue and the flat of the tongue), but κυρτόν is not, and in ps.-Alexander’s preceding list, the corresponding term is οὐρανίσκος (sc. τόπος p. 833.33), the vaulted region or roof of the mouth.²¹¹

Archinus was an Athenian who was active in politics and instrumental in restoring democracy during the archonship of Eucleides in 403/2 B.C. At that time he successfully proposed a reform of the Attic alphabet, that brought it in line with the Ionic alphabet. H would now be used for long *e* (eta) instead of signifying the consonantal *h*; Ω would be used for a long *o* (omega); and the sigmatic compounds Ξ and Ψ were added in place of the digraphs ΧΣ and ΠΣ. Building on Usener p. 591–2, D’Angour p. 118–19 suggests that Archinus offered a scientific analysis of the sigmatic compounds as part of an argument in favor of adopting the proposed reforms. Since there are three sigmatic compounds, and since the Attic alphabet already had a letter for one, i.e. the letter Ζ, it would be consistent to adopt Ξ and Ψ, so that each of the compounds may be recognized by its own letter. In addition, the introduction of Η and Ω as long vowels would eliminate an ambiguity in the Attic alphabet, in which epsilon and omicron served as both long and short vowels.²¹² Archinus may also have been motivated by political considerations. According to D’Angour p. 119–29 the acceptance of the Ionic alphabet would be both a way of calling attention to Athens’ common ancestry with the

²¹⁰ D. Ross, *Aristotle’s Metaphysics* (Oxford: Clarendon 1958) vol. 2 p. 497.

²¹¹ Cf. LSJ s.v. II.

²¹² With the introduction of eta and omega, spelling would make clear when a poet was lengthening a short vowel or shortening a long one in order to fit the meter or to achieve some other effect. Cf. *Poetics* 22 1458b7–8: Eucleides — perhaps the archon of 403/2 (reading ἄρχων instead of ἀρχαῖος; see Janko [1987] p. 134–5) — is reported to have said that it is easy to write poetry if one is permitted to lengthen a word or syllable at will. On lengthening, see *Poetics* 21 1457b35–1458a5 and **Append. 9**.83–6.

Ionians²¹³ and a special gesture toward the Samians, who had been loyal to the Athenians in the closing years of the Peloponnesian War and were closely identified with the Ionic alphabet.²¹⁴

We still need to ask in what context Theophrastus cited Archinus. One possibility is a discussion of the physiology (or mechanics) of speech. That is suggested by Archinus' careful observation concerning Ψ : whereas the letter Π is pronounced outside the lips, the sigmatic compound Ψ is pronounced at the tip of the tongue (lines 2–4).²¹⁵ Such an observation might be at home in the work *On Style* (666 no. 17a), for in the *Poetics*, Aristotle discusses letters as one of eight parts of λέξις and notes that the letters differ *inter alia* according to the formation of the mouth and the region within the mouth where the sounds are produced (20 1456b31–2). Theophrastus may have offered more detail toward the beginning of *On Style*, but we should note that Aristotle refers to works on versification, where consideration of such matters is said to belong (περὶ ὧν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐν τοῖς μετρικοῖς προσήκει θεωρεῖν 20 1456b34).²¹⁶ A different possibility is *On Discoveries* (727 no. 11). We know that Theophrastus took an interest in the invention of letters including Ξ , Ψ and Z (735.7). The source text in question cites Theophrastus' *Peplos* (727 no. 10), but that work is likely to be spurious and perhaps based on material found in a genuine work such as *On Discoveries*.²¹⁷ The report concerning Archinus might then have occurred as a kind of footnote or excursus within a discussion of the invention of letters and in particular of additions to the Attic alphabet. A third possibility is that the Theophrastean context was similar to that in the commentaries of Syrianus and ps.-Alexander. Following Aristotle and criticizing Pythagorean numerology, Theophrastus may have supplemented his teacher's brief reference to three regions of the mouth (1093a24) by introducing the more detailed remarks of

²¹³ On the common ancestry, see Herodotus, *Histories* 1.146.2.

²¹⁴ On the connection of the Samians with the Ionic alphabet, see D'Angour p. 112–15.

²¹⁵ D'Angour p. 119 n. 48.

²¹⁶ Similarly Aristotle leaves the study of different kinds of syllables to the art of versification (τούτων θεωρῆσαι τὰς διαφορὰς τῆς μετρικῆς ἐστίν 20 1456b38). So too in the *Parts of Animals*, he offers some brief remarks on the role of the lips and the tongue in speech and then tells us that additional information is to be sought from the authorities on versification (δεῖ πυνθάνεσθαι παρὰ τῶν μετρικῶν 2.16 660a8).

²¹⁷ See the commentary on 735.

Archinus. But if one asks in what work such a supplement may have occurred, no title springs to mind.²¹⁸

- 682** pseudo-Sergius, *Explanations concerning the Art of Donatus* 1 (GL vol. 4 p. 530.9–17 Keil)

Literature: Usener (1892) p. 631–41; Haas p. 170–2

Text **682** is part of a discussion concerning the number of pitch accents: *quot sint prosodiae dicendum est* (p. 529.1–2 Keil). Pseudo-Sergius surveys several possibilities, giving for each the name of at least one proponent. We are told that Athenodorus recognized two, a higher and a lower accent, for he regarded the circumflex, what the Greeks call περισπωμένη, as nothing more than a union of the other two in a single syllable (p. 529.4–7). Dionysius Thrax is said to have handed down the three that everyone now uses, i.e., the grave, acute and circumflex: βαρεῖα, ὀξεῖα and περισπωμένη (p. 529.7–10). Tyrannion is reported to have opted for four, i.e., grave, middle, acute and circumflex: βαρεῖα, μέση, ὀξεῖα and περισπωμένη (p. 529.10–12). Varro is said to have posited the same four and to have presented numerous arguments *pro media prosodia* (p. 529.17–18). After presenting a selection of Varro's arguments (p. 529.15–530.9),²¹⁹ pseudo-Sergius tells us that Varro appealed to earlier authorities, who are described as most famous and said to have made mention of the *media prosodia*. The appeal to authorities is our text **682**. Two grammarians, Glaucus of Samos and Hermocrates of Iasus, are named, as are two philosophers, Theophrastus and the Peripatetic Athenodorus. After this appeal to authorities, i.e., at the conclusion of **682**, pseudo-Sergius refers again to Glaucus of Samos

²¹⁸ That is a serious objection but not a fatal one, for Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean works is not 100 percent complete. E.g., it makes no reference to the *Metaphysics*, which we have in manuscript form. Nevertheless, no surviving fragment suggests that Theophrastus addressed the absurdities of Pythagorean number-lore, so that the third possibility has little to recommend it.

²¹⁹ Pseudo-Sergius tells us that he has omitted many of Varro's arguments (p. 530.8–9). The arguments that are recorded are largely theoretical, though direct sensory experience is not ignored (p. 529.15–530.9). Haas p. 171 attributes the arguments to Tyrannion, but in the text of pseudo-Sergius the arguments are presented as those of Varro. In the case of Tyrannion, only his attention to the actual pitch of the voice is mentioned (p. 529.13–15). Presumably Haas has expressed himself in a condensed manner, his fuller view being that Varro has drawn on Tyrannion and pseudo-Sergius on Tyrannion indirectly through Varro. Cf. Funaioli, cited below at note 229.

and tells us that he posited six accents. Three are described as simple (the grave, middle and acute), and three are said to be double or compound and to be species of a single genus, i.e., the circumflex (p. 530.17–23).

In approaching 682,²²⁰ we should keep in mind that pseudo-Sergius is considering a theory of four pitch accents — that advanced by Tyrannion and embraced by Varro — in which the middle and the circumflex are distinct from one another. That is clear not only from what pseudo-Sergius says about Tyrannion, Varro and Glaucus of Samos (p. 529.10–530.23) but also from subsequent remarks. The μέση is said to be between the acute and grave (531.16), while the circumflex is called a fourth accent that is *plexior* than the other three (531.17–18). If naming Theophrastus among the four authorities is not a mistake,²²¹ Theophrastus must have recognized a middle pitch accent that was different from the circumflex. He need not have used the term μέση, but he probably did. Only Athenodorus is said to have used a different term; he spoke of the μονότονος (lines 8–9).²²² Problematic is how this report concerning Athenodorus fits with the earlier statement that Athenodorus recognized only two pitch accents, an *inferior* and a *superior*, and regarded the circumflex as a combination of the two (p. 529.4–7). This earlier statement seems to rule out a middle pitch accent under any name including μονότονος. Two possibilities suggest themselves. The first is textual. The proper name “Athenodorus” is an emendation by Wasius (see the *apparatus criticus*). The emendation is reasonable, but its correctness cannot be guaranteed, so that the Peripatetic may be someone of a different name. The second possibility is that we are presented with two different persons named Athenodorus. One is explicitly said to be a Peripatetic (line 7);²²³ the other is to be identified as a Stoic of the first century B.C.²²⁴

²²⁰ The discussion that begins here owes much to valuable pointers and criticisms by Wolfram Ax and Gualtiero Calboli. As always, any mistakes are entirely my own.

²²¹ Toward the end of this comment, I consider the possibility that listing Theophrastus as one of four authorities may be a mistake.

²²² I am drawing a probable conclusion based on silence, but not all arguments from silence are to be dismissed.

²²³ The use of *nec non* may be emphatic and intended to call attention to the fact that this Athenodorus is not a better known Stoic (see the following note), but according to Lewis and Short s.v. *neque* II.B.5.b, Varro might use *nec non* as a simple conjunction.

²²⁴ There appear to have been two Stoics named Athenodorus at work in the first century B.C.: Athenodorus Kordylion and Athenodorus the son of Sandon.

If what is said above is not mistaken, Theophrastus is presented as someone who took notice of a middle accent of the kind that Tyrannion and Varro recognized. In others words, he will have called attention to a μέση that falls between the acute and grave. It is not necessary that he recognized the circumflex as a fourth accent. Like (the first mentioned) Athenodorus (p. 529.4–7), he may have regarded it as a combination of the acute and the grave. But it is necessary that he did not identify the middle with the circumflex. That is of some interest, for Aristotle, too, recognized a middle pitch accent. In the *Rhetoric*, he speaks of the μέση (*sc.* προσωδία 3.1 1403b30) and in the *Poetics*, he refers to τὸ μέσον (20 1456b33). That suggests that Theophrastus did nothing very different from his teacher; both recognized a middle accent. The difficulty here is that modern commentators identify Aristotle's middle accent with the circumflex.²²⁵ If that identification is correct, then Theophrastus seems not to have followed his teacher in regard to the middle accent. Rather, Theophrastus will have introduced a change in terminology. Instead of using μέση or μέσον to refer to the circumflex, he used it to refer to a middle accent between the acute and the grave.²²⁶ In addition, he may have recognized the circumflex as a fourth accent. We are told that Ephorus of Cumae (Isocrates' pupil, c. 405–330 B.C.) used the term περίσπωσις to refer to the circumflex (p. 531.19–20). Theophrastus may have used the same term or the cognate participle περισπωμένη or both.²²⁷ Nevertheless, one wonders whether scholarly opinion is correct concerning Aristotle's use of the terms μέση and μέσον. If Aristotle, like Athenodorus (p. 529.4–7), viewed the circumflex as a combination of the acute and grave, he may have given the circumflex no special name and used μέση or μέσον to refer to the middle pitch accent that pseudo-Sergius, following Varro, finds in Theophrastus.²²⁸

See H. Dörrie, "Athenodoros," (2 & 3) in *Der kleine Pauly* (Stuttgart: Druckenmüller 1964) vol. 1 col. 705 and I. Vasilou, "Athenodoros," in *Encyclopedia of Classical Philosophy*, ed. D. Zeyl (Westport: Greenwood 1997) p. 100.

²²⁵ E.g., Kühner-Blass vol. 1 p. 318 n. 4, Cope (1867) p. 379, Lucas p. 200, Kennedy (1991) p. 218.

²²⁶ Even if Theophrastus did not use μέση or μέσον as a *terminus technicus*, he is likely to have used one or the other of these words to describe the accent that is conceived of as lying between the acute and grave.

²²⁷ When listing the accents recognized by Dionysius Thrax and Tyrannion, pseudo-Sergius uses the participle περισπωμένη (p. 529.9–10, 12, cf. 529.6).

²²⁸ To avoid any confusion, I want to state clearly that I am not suggesting that Aristotle totally ignored what others called the circumflex. In the *Poetics* 25 1461a23 and in *Sophistical Refutations* 4 166b3–6, 21 177b37–178a3, he takes account of

If one asks why Aristotle is omitted from the list of authorities who make mention of the middle accent, two answers come to mind. One is that Varro construed μέση or μέσον in Aristotle as references to the circumflex, which is different from the middle accent under consideration in **682**. A different answer (and the more likely of the two) is that Varro had no direct acquaintance with the (relevant portions of the) *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, and what he did know from anthologies and other secondary sources did not speak to the issue. That leaves open how Varro would have construed the passages in *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*, had he been confronted with them.

A different possibility is that Theophrastus' name is out of place in text **682**, i.e., it does not belong in a list of authorities who made mention of a middle accent of the kind that Tyrannion and Varro recognized. Scholars are correct when they explain Aristotle's use of μέση and μέσον by reference to the circumflex, and Theophrastus, following his teacher, used one or the other or both of these words in reference to the circumflex. Varro, then, will have erred. Perhaps he was misled by a handbook and confused two different uses of μέση or μέσον, so that he included Theophrastus in a list to which he does not belong. I hesitate to ascribe such a mistake to Varro, but in regard to pitch accents his knowledge of Theophrastus may have been only slightly better than his knowledge of Aristotle.

For completeness' sake, I add that the mistake, if it is one, may have occurred at a later time. According to Funaioli, pseudo-Sergius is drawing indirectly on Varro, who is dependent on Tyrannion.²²⁹ Such a chain of borrowing opens the door to mistaken additions, and the inclusion of Theophrastus' name could be one. In the *Suda*, we read that Tyrannion was originally called Theophrastus. His teacher Hestiaeus gave him the name Tyrannion, indicating the way he treated his fellow students (tau no. 1184, *LG* vol. 1 part 4 p. 607.17–19 Adler = T 1 Haas). Even if we doubt the veracity of the report, we can imagine someone in the chain referring briefly to the alleged name change and adding a reference to Theophrastus of Eresus, who is said to have received his name from Aristotle (1.30–1). Subsequently the mention of Tyrannion's original name fell out, and the Eresian, together with a reference to his name change (p. 530.14–15), entered the list of

problems that depend on pitch accent including the circumflex. I am only suggesting that he may have regarded it as a combination of the acute and grave and therefore did not assign it a special label.

²²⁹ H. Funaioli, "Hermokrates," (11) in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* (1912) vol. 8 col. 888.

persons who anticipated Tyrannion and Varro by adopting a middle accent. But I am only putting forth a possibility and not a scenario that I think at all likely, especially given the other Hellenistic writers named by pseudo-Sergius. The reference to Theophrastus is entirely at home where it occurs in the *Explanations*.

Text **682** may reflect what Theophrastus said in the work *Περὶ λέξεως*, *On Style* (**666** no. 17a). Aristotle mentions pitch accent when discussing *λέξις* in the *Poetics* (20 1456b33), and Ephorus seems to have discussed pitch accent in his work *Περὶ λέξεως*.²³⁰ But there are other possibilities. In the *Poetics*, Aristotle considers problems in Homer that are resolved by a change in accent (25 1461a21–3). Theophrastus is said to have written two different books entitled *On Poetry* (**666** no. 20 and 21). In one or both of them, he may have considered problems based on accent and in this context listed, perhaps with brief discussion, the different kinds of pitch accent. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle mentions pitch accent in regard to delivery (3.1 1403b29), and we can easily imagine Theophrastus saying more in his work *On Delivery* (**666** no. 24). In addition, Theophrastus may have taken notice of pitch accent in a logical work, for a change in accent can cause misunderstanding. Indeed, Aristotle discusses pitch accent in the *Sophistical Refutations* (3 165b27, 4 166b1–9, 21 177b35–178a3).²³¹

- 78** Ammonius, *On Aristotle's De interpretatione* 4 17a1 (CAG vol. 4.5 p. 65.31–66.10 Busse)

Literature: Fabricius (1793) vol. 3 p. 451; Westermann (1833) p. 172; Schmidt (1839) p. 52–3; Hendrickson (1905) p. 255–7; Kayser (1906) p. 25; Mayer (1910) p. 14–15; Stroux (1912) p. 2; Rostagni (1922) p. 108; Throm (1932) p. 65; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1383; Grube (1952) p. 178; Kennedy (1957) p. 98; Dosi (1960) p. 614, 622, 626; Lossau (1964) p. 39–47; Janko (1984) p. 50, 112 n. 40, 222; Innes (1985) p.

²³⁰ Pseudo-Sergius tells us only that Ephorus used the term *περίσπασις* (p. 531.19–20). He does not mention *Περὶ λέξεως* or any other work of Ephorus. However, we do know that Ephorus wrote a work *Περὶ λέξεως* (Theon, *Progymnasmata* 2 p. 71.22–3 Spengel = *FGrH* 70 F 6 Jacoby), so that connecting pseudo-Sergius' report with the work *Περὶ λέξεως* is reasonable. See Kühner-Blass vol. 1 p. 318 n. 4.

²³¹ Aristotle is careful to observe that fallacies involving pitch accent arise primarily in arguments that are written down (4 166b1–3, cf. 21 177b35–7). Signs for accents are probably a later invention, perhaps attributable to Aristophanes of Byzantium. See Kühner-Blass vol. 1 n. 4 p. 318.

254–5; Patillon (1988) p. 27–34; Fortenbaugh (1990) p. 168–75; Gottschalk (1992) p. 529; Schenkeveld (1998) p. 72–80

Text **78** is printed among the sources for logic at the beginning of the section on statement (**78–89**). It is taken from Ammonius' commentary on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*. The commentator is discussing the fourth chapter, in which Aristotle first defines the sentence in general and then picks out the statement-making sentence, the λόγος ἀποφαντικός, as the subject of his treatise. This kind of sentence is said to admit truth or falsity (17a2–3); other kinds that do not are dismissed from consideration. Aristotle mentions prayer in order to illustrate these other kinds (17a4) and says that a discussion of them is more at home in rhetoric and poetics (17a5–6). The mention of prayer alone invites supplementation, and Ammonius does not disappoint us. He lists four kinds of sentence that do not admit truth or falsity: the vocative, interrogative and imperative as well as the optative or prayer (64.30–65.2). After that the commentator takes up the reference to rhetoric and poetry and gives reasons for assigning an investigation of sentences to these fields of inquiry. He makes reference to both Platonic division and Plato's notion of a general art of discourse, after which he expands upon Aristotle's assertion that the present inquiry is concerned only with statement-making sentences (65.2–30).

It is in this context that Ammonius names Theophrastus and reports his distinction between the sentence in relation to the listeners and in relation to the facts: διττῆς γὰρ οὔσης τῆς τοῦ λόγου σχέσεως, καθὰ διώρισεν ὁ Θεόφραστος, τῆς τε πρὸς τοὺς ἀκροωμένους, οἷς καὶ σημαίνει τι, καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὰ πράγματα, ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ λέγων πείσαι προτίθεται τοὺς ἀκροωμένους (**78.1–4**). Here Ammonius is almost certainly drawing on Theophrastus' treatise *On Affirmation and Denial* (**68** no. 3a).²³² That work, now lost, was a logical treatise, closely related to Aristotle's *De interpretatione*. We can be certain that Theophrastus discussed the statement-making sentence and, like Aristotle, distinguished this kind of sentence from other kinds that are neither true nor false. Furthermore, we can imagine Theo-

²³² See Schmidt (1839) p. 53, opposing Fabricius and Westermann, who thought that Ammonius was drawing on the treatise *On Style*. Innes (1985) p. 265 n. 17 names no work; but like Schmidt, she thinks that Ammonius is drawing on a logical work of Theophrastus. In addition to Fabricius and Westermann, Mayer, Hendrickson and Regenbogen think that *On Style* stands behind the remarks of Ammonius.

phrastus adding that the statement-making sentence, like any other sentence, involves stylistic aspects that are irrelevant to its truth or falsity. In making that point, he will have said that the statement-making sentence may be viewed not only, “in relation to the facts,” but also “in relation to the hearers.”²³³ Aristotle does not make the point in *De interpretatione*; but I suspect that Theophrastus did make it in *On Affirmation and Denial*. And if he did, he would be doing exactly what Boethius said he did in that work: namely, adding points not made by Aristotle in the *De interpretatione* (72A.10–12).

In what immediately follows the segment quoted above, we are told that poetics and rhetoric are concerned with the relation of λόγος to the hearers: περὶ μὲν τὴν σχέσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀκροατὰς καταγίνονται ποιητικὴ καὶ ῥητορικὴ (4–5). Then come some remarks indicating the business of poetics and rhetoric (5–11), after which we are told that the philosopher is concerned with λόγος in relation to the facts: τῆς δέ γε πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῦ λόγου σχέσεως ὁ φιλόσοφος προηγουμένως ἐπιμελήσεται (11–12). Here we need to guard against a possible confusion. We are not being told that Theophrastus distinguished between two λόγοι: the ornamented speech of poets and orators on the one hand and the unadorned language of philosophers on the other.²³⁴ Rather Ammonius credits Theophrastus with recognizing a double relationship that characterizes one and the same λόγος, i.e., the statement-making sentence which has a relationship to both the hearers and the facts, and therefore can be the business of poetics and rhetoric as well as logic. Apparently Theophrastus wanted to make clear that *On Affirmation and Denial* was a work exclusively devoted to logic, and toward that end he stated the twofold relationship in order to dismiss one member: namely, that which is the business of poetics and rhetoric.

The business of poetics and rhetoric is illustrated briefly, but densely. These arts are said to be concerned with the selection of dignified words, their harmonious arrangement, clarity and sweet-

²³³ I have expressed myself as if Ammonius is quoting or at least using the words of Theophrastus. A caveat should, however, be stated in regard to σχέσις. The word does appear to have been used elsewhere by Theophrastus (282.31), but in the passage under consideration, its use may derive from Ammonius, who uses it repeatedly throughout his commentary, despite the fact that it is not found in Aristotle's *De interpretatione*. But even if Ammonius is using his own word to report Theophrastus' distinction between two aspects of the statement-making sentence (and I leave the matter open), there is no reason to think that Ammonius has in any way misrepresented Theophrastus.

²³⁴ Here I am disagreeing with Innes (1985) p. 254–55. Cf. Stroux p. 2.

ness and other qualities of style, length and brevity of speech, all of which when used on the right occasion produce pleasure, amazement and conviction (5–11). At first reading, we may be tempted to think that this list reflects more or less accurately what Theophrastus wrote when dissociating *On Affirmation and Denial* from the business of poetics and rhetoric. But first impressions are often wrong, and in this case almost certainly so. The use of ἰδέαι to refer to qualities of style postdates Theophrastus and should be attributed to Ammonius.²³⁵ Furthermore the mention of length and brevity of speech in combination with the right occasion invites comparison with Plato's *Phaedrus* 267A–269B. Since Ammonius has cited the *Phaedrus* roughly one half page earlier (65.22–3), it is not unreasonable to ask whether he is not recalling Platonic material in the lines that concern us. More telling, however, may be two lines that occur another half page earlier. Ammonius is commenting on sentences that are not statement-making. He tells us that Aristotle assigns them to rhetoric and poetics, and that prompts him to mention rhythm, the period and figures of speech (65.6–7). These items are, of course, the special concern of rhetoric and poetics, but they are not closely tied to the subject under consideration and are not suggested by anything in the Aristotelian text, except the mention of rhetoric and poetics. In my view, something similar may be true of Ammonius' handling of Theophrastean material. Theophrastus will have mentioned rhetoric and poetics in connection with style or expression, i.e., the statement-making sentence in relation to the hearers. Perhaps he illustrated style by distinguishing between dignified and common words (lines 6–7).²³⁶ But the subsequent items mentioned in our text are likely to come from Ammonius. Being a commentator, he expands on his source, and in most contexts that is helpful.

For understanding the development of Peripatetic rhetoric and poetics, text **78** is a disappointment. It is primarily a logical text; and even if the reference to the hearers and the mention of rhetoric and poetics look beyond logic, nothing is said which justifies the assertion that Theophrastus departed from Aristotle by shifting the focus

²³⁵ Lossau p. 39 n. 79, citing Radermacher (1899) p. 374–80; also Innes (1985) p. 265 n. 23.

²³⁶ The distinction is Aristotelian, see *Rhetoric* 3.2 1404b3–8, 3.7 1408a11–14 and *Poetics* 22 1458a18–23. The words τὰ κοινὰ καὶ δεδημευμένα invite comparison with the description of comic diction found in the *Tractatus Coislinianus*: κωμικὴ ἐστὶ λέξις κοινὴ καὶ δημώδης (8 p. 52 Kaibel = XIVa p. 38 Janko). See Janko (1984) p. 222.

of rhetoric from argument to style and audience reaction. He may have done so, but text **78** offers little to support the claim.

- 683** Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Categories*, Introduction (CAG vol. 8 p. 10.20–11.12 Kalbfleisch)

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 37–8, 45; Rose (1863) p. 142–3; Volkmann (1885) p. 395–6, 533; Diels (1886) p. 12 n. 3; Striller (1886) p. 51–2; Rabe (1890) p. 5–6, 36–45; Schmid (1894) p. 144–5; Mayer (1910) p. vi, li, 15–16; Stroux (1912) p. 23–8; Solmsen (1931) p. 247, 261, (1941) p. 185; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1527–8; Grube (1952a) p. 177; Lucas (1968) p. 201–2; Martin (1974) p. 248–9; van Bennekom (1975) p. 408–11; Frede (1978, repr. 1987) p. 317, 328; Janko (1984) p. 180; Schenkeveld (1990) p. 103–4, (1993b) p. 79, (1994a) p. 271, (1998) p. 69–79; Blank (1996) p. 140; Chase (2003) p. 25–6, 106–7

In the introduction to his commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, Simplicius surveys the work of earlier commentators (1.3–2.29 Kalbfleisch), explains his decision to add a commentary of his own (2.30–3.17), lists ten questions for preliminary consideration (p. 3.18–29), and then goes on to answer each of the questions. Our text is part of Simplicius' response to the tenth question: Regarding each of Aristotle's treatises, what are the topics that need to be addressed? (3.28–9, 8.9–10) Seven topics are recognized, of which the first is the σκόπος, the focus or subject of each treatise (8.10). Simplicius explains that knowledge of the subject will keep our thinking properly directed (8.13–15), and he reports that scholars offer differing views concerning the subject of the *Categories* (9.5–6). Three views are rejected as incomplete,²³⁷ after which Simplicius considers two views which are deemed more complete. The first is that of Alexander of Aphrodisias,²³⁸ and the second that of Porphyry, who is said to see the subject of the work in the predicates, i.e., "the simple sounds which signify things in so far as they (the sounds) are significant, but not in so far as they are simply expressions" (10.20–3). That is the beginning of text **683**. It contains both a report concern-

²³⁷ The rejected views are that the *Categories* is concerned with the simple sounds of voice (9.6–19), with the things that are signified by voice (9.19–30) and with simple thoughts (9.31–10.5).

²³⁸ Alexander is said to see the subject of the *Categories* in the simplest and most generic parts of the *logos*: those that signify the simple things and the simple thoughts about these things (10.9–20).

ing the view of Porphyry and a kind of excursus or parenthesis dealing with λέξις, style or expression. The latter divides the report, of which the first part runs to line 5 (as far as ἄλλας ἔχουσι πραγματείας) and the second begins in line 12 (with καθὸ μέντοι). In the text-translation volumes, we have printed only the opening sentence of the second part. In the edition of Kalbfleisch, the second part runs 24 lines (11.1–24).

Schenkeveld has discussed **683** at length and shown convincingly that Simplicius' remarks concerning Theophrastus do not go back to the work *On Style* (**666** no. 17a).²³⁹ Rather they depend ultimately on a logical treatise, perhaps *On Affirmation and Denial* (**68** no. 3a). Most likely the same treatise stands behind text **78** = Ammonius, *On Aristotle's De interpretatione* 4 17a1, in which the commentator reports Theophrastus' distinction between the sentence in relation to the listeners and the sentence in relation to the facts. Schenkeveld recommends printing **683** together with **78**; I agree and would place **683** before **78**.²⁴⁰ In what follows, I offer some reflections on specific points.

The report concerning Porphyry seems fair enough. Two of his works are cited: *To Gedalios* and *By Question and Answer*; and while the former has been lost and therefore cannot be checked, the latter does survive (CAG vol. 4.1) and agrees with what is reported (cf. 58.5–6, 15–16, 59.1 with the first part of the report and 58.12–15, 23–7 with the second). The excursus dealing with style or expression (lines 5–12) has no parallel in *By Question and Answer* and is generally believed to derive from the work *To Gedalios*. That is not to say that Simplicius had no views of his own on expression, but it is to say that in so far as the excursus names Theophrastus and reports his thinking, the excursus is likely to depend on what Porphyry said in *To Gedalios* and not to reflect Simplicius' own reading of Theophrastus.²⁴¹

²³⁹ Schenkeveld (1998) p. 69–79, who is tacitly correcting earlier remarks (1990) p. 103–4.

²⁴⁰ Schenkeveld (1998) p. 78 recommends moving text **683** and making it **78B**, which implies placing it in second position. I prefer to place **683** first, for it refers to a Theophrastean discussion of the elements of λόγος, i.e. the noun and the verb. In the *De interpretatione* 2–4, Aristotle discusses these elements before taking up λόγος, which is the focus of **78** (more precisely, the focus is on λόγος in two relationships). Presumably Theophrastus followed the same order in *On Affirmation and Denial*. But this is a quibble.

²⁴¹ See "The Sources" on Simplicius, above, p. 38.

The beginning of the sentence in which Theophrastus is named involves several interrelated problems. Here is the beginning of the sentence and the translation which we have printed: καθὼ μὲν γὰρ λέξεις, ἄλλας ἔχουσι πραγματείας, ὥς ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου στοιχείων ὃ τε Θεόφραστος ἀνακινεῖ καὶ οἱ περὶ αὐτὸν γεγραφότες οἶον πότερον . . . “For in so far as they (the simple sounds) are expressions, they belong to other subjects, which are worked up by Theophrastus in *On the Elements of Speech* and by his associates. In their writings they (inquire), e.g., whether . . .” (lines 4–7). One of the problems concerns the words καὶ οἱ περὶ αὐτὸν γεγραφότες. That is the text printed by Kalbfleisch. The word αὐτὸν refers to Theophrastus, so that the phrase οἱ περὶ αὐτὸν seems to mean “those around Theophrastus,” i.e., “his associates.” That is the interpretation that we have adopted in the translation. But the phrase οἱ περὶ plus accusative often has a different sense: it means no more than the person referred to in the accusative.²⁴² Understood in that way, the phrase would constitute a second reference to Theophrastus, which is absurd in this context. But perhaps the text as printed is faulty. Instead of reading αὐτὸν with Kalbfleisch, we might prefer αὐτῶν, which is found in three manuscripts,²⁴³ and translate “those who have written about these (matters).” That is attractive, but what exactly is the reference of the pronoun αὐτῶν? It might refer to λέξεις (lines 4 and 5) or ἄλλας πραγματείας (line 5);²⁴⁴ either way, Simplicius would be referring to “those who have written about lexical subjects.” Alternatively αὐτῶν may pick up τῶν τοῦ λόγου στοιχείων in the Theophrastean title,²⁴⁵ so that Simplicius is referring to others who had written about the elements of speech. This last possibility

²⁴² It is well-known that in post-classical Greek the phrase οἱ περὶ + accusative is often used periphrastically to refer to the person mentioned in the accusative case. See Kühner-Gerth vol. 1 p. 270 sec. 403d; for occurrences already in Aristotle, see P. Stevens, “Aristotle and the Koine,” *Classical Quarterly* 30 (1936) p. 214–15, to which Robert Todd has called my attention. Nevertheless, it was always possible to use the phrase to refer to a group of persons that might either include or exclude the person named. For an example of the latter possibility (which is what our passage as printed requires), see Galen, *Introduction to Logic* 16.1 with Kieffer’s translation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins [1964] p. 49), to which Pamela Huby has directed my attention.

²⁴³ The preference is first advanced by Stroux p. 24, who is followed by Schenkeveld (1998) p. 69–70.

²⁴⁴ Since ἄλλας πραγματείας is closer, it may be preferred.

²⁴⁵ Or, in the phrase beginning with περὶ. On the question whether we should read Περὶ (introducing a title) or περὶ (introducing a phrase), see the commentary on 666 no. 17b, above, p. 124–6.

is, I think, preferable, for not only is στοιχείων the nearest of the possible references, but also it best suits the people whom Simplicius probably has in mind: namely commentators on logic as against rhetoric and poetics.

A different reason for reading αὐτῶν is that the text as printed does not read smoothly. The participle γεγραφότες governs οἶον πότερον etc., i.e., the string of sample questions that follow the participle. Schenkeveld condemns the construction as impossible Greek.²⁴⁶ I would prefer to say that the construction is (irritatingly/intolerably) awkward, for it seems possible that Simplicius has expressed himself elliptically. Hence, our translation involves the supplement “inquire.” If, however, we read αὐτῶν instead of αὐτὸν, the text seems smoother. The phrase οἱ περὶ αὐτῶν γεγραφότες is a closed unit and the following sample questions pick up and elucidate πραγματείας, ἅς. They illustrate the “subjects, which” were discussed by Theophrastus and others.²⁴⁷

Another concern is the phrase τὰ τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα (line 5–6). What are “the elements of speech,” about which Theophrastus and others wrote? They are referred to again one line later, where they are identified with ὄνομα and ῥῆμα, the noun and the verb, which are said to be μέρη τοῦ λόγου (line 7–8).²⁴⁸ Apparently we are to think of these elements as expressions which are significant in themselves,²⁴⁹ and the basic building blocks from which sentences are made.²⁵⁰ They differ from ἄρθρα and σύνδεσμοι, joints and ligaments,²⁵¹ which are not significant in themselves,²⁵² and which are said to be μέρη λέξεως (line 8). If there is a surprise here, it is in the use of στοιχεῖον. Aristotle uses it to refer to an individual letter (strictly speaking, an indivisible sound) which is one among many parts of λέξις (*Poet.* 20 1456b20–3). When he wants to refer to the noun and the verb as significant parts of a sentence, he uses μέρος (*De int.* 4 16b26, *Poet.* 20 1457a24). We might, therefore, expect Theophrastus to use μέρος; but in our text, we find στοιχεῖα both in

²⁴⁶ Schenkeveld (1998) p. 70.

²⁴⁷ Alternatively, we might say that the sample questions are governed by ἀνακινεῖ; but since that verb has ἅς as its object, it seems best to say that the questions stand in apposition to ἅς or πραγματείας, ἅς, and that they serve to elucidate the subjects in question.

²⁴⁸ In the context of line 8, μέρη is to be understood with λόγου.

²⁴⁹ Aristotle, *Poetics* 20 1457a10–28.

²⁵⁰ Aristotle, *De interpretatione* 4 16b26–5 17a22.

²⁵¹ On the translations “joints” and “ligaments,” see the next paragraph.

²⁵² Aristotle, *Poetics* 20 1456b38–1457a10.

the title and again one line later. Theophrastus, it seems, has departed from the terminology of his teacher, perhaps to call attention to the noun and the verb, now called στοιχεῖα, as against μέρη which is used of the joint and the ligament (line 8).²⁵³ An alternative is to suppose that the use of στοιχεῖα is attributable to Simplicius or his source. In this regard, it is worth noting that there are several passages, in which Simplicius uses the phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου with reference to the noun and verb. One of these passages occurs less than a page after our text and still within Simplicius' remarks concerning Porphyry (11.25). It may be that here the phrase is attributable to Boëthius, for his views, as reported by Porphyry, are being presented in summary form. I am inclined, however, to believe that Porphyry introduced the phrase, and Simplicius has it from him. Be that as it may, we find the phrase not only elsewhere in Simplicius (e.g., 64.24 and 124.11)²⁵⁴ but also in Ammonius (*On De interpretatione* 64.26). Since the latter refers to Theophrastus on the very next page (65.32 = 78.2),²⁵⁵ it is tempting to think that he is using the terminology of the Eresian. But perhaps he, too, has the phrase from Porphyry.²⁵⁶ All this, of course, hardly shows that the use of στοιχεῖα at 683.6 and 7 is not Theophrastean; and I am inclined to believe that it is.²⁵⁷

In the preceding paragraph, I translated ἄρθρα and σύνδεσμοι with "joints" and "ligaments." That is in conformity with the text-translation volumes, where we have deliberately chosen a literal translation that comes from anatomy. That may seem odd in a passage that introduces grammatical categories, but grammatical translations like "article" and "conjunction" run the risk of suggesting modern categories that may be misleading when applied to the early Peripatos. Indeed, during the headship of Aristotle and Theophras-

²⁵³ But we still must supply μέρη with λόγου in line 8.

²⁵⁴ In both passages the phrase occurs without τοῦ. At 64.24–5 conjunctions are said to be λέξεως μέρη and not λόγου στοιχεῖα. At 124.10–11 we are told that every λόγος is composed of ὀνόματα and ῥήματα; and that every στοιχεῖον λόγου is composed of syllables.

²⁵⁵ Ammonius uses the phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου (64.26) in a transitional passage introducing comments which Schenkeveld p. 75–9 has shown to be closely connected both with the named text which follows (esp. 65.2–12 and 65.31–66.6 = 78.1–10) and with our Simplicius passage.

²⁵⁶ See "The Sources" on Ammonius, above, p. 37.

²⁵⁷ If the title could be shown to be no title at all, or one adapted by Simplicius or his source (i.e., στοιχεῖα substituted for μέρη), then there would be a strong case for saying that στοιχεῖα is not Theophrastean; but I do not think that either alternative can be demonstrated. See the discussion of 666 no. 17b.

tus, grammar was in its infancy. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Aristotle recognized only the ὄνομα, ῥῆμα and σύνδεσμος. Subsequently the Stoics added the ἄρθρον, separating it from the σύνδεσμος (*Demosthenes* 48, *On Literary Composition* 2). That seems to reveal Dionysius' ignorance of the *Poetics*, for in that work the ἄρθρον is recognized as well as the σύνδεσμος (20 1456b38–1457a10). Nevertheless, the text of the *Poetics* is faulty, and some scholars have been tempted to remove the reference to the ἄρθρον.²⁵⁸ Such surgery is to be rejected. The author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* recognizes the ἄρθρον (25 1435a35, b13), and Aristotle will have done so as well. The question is what Aristotle and his pupil Theophrastus meant when using the terms ἄρθρον and σύνδεσμος. If the text of the *Poetics* is to be followed, Aristotle classified prepositions like “about” and “concerning” as ἄρθρα (1457a7).²⁵⁹ That may be correct, but according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, prepositions, προθέσεις, were separated off from σύνδεσμοι, after the ἄρθρα had been separated from the σύνδεσμοι (*On Literary Composition* 2).²⁶⁰ We should, therefore, be cautious, and if we do translate ἄρθρα and σύνδεσμοι with terms like “articles” and “conjunctions,” we should keep in mind that these labels may not fit exactly the categories that Aristotle and Theophrastus had in mind.

Another problem is the meaning of ἀνακινεῖ. The verb frequently means “stir up” and may be used metaphorically (LSJ s.v. II). It is used in that way by Simplicius at 186.24: πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν λόγων ἔσμον ἀνακινήσαι, “to stir up a swarm of many and fine arguments.”²⁶¹ In the text-translation volumes, we translated “worked up,” in order to suggest that Theophrastus not only “stirred up” but also developed the study of λέξεις.²⁶² That now appears to be an over-translation, encouraged by the belief that the title *On the Elements of Speech* refers to a portion of Theophrastus' rhetorical

²⁵⁸ Lucas p. 201 cites Susemihl and Rostagni. See also Bennekom p. 410–11.

²⁵⁹ The text at 1457a7 is not altogether sound, but it seems unreasonable to doubt περί, “concerning.” More problematic is ἀμφί, “about,” but occurring next to περί, a second preposition seems highly likely. For other possibilities, See Bennekom p. 410.

²⁶⁰ In referring to Dionysius, I am only introducing grounds for caution; I am not citing him as an entirely trustworthy witness. As already pointed out, withholding the ἄρθρον from Aristotle does not agree with what we read in the *Poetics*.

²⁶¹ See Schenkeveld (1998) p. 70 n. 8, who cites Simplicius, *Commentary on On the Heavens* 119.11 and *On the Physics* 7.31 in addition to *On the Categories* 186.24.

²⁶² Cf. the most recent translator Chase, p. 26, who translates with “dealt with.”

work *On Style* (666 17a). That belief now appears to be mistaken. The title seems to refer to a logical treatise or a section or discussion within one, so that Simplicius may be reporting that Theophrastus merely stirred up or touched upon the subject of expression apart from significance. He merely mentioned the subject, in order to dismiss it, as did others who wrote about logical topics.

In our Simplicius text, the commentator goes on to illustrate (οἶον) the type of question that Theophrastus and others stirred up. The first is whether only nouns and verbs or also joints and ligaments are elements of λόγος, speech or, more precisely, the statement-making sentence. This question and the answer that follows (only nouns and verbs) suit a work on logic.²⁶³ After that comes a string of questions which are less suitable in a logical context. They would be at home in a work on λέξεις, and Theophrastus will have discussed them, or most of them, in his work *On Style*. But here they appear to be additions by Simplicius or his source, who chose to expand in the manner of a commentator. In some cases, the questions are expressed in terminology that is later than Theophrastus: especially ὑποσύνθετοι and ἰδεῶν (line 11). The former is quite rare: LSJ cites only three occurrences, of which two are from Simplicius' commentary on the *Categories* (our passage and p. 71.27) and one from Dexippus' commentary (p. 12.7 Busse).²⁶⁴ The latter recalls Hermogenes, and not surprisingly, for the four qualities or types of style listed by Simplicius (lines 11–12) invite comparison with those of Hermogenes: τὸ σαφές relates to σαφήνεια, τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές to μέγεθος, τὸ ἡδύ to γλυκύτης and τὸ πιθανόν to ἀλήθεια.²⁶⁵

Appendix 8: Papyrus Pack² 2296 = P. Hib. no. 183, fr. a, b and c (P. Hib., pars 2 p. 41–3 Turner)

Literature: Turner (1955) 40–4

²⁶³ Expressions which are not significant in themselves, i.e. articles and conjunctions, are mentioned, only to be dismissed as parts of λέξεις and not of λόγος.

²⁶⁴ See Schenkeveld (1998) p. 78 n. 32, Chase p. 107 n. 147 and J. Dillon, *Dexippus*, On Aristotle('s) *Categories* (London: Duckworth 1990) p. 32 n. 26.

²⁶⁵ The Neoplatonists took notice of Hermogenes; Syrianus, who became head of the Academy in 432 A.D., wrote two commentaries on Hermogenes: one on *Περὶ στάσεων* and another on *Περὶ ἰδεῶν*. At 78.9 Ammonius uses ἰδέαι of qualities of style (see the commentary on 78). Hermogenes' work *Περὶ ἰδεῶν* is referred to in 673B.3.

Our text comes from a papyrus that Turner dates between 270 and 230 B.C. There are five fragments, three of which, frs. a, b and c, offer some readable material. They have been printed in the text-translation volumes. The other two, frs. d and e, offer little or nothing and have been omitted. They can be found in Turner's publication of the papyrus.²⁶⁶ The subject of the surviving fragments is poetry and in particular good diction. Nothing is said that is inconsistent with Aristotle's *Poetics*; whoever the author may have been, the material seems to be Peripatetic in origin.

In lines 3–9, the author explains who will benefit from the discussion that is to follow. The poet will learn the force or meaning of each phrase and which ones must be used if he is to write good poetry. He will also learn what must be avoided if he is to escape criticism. The layman will learn to discern what is well written and why it is so. He will also learn to discern bad writing and what its characteristics are. In spelling out the benefit to the layman, the author of the papyrus makes clear that he is not writing exclusively for the poet. He is also writing for the person who wishes simply to be instructed, διδασχθείς (line 7), in the art of poetry, i.e., to be an educated person who can appreciate good poetry, even though he makes no claim to be a practicing, let alone accomplished, poet.

The word διδασχθείς is, of course, a conjecture (only the final sigma survives), but it is a reasonable one that goes well with ιδιώτης (line 6). Indeed the idea of a learned layman invites comparison with *Politics* 3.11, where Aristotle draws a distinction between three kinds of doctors: ὁ δημιουργός, ὁ ἀρχιτεκτονικός and ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην (1282a3–4). The last, the man who is educated in the art, is neither a practitioner nor a responsible supervisor, but he has been educated in the art and can therefore pass judgment on medical matters. Such a capacity is not peculiar to the field of medicine. Aristotle makes the point explicitly when he says that members of the third class, the πεπαιδευμένοι, are found in almost all arts, and that we respect their judgment no less than that of persons with knowledge (1282a4–7). An example outside the field of medicine is provided by *Politics* 8.6, where Aristotle discusses musical education. A person trained in music at a young age may be a good judge of music later in life, even though he is not a performing musician (1340b37–9). An important part of this youthful training is

²⁶⁶ Turner p. 43.

participating in musical performances, for as Aristotle emphasizes, it is impossible or difficult to become a good judge if one has not taken part in performances (1340b23–5). Would Aristotle want to make a similar claim concerning poetry? In particular, would he want to say that time spent composing and reciting verse results in a better appreciation of good poetry.²⁶⁷ No surviving text records his answer, but it is easy to imagine him endorsing the idea. The same holds for the author of the papyrus. At least, the phrase διδασκθῆναι ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης is compatible with undergoing instruction in the composition and recitation of poems. Of course, a handbook or a teacher may explain why a particular verse is well written, διὰ τί εἶ (line 8), but attempting verse for oneself may also increase one's ability to judge the work of others.²⁶⁸

In line 10 we have the words ἐθέμεθα ὀκτώ. Turner restores lines 9–10, so that the text reads γενέσθαι δ' οὖν τῆς λέξεως μέρη ἐθέμεθα ὀκτώ. He translates: "We posited the existence of eight units of speech."²⁶⁹ Our translation differs little: "We did in any case posit the existence of eight parts of speech (expression)." For our purposes, the important point is that the number eight recalls Aristotle's *Poetics* 20, where the Stagirite lists eight parts of expression, μέρη λέξεως: the letter, syllable, ligament, noun, verb, joint, inflexion and phrase (1456b20–1). In all probability, the author of the papyrus put forth a similar list²⁷⁰ in an earlier, lost portion of the

²⁶⁷ It might be thought that practice in composing verse will sufficiently enhance one's ability to discern good poetry; adding recitation is unnecessary and serves only to relate poetry more closely to music, in regard to which Aristotle calls for instruction in performance. There is no denying that the addition of recitation makes the relationship closer, but there are other more important reasons for including recitation: e.g., rhythm is best appreciated when poems are read allowed, and choice of word is often governed by considerations of sound.

²⁶⁸ In discussing the person who is educated in regard to poetry, medicine and music, I have been concerned only with the educated man who is capable of judging particular cases, e.g., the quality of a particular poem or one or more verses within a poem. I have not been concerned with the educated man, the πεπαιδευμένος, who is capable of judging the general principles and procedures of a discipline like biology or ethics. See Aristotle, *Parts of Animals* 1.1 639a1–8 and *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.3 1094b19–1095a2 with the remarks of D. Balme, *Aristotle's De partibus animalium I and De generatione animalium I* (Oxford: Clarendon 1972) p. 70–1 and W. Hardie, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon 1968) p. 31–2.

²⁶⁹ Turner p. 44 n. 11.

²⁷⁰ The list in the papyrus need not have been identical to that found in the *Poetics*. A century later, Dionysius Thrax (*Ars grammatica* 11) listed eight parts of speech of which four are identical with those found in the *Poetics*.

papyrus.²⁷¹ Now he refers to the list by way of introduction to a discussion of nouns and verbs in a poetic context.

Lines 11–30 are badly damaged. We get repeated references to poetry but little else is certain. However, with fr. b, lines 31–56, we again have some readable text. The comic poet Philemon is said to have introduced a stage character (line 32), who will have used a word that had already been declared acceptable or unacceptable in poetry. There follows discussion of the words εὐχή and προσευχή. The former is said to be admitted into all poetry, for it is the prevailing or ordinary word (τὸ κύριον) for offering prayer. In contrast, the latter is said to be inadmissible, for it has the same force as εὐχή in regard to pious action (lines 33–7). The use of δύναμις, “force” or “meaning,” recalls the earlier statement that the poet will learn the force of each word (line 4), and the two explanatory clauses (introduced by γάρ) recall the statement that a learned layman will discern what is well written and the reason why it is well written (line 8). To that extent lines 33–7 may be said to be in line with the preliminary statement of fr. a (lines 3–9). But the explanations that are offered seem unsatisfactory or at least incomplete. For while poetry admits ordinary words, unusual words are also admissible and important for elevating the diction.²⁷² Moreover, προσευχή seems to be a good candidate for use in poetry, in part because it has the same force as εὐχή. Without affecting the meaning, it can be used to replace a shorter form with a longer form, which is not only outside the ordinary²⁷³ but also more impressive because of its length.

In line 39, Philemon is again mentioned in connection with bringing a character on stage. To be sure, only the first three letters of Philemon’s name survive, but the poet has already been named once and said to bring a character on stage (line 32). Moreover, the occurrence of χρηστοθήες, “of good character,” in line 40 is suggestive. For according to Athenaeus, Philemon was in love with a courtesan and in one of his plays referred to her as χρηστή (*The Sophists at Dinner* 13 594D = Philomon fr. 215 Kock = CGrF no. 214 Austin).²⁷⁴

²⁷¹ The use of the past tense (ἐθέμεθα) makes clear that the reference is backward to an earlier, lost portion.

²⁷² In fact, both ordinary words and unusual words are necessary to the mix that is good poetry. See, e.g., Aristotle, *Poetics* 22 1458a31–4.

²⁷³ Apart from lines 35–7 of the papyrus, “the earliest evidence for προσευχή used in the sense of εὐχή is the Septuagint (Isiah lvi.7).” So Turner p. 44 n. 35.

²⁷⁴ According to Athenaeus 594D, Menander wrote in reply that no courtesan is good.

It may be that the author of the papyrus is citing Polemon with reference to the word *χρηστός* or some cognate, but that is not certain. What is certain is that the papyrus continues with a discussion of admissible and inadmissible words. In line 50 we find *ρήματα*; in line 51 the author rules against the use of some word or words;²⁷⁵ and in lines 59–60 the author seems to recognize the occurrence of *καταστροφή* in both poetry and prose.

Who is the author of this discussion? Turner suggests either Theophrastus or Heraclides Ponticus, but doubts the latter, because he left Athens in 338 B.C. and could not have seen a play by Polemon, whose first victory came in 327.²⁷⁶ In favor of Theophrastus, Turner cites Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Literary Composition* 16, where Dionysius “cogently states that in the *Περὶ λέξεως* Theophrastus quoted individual words, quoting some with approval, and dismissing others as *μικρὰ καὶ ταπεινὰ ἐξ ὧν οὔτε ποίημα χρηστὸν ἔσσεσθαι οὔτε λόγον.*” The trouble here is that Dionysius does not say what Turner has him say. Rather, Dionysius says that Theophrastus “made some rather general remarks on these matters (obtaining beauty in the combination of sounds) in *On Style*, where he defines which words are by nature beautiful” (688.3–5). This report does not say that Theophrastus quoted individual words. He may have, but equally he may have proceeded much as he did when discussing helping a friend contrary to the law. There he is said to have dealt generally with classes of things without evaluating individual deeds (534.41–3).²⁷⁷ In our papyrus there is discussion of individual words, and that discussion may stem from some Peripatetic other than Theophrastus or even from a person outside the school who was influenced by the early Peripatetics. I leave the matter undecided.

Appendix 9: Papyrus Pack² no. 1502 = P. Hamb. no. 128, fr. a (*Veröff. Hamb. Staats- und Univ.-Bibl.*, vol. 4 [1954] p. 36–9 Snell)

Literature: Snell (1954) p. 36–50; Merkelbach (1958) p. 107–8; Lucas (1968) p. 202–5; Bennekom (1975) p. 411; Janko (1984) p. 51, 180–1; Innes (1985) p. 251–2, 264; Schenkeveld (1993a) p. 86,

²⁷⁵ Little survives of line 51, so that the text of Turner may seem bold. But compare line 4, where *δεῖ χρῆσθαι* is legible.

²⁷⁶ Turner p. 40, who acknowledges that he is reporting a suggestion of T. B. L. Webster.

²⁷⁷ See the commentary on 688.

(1993b) p. 67–80, (1994a) p. 292, 304, (1994b) p. 13; Guidorizzi (2000) p. 72–5, 165–70

Our text is a fragment, fr. a, of a papyrus that dates from 250 to 200 B.C.²⁷⁸ A second fragment, fr. b, contains only a few incomplete words and has not been included in the text-translation volumes. It can be found in Snell's publication of the papyrus on page 39. Column 2 of fr. a is comparatively well preserved; columns 1 and 3 are less so. Since the text of the papyrus is closely related to that of Aristotle's *Poetics* 20–21, the topics under discussion are largely certain: after a few lines on the parts of a word, i.e., syllables, the author lists different kinds of words, providing definitions and examples.²⁷⁹ The close relationship with the *Poetics* also facilitates the restoration of damaged lines.

Lines 5–12 are closely related to what Aristotle says in *Poetics* 20 1457a10–14. There we read that the noun is a composite significant voice (or sound); it does not signify time and none of its parts is in itself significant. By way of illustration, Aristotle introduces the compound proper name Θεόδωρος and comments that δωρος lacks significance. In the papyrus, we have Δῶρος instead of Θεόδωρος. We are told that when the first syllable is removed, what is left, πορ, is not significant. Schenkeveld says that the papyrus is almost certainly arguing along the same lines as the *Poetics*, and that the papyrus makes the point more clearly. “We see the author agreeing with Aristotle in general and correcting him at the same time.”²⁸⁰ To this observation I add two reflections of my own. First, confronted by the letters πορ, most of us (all of us, I hope) would acknowledge straightaway that the letters lack significance. But when we are confronted by δωρος, we may hesitate, for δωρος is derived from δῶρον. Theodorus is “god’s gift.” Nevertheless, the hesitation is unfounded, for δῶρον is not part of Θεόδωρος. Rather, δωρος is, and δωρος is not a word, i.e., it is not a significant voice that can be used in a phrase or sentence. When we say θεοῦ δῶρον, our words constitute a perfectly good phrase, “god’s gift,” but that is not true of θεοῦ

²⁷⁸ Snell p. 36 and Schenkeveld (1993b) p. 67 give c. 200 B.C. as the date of the papyrus. Merkelbach p. 108, apparently citing a communication by Snell, states that according to Turner the papyrus is not later than 250 B.C.

²⁷⁹ Both Snell p. 48 and Schenkeveld (1993b) p. 68 show the correspondence in content by means of facing columns: *Poetics* on the left and papyrus on the right.

²⁸⁰ Schenkeveld (1993b) p. 68.

δωρος.²⁸¹ Here we have only “god’s.” Second, a closely related discussion is found in chapter 2 of Aristotle’s *De interpretation*. There Aristotle tell us that no part of a noun is significant when separated. As an example he offers the compound proper noun Κόλλιππος, and says that ιππος in itself signifies nothing (16a20–2). Here the example is more challenging, for ἵππος, unlike δωρος, does have meaning, and together with καλός it can form the phrase καλὸς ἵππος. Nevertheless, Aristotle stands his ground and tells us that in compound words a part is not significant. The part may “wish” to signify, but in separation it is not significant of anything. For the sake of clarity, Aristotle introduces a second example, ἐπακτροκέλης, “pirate-skiff” (16a19–26). Here we have a compound common noun, whose meaning is clearly dependent on its parts. Hence Aristotle speaks of a part wishing (βούλεται) to signify.²⁸² But is that also true of proper nouns? When one Greek calls another Κόλλιππος, he is not suggesting that the other person is or resembles a beautiful horse. He may not even want to suggest that the other person is an admirer of beautiful horses. Of course, we are told that Aristotle changed the name of Theophrastus from Τύρταμος to Θεόφραστος, because he wanted to call attention to his pupil’s divine sounding voice (1.30–1), but most of us use “Theophrastus” merely to refer to the Eresian without any thought of describing him or his voice.²⁸³ Were that not the case, puns based on proper names would lose much of their punch. When a man named Bearable is said to be unbearable (Ἀνάσχετος οὐκ ἀνάσχετος, *Rhet.* 3.11 1412b13), we are likely to laugh aloud not only because we feel superior to Mr. Bearable but also and especially because we are surprised by a verbal play that had never occurred to us.

Lines 13–37 are related to *Poetics* 21 1457b1–5. In the *Poetics*, the κύριον, the prevailing or everyday word (that which everyone uses, 1457b3–4), enjoys pride of place, after which comes the γλῶττα, the strange or unfamiliar word (that which “other” people use, 1457b4). In the papyrus, somewhere within lines 13–31, the κύριον will have been explained, so that it may be mentioned later without explanation in the definition of the epithet (line 47).²⁸⁴ After the κύριον, a discussion of the γλῶττα will have begun. In line 31

²⁸¹ I deliberately withhold an accent from δωρος, because δωρος is not a word.

²⁸² J. Ackrill in the Clarendon series (1963) p. 44 translates “has some force.”

²⁸³ We tend to use (cf. χρώμεθα at *Poetics* 20 1457a12) proper nouns as if they denote without any connotation.

²⁸⁴ Schenkeveld (1993b) p. 68.

we have the last word of an example in which, σκῆνος, a γλῶττα, will have been marked off from a common word having more or less the same meaning, e.g., σῶμα.²⁸⁵ In line 32 we have a complete example: κομπτήρ and νύσσα are synonyms, but the former is the prevailing Attic word, while the latter is Homeric (*Il.* 23.332, 344). Here Schenkeveld sees a difference between the *Poetics* and the papyrus.²⁸⁶ While the former treats the γλῶττα as a strange or foreign word, the latter treats the γλῶττα as an archaic word. Two further examples follow, each of which involves three words, not two. The second example, μέλαν–δνοφερόν–ἐρεμνόν (lines 36–7),²⁸⁷ is clear enough. It begins with the prevailing Attic word, μέλαν, after which come two Homeric words, δνοφερόν and ἐρεμνόν (*Il.* 9.15 *Od.* 13.269; *Il.* 12.375, *Od.* 11.606). In contrast, the first example, κλάδος–ἔρνος–βλαστός (lines 35–6), is problematic. Like the preceding examples, it begins with a prevailing word, κλάδος. The next word, ἔρνος, is Homeric (*Il.* 18.56, *Od.* 14.175) and clearly cited as a γλῶττα. But the status of the third word, βλαστός, is unclear. Given the other examples, we expect one or more γλῶτται to follow a single κύριον. But is βλαστός introduced as a γλῶττα? Schenkeveld thinks not and suggests that in lines 33–7, the author of the papyrus “adds a remark on synonyms to his discussion of γλῶττα.” By linking synonyms to γλῶτται, the author is said to depart from Aristotle, who explains synonymy by reference to prevailing words, κύρια (*Rhet.* 3.2 1404b39–1405a2).²⁸⁸ Snell anticipates Schenkeveld in recognizing a discussion of synonyms, but he thinks that the expected order — first the prevailing Attic word, then γλῶτται — is maintained. Although βλαστός is not decidedly poetic, it is said to be such when used in the sense of branch, i.e., as a synonym of κλάδος.²⁸⁹ Be that as it may, I am not convinced that the occurrence of a single γλῶττα between two κύρια must be significant. We would still have words that illustrate the distinction between the κύριον and the γλῶττα. Moreover, it is not immediately clear that

²⁸⁵ See Snell p. 41.

²⁸⁶ Schenkeveld (1993b) p. 69.

²⁸⁷ The papyrus gives the adjectives in the neuter.

²⁸⁸ At *Rhetoric* 3.2 1405a1, Aristotle uses two prevailing or common words, πορεύεσθαι and βαδίζειν, in order to illustrate synonymy.

²⁸⁹ Snell p. 41 acknowledges that he can cite no passage to support his suggestion. It may be of some significance that Theophrastus distinguishes between κλάδος and ἄκρεμὼν (the former is a twig, the latter a branch) and explains the κλάδος as a βλάστημα, a growth that springs from branches, especially annual growth (*Research on Plants* 1.1.9).

adding a remark on synonyms is needed, for the difference between the κύριον and the γλῶττα is readily and most naturally illustrated by citing synonyms, as is done in lines 32–7 of the papyrus. In other words, the author of the papyrus may have used synonyms in order to elucidate the κύριον-γλῶττα distinction without discussing synonymy itself.

Lines 37–46 relate to the discussion of metaphor in *Poetics* 21 1457b6–33 and more precisely to those lines within the discussion that deal with metaphor based on analogy, i.e., 1457b9, 16–33. In the papyrus, the opening definition or description of metaphor is difficult. Snell supplies τὸ after δὲ and before τῶν αὐτῶν ὀνομάτων ἢ ῥημάτων συνθέτων . . . μετενηγμένον (lines 38–42). The supplement is supported by the use of τὸ in lines 46 and 71.²⁹⁰ Schenkeveld prefers to supply ἐκ instead of τὸ (*re vera*, he proposes reading δ' ἐκ). He changes μετενηγμένον to μετενηγμένων (genitive plural after ἐκ) and construes συνθέτων in terms of context ("I interpret συνθέτων in ll. 39–40 as meaning 'combined with another word, put in a context'" p. 75). His translation runs: "(they call) metaphor after the transfer of the same nouns and/or verbs, in a new combination, from one similar thing to another." The proposed changes and the translation are attractive (we have a readable text); nevertheless, I am not convinced that συνθέτων should be construed in terms of context. Schenkeveld's translation supplies "new" ("in a new combination"), but that addition is not clearly implied by the Greek text. In my view, συνθέτων is best understood by comparing *Poetics* 20 1457a10–18,²⁹¹ where we find συνθετή twice: once applied to the noun and once to the verb (1457a11, 14).²⁹² Both times it refers to a composite word, i.e., one composed of syllables. To be sure, the idea that a noun or verb must be composed of syllables is odd — γῆ is a perfectly good noun, and ῥεῖ is a good verb — but that is what Aristotle seems to say in *Poetics* 20. As already observed, lines 5–12 of the papyrus are closely related to *Poetics* 20. Later within the discussion of metaphor in lines 37–46, the author of the papyrus seems to recall what is said in chapter 20 concerning the noun and verb, and to add without reflection συνθέτων after ὀνομάτων ἢ ῥημάτων. Moreover, I am not inclined to supply ἐκ (δ' ἐκ) and therefore, not

²⁹⁰ See also lines 79, 83 and 92, where τὸ can be restored with confidence.

²⁹¹ Here I am disagreeing not only with Schenkeveld but also with Snell p. 42.

²⁹² The feminine form συνθετή is recognized by LSJ s.v. σύνθετος. Two Aristotelian passages are cited: *Phys.* 265a21 and *Metaph.* 1051b27. In the papyrus, the form συνθέτων is the neuter genitive plural of σύνθετος.

to read μετενηγμένων. Rather, I would add τὸ with Snell, keep μετενηγμένον and understand the phrase τῶν αὐτῶν ὀναμάτων ἢ ῥημάτων συνθέτων as a partitive genitive. The passage would be easier to read if τὸ were placed after συνθέτων, but given the flexibility of Greek word order, I think that we can leave τὸ where Snell has placed it. We might translate as follows: “(men call) ‘metaphor’ that which, among the same composite nouns or verbs, has been transferred from something similar to another thing.”²⁹³ The English is awkward and use of “same” opaque, but that is equally true of the Greek. For the sake of clarity, we might change the word order of the translation and flesh out “the same,” so that the translation reads: “among composite nouns or verbs (that remain) the same (or unchanged), (we call) ‘metaphor’ that which has been transferred from something similar to another thing.” In any case, there is no compelling reason to follow Snell and to change τῶν αὐτῶν to αὐτῶν τῶν,²⁹⁴ for an important feature of metaphor as presented in the papyrus would be lost. Metaphor is restricted to cases in which the same word, being unchanged, is transferred from its normal context to another. For example, when the word δυσμάς is transferred from the setting of the sun to old age (lines 42–3), the word itself remains the same.

Before leaving metaphor, I want to call attention to the words ἀπὸ ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐπ’ ἄλλο πράγμα (lines 40–1). At first reading these words seem unproblematic. They are intended to introduce metaphor based on analogy, i.e., to specify one kind of metaphor discussed by Aristotle in *Poetics* 21 (1457b9, 16–33). Two other kinds recognized by Aristotle, metaphor from genus to species and from species to genus (1457b7–8, 9–13), will be discussed later under the label “metousia” (line 59). So much seems to me unobjectionable, but the imprecision of the words ἀπὸ ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐπ’ ἄλλο πράγμα is remarkable. In particular, the words fail to make explicit what is central to metaphor based on analogy: namely, that it is not unqualified similarity, but rather similarity in relationship. In the *Poetics*, Aristotle expresses himself with care, saying that metaphor based on analogy occurs when one thing is related to another in a way that is similar to the relation existing between two other

²⁹³ I agree with Schenkeveld (1993b) p. 74–5 that συνθέτων should be taken with both ὀναμάτων and ῥημάτων: hence, the translation “composite nouns or verbs.”

²⁹⁴ See Snell p. 42, who also suggests (prefers) reading τῶν ὀναμάτων αὐτῶν ἢ ῥημάτων συνθέτων.

things: ὅταν ὁμοίως ἔχῃ τὸ δεύτερον πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ τέταρτον πρὸς τὸ τρίτον (1457b16–18, cf. 20–1, 28–9). Here analogy involves four terms and two relationships that are recognized as similar. In contrast, the wording of the papyrus is compatible with mere similarity, i.e., a two-term relationship in which the two terms are related directly through likeness. E.g., when I say that the sky is full of bulls, I am not using metaphor based on analogy. Rather, I am indicating that certain clouds resemble a particular kind of animal; they are similar in shape.²⁹⁵ Of course, the subsequent examples given in the papyrus (old age is the setting of life, etc., lines 10–14) may be said to supply the needed clarification, but that does not contradict what has just been argued: the words ἀπὸ ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐπ' ἄλλο πράγμα are remarkably imprecise in that they open the door to a two term relationship.²⁹⁶ Add to this imprecision the mindless use of συνθέτων (at least on my reading) and the opacity of τῶν αὐτῶν, and there is good reason to be dissatisfied with this portion of the papyrus.

Lines 46–59 are related to what has been lost in *Poetics* 21: namely a discussion of the ornamental word. That kind of word is mentioned in the initial list of kinds of words, κόσμος at 1457b2, but the discussion itself is lost at 1457b33, where editors regularly mark a lacuna. In the papyrus, we do not find the word κόσμος. Instead, the author speaks of the ἐπίθετον, which is said to be used in conjunction with prevailing or common words (lines 46–8). That definition or description in combination with the immediately following examples — “blazing” applied to iron and “dazzling” applied to gold (lines 48–9) — makes clear that the papyrus is concerned with κόσμος *qua* additional word (ἐπίθετον) that is added to an ordinary word for the sake of embellishment. The subsequent remarks concerning double and triple words — “shield-bearing,” “Ares-lover,” “grape-fruit-productive,” “star-crystal-bright” (lines 54–7) — convey the same impression. So too do the final examples: “footless” and “wingless” (lines 58–9). These last examples are important, for here we see clearly that embellishment need not depend on the meaning of the *epithet*. The idea of being without feet or wings is not in itself ornamental, but “footless” and “wingless” can elevate style

²⁹⁵ I take the example from Aristophanes' *Clouds* 347.

²⁹⁶ For completeness' sake, I add that on occasion Theophrastus takes note of the fact that not all cases of similarity are cases involving analogy. Cf. *Metaphysics* 4 4b12–13.

in two ways. First, merely by being added they lengthen the expression, and in many contexts that adds dignity.²⁹⁷ Second, by bringing in a rather sophisticated mode of expression, the privative form, they lift the style above the ordinary. The concluding examples, then, are instructive, but they do leave us wondering whether we should think of the epithet solely as an adjective, or whether the notion of epithet also covers cases in which a noun is added and the construction changes. In *Rhetoric* 3.3 1406a10–35, Aristotle recognizes such cases.²⁹⁸ There is no reason to think that the author of the papyrus would object. He simply chooses to be brief and therefore to omit much that might be said.

Lines 59–69 relate to the discussion of metaphor in *Poetics* 21 and in particular to the remarks on metaphor in which the transference is from genus to species and from species to genus (1457b7–13). The examples given in the papyrus are lost, but those found in the *Poetics* illustrate the two kinds. “Here stands my ship” (1475b10) exemplifies metaphor from genus to species, for the general word “stands” is used of a particular kind of standing, i.e., being at anchor. And “Truly Odysseus has done ten thousand noble deeds” (1475b11–12) exemplifies metaphor from species to genus, for the particular number “ten thousand” is used in place of a general word indicating a large number.²⁹⁹ We are not told why these two kinds of metaphor are separated from metaphor by analogy and brought under the label μεταούσια (line 59). One possibility is that there is an essential connection between species and genus, which is absent in the case of metaphor by analogy. Whereas lying at anchor may be conceived of as a particular kind of standing and ten thousand may be conceived of as many, the setting of the sun and old age (lines 42–3) are conceptually distinct. Neither of the two will appear as the

²⁹⁷ Cf. *Rhetoric* 3.3 1406a11–12, where Aristotle is discussing frigid epithets and tells us that the phrase “white milk” is appropriate in poetry. The epithet “white” is an ordinary word whose meaning in most contexts including the present — i.e., modifying “milk” — is familiar and unexciting. Indeed with milk, adding “white” seems painfully unnecessary. But Aristotle finds it acceptable in poetry, presumably because it adds length and thereby elevates the style.

²⁹⁸ In *Rhetoric* 3.3 Aristotle is discussing frigidity and offers the following examples. Instead of saying εἰς Ἴσθμια, one says εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἰσθμίων πανήγυριν (1406a21–2), and instead of κλάδοις, one says τοῖς τῆς ὕλης κλάδοις (1406a27–8). In both cases, a noun is added, not an adjective, and in both the construction is changed. The fact that these cases are deemed frigid does not mean that epithet is not involved.

²⁹⁹ Cf. *Poetics* 25 1461a19–20.

genus in an essential definition of the other. The label μετουσία marks (or more cautiously, appears to mark) this difference by calling attention to the participation of the species in the genus.³⁰⁰

At this point one wonders what has happened to the fourth kind of metaphor recognized by Aristotle in *Poetics* 21. I am thinking of metaphor from species to species (1457b8–9, 13). Aristotle illustrates this kind of metaphor with (killing a man) by “drawing out his life” and (drawing water) by “cutting it with long-edged bronze.” Here “drawing” is used for “cutting” and vice versa, for each is a sort of removing or taking away (1457b13–16). Since the other three kinds of metaphor are accounted for, why is metaphor from species to species passed over in silence? Recalling that the discussion of the ornamental word has fallen out in *Poetics* 21 at 1457b33, we may be tempted to say that the papyrus too is lacunose: a discussion of metaphor from species to species has fallen out. But if so, it was never part of the discussion of μετουσία, for that category is explicitly recognized as bipartite (lines 60–1). Metaphor from species to genus and from genus to species are its divisions.

Schenkeveld suggests that metaphor from species to species has been included in metaphor by analogy. To make his point, he cites Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* 3.10, where we read, “When (Homer) calls old age ‘stubble,’³⁰¹ he creates understanding and knowledge through the genus, since both are things that have lost their bloom” (1410b14–15).³⁰² Here we have an example of metaphor from species to species: an aged man and stubble are specific cases of things that have lost their bloom. Moreover, the transference can be viewed as metaphor by analogy: as the aged man relates to man in his prime

³⁰⁰ Cf. Aristotle, *Topics* 4.1, where we are told that the species partakes of the genus and that the species admits the definition of the genus (121a12–14). Here Aristotle uses the verb μετέχειν; the word μετουσία does not occur. We are also told that the relationship of participation goes in one direction only: the genus does not partake of the species, for the genus does not admit the definition of the species (*ibid.*). The phrase ἐκ τοῦ παρεπομένου, “from what follows” (lines 59–60 of the papyrus), may be interpreted in a similar way: the genus necessarily follows on the species, because the species is conceived of and defined in terms of the genus. The reverse does not hold: it is not true that the species necessarily follows the genus. Our notion of tree does not entail any particular species of tree, e.g., the palm; in fact, there need not be such a species. But of course there is such a species (it is a natural kind), so that a full account of the different species of tree will mention the palm. And a full account of the subspecies will mention, e.g., the date-palm.

³⁰¹ *Odyssey* 14.214.

³⁰² Schenkeveld (1993b) p. 76–7.

so stubble relates to grass in its productive stage. In both pairs the relationship is one of decline or deterioration, and that may be cited to explain the transference of stubble from grass to man.³⁰³

So much is, I think, clear. Analyzing metaphor from species to species in terms of metaphor based on analogy is encouraged by Aristotle's words at *Rhetoric* 3.10 1410b14–15, and such an analysis will appeal to those scholars who think that all four forms of metaphor recognized by Aristotle in the *Poetics* can be viewed as metaphor by analogy.³⁰⁴ There is, however, a down side to treating metaphor from species to species as a form of metaphor by analogy. We shall be obscuring the fact that species have a true or proper (οἰκεῖον) genus.³⁰⁵ In the *Poetics*, Aristotle illustrates metaphor from species to species by citing “cutting” and “drawing,” each of which falls under the genus “removing.” If I understand Aristotle correctly, the genus here is conceived of as a proper genus, i.e., one that is mentioned in the essential definitions of the two species. In other words, metaphor from species to species is based on a three term relationship — one genus and two species — in which one term, the genus, is tied essentially to the other two, the species, and the species are related to each other through the genus. Metaphor by analogy is significantly different in that it is a four-term relationship, in which a proper genus need not occur. Take the example of Dionysus' cup and Ares' shield, which Aristotle introduces in *Poetics* 21 1457b21–3. Here there is a common relationship. The cup is the recognized attribute of Dionysus, and the shield is the recognized attribute of Ares. Hence one can use cup for shield and shield for cup, but there is no proper genus that is shared by cup and shield. The one is a drinking vessel and the other a means of protection.³⁰⁶ Much more

³⁰³ Cf. E. Eggs, “Metapher,” in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*, vol. 5 col. 1104.

³⁰⁴ G. Most, “Seming and Being: Sign and Metaphor in Aristotle,” in *Creativity and the Imagination*, ed. M. Amsler (Newark: University of Delaware Press 1987) p. 19–20 and A. Laks, “Substitution et Connaissance: une Interpretation,” in *Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays*, ed. D. Furley and A. Nehamas (Princeton: University Press 1994) p. 290.

³⁰⁵ The proper, οἰκεῖον, genus of a thing is that which occurs in the essential definition of the thing in question. See *Topics* 6.1 139a27–31, cf. b3 and 6.5 143a13.

³⁰⁶ Most, “Seming and Being” p. 21 treats attribute as the genus of cup and shield, which seems quite wrong if one is thinking of a proper genus. He avoids the difficulty by saying that the genus in a metaphor from species to species is “more strictly generic.” I wonder whether that would satisfy Aristotle, for whom a proper genus is not more generic but rather the genus mentioned in an essential definition. See Chr. Rapp, *Aristoteles, Rhetorik* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag 2002) p. 891.

might be said about metaphor, its divisions and the examples found in Peripatetic texts,³⁰⁷ but I stop here. Philosophers will continue the discussion, but poets and orators need not sit idly by. Their task is to compose attractive verse and prose texts, and toward that end having a practical grasp of metaphor is sufficient.

Lines 69–96 relate to *Poetics* 21 1457b33–1458a7. The closeness of the relationship is emphasized by the fact that both texts use the perfect passive participle in order to name the kinds of word under consideration. At the beginning, each text takes account of the made up or coined (πεποιημένον) word (*Poet.* 1457b33–5, pap. lines 70–9), after which we are offered a list of words in which there is a change in form.³⁰⁸ In the *Poetics*, the lengthened (ἐπεκτεταμένον) word and the shortened (ὀφρηγμένον) word are treated together (1457b35–1458a5); in the papyrus they are treated separately (lines 79–86). The syncopated (συγκεκομμένον) word follows in the papyrus (lines 86–91); it is not mentioned in the *Poetics*. According to Snell, the explanation lies in a narrower conception of the shortened word. In the *Poetics* this kind of word is characterized by the loss of either a vowel or a syllable; in the papyrus it is characterized more narrowly by the loss of a final syllable. Hence, there is room for the syncopated word in which a vowel within the word is removed.³⁰⁹ Both lists end with a consideration of the altered (ἐξηλλαγμένον) word. In the *Poetics* this kind of word is said to occur when the poet leaves one part the same and makes up another part (1458a6–7). In the papyrus there is no room for this characterization (lines 92–3). If I understand Snell correctly, he thinks that the altered word as presented in the papyrus is not single but twofold, covering both a word in which a syllable within the word has fallen out and one in which the number of syllables has been increased. This interpretation depends on the sole surviving example, ἀντὶ τοῦ λιβανωτὸς λίβανος (a syllable has been lost, lines 95–6) and on a second example which may have occurred in the next column, ἀντὶ τοῦ δεξιὸς δεξιτερός (there is an increase in syllables).³¹⁰ Be that as it may, it should be underlined that fr. a of the papyrus breaks off at line 96, so that we do not know what followed. Perhaps the list ended

³⁰⁷ On the proverb and metaphor from species to species, see the comment on 710.

³⁰⁸ Cf. 683.9–10, where ἀποκοπή and ἀφαίρεσις are called modifications (πάθη) of ordinary expression.

³⁰⁹ Snell p. 46–7.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*

with the altered word as it does in the *Poetics*, but since there is an addition, the syncopated word, in the surviving third column (lines 86–91), it would be hasty to rule out an addition in what followed.

In conclusion, one wants to know who the author of the material contained in the papyrus may have been and in particular whether he was Theophrastus. In favor of the Eresian are the early date of the papyrus (250–200 B.C.) and the closeness of the papyrus to Aristotle's *Poetics* 20–1. It suggests that the author was an early Peripatetic who was influenced by and building on the work of Aristotle. Among the possible candidates, Theophrastus stands out. Moreover, Theophrastus' interest in ἑλληνισμός, correct Greek,³¹¹ would encourage a discussion of kinds of words, their modification and metaphorical use. We can imagine him beginning his work *On Style* (666 no. 17a) with such a discussion after which came a detailed treatment of poetic style or perhaps a more general treatment of style that covered both poetry and prose.³¹² At first reading, a passage within the introduction to Simplicius' *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories* may be thought to support this view. For there (683.5–12), Simplicius, drawing on Porphyrius, cites Theophrastus' work *On the Elements of Speech* (666 no. 17b), after which the commentator presents a string of questions concerned with style. The work *On the Elements of Speech* has been identified with the opening portion of *On Style*,³¹³ and the questions that follow are clearly related to what is said in the papyrus. The trouble here is that the title (if it is a title and not a descriptive phrase) is likely to refer to a logical work and not to *On Style*.³¹⁴ Moreover, the string of questions may not be Theophrastean but rather an addition by Simplicius or his source. (See the commentary on 683). There are other concerns about the papyrus. Breaking up metaphor and placing transference from species to genus and genus to species under the label μετουσίᾳ is striking (lines 59–69), and were it Theophrastean, we would expect it to have been mentioned by later writers like

³¹¹ See the commentary on 684.

³¹² Snell p. 50–1.

³¹³ Stroux p. 25

³¹⁴ In the text-translation volumes at 666 no. 17b, we explain *On the Elements of Speech* as “another title of the book *On Style*, which seems to pertain especially to the first part of the book.” That now seems at best incautious and almost certainly wrong. See the commentary on 666 no. 17b, where it is suggested that the words Π(π)ερὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου στοιχείων do not refer to a treatise as a whole but to a section within a logical work, presumably *On Affirmation and Denial* (68 no. 3a).

Demetrius Rhetor and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, but it isn't.³¹⁵ Furthermore the content of the papyrus is remarkably free of argument. We are offered brief definitions and examples such as we might look for in a basic *ars* and not what we would expect to find in an influential treatise like Theophrastus' *On Style*.³¹⁶ Finally, the several difficulties involved in the section on metaphor, especially the (apparently) mindless use of συνθέτων and the imprecision concerning similarity (lines 39–41), may be thought to speak against attributing the papyrus to Theophrastus. But then again, great minds sometimes fail, and copyists can make a mess of what had once been an admirable text.

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Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 44–5; Rose (1863) p. 142–3; Sandys (1885) p. 90–1; Striller (1886) p. 51–2; Rabe (1890) p. 41–5; Schmid (1894) p. 144–5; Mayer (1910) p. 13–14; Stroux (1912) 9–28, 35–43; Solmsen (1931) p. 241, 262, (1941) p. 43–4, 181–5; Voit (1934) p. 31; Bonner (1939) p. 16–17; Kroll (1940) col. 1072–3; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1528–32; Grube (1952a) p. 180–1, (1965) p. 106–7, 138; Douglas (1957) p. 19; Kennedy (1963) p. 273–8; Schenkeveld (1964) p. 72–6; Martin (1974) p. 248–52; Leeman et al. (1981 onward) vol. 4 p. 179–83; Wehrli (1983) p. 499; Innes (1985) p. 255–60; Wisse (1989) 180–1; Conley (1994) p. 223

In the sections preceding our text, Cicero assigns the orator three tasks and relates each to a particular style. Proving one's case is associated with the plain style, providing pleasure with the middle style and swaying emotions with the vigorous style (69). Emphasis is placed on the appropriate use of each style (70–4), after which each of the three styles is discussed individually. Cicero begins with the plain style (75), which he characterizes as restrained. It is said to avoid rhythm but not hiatus, and to exhibit a careful negligence that is free of noticeable ornament (76–9). At this point our text occurs. Cicero lists three qualities of the plain style — correctness of language, lucidity and propriety — and then takes note of what the plain style lacks: namely, that pleasing and abundant ornamentation which Theophrastus numbered fourth among the virtues of style or expres-

³¹⁵ Innes (1985) p. 252.

³¹⁶ Schenkeveld (1993b) p. 80.

sion.³¹⁷ Here some caution is order, for as Grube argues, our text does not speak of *virtutes* — it speaks of *laudes* — and it is not stated explicitly that Theophrastus recognized *only* those four virtues or qualities which Cicero happens to enumerate.³¹⁸ I am sympathetic to Grube's general worries concerning Cicero as a reliable witness, but in this case, I am inclined to follow the majority of scholars and to speak of four virtues. For *laus* is a perfectly good word to use when referring to rhetorical virtue,³¹⁹ and more importantly, Aristotle's discussion of style in *Rhetoric* 3.5 encourages focusing on purity or correctness of language independently of clarity.³²⁰ Finally in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it seems reasonable to say that the four qualities mentioned in our text are the sum of those recognized by Theophrastus as virtues of style. The Stoics will have added brevity as a fifth, and later rhetoricians will have extended the list still further.

In picking out four qualities, Theophrastus is developing the tripartite notion of virtue advanced by Aristotle within his account of expression (*Rhet.* 3.2–12).³²¹ At the beginning of this account, Aristotle defines virtue of style or expression, λέξεως ἀρετή, saying that it is a matter of being clear, and neither low nor excessively elevated, but appropriate (3.2 1404b1–4);³²² and at the end of the account, he recalls the earlier definition, listing the same three attributes (3.12 1414a22–4).³²³ Along the way, each of the attributes is given brief, independent treatment (3.5–7 1407a19–1408b20). Here difficulties arise, for clarity is merged with good grammar. Aristotle tells us that the beginning or first principle of expression is speaking (correct) Greek (3.5 1407a19)³²⁴ and then proceeds to discuss issues of form and

³¹⁷ The plain style lacks embellishment because it is used to instruct and to prove, not to please and to sway (*Orator* 20, 69).

³¹⁸ Grube (1952a) p. 180–1 and (1965) p. 106–7, and cf. Schmid p. 145.

³¹⁹ Cf. Cicero, *Brutus* 28 and 89. The first passage is especially relevant, for there *laus* is used as a variant for *virtus*: *post Pericles, qui cum floreret omni genere virtutis, hac tamen fuit laude* (i.e., eloquence) *clarissimus*.

³²⁰ See the immediately following paragraph.

³²¹ I agree with, e.g., Innes p. 255 that Aristotle's virtue of style is “an interdependent package of three items — clarity, propriety, and ornamentation.” It is not a single virtue of clarity as is often supposed. See Innes (1985) p. 265 n. 25 and Solmsen (1941) p. 43. For a vigorous defense of the single virtue view, see Stroux 30–3.

³²² 1404b1–4: ὀρίσθω λέξεως ἀρετὴ σαφὴ εἶναι . . . καὶ μήτε ταπεινὴν μήτε ὑπερ τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ πρέπουσαν.

³²³ 1414a22–4: εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ὀρίσται ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς λέξεως· τίνος γὰρ ἔνεκα δεῖ σαφὴ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι ἀλλὰ πρέπουσαν. But the evidence is confusing. See 3.2 1404b36–7, where escaping notice replaces propriety.

³²⁴ 1407a19: ἔστι δ' ἀρχὴ λέξεως τὸ ἐλληνίζειν.

syntax (like gender and number and the use of connectives), while repeatedly emphasizing the importance of clarity (1407a30, b15, 17, 21).³²⁵ Aristotle need not be confused. Good grammar is important to clarity, so that Aristotle is doing nothing odd in treating the topics together. Nevertheless, speaking correct Greek is largely a matter of following rules.³²⁶ In contrast, clarity is often a matter of responding to the particular situation: what will be clear to this audience now in a particular part of the oration.³²⁷ This consideration together with a growing interest in questions of grammar may have encouraged Theophrastus to modify Aristotle's tripartite notion of virtue by marking off grammatically correct language from lucid, unambiguous expression. But having said that, I want to acknowledge that no text tells us exactly how Theophrastus distinguished purity from clarity. Indeed, it may be that he never attempted a neat division between the two categories, for the two are intimately connected.³²⁸

It seems certain that Theophrastus followed Aristotle in naming three of his four virtues. Correct Greek will have been labeled ἑλληνισμός, clarity σαφήνεια, and propriety τὸ πρέπον (cf. *Rhet.* 3.5 1407a20, 3.2 1404b2, 4). The name of the fourth virtue is more puzzling. Theophrastus may have chosen a term used by Aristotle, e.g. κεκοσμημένον (cf. 3.2 1404b7), or he may have anticipated the Stoa in using κατασκευή (cf. Diog. Laert. 7.59).³²⁹ He did not choose ὄγκος, which Aristotle uses to introduce remarks on embellishment in *Rhetoric* 3.6 (1407b26); and rightly so, for the term is too narrow, being closely tied to expansive expression and suggestive of excess.

When Aristotle first introduces his tripartite notion of virtuous style, he speaks of prose which is neither low nor excessively el-

³²⁵ All the lines listed mention lack of clarity, but that does not affect my argument. On the general character of chapter 3.5, see, e.g., Cope (1877) vol. 3 p. 55 and Kennedy (1991) p. 231.

³²⁶ The rules are a reflection of the forms and combinations that occur naturally (ὡς πεφύκασι 1407a21), i.e. for the most part, in the language of persons speaking (Attic) Greek.

³²⁷ Being either long-winded or excessively brief is not a grammatical failing, but it does affect clarity; cf. *Rhet.* 3.12 1414a24–5.

³²⁸ Cf. Cicero, *On the Orator* 3.49. Cicero has introduced Theophrastus' four qualities without naming the Eresian (3.37) and discussed correct Latin including accent (3.38–47, see below). He then turns to clarity (3.48), which is immediately connected with speaking correct Latin and soon thereafter with the use of proper tenses and persons (3.49).

³²⁹ For the former alternative, κεκοσμημένον (or κόσμος), see Solmsen (1931) p. 241, (1941) p. 44; Pohlenz vol. 1 p. 31 and Schenkeveld (1964) p. 73; for the latter, κατασκευή, see Stroux p. 10, Kennedy (1963) p. 276 and Douglas p. 19.

evated, but appropriate (3.2 1404b3–4). That seems to combine a cautious, almost negative approach to embellishment with a clear emphasis on what is appropriate. Ornament is desirable, but what kind and how much are questions that cannot be answered without reference to the particular situation. Is this kind of embellishment appropriate to this kind of speaker and in this part of his oration? Does extended ornamentation suit the context, or does it diminish the clarity of the argument in progress? Theophrastus may have approached embellishment in a more positive manner; but if he did, it does not follow that he laid less emphasis on the appropriate or that he valued ornament apart from what is appropriate. In fact, Theophrastus may have listed propriety before ornamentation, third and fourth respectively, because he wanted to emphasize the unifying role of propriety. It helps mediate between the claims of clarity and ornamentation³³⁰ and gives rise to persuasive speech (cf. 3.12 1414a27).

In our Ciceronian text, Theophrastus' fourth virtue, ornamentation, is characterized as pleasant and abundant: *suave et affluens* (line 3). Assuming that the characterization is Theophrastean, the Greek behind these Latin adjectives would seem to be ἡδύ and περιττόν.³³¹ The former, ἡδύ, indicates that the ornamentation in question has an agreeable effect on the audience. The latter, περιττόν, occurs in 691.2 and refers generally to expression that rises above the level of ordinary discourse. This elevation has a pleasurable effect on the listener, so that the two characteristics mentioned by Cicero are causally related. We may compare *Rhetoric* 3.2, where Aristotle introduces an analogy between a citizen's response to foreigners and an audience's response to unfamiliar expression (1404b9–10). What is out of the ordinary arouses wonder, and what is wonderful is pleasant; for this reason we ought to use a mode of expression which is foreign or unfamiliar (1404a10–12). In 3.12 Aristotle also makes the connection between style and pleasure. Only here he is explicit that a pleasant effect depends upon clarity as well as elevation. There must be a good mix of the ordinary (what is immediately clear) and the foreign or unfamiliar (1414a21–7).

In the preceding paragraph, I wrote "assuming that the characterization is Theophrastean," for it is possible to construe the adjectives *suave* and *affluens* as Ciceronian additions. Cicero is dis-

³³⁰ Cf. Schenkeveld (1964) p. 73 and Innes p. 256–7.

³³¹ On the latter term, see Innes p. 257–8, citing Aulus Gellius 1.22.9.

cussing the plain style, which is one of three styles, the other two being the middle and the vigorous or grand.³³² This doctrine of three styles is probably not Theophrastean,³³³ and in the case of the plain style, ornamentation is not necessarily excluded. That was made clear earlier, when Cicero first introduced the plain style and divided its users into two groups: those who are unpolished and those who are bright and in some small measure ornate: *florentes etiam et leviter ornati* (20). Similarly in the lines which immediately follow **684**, Cicero does not withhold ornament from the plain style. On the contrary, he discusses its use, albeit insisting that the use be modest (79–81). As a consequence, in **684** Cicero would be creating confusion were he to say simply that ornament is absent from the plain style. He needs to qualify the ornament that is missing, and he appears to do so in a way that suggests the middle and the grand style. For *suave* or *suavitas* is repeatedly associated with the middle style,³³⁴ and *affluens* suggests the grand style.³³⁵ In addition, the order in which the adjectives are mentioned suggests a natural progression from the plain to the middle and to the grand style.³³⁶ If that is the correct interpretation of *suave* and *affluens*, then these adjectives have no direct connection with Theophrastus. But losing the two adjectives for Theophrastus does not entail losing the four virtues of style listed by Cicero. We need only recognize that *ornatum* may be used widely, so that it covers embellishment of all kinds.

The four virtues of style listed in the *Orator* are also found in Cicero's earlier work *De oratore*. In the opening book, Crassus is made to list them within a survey of well-worn precepts (*contrita praecepta* 1.137). Some of the precepts have Peripatetic roots (e.g., the recognition of three kinds of oratory³³⁷ and the corresponding division of special topics 1.141), but the inclusion of stasis theory

³³² Cicero uses various adjectives to describe the grand style. In section 69, he uses "vigorous," *vehemens*, which seems to suit the task of arousing emotion. Earlier in section 20, Cicero had described persons accomplished in this style not only as *vehementes* but also as *grandiloqui*, *varii*, *copiosi* and *graves*. Later in 97, we find the adjectives *amplus*, *copiosus*, *gravis* and *ornatus* (97). The several different adjectives reflect the fact that the grand style is not simple but complex.

³³³ See the commentary on **685**.

³³⁴ In addition to section 79 = **684.4**, see 69, 91, 92 and 99.

³³⁵ Sandys p. 91 and Grube (1952a) p. 181 n. 32.

³³⁶ When Cicero finishes his discussion of the plain style (at 90), he takes up the middle style (91–6) and later turns to the grand style (beginning at 97). Cf. 69 and 99. But it must be acknowledged that Cicero does not always follow this order. In 20–1 the sequence is grand, plain, middle.

³³⁷ See the commentary to **671**.

(1.139) suggests the Hermagorean school-tradition.³³⁸ In any case, Crassus describes the precepts as common to all the teachers of rhetoric (*omnium communia* 1.137) and of only limited benefit to the would-be orator (1.145–6). Of especial interest is the order in which the virtues of style are reported. Purity of language comes first, then lucidity, third ornament and fourth propriety (1.144). The fact that ornament is mentioned before propriety recalls Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3.2, 6–7, 12) and not Theophrastus (684), but there need be no direct connection with the Stagirite. For once Theophrastus had developed a doctrine of four virtues, later rhetoricians were free to take over the doctrine and to vary the order as they wanted.

The same order, ornament third and propriety fourth, is found in *De oratore* 3.37, where Cicero has Crassus begin a detailed treatment of style. In this context it is plausible to explain the order by reference to the discussion which follows: purity of language and lucidity are taken up in 3.37–48 and 48–52 respectively, ornament in 3.53, 91–209³³⁹ and propriety in 3.210–12. In other words, the order in 3.37 is forward looking.³⁴⁰ Of especial interest is the sharp distinction which Crassus draws between purity of language and lucidity on the one hand and ornament and propriety on the other. He says that the first two virtues are easy to acquire. Language skills are taught to children; the ability to make clear one's thoughts is no more than a bare minimum (3.38). In contrast, the other two virtues are described as great and a basis for admiration and praise (3.52). There is no suggestion of this division in 1.144. More important, it marks a significant departure from Aristotle, who seems to value clarity as much as or more than elevation and propriety. Since no text suggests that Theophrastus departed from his teacher by diminishing the importance of clear expression, it is likely that Cicero is influenced by a later development or simply by his own idea of oratory and the emphasis put on ornament in *De oratore* 3.³⁴¹

³³⁸ Leeman et al. vol. 1 p. 232.

³³⁹ At the beginning, the discussion of ornament is interrupted by digression. Continuous discussion begins at 3.148.

³⁴⁰ It does not seem plausible to say that the order in 1.144 is forward looking and an anticipation of what is to come in Book 3. As suggested, Cicero is most likely following a Hellenistic/Hermagorean source that contained a string of precepts. In fact, the use of adverbs to emphasize serial-order (*primum, deinde, tum, post*) seems appropriate to an elementary handbook.

³⁴¹ The emphasis placed on ornament in Book 3 — it is discussed at much greater length than the other virtues — seems to be prepared for consciously earlier in Book 2. There Antonius is made to acknowledge Crassus' command of

Two further points of interest may be mentioned. First, Crassus twice calls attention to the benefits of reading the older orators and poets, who used good Latin and expressed themselves clearly (3.39, 48). That invites comparison with 707, where Theophrastus is reported to have recommended reading the poets; but the reasons attributed to Theophrastus are different from those of Crassus. In 707, there is no mention of correct Greek and clarity.³⁴² Second, Crassus includes voice within the discussion of correct language (3.40–6). He explains that he is not concerned with delivery (3.41), but rather with speech at a more fundamental level: the control of the tongue, breathe and tone of voice (3.41). Crassus mentions certain faults which everyone wants to avoid, a soft or effeminate voice and one which is out of tune (3.41); and he discusses at some length the fault of affecting a rustic tone of voice. According to Crassus, orators adopt such a pronunciation, because they want their speech to have the ring of antiquity. It delights them (3.42), and they expect that it will please the audience.³⁴³ They are, however, wrong; at least in Crassus' opinion, the truly pleasing tone is that of the city. It is the same with the language of the Greeks: just as the inhabitants of Athens have a pronunciation which is more agreeable than that of other Greeks, so the Romans have a pronunciation which excels other persons speaking Latin (3.42–3). The reference to the Greek language might suggest that Theophrastus anticipated Cicero by making pronunciation a part of speaking correct Greek, but there is no strong evidence to support the suggestion.³⁴⁴ The most that can be said is that as a non-Athenian living in Athens, Theophrastus will

ornament (2.122) and to say that the orator's godlike power and virtue are seen in his ornate, copious and varied manner (2.120). Antonius also recognizes a close connection between ornament and emotional appeal (2.312), whose importance for persuasive speech is clearly stated (2.178). In Book 3, Crassus expresses a similar view (e.g. 3.104–5, 197).

³⁴² See the commentary on 707.

³⁴³ Although Crassus does not make the point explicitly, these orators most probably aim at more than providing pleasure. They think that a rustic tone will have the authority of antiquity. Through their voice, they aim to establish a particular *ethos*, which in the Roman context has persuasive force. See Leeman et al. vol. 4 p. 182, who cite 3.42, 46; but in these sections Crassus confines his remarks to rustic pronunciation and the pleasure it is thought to provide.

³⁴⁴ Leeman et al. vol. 4 p. 181 explain the discussion of pronunciation as a personal interest of Cicero, who is responding to actual changes beginning in the 2nd century B.C. and continuing during his own time. See Cicero, *Brutus* 258–9. Like Aristotle, Theophrastus took notice of pitch accent (682), but it is unclear what view he held and in what work and context he set forth his view. See the commentary on 682.

have been sensitive to differences in accent. Indeed, at *Brutus* 172 = **7A**, Cicero reports Theophrastus' annoyance at being unable to conceal his non-Athenian origins, despite his mastery of Attic Greek. When he asked an old lady how much she would sell something for, she replied, "Foreigner, it is not possible to sell it for less" (**7A**).³⁴⁵ A different version of the story is found in Quintilian. Theophrastus will have asked the old lady how she recognized him as a foreigner. She answered that his speech was too Attic (**7B**). As Hendrickson notes,³⁴⁶ the answer is an inept embellishment. The reader is left wondering how speaking Attic to the fullest identifies one as non-Athenian. Did Theophrastus fail to use an idiomatic expression peculiar to the market place? Be that as it may, the encounter with the old lady is almost certainly a fabrication,³⁴⁷ and as reported by Cicero in the *Brutus*, the story is clearly concerned with pronunciation.³⁴⁸

In citing Theophrastus' four virtues of style, Cicero is drawing, directly or indirectly, on the work *On Style* (666 no. 17a).

- 685** Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Demosthenes* 3 (*Opuscula* vol. 1 p. 132.3–7, 13–17 Usener and Radermacher)

Literature: Spengel (1828) p. 94–5; Westermann (1833) p. 170–1; Schmidt (1839) p. 41; Sandys (1885) p. lxx, 20–1; Volkmann (1885) p. 533–51; Blass (1865) p. 81–2, (1887–98) vol. 1 p. 251; Rabe (1890) p. 42; Hendrickson (1904) p. 125–46; Mayer (1910) p. 6, 34, (1911) p. 77; Stroux (1912) p. 119–20; Rostagni (1922) p. 109; Bonner (1938) p. 261–2; Kroll (1913) p. 71, (1940) col. 1074; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1531; Grube (1952a) p. 179, (1952b) p. 261–7, (1965) p. 107–8; Kennedy (1957) p. 93–104, (1963) p. 280–2; Dossi (1960) p. 613, 622; Innes (1985) p. 260–2; Benediktson (2000) p. 89–90, 211 n. 3

³⁴⁵ Toward the beginning of his discussion of expression, Aristotle says that a speaker should make use of foreign or unfamiliar words. For men respond to foreigners and citizens in the same way that they respond to differences in diction; and that men are struck by wonder at what is far off, and the wonderful is pleasant (*Rhetoric* 3.2 1404b9–12). These observations are sensible and raise the question whether a speaker ought to adopt a foreign or unfamiliar accent, thereby arousing wonder and pleasure. Aristotle and Theophrastus might have replied in the negative, citing the importance of clarity and an overriding concern with the presentation of the speaker's character. But that is no more than speculation.

³⁴⁶ In the Loeb edition of the *Brutus* p. 148 note a.

³⁴⁷ Stroux p. 38 n. 2 attributes the story to Hermippus.

³⁴⁸ Cf. *Brutus* 171, where Cicero distinguishes between the vocabulary of a Roman and the intonation of his voice. The latter is said to be of greater import.

Text **685** is taken from the essay *On Demosthenes* by Dionysius of Halicarnassus. The opening portion of the essay is lost. There will have been an introduction in which Dionysius stated what he planned to accomplish, followed by a discussion of the grand style. The beginning of that discussion is lost; the essay as we have it begins with two illustrative passages: one from Gorgias (*Artium script.* B VII 42 Radermacher) and another from Thucydides (3.82.3–7). The latter passage is characterized as abundant and full of every kind of embellishment; in addition, Thucydides is recognized as the standard and measure of the grand style (1). After that comes a brief description of the plain style. Its similarity to ordinary speech is mentioned, Lysias is said to have perfected it, and the styles of Lysias and Thucydides are compared (2). Next comes text **685**. Dionysius turns to the middle style and characterizes it as a mixture and combination of the plain and grand styles.³⁴⁹ We are then told that according to Theophrastus the first person to combine the styles was Thrasymachus. Dionysius expresses uncertainty concerning this attribution (lines 1–4) and goes on to name Isocrates and Plato and especially Demosthenes as preeminent practitioners of this style (not printed as part of **685**). Dionysius then returns to Thrasymachus. He queries whether the style of Thrasymachus was the source of the mean and tells us that it possesses a plan that is worthy of serious attention. The style is described as well blended and it is said to have adopted what is useful in the other two styles (lines 4–7).

At first reading, it is tempting to think that Theophrastus picked out Thrasymachus as the person who first introduced the middle style as it appears in writers of the first century B.C.³⁵⁰ Moreover, since Theophrastus could not do that without recognizing two styles between which the middle style falls, he must have had a doctrine of three styles: plain, middle and grand. But is that correct?³⁵¹ On the affirmative side, we may cite Aristotle who holds that epideictic, judicial and deliberative oratory call for different styles. Epideictic oratory admits considerable finish (ἀκρίβεια), judicial less and deliberative still less (*Rhetoric* 3.12 1414a7–18). Theophrastus will have known his master's view, and in the absence of any evidence to

³⁴⁹ There is a lacuna here (line 1), but the supplement proposed by Sylburg captures the sense and is printed by Usher in his recent edition.

³⁵⁰ See, e.g., Sandys (1885) p. lxx and 20–1, who tells us that the three kinds of style recognized by Cicero in *Orator* 20–1 go back to Theophrastus.

³⁵¹ The scholarly literature is plentiful and divided. For useful summaries, see Stroux p. 5–9 and Kennedy (1957) p. 93.

the contrary, we can assume that he accepted it. Moreover, Quintilian tells us that Theophrastus, following his teacher, wished the language of deliberative oratory to be removed as far as possible from all verbal affectation (694). Presumably he was more generous in regard to judicial oratory, and in the case of epideictic he will have welcomed richness of style. Furthermore, it is easy to imagine Theophrastus loosening the tie to the three *genera causarum*³⁵² and referring to particular orators in order to illustrate the three kinds of style. He will have cited, e.g., Lysias and Gorgias as examples of the plain and grand styles respectively, and he will have made Thrasymachus a paradigm of the middle style. Theophrastus may even have associated the three styles with authors who were not orators.³⁵³ Cicero tells us that Theophrastus recognized Herodotus and Thucydides as the first historians who dared to write in a fulsome and ornate manner (697). If that is correct, it would be a small step to include the two historians in a discussion of styles, especially Thucydides, whose work includes speeches of considerable stylistic interest. If he did, Theophrastus will have anticipated Dionysius, who cites Thucydides in order to illustrate the grand style (1). But such speculation takes us well beyond what our sources actually tell us.

It may be sobering to recognize that our text is introductory. Theophrastus is cited, not because Dionysius is especially interested in his views on style, but because Dionysius finds the citation an attractive way to move from one topic to another. In fact, there are three other occasions when Dionysius cites Theophrastus as part of an introduction (688, 691 and 695). On one of these occasions, we again meet Thrasymachus in connection with a first: according to Theophrastus, he was the first to use compression (695). On another

³⁵² Dionysius quotes from a deliberative speech of Thrasymachus in order to illustrate the middle style (3). Were he guided by what Aristotle says in *Rhetoric* 3.12, we might expect him to quote from a judicial speech, for in terms of polish, judicial oratory occupies the middle position between deliberative and epideictic oratory. That is suggestive, but it should not be taken as evidence for Theophrastus' treatment of Thrasymachus. The selection of the quoted passage and the brief comment that follows are the work of Dionysius.

³⁵³ In an early article (1967) p. 101, Kennedy rejects the idea that Theophrastus cited philosophers and historians like Plato and Thucydides (both cited by Dionysius [5–7 and 1–2]), in order to illustrate the doctrine of three styles. Their inclusion in the discussion of the three styles is said to be "a typical development of the first century which systematically extended rhetoric to include history and philosophy, partly because of the disappearance of political oratory." In a later book (1973) p. 280–1, Kennedy changes his mind and allows that Plato and Thucydides may well have been used as examples by Theophrastus.

occasion, we find a view attributed to Theophrastus — from paltry and mean words neither fine poetry nor prose will be produced (688) — which does not entirely harmonize with what Dionysius goes on to argue, and which may not be entirely fair to Theophrastus.³⁵⁴ Against this background, we should I think ask whether our text may not involve a typical introductory citation. There is mention of an authority, Theophrastus, and of a first, Thrasy Machus, without special concern for every detail. To be sure Dionysius goes on to treat Thrasy Machus as an example of the mean — he is quoted at length (3) — but it does not follow automatically that Theophrastus recognized Thrasy Machus as the originator of the middle style as we meet it in Cicero and the *Auctor ad Herennium*.³⁵⁵ Instead, Theophrastus may have viewed Thrasy Machus simply as a source of the mean in prose, πηγὴ τις τῆς μεσότητος (line 5): someone whose use of ornament regularly suited the occasion, being neither underdone nor overdone. More specifically, he may have viewed Thrasy Machus as the first to achieve a proper mean in diction, choice of words, for that seems to be Dionysius' focus in the opening sections of *On Demosthenes*.³⁵⁶

That Theophrastus, following Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 3.2 1404b3–4), recognized a mean in diction cannot be doubted. He labeled ψυχρόν, “frigid,” that usage which exceeds the proper mode of expression (686.2), and he may have spoken of usage that falls short as ξηρόν, “arid” or μικρόν καὶ ταπεινόν “paltry and mean.”³⁵⁷ He will have advocated the use of metaphor as one way to elevate diction and at the same time warned against excess (cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.2 1405a30, 3.3 1406b4–14), adding that bold metaphors may be softened by the use of an apologetic phrase: e.g., “just as if” and “as it were” (690). In regard to composition, it seems certain that he adopted Aristotle's recommendation concerning prose rhythm: it should be neither metrical nor altogether devoid of rhythm; rather it should be rhythmical up to a point (700 with *Rhetoric* 3.8 1408b21–32). That Theophrastus also recognized a mean in the use of periodic

³⁵⁴ See the commentary on 688. Kennedy (1963) p. 276 thinks that 691 misrepresents Theophrastus, but I am not convinced. See the commentary on 691.

³⁵⁵ On Cicero see above, note 350, and on the *Auctor* see the *Rhetoric to Herennius* 4.11–16.

³⁵⁶ See Grube (1952b) p. 261–7, and cf. Innes (1985) p. 260–2.

³⁵⁷ The label “arid” is suggested by Stroux (1912) p. 107, referring to Demetrius, *On Style* 237; “paltry and mean” by Innes (1985) p. 261, referring to Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.2 1404b3 and 688.7.

structure is quite likely (cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.9 1409b17–32), even though no particular Theophrastean text makes the point explicitly.³⁵⁸ It seems, then, that Theophrastus followed his teacher³⁵⁹ and conceived of a mean that covers all good style. In this regard, the use of μεσότης in line 5 of our text is suggestive.³⁶⁰ The Greek word is familiar from Aristotle's definition of moral virtue (*Nicomachean Ethics* 2.6 1106b36, apparently adopted by Theophrastus **449A.5**), and Dionysius may have found it in Theophrastus' remarks on Thrasymachus. But it is also possible that Dionysius himself introduced the word. We may compare *On Literary Composition* 24, where Dionysius uses the word in regard to the best type of composition and then adds a reference to Aristotle's doctrine of moral virtue. But whatever the truth concerning μεσότης in line 5,³⁶¹ it seems clear that Theophrastus thought of good style as a mean in much the way that good behavior is a mean: it is to be looked for in all kinds of oratory (and we may add literature in general) in the way that the ethical mean is called for in whatever a man does.

My conclusion is that in all probability Theophrastus did not cite Thrasymachus as the originator of the middle style. He did, however, recognize his importance for the development of a refined prose, which rose above ordinary speech and at the same time avoided poetic language. In our sources, Theophrastus makes explicit reference to his originality not only in **685** but also in **695** regarding compression. And since Aristotle cites Thrasymachus as the first to use the

³⁵⁸ See Bonner (1938) p. 260, who detects the doctrine of Theophrastus behind Demetrius, *On Style* 4 and Dionysius, *On Literary Composition* 23. See also Innes (1985) p. 262, who cites **692** and **695**.

³⁵⁹ That Aristotle himself applied the doctrine of the mean to matters of style — to both diction and composition — has been well argued in the scholarly literature. See, e.g., Hendrickson (1904) p. 127–36 and Bonner (1938) p. 257–60.

³⁶⁰ See Innes (1985) p. 260.

³⁶¹ In *On Literary Composition* 24, Dionysius not only compares the μεσότης in rhetoric with that in ethics but also makes specific reference to Aristotle and the other philosophers of that school. The other philosophers certainly include Theophrastus, and that may encourage us to say that Theophrastus used the word in his remarks on Thrasymachus, and that Dionysius, in *On Demosthenes* 3, has it from these remarks. But before accepting that line of reasoning, we should take note of the fact that Dionysius is introducing the middle style which he believes to be the best (33–4). That alone may have prompted him to use μεσότης — the word is closely connected with perfection — and not the fact that Theophrastus used it. Or perhaps Theophrastus did use the word in his remarks on Thrasymachus, and when Dionysius returns to Thrasymachus after introducing Isocrates, Plato and Demosthenes, he takes over the word because of its association with perfection.

paeon (*Rhetoric* 3.8 1409a1), we can guess with considerable conviction that Theophrastus did the same.³⁶²

Text **695** could conceivably derive from the work *On Discoveries* (**727** no. 11) — Thrasyarchus might be cited as the first to find the mean in diction and generally in style — but given the fact that Dionysius twice cites *On Style* (**688** and **692**), our text should be assigned to that work (**666** no. 17a).

686 Demetrius, *On Style* 114 (p. 124.6–14 Roberts)

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 42–3; Rabe (1890) p. 21, 26–7; Schmid (1894) p. 144–5; Roberts (1902) p. 232–3, 267; Hendrickson (1905) p. 141; Mayer (1910) p. xxv, 147–8; Stroux (1912) 106–7; Solmsen (1931) p. 249, (1941) p. 43–4; Bonner (1938) p. 258; Grube (1952a) p. 176, (1961) p. 39, (1965) p. 105; Kennedy (1963) p. 276; Schenkeveld (1964) p. 80–5; Wehrli (1983) p. 499–500; Innes (1985) p. 260, (1995) 326, 421.

Text **686** is taken from the opening section of Demetrius' discussion of frigidity (ψυχρότης). The discussion of the grand style has been completed (38–113), and Demetrius introduces (114) a comparison with ethics: just as certain bad qualities exist side by side with certain refined qualities, e.g., rashness is close to boldness and shame to respect, so too there are mistaken or faulty types of style which border upon approved types, i.e., upon the grand, elegant, plain and forceful styles. After that comes text **686**. Demetrius announces that he will first discuss the faulty style, which is the neighbor of the grand style. He names it the frigid style, reports Theophrastus' definition of frigidity and gives an example taken from Sophocles' *Triptolemus*.

According to Demetrius, "Theophrastus defines the frigid as follows: 'frigid is that which exceeds the proper mode of expression'" (lines 2–3). In Greek the definition runs: ψυχρόν ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τὴν οἰκείαν ἀπαγγελίαν. Is that an entirely accurate quotation of the Theophrastean definition? Doreen Innes believes that it is, and argues as follows: "This [Theophrastus'] definition allows only one excess fault of style, contrary to the context in Demetrius, for whom *to psychron* is the neighboring excess fault of one specific

³⁶² See, e.g., Blass vol. 1 p. 251 (whose interpretations of **685** and **695** are, in my judgment, faulty) and Innes (1985) p. 262.

style, the grand style — a mismatch which is convincing proof that we have the genuine words of Theophrastus.”³⁶³ I agree with Innes that there is a mismatch here: Theophrastus did not advance a doctrine of four styles, each paired with a specific faulty style. Rather he recognized one ideal mean — appropriately ornamented prose — from which a speaker can depart either in the direction of excess or in that of deficiency.³⁶⁴ Frigidity is departure in the direction of excess. Nevertheless, the word ἀπαγγελία may give pause. In the definition of the frigid, it almost certainly means “expression,” and that usage may be thought to postdate Theophrastus.³⁶⁵ Both Plato and Aristotle use the word in the sense of “narration,” which is in line with its use by a fifth-century author like Thucydides.³⁶⁶ Of course, the definition reported by Demetrius may involve an early occurrence, perhaps even the first occurrence, of ἀπαγγελία in the sense of “expression,” but it is also possible that its occurrence in **686** is an example of Demetrius replacing one word with another of his own choosing.³⁶⁷ Such intervention can be demonstrated in regard to Aristotle. For example, in section 34, Demetrius writes, “Aristotle defines the colon as follows” — the same formula as in **686**³⁶⁸ — and then reports a definition which involves alteration: μῆρος replaces μέριον (*Rhetoric* 3.9 1409b16). The same can be said of the subsequent reference to Aristotle’s “simple” period: ἀπλῆ replaces ἀφελῆ (1409b6).³⁶⁹ Similarly in section 116, within the discussion of frigidity, Demetrius cites Aristotle’s discussion of frigidity (*Rhetoric* 3.3), and in doing so, he introduces a change in terminology: instead of ἐν τοῖς διπλοῖς (3.3 1405b36), Demetrius writes ἐν συνθέτῳ.³⁷⁰ In ad-

³⁶³ Innes (1985) p. 260.

³⁶⁴ See the commentary on **685**.

³⁶⁵ See LSJ s.v. II and Roberts (1902) p. 267, who refers to his earlier article “The Greek Words for ‘Style,’” *Classical Review* 15 (1901) p. 253.

³⁶⁶ Plato, *Republic* 3 394C; Aristotle, *Poetics* 5 1449b11, 6 1449b26–7; Thucydides, *Histories* 3.67.

³⁶⁷ Roberts (1902) p. 267 comments that “Theophrastus himself probably used the word λέξις.” If he did, we can imagine Demetrius choosing to replace λέξις, a word closely (but not always) tied to diction (see, e.g., sections 38 and 77 within the discussion of the grand style), with another word, ἀπαγγελία, which he thought more suitable to frigidity conceived of as a faulty style that includes more than inappropriate diction.

³⁶⁸ Cf. **687.2**.

³⁶⁹ See “The Sources” under Demetrius, p. 6.

³⁷⁰ Demetrius does, however, use the noun δίπλωσις in section 116. That Demetrius favors the term σύνθετον is clear from sections 91–3, but τὰ διπλᾶ occurs at the end of 93. See Solmsen (1931) p. 246–8.

dition, at least one example given by Demetrius is not found in Aristotle: namely, ἐρημοπλάνος.³⁷¹ None of this is intended to suggest that Demetrius has seriously misreported Theophrastus' definition of the frigid. He has not, but we must, I think, allow the possibility that he has reported the definition with less than perfect accuracy. Moreover, we cannot assume that the example given by Demetrius "a baseless cup is not tabled" (line 4) is taken from Theophrastus. As with Aristotle, Demetrius may be introducing an example of his own choosing.

Before leaving ἀπαγγελία, it should be noted that the verb ἀπαγγέλλειν occurs later in Demetrius' discussion of the arid style, i.e., that faulty style which borders on the plain style. We read: περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν γίνεται τὸ ξηρόν, ὅταν πρᾶγμα μέγα σμικροῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀπαγγέλλῃ, "In diction aridity is found when a writer narrates a great event in trivial language" (237). The translation is that of Innes (1995) p. 487. However, in her earlier article, Innes (1985) p. 261, Innes translates "when a writer expresses an important subject in trivial words." She suggests that Theophrastus' definition of aridity stands behind these words, and she compares the use of the verb ἀπαγγέλλειν with the use of the noun ἀπαγγελία in 686. That may be another reason for thinking that Theophrastus used ἀπαγγελία in his definition of frigidity, but caution is necessary. In her later translation (1995), Innes renders the verb with "narrates," which seems to me the more natural translation.³⁷² If it is, then the occurrence of ἀπαγγέλλειν in the passage on aridity tells us little about ἀπαγγελία in 686, where the noun seems to mean — and I think does mean — "expression."³⁷³

According to Theophrastus the frigid is that which exceeds, ὑπερβάλλον (line 3), the proper mode of expression. The idea is elucidated not only by the example of the baseless cup but also by the subsequent statement: "For the subject matter, being slight, does not admit such weighty style" (lines 5–6). We may compare

³⁷¹ The same might be said of the example τρέμοντα καὶ ὥχρα τὰ γράμματα, but the last word is regularly emended to reflect the Aristotelian example χλωρὰ καὶ ἄναιμα τὰ πράγματα (3.3 1406b9).

³⁷² Roberts p. 179 translates "describes."

³⁷³ In 696 Demetrius cites Theophrastus concerning the benefit of leaving some things to be inferred by the listener. Since Demetrius seems to be drawing on a Theophrastean discussion of narration, I was once tempted to argue that in 686 ἀπαγγελία means "narration" and that Demetrius has taken the definition of the frigid from the same discussion of narration. The idea now seems to me too imaginative to merit further discussion.

Aristotle, who discusses frigidity in *Rhetoric* 3.3. Neither the verb ὑπερβάλλειν nor the cognate noun ὑπερβολή occurs (except in an example, 1406a32), but the idea is prominent.³⁷⁴ We do not know whether Theophrastus organized his discussion of frigidity under Aristotle's four headings: compounds, glosses, epithets and metaphors, but he may have done so. In any case, he probably followed Aristotle in restricting his discussion to diction. Certainly, he followed him in characterizing frigidity as inappropriate (1406a32, b6). That is immediately clear from Theophrastus' definition of frigidity (686); it is also in line with his conception of good style, i.e., style which is appropriate as well as correct, clear and ornamented (684). Indeed, frigidity may do more than violate propriety; it can also impede clarity and diminish persuasive force. Aristotle had already made these observations (1406a32–4, b14). Theophrastus will have agreed and followed Aristotle in recommending moderation in expression (1406a16). Prose should be ornamented, but it becomes frigid when embellishment is overdone.

Theophrastus' definition of the frigid can be assigned to the work *On Style* (666 no. 17a).

687 Demetrius, *On Style* 173–5 (p. 150.19–28, 152.1–4 Roberts)

688 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Literary Composition* 16 (*Opuscula* vol. 2 p. 66.8–18 Usener and Radermacher)

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 39–40; Cope (1877) vol. 3 p. 30–1; Sandys (1885) p. 91; Diels (1886) p. 28–31; Rabe (1890) p. 5, 10, 22–3, 44; Roberts (1902) p. 241–2, (1910) p. 164–7; Mayer (1910) p. 51; Stroux (1912) 20–1; Solmsen (1931) p. 252; Stanford (1936) p. 63–5; Kroll (1940) col. 1072; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1528, 31; Grube (1952a) p. 173, (1961) p. 39, 101, (1965) p. 104; Kennedy (1963) p. 277; Dossi (1960) p. 616–17; Wehrli (1983) p. 499; Innes (1985) p. 258, (1995) p. 319, 323, 455; Fantham (1988) p. 284 Benediktson (2000) p. 89

Text **687** occurs within Demetrius' discussion of the elegant style, ὁ γλαφυρὸς χαρακτήρ (128–85). This style is characterized as charm-

³⁷⁴ For example, we are told that style becomes completely poetic, when there is much use of compound words (3.3 1406a37–b1); that style becomes patently poetic when epithets are used frequently, not as seasoning but as the main course (1406a11, 13, 18–19); that metaphors are frigid, when they are too dignified and tragic and generally too poetic (1406b7–11).

ing, χαριέντισμος, and genial speech (128). A distinction is drawn between more dignified forms of charm, χάρις, and those which are ordinary and closely related to comedy (128–31). There is an extended analysis of charm in terms of subject matter and style (132–62); there is also a comparison between what is ludicrous and what is charming, followed by brief remarks on laughter and human character (163–72). At this point comes text **687** on beautiful words. Demetrius has already made mention of beautiful words when comparing what is ludicrous and what is charming (164); now he adds a kind of appendix on the subject.³⁷⁵ Beautiful words are said to produce a style that is charming (line 1), and Theophrastus is said to have defined beautiful words as follows: κάλλος ὀνόματός ἐστι τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀκοὴν ἢ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν ἡδύ, ἢ τὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔντιμον, “Beauty in a word is that which is pleasant in regard to hearing or in regard to sight or that which suggests in thought great value” (lines 2–3). The formula with which Demetrius introduces the definition, ὠρίσατο δ’ αὐτὰ Θεόφραστος οὕτως, is essentially the same as we find in **686.2**, where the present tense, ὀρίζεται, occurs.

The definition of beauty in a word involves a primary division: “that which is pleasant in regard to hearing or in regard to sight” is distinguished from “that which suggests in thought great value.” There is also a secondary division: the pleasant is divided by reference to hearing and sight. What follows (lines 3–10) is an elucidation of these divisions. The order is reversed, so that the pleasant in regard to sight is discussed before the pleasant in regard to hearing. More importantly, the explanations of the pleasant in regard to sight and the pleasant in regard to hearing are significantly different. Concerning the former we are told that “all those things which are pleasant to see are also beautiful when spoken of.” Apparently a word like “rose-colored” is beautiful because it suggests a pleasant sight that is recalled or simply imagined (lines 3–5). In contrast, the latter, the pleasant in regard to hearing, is explained by reference to the audible qualities of a word. Double lambda and double nu are said to have a certain resonance, and Attic writers are said to add nu to accusative forms for the sake of euphony (lines 5–8). The difference here is real, but it need not be a sign of confusion. The pleasant in regard to sight and the pleasant in regard to hearing may be grouped together (lines 2–3) because both are concerned with sense perception (albeit in different ways) and neither is concerned with value apart from the senses.

³⁷⁵ Innes (1995) p. 323 n. 25.

In contrast, that which suggests in thought great value (line 3) is not tied to the pleasures of perception but to worth. Words like ἀρχαῖοι, “ancients” (line 9), convey nobility and are beautiful independently of their audible qualities and any mental images that they may occasion.

The elucidation provided by Demetrius is likely to reflect what Theophrastus had in mind when he defined beauty in a word, but the fact that Theophrastus makes a unit of the pleasant in regard to hearing and the pleasant in regard to sight (τὸ . . . ἡδύ, lines 2–3) may suggest two alternative explanations. According to the first, Theophrastus is not concerned with the sounds of words. To be sure, he would not deny that certain words are pleasant to the ear, but his definition of beauty in a word ignores audible qualities. In regard to both hearing and sight, we should think of words or phrases which recall or suggest to the mind a pleasant sense experience. Such words may be grouped together, because they differ from other beautiful words, like ἀρχαῖοι, which are not tied to sense experiences and which suggest great value. The second alternative explanation differs in that it does not dismiss audible qualities. Indeed, in the case of both hearing and sight, we are to think of direct sense experiences. The pleasant in regard to hearing is the sound heard by the ear, and the pleasant in regard to sight is the visual effect of letters and words on the eye of the reader. This second alternative (that of W. B. Stanford p. 64) is highly imaginative and in my judgment far removed from the rhetorical theory of the early Peripatos.

The idea of beauty in a word is not original with Theophrastus. It is found already in Aristotle’s discussion of metaphor in *Rhetoric* 3.2. There we read: κάλλος δὲ ὀνόματος τὸ μὲν, ὥσπερ Λικύμνιος λέγει, ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις ἢ τῷ σημαινόμενῳ, καὶ αἶσχος δὲ ὡσαύτως, “Beauty in a word, as Licymnius says, is in the sounds or in what is signified, and the same holds for ugliness (3.2 1405b6–8). The mention of Licymnius takes us back to the late fifth century,³⁷⁶ and the distinction between sounds, ψόφοι, and signification appears to be in line with Demetrius’ explanation of the Theophrastean definition. To be sure, the word ψόφος covers more sounds than those of the voice, but in context — especially in contrast with what is signified by a word — ψόφος is most naturally taken as a reference to vocal qualities. Such an interpretation seems to be confirmed a few lines later,

³⁷⁶ According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Lysias* 3, Licymnius was a pupil of Gorgias; according to Plato, *Phaedrus* 267C2, he wrote on beautiful words. In general, see Blass (1887) vol. 1 p. 85–6.

when Aristotle writes: τὰς δὴ μεταφορὰς ἐντεῦθεν οἰστέον, ἀπὸ καλῶν ἢ τῇ φωνῇ ἢ τῇ δυνάμει ἢ τῇ ὄψει ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει, “Metaphors are to be drawn from these sources: from what is beautiful either in voice or in meaning or in seeing or some other sense” (1405b17–19). Here φωνή (1405b18) has replaced ψόφος (1405b7), and like ψόφος, it comes first and contrasts with what is signified or meant by a word. Apparently Aristotle is drawing a distinction between vocal sounds that please a listener and what is signified by a word including certain sights and other sense experiences that are recalled or suggested to the mind.³⁷⁷ Aristotle also recognizes that different words convey different values. “Torch-bearer” has honorable connotations; “mendicant-priest” has the opposite: the former is honorable, τίμιον, the latter without honor, ἄτιμον (1405a14–23). Both the vocabulary and the idea are picked up in Theophrastus’ definition and in the subsequent explanation: words like “ancients” suggest great value; they are τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔντιμα (lines 8–9).

If the preceding remarks concerning Aristotle are correct, and if Theophrastus’ definition of beauty in a word is based closely on that of his master, then the explanation offered by Demetrius seems preferable to the alternatives mentioned above. Despite the reversal of order,³⁷⁸ Demetrius does no violence to Theophrastus when he refers to the audible qualities of words. Here text 688 is relevant. It comes from Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Literary Composition* 16 and is clearly concerned with the sound of words. Earlier in Section 13, Dionysius introduced a discussion of beauty in composition and told us that, just as with charm or pleasantness (cf. 12), the cause is to be found in the letters and syllables from which words are constructed. In the next two sections, 14–15, Dionysius discusses the sound of letters and of syllables, and in the immediately preceding portion of section 16, he continues to focus on sound. He takes up words whose sound is imitative like the “bellowing” of bulls and the “whinnying” of horses,

³⁷⁷ On this interpretation, the reference to “some other sense” includes hearing. I.e., it opens the door to words which refer to or signify pleasing sounds, whether or not the words themselves have pleasing audible qualities. The fact that Aristotle does not make this clear might be thought to count against the interpretation and to suggest that the mention of “sight or some other sense” is a kind of afterthought which should be taken closely with the initial reference to voice. Nevertheless, it is hearing, which is coordinate with sight, not voice. Certainty here is elusive, but my guess is that Aristotle uses φωνή, because he is thinking narrowly of vocal sounds and not sounds of all kinds.

³⁷⁸ I.e., the order in lines 3–8 (sight before hearing) involves a reversal of what is found in the definition in lines 2–3 (hearing before sight).

and then tells us that language becomes pleasing as a result of words, syllables and letters that are pleasing to hear (ἐκ τῶν ἡδυνόντων τὴν ἀκοήν). Examples from Homer follow, after which comes **688**. Dionysius speaks of fashioning a beautiful style in the combination of sounds (ἐν τῷ συντιθέναι τὰς φωνάς, lines 1–2) and introduces Theophrastus, who is said to define which words are by nature beautiful and which are paltry and mean. The former, when combined, are said to result in beautiful and magnificent phrasing; the latter are said to produce neither fine poetry nor fine prose. Since it is all but certain that Demetrius and Dionysius have the same Theophrastean passage in mind, and since Dionysius is concerned with the audible qualities of words, Demetrius' reference to audible qualities is to be accepted as a fair representation of what Theophrastus said.

Dionysius adds one thing missing in Demetrius: namely, that Theophrastus spoke of “paltry and mean (words) from which neither fine poetry nor prose will be produced” (lines 7–8). The mention of unattractive words appears to explain why Dionysius cites Theophrastus. In the first part of Section 16, his focus has been on beautiful words. Now he wants to introduce a new topic: namely, how to deal with words that are not beautiful but cannot be avoided. Toward this end, he finds it useful to cite Theophrastus. The name “Theophrastus” lends a ring of authority to the subsequent discussion, and the mention of paltry and mean words raises the question how one deals with such words when one wishes to compose beautiful prose. Dionysius' answer (not printed as part of our text) is to mix beautiful words with the ugly and thereby mask their unattractive qualities (cf. 12 on charm). There is no suggestion that Theophrastus made such a recommendation; indeed, what Theophrastus is reported to have said seems to rule out any recommendation. For according to Dionysius, Theophrastus said that from paltry and mean words “neither fine poetry nor prose will be produced.” Perhaps Theophrastus went on to qualify the assertion attributed to him, but if he did, Dionysius has suppressed the fact.³⁷⁹

Dionysius tells us that Theophrastus spoke in a rather general way (κοινότερον, line 4) about beauty in composition. That may mean that Theophrastus did not offer specific examples in the manner of Diony-

³⁷⁹ In one respect, it seems clear that Dionysius has omitted material: namely, he concentrates on hearing and does not mention words that are beautiful in regard to sight and thought (cf. **687.2–3**). The omission may explain why Dionysius introduces the phrase παραδείγματος ἕνεκα: it is a way of acknowledging that his focus is on only one kind of beautiful word.

sus, who quotes Homer's *Iliad* 2.494–501, in order to illustrate the effective mixing of unattractive words with those that have a good sound. We may compare what Aulus Gellius says about Theophrastus' treatment of helping a friend contrary to the law: he "does not evaluate individual deeds taken one at a time, nor (does he make use of) the certain evidence of examples; rather he deals with classes of things summarily and generally" (534.41–3).³⁸⁰ On the basis of two texts, I do not want to suggest that Theophrastus regularly avoided specific examples, preferring to deal with topics *summatim universimque*. Nevertheless, in the case of rhetorical style, Theophrastus, *qua* philosopher, may have been more concerned to set forth his theory than to elucidate it by reference to specific examples.

Since Dionysius names the work *On Style*, it is reasonable to believe that both texts, 687 as well as 688, are to be assigned to that work (666 no. 17a).

689A Philodemus, *On Rhetoric* 4, P. Herc. 1007/1673 col. 13 (*BT* vol. 1 p. 173.13–23 Sudhaus)

689B Cicero, *To Friends* 16.17.1 (*BT* p. 597.10–17 Shackelton Bailey)

690 pseudo-Longinus, *On the Sublime* 32.3 (*OCT* p. 38.10–15 Russell)

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 43–4; Sandys (1885) p. 93; Diels (1886) p. 26–7; Mayer (1910) p. 62; R. Tyrrell and L. Purser, *The Correspondence of M. Tullius Cicero*, 2nd ed. (Dublin: Hodges and Figgis 1915) vol. 5 p. 168–9; Solmsen (1931) p. 245–6; Stanford (1936) p. 27; Grube (1965) p. 104; McCall (1969) p. 53–5; Ievoli (1973) p. 95; D. Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: University Press 1977) p. 185–6; Matelli (1988) p. 203; Gigante (1999) p. 88–9; Guidorizzi (2000) p. 70–3, 82–3, 163–4, 182–4

Text **689A** is from the fourth book of Philodemus' work *On Rhetoric*. In what immediately precedes, the Epicurean philosopher is critical of what has been written on metaphor. In particular, he complains that we are offered no practical help in the use of metaphor, whether we pass from the living to the lifeless, or the lifeless to the living, and similarly from genus to species or species to genus (col.

³⁸⁰ On the text of Gellius, see Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 288–9 and "Theophrastus, fr. 534 FHS&G," *Synthesis Philosophica* 10 (Zagreb: The Croatian Philosophical Society & The Union of Philosophical Societies of Yugoslavia 1990) p. 457–68.

12.24–13.13 p. 172–3 Sudhaus).³⁸¹ In **689A** we are told that the majority of writers deplore or exalt metaphor, and in doing so, they cite Theophrastus who says that “harshness should be absent from even the apologetic metaphor, which is mild and inoffensive, such as one that does not belong should be, just as when visiting a house.”

In several places the text of **689A** calls for comment.³⁸² At the very beginning of line 1, Sudhaus supplies οὐ before κατὰ λόγον,³⁸³ so that the denunciation and praise of the majority is characterized as unreasonable. In line 2, the reading ἐπι[φ]ω[νο]ῦντες is not to be doubted; in private correspondence, David Sedley has called my attention to the fact that Philodemus uses the verb ἐπιφωνεῖν in order to introduce direct quotation (e.g., *On Rhetoric* vol. 2 p. 50.3 S). In line 3, the relative pronoun ἣ is the reading suggested by Doreen Innes, also in private correspondence. It connects the two halves of the quotation. Nevertheless, the definite article ἡ is not impossible, for as Sedley has remarked, quoted words do not have to constitute a complete grammatical sentence.³⁸⁴ In line 5, οἰκ[ί]ον is the reading of Sedley. Innes prefers οἰκ[εῖ]ον, arguing that it is the correct contrast after ἀλλοτρίον. She also says that while οἰκία “house,” is an image used of sentence structure, it is not used of diction; hence in line 5 one expects a word like τόπος or χώρα (cf. Demetrius Rhetor, *On Style* 87, 110). Sedley opposes οἰκ[εῖ]ον, pointing out that there is no room in the papyrus for both epsilon and iota; moreover, the occurrence of *domicilium* in **689B.4** speaks for οἰκία. So does the participle εἰσίουσαν.³⁸⁵ I agree with

³⁸¹ On genus to species and species to genus, see **Append. 9.59–70**.

³⁸² In the heading to **689A** we have referred to Sudhaus’ edition of Philodemus’ work *On Rhetoric* (1892). That seemed a helpful way to locate the text within Book 4 of Philodemus’ work. Nevertheless, the reference may be confusing for in recent years the text of **689A** has been much improved, first by A. Petrazzuolo and then by David Sedley. The text of the former is printed by Ievoli (1973) and that of the latter is found in FHS&G (1991). The text printed by Gigante (1999) p. 89 is based on that of Petrazzuolo and is described by Gigante as *molto diverso* from **689A**. In my judgment the text of Sedley is to be preferred. Nevertheless, a new and hopefully authoritative edition of Book 4 is in preparation by Robert Gaines and Costantina Romeo.

³⁸³ Sudhaus is followed by Petrazzuolo.

³⁸⁴ Following Sedley, I do not doubt that the papyrus exhibits an eta. Petrazzuolo reports an epsilon, i.e., δ]ε.

³⁸⁵ The reading εἰσίουσαν seems secure. According to Sedley only the second iota is unclear. Sudhaus prints ἐ[γ]κ[ρ]αι[παλίζ]ουσαν, followed by a question mark; Petrazzuolo cuts off his text with οἰκία.

Sedley and add only that the image of entering someone else's house adds vividness to the notion of the apologetic metaphor.

Text **698B** is the beginning of a letter written by Cicero to his freedman Tiro on July 29, 45 B.C.³⁸⁶ From line 1, it appears that Cicero is already contemplating the publication of his own letters. Tiro will have been informed, and in response he will have indicated interest in having his own letters published as well. Cicero is less than enthusiastic. Hence, he merely takes note of what Tiro wants, and quickly moves on to criticize Tiro's use of the adverb *fideliter* in the phrase *valetudini fideliter inserviando*.³⁸⁷ Apparently Tiro referred to his own poor health and said that he would take care of himself faithfully. According to Cicero, *fideliter* is out of place in this context. It is used properly with reference to duty, and it is used metaphorically with regard to learning, art, and even a field. Cicero's criticism may be unfair, for Tiro may have meant that he would conscientiously care for his health as a duty to Cicero.³⁸⁸ Be that as it may, Cicero goes on to cite Theophrastus, who found metaphor acceptable providing that it be kept within the bounds of the apologetic metaphor.

Text **690** comes from the work *On the Sublime*. The author, whoever he may be,³⁸⁹ is discussing diction and in particular the use of multiple metaphors. He first cites Caecilius,³⁹⁰ who thinks that no more than three metaphors should be used in one place. After that the author introduces Demosthenes, who is said to be the standard in such matters. We are told that the right moment for using metaphors is when emotion flows like a torrent, for at such times metaphors are carried along as a necessary consequence (32.1). A passage from

³⁸⁶ Tiro was Cicero's secretary and literary adviser. He was originally Cicero's slave, but was freed in 53 B.C. After Cicero's death, he published a biography of Cicero as well as some of his speeches and letters. Tiro also published on Latin grammar.

³⁸⁷ The adjective *κόριον* characterizes a word or phrase which is used in its "prevailing" or ordinary sense; *ἄκυρον* is used of a word or phrase which does not have its ordinary meaning. The positive form occurs several times in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (see, e.g., 3.2 1404b6, 31, 35, 39), but we do not find the negative form. Perhaps Theophrastus used both, but it would be a stretch to argue on the basis of the subsequent reference to Theophrastus (line 6) that in using *ἄκυρον* (line 3) Cicero is reflecting Theophrastean usage.

³⁸⁸ Tyrrell and Purser vol. 5 p. 168 and Shackleton Bailey p. 185, both citing Ovid, *Letters from Pontus* 2.9.47.

³⁸⁹ See "Sources" on pseudo-Longinus p. 17.

³⁹⁰ That is, Caecilius of Calacte in Sicily, who was a rhetorician of the Augustan period.

Demosthenes' *On the Crown* 296 is quoted, and the orator's anger is said to screen or veil the multitude of metaphors (32.2). At this point **690** occurs. Aristotle and Theophrastus are named and we are told what the two said concerning bold metaphor: namely, that such metaphors may be softened by the use of certain phrases like "just as if," "as it were," "if it befits one to speak in this manner" and "if one must use a more audacious expression." Such phrases are said to function as a kind of excuse, which is a cure for daring metaphors (32.3). The author accepts what the Peripatetics say, but he goes on to restate the importance of emotion: it is said to be the proper antidote for a multitude of bold metaphors (32.4).

In both accepting the position of Aristotle and Theophrastus and also recognizing Demosthenes as a standard, the author of *On the Sublime* need not be creating a difficulty for himself. When emotions are calm, an orator does well to excuse a bold metaphor, but when emotions are intense an apologetic phrase may be quite out of place. Indeed, a phrase like "as it were" — let alone one like "if one must use a more audacious expression" — would be unnatural and give the listener reason to question the intensity of the speaker's emotion. We are not told that the two Peripatetics recognized this particular limitation to the use of the apologetic metaphor, but I am inclined to believe that they did. After all, Aristotle is clear that the style with which an orator expresses himself may or may not be appropriate to the expression of emotion, but when it is appropriate, then it is persuasive. I am thinking of *Rhetoric* 3.7 (1408a16–25), where Aristotle goes on to say that strange words, ξένα, are suitable when a person is speaking with emotion (1408b11–12). From *Rhetoric* 3.2, we know that metaphor is characterized by strangeness (1405a8–9).

In *Rhetoric* 3.7, Aristotle says that a cure for all exaggeration (ὑπερβολή) is self-criticism (αὐτῷ προεπιπλήττειν): the speaker indicates that he knows what he is doing, and as a result he appears to be speaking the truth (1408b1–4).³⁹¹ The image of a cure, ἄκος (1408b1) also occurs in **690.4**: the author tells us that excuse (ὑποτίμησις) is a cure, ἰάται, for daring metaphors. In *Rhetoric* 3.11, Aristotle returns to exaggeration and tells us that successful exaggerations are also metaphors (1413a19–20). Among the ex-

³⁹¹ The best manuscripts say that the speaker ought "to add self-criticism," προεπιπλήττειν (1408b2–3). Nevertheless the correct reading is almost certainly προεπιπλήττειν, "to put first a self-criticism" (cf. Quintilian, *Oratorical Education* 8.3.37, where προεπιπλήττειν occurs). In the case of a daring metaphor, the speaker should put an apologetic phrase immediately before the metaphor.

amples is the following: “Those legs of his curl just like (ὥσπερ) parsley leaves.” It is equivalent to saying “His legs are so curly that you would have thought that they were not legs but parsley leaves” (1413a27–8). What interests me is that a few lines earlier, Aristotle had identified the same exaggeration (expressed with ὥσπερ) as an εἰκὼν, or simile (1413a11–13). There is no difficulty here, for the apologetic metaphor is a simile. In *Rhetoric* 3.11, Aristotle tells us that similes are metaphors (1413a13–14), or more cautiously, in a way they are metaphors (1412b33–4). Earlier in *Rhetoric* 3.4, Aristotle says much the same: he explains the simile as a metaphor, albeit one that differs a little through the addition of some word like ὥς, “as,” or ὅμοιος, “like” (1406b20–1, 27). Here as in 3.11, a single word is added, but if 690 is a fair guide, the addition may be longer and more obviously apologetic: e.g., “if it befits one to speak in this manner.” Some times such an addition will be overkill, but on other occasions it may be suitable. Context and the speaker’s intentions are determinant. Be that as it may, the idea of treating the apologetic metaphor as a simile finds expression in a later Hellenistic author, Demetrius Rhetor, who often reflects Peripatetic views. He tells us that when a metaphor seems dangerous (κινδυνώδης), we should convert it to a simile. Instead of saying “the orator Python was then a rushing torrent against you,” we should add to it and say “just like (ὥσπερ) a rushing torrent” (80).

There is a Ciceronian text which is closely related to 689A and B and which calls attention to the use of apologetic phrases. I am thinking of Cicero’s work *On the Orator*, where we read: “If you fear that a metaphor may appear to be a little harsh, it may frequently be softened by placing a word (or words) before the metaphor. For example, if a person were to say that the senate was left ‘an orphan’ by the death of Marcus Cato, that would be a little harsh; but if the person were to say ‘so to speak, an orphan,’ that would be somewhat milder. For a metaphor ought to be apologetic, so that it may seem to have been introduced into the place of another instead of having rushed in, and to have come in by entreaty and not by force” (3.165).³⁹² Here the idea of “having rushed in” and “having come in” (*irruisse* and *venisse*) may be compared with “visiting” or “going in”

³⁹² *On the Orator* 3.165: *si vereare ne paulo durior translatio esse videatur, mollienda est praeposito saepe verbo: ut si olim M. Catone mortuo “pupillum” senatum quis relictum diceret, paulo durius, sin “ut ita dicam, pupillum” aliquanto mitius; etenim verecunda debet esse translatio, ut deducta esse in alienum locum, non irruisse atque ut precario, non vi venisse videatur.*

(εἰσίουσαν) in **689A.5**, and the phrase “apologetic metaphor” (*verecunda translatio*) occurs as it does in **689B.7**. For our purposes, the important point is that *On the Orator* 3.165 makes explicit the idea of using a word or phrase in order to introduce a metaphor and to mitigate its harshness. That is in line with what Aristotle says in *Rhetoric* 3.7 and 3.11 and also in line with **690**, where the author speaks of phrases which are self-critical and function as an excuse (ὑποτίμησις).

The author of *On the Sublime* mentions Theophrastus together with Aristotle. Given what has already been said, conjoining the two Peripatetics seems entirely justified. Theophrastus will have picked up on what his teacher says in the *Rhetoric*, and will have called attention to the use of apologetic phrases like “just as if” and “as it were.” In particular, Theophrastus will have discussed the way such phrases soften bold metaphors, and this discussion will have influenced later writers like Philodemus, Demetrius Rhetor, Cicero and the author of *On the Sublime*.³⁹³ But having said that, I want to emphasize that Theophrastus’ discussion of metaphor will not have been confined to cases in which an apologetic phrase is appropriate. I have already observed that such a phrase may be inappropriate when emotion is strong. Similarly an apologetic phrase may be out of place and even harmful when a metaphor is used, e.g., for the sake of adding vividness, magnifying a subject, or simply embellishing a passage.³⁹⁴ Theophrastus will have recognized as much, and in all probability he will have offered an inclusive account of metaphor.

³⁹³ In regard to Cicero, a caveat is in order. Cicero sometimes uses the adjective *verecundus* in relation to metaphor without suggesting that an apologetic phrase is always required for good style. An example is provided by the *Orator*, in which Cicero discusses *inter alia* the plain style. He first tells us that the use of stylistic embellishments will be *verecundus* (79) and then says that the orator of the plain style will be *verecundus* in the use of metaphor (81). In these passages *verecundus* is best translated by “modest.” Cf. the earlier description of philosophic style: it is compared with a virgin who is said to be *casta*, *verecunda* and *incorrupta* (64). In a later passage, Cicero speaks of the introduction to a speech and uses the phrase *principia verecunda* in reference to opening remarks that are not inflamed by elevated language (124). Here, too, “modest” is an appropriate translation.

³⁹⁴ The *Rhetoric to Herennius* is instructive. The author tells us that metaphor occurs when a word is transferred from one thing to another on the basis of similarity. He then lists six reasons for introducing metaphor and illustrates each. None of the examples includes an apologetic phrase. Finally he reports what is said about restraint in the use of metaphor: in particular, a metaphor ought to be bashful and not seem to have run across to an unlike thing. “Bashful,” *pudens*, invites comparison with *verecunda* in **689B.7** and *On the Orator* 3.165. In addition, “run across,” *transcurrere*, recalls similar images in **689A.5** and *On the Orator* 3.165. Never-

Finally, it seems certain that Theophrastus will have discussed the apologetic metaphor in the work *On Style* (666 no. 17a).

- 691** Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Isocrates* 3 (*Opuscula* vol. 1 p. 58.4–13 Usener and Radermacher)

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 42; Sandys (1885) p. 91; Volkmann (1885) p. 394, 533; Rabe (1890) p. 44–5; Schrader (1904) p. 586–8; Schmid (1894) p. 145–8; Mayer (1910) p. 6, 14, 17; Stroux (1912) p. 18–22, 106; Solmsen (1931) p. 242–3, 252, (1941) p. 44, 184; Bonner (1938) p. 265, (1939) p. 21, 50; Grube (1952a) p. 179, (1952b) p. 266 n. 20, (1965) p. 106; Kennedy (1957) p. 100, (1963) p. 276–7; Dosi (1960) p. 616; Schenkeveld (1964) p. 132–3; Martin (1974) p. 249; Innes (1985) p. 257–8; Benediktson (2000) p. 115–16, 212 n. 8, 217 n. 40

Text **691** is taken from the essay *On Isocrates* by Dionysius of Halicarnassus. The essay opens with a discussion of the life and accomplishments of Isocrates (1), after which Dionysius considers style. He tells us what qualities are present in the speeches of Isocrates and what qualities are absent. In addition we are told that the style of Isocrates is poorly suited to the assembly and courts of law, and better suited for reading and ceremonial occasions (2). At this point our text occurs. Theophrastus is cited for recognizing three sources of grandeur, dignity and eminence in style: namely, the selection of words, their harmonious arrangement and the figures in which they are set.

Theophrastus is not quoted, and the words of the report are all used elsewhere by Dionysius. That does not mean that Dionysius has in any way misrepresented Theophrastus. On the contrary, we can be sure Theophrastus recognized that elevated style depends upon the words selected (cf. **686–90**), their arrangement (cf. **698–704**) and a judicious use of figures (cf. **692–94**). This threefold division may well have determined (at least in part) the structure of Theophrastus' work *On Style* (666 no. 17a). The selection of words will have been treated first, their arrangement second, and figures third, perhaps in a

theless, in the case of *pudens*, the most apt comparison may be with *Orator* 79 and 81, for there the adjective *verecundus* occurs without implying the use of an apologetic phrase. See the preceding note.

separate section or chapter.³⁹⁵ And if figures were picked out for independent treatment, then Theophrastus may have given special impetus to the cataloguing of figures, which later generations practiced to excess.³⁹⁶ We should, however, be clear that the Theophrastean triad was no creation *ex nihilo*. It is already implicit in Aristotle, who begins his discussion of style by focusing on diction (ordinary and strange words, metaphor, etc. 3.2–4), then takes up composition (including prose rhythm and periodic structure 3.8–9), and along the way gives special consideration to several well-known figures: namely, antithesis, balanced clauses and similarity in sound (3.9 1409b35–1410b1). Here figures come after periodic structure (i.e., they are discussed in the second half of *Rhetoric* 3.9), so that by position they are marked off from periodic structure. But strictly speaking, figures are not assigned to a separate section or chapter. They are introduced as a feature of periodic structure and as such are part of Aristotle's treatment of that topic. I hesitate, therefore, to assert without qualification that Theophrastus gave independent treatment to figures. He may have made clear that they are distinct from periodic structure and nevertheless treated figures (at least those of antithesis, balanced clauses and similarity in sound) together with periodic structure as important enhancements.³⁹⁷

³⁹⁵ Stroux p. 19–21. Having said above that figures may have been treated in a separate section or chapter, I want to dissociate myself clearly from Schmidt (1838) p. 23, 42, who believes that the title 'Ἀνηγγμένων λόγων εἰς τὰ σχήματα (δύο) (68 no. 18b) refers to the transformation of unadorned prose into rhetorical figures, and that the title 'Ἀνηγγμένων τόπων α'β' (68 no. 18a) is corrupt: λόγων should be read for τόπων, so that the titles do not name different works but rather one and the same rhetorical work that is concerned with figures of style. I have no quarrel with seeing a single work behind the two titles, but I do object to emending τόπων (no. 18a) and to interpreting the titles in terms of rhetorical figures. Almost certainly λόγων (no. 18b) refers to arguments and the participle ἀνηγγμένων (18a and b) is used to refer to the reduction of topics and generally arguments to syllogistic figures (cf. Aristotle, *Anal. Pr.* 1.32 46b40–47a1).

³⁹⁶ Kennedy (1963) p. 277.

³⁹⁷ Theophrastus was prepared to set limits to such enhancement. In 693 we are told that Theophrastus, along with Aristotle, wanted to restrict antithesis to judicial and deliberative speeches. See the commentary to 693. For further discussion of antithesis, balanced clauses and similar sound, see the commentary on 692. Kennedy (1963) p. 276 denies that Theophrastus distinguished between diction and composition. His reason is that the distinction is not present in Aristotle or Cicero. It is true that the distinction is not explicitly recognized by Aristotle, but it is implicit in the organization of *Rhetoric* 3. Figures fall within and complete the discussion of periodic structure (3.9), so that Theophrastus (or some other Peripatetic) needed only to formulate the distinction. See, Kennedy (1991) p. 220: chapters 2–4 of *Rhetoric* 3 are said to be primarily concerned with diction and chapters

Toward the end of *On Isocrates* 3, Dionysius compares the different oratorical styles of Isocrates and Lysias with those of well-known sculptors. The lines, which are not included in **691**, run as follows: δοκεῖ δὴ μοι μὴ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ τις ἂν εἰκάσαι τὴν μὲν Ἴσοκράτους ῥητορικὴν τῇ Πολυκλείτου τε καὶ Φειδίου τέχνῃ κατὰ τὸ σεμνὸν καὶ μεγαλότεχνον καὶ ἀξιωματικόν, τὴν δὲ Λυσίου τῇ Καλάμιδος καὶ Καλλιμάχου τῆς λεπτότητος ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς χάριτος: “A person would not, I think, be off target, in likening the rhetorical style of Isocrates to the artistic skill of Polyclitus and Phidias in regard to dignity, great artistry and stately manner, and the style of Lysias to the skill of Calamis and Callimachus as regards lightness and charm.” George Kennedy has argued that the similarity of the triad τὸ σεμνὸν καὶ μεγαλότεχνον καὶ ἀξιωματικόν to that which begins text **691**, τὸ μέγα καὶ σεμνὸν καὶ περιττόν (lines 1–2), suggests clearly that the person referred to by τις is Theophrastus. Kennedy adds that the suggestion is reinforced by the fact that the Isocrates-Polyclitus comparison accords with Cicero, *On the Orator* 3.26, where Polyclitus is cited as an example of the middle style. The reference to *On the Orator* is motivated by Kennedy’s general conviction that the third book of *On the Orator* is greatly influenced by Theophrastus’ work *On Style*, and by the particular belief that the relevant chapter, 3.26, falls between two Theophrastean passages. I agree that falling between two Theophrastean passages can be significant, but in this case, I find it difficult to follow Kennedy. For the first passage, 3.19, makes no reference to Theophrastus and the Theophrastean text cited by Kennedy, **78** — in order to support his claim concerning 3.19 — is not a good parallel³⁹⁸ and almost certainly not derived from the work *On Style*. It derives from a logical work, probably *On Affirmation and Negation* (**68** no. 3a).³⁹⁹ The second passage, 3.37, also makes no reference to Theophrastus, and although the four virtues mentioned are Theophrastean, the order of the last two, ornament before propriety, does not correspond to the order as stated in *Orator* 79 = **684**, propriety before ornament. Simple variation in word order can be quite unimportant, but if the claim is that *On the Orator* follows *On Style* closely,

5–12 with composition. See also Grube [1965] p. 95, 106. Concerning Cicero, see the next paragraph. In my judgment, Kennedy overrates the relationship that exists between Theophrastus’ work *On Style* and Cicero’s *On the Orator*.

³⁹⁸ Kennedy (1957) p. 98 admits as much when he tells us that Cicero “reverses the meaning” of **78**.

³⁹⁹ See above, the commentary on **78**.

then variation may be significant. Much as the *Orator* shows improved knowledge of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, so the *Orator* may exhibit improved knowledge of *On Style*: Theophrastus is named and ornament is explicitly assigned the fourth position after propriety. Be that as it may, other texts cited by Kennedy do little to support his thesis.⁴⁰⁰ Pliny the Elder tells us that according to Theophrastus, painting originated in Greece with Polygnotus (7.205 = **733**). This text shows that Theophrastus was interested in "firsts," but it does not show that Theophrastus compared orators with artists, either painters or sculptors, in his work *On Style*. The text is fundamentally historical and probably derives from the work *On Discoveries* (**727** no. 11).⁴⁰¹ I do not want to deny that Theophrastus may have compared orators and artists in *On Style*. Aristotle refers to artists in the *Poetics* (2 1448a5–6, 6 1450a26–9, 25 1460b8–9, 1461b12–13), and Cicero does the same in *On the Orator* (3.26). But when Dionysius compares Isocrates and Lysias to sculptors toward the end of *On Isocrates* 3, he need not be following Theophrastus. Likening the style of orators to that of artists had become a commonplace,⁴⁰² so that Dionysius might well make use of the comparison without the prompting of a Theophrastean text or that of any other author. And if there is a similarity between the triad with which the chapter begins and that which accompanies the comparison of orators and artists, the similarity shows only that Dionysius is conscious of how he began the chapter, and that he prefers variation to exact repetition.

In text **691**, Dionysius is drawing on the work *On Style*. Cf. **688.4** and **692.3**.

⁴⁰⁰ Concerning the order in which the virtues are mentioned, see the commentary to **684**. At *On the Orator* 3.37, the order may reflect the order in which the virtues are subsequently discussed. Certainty is elusive.

⁴⁰¹ Kennedy p. 100 finds the historical orientation inappropriate to *On Style* and therefore suggests that **733** was "merely parenthetical."

⁴⁰² So Kennedy p. 99. Cf., e.g., Dionysius, *On Isaeus* 4, where Lysias is compared to earlier painters and Isaeus to later painters, and *On Literary Composition* 10, where the charm and beauty of composition in prose and verse are compared with the same qualities in sculpture and painting. The fact that in these passages Dionysius refers to no particular painters is unimportant. Comparison with artists had become a commonplace which Dionysius makes use of now with and now without specific references. On Dionysius' use of the comparison between literature and the visual arts, see Benedikton (2000) p. 108–20. Regarding *On Isocrates* 3, see p. 115–16 and 217 n. 40.

- 692** Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Lysias* 14 (*Opuscula* vol. 1 p. 23.16–24.20 Usener and Radermacher)

Literature: Spengel (1828) p. 138–40; Schmidt (1839) p. 40–1; Diels (1886) p. 28–9; Blass (1865) p. 82, (1887–98) vol. 1 p. 447–8, vol. 2 p. 176–9; Volkmann (1885) p. 486; Rabe (1890) p. 5; Rosenthal (1897) p. 319; Schrader (1904) p. 586–8; Mayer (1910) p. 108; Stroux (1912) p. 121; Voit (1934) p. 35, 102; Bonner (1938) p. 265; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1528; Grube (1952a) p. 182; (1963) p. 277, (1965) p. 108; Dosi (1960) p. 613, 622; Kennedy (1963) p. 277; Lossau (1964) p. 50–2; Schenkeveld (1964) p. 42, 47–8; Dover (1968) p. 97–8; Usher (1976) p. 33; Janko (1984) p. 50; Innes (1985) p. 262

Text **692** is taken from the essay *On Lysias* by Dionysius of Halicarnassus. The essay begins with a short account of Lysias' life, after which comes a discussion of his style (2–14). Our text is found at the end of that discussion. Dionysius has gone through a series of qualities or virtues that he thinks are characteristic of Lysias' style. He adds a brief survey of qualities missing in Lysias (13) and then expresses astonishment at what Theophrastus says about Lysias (14). That is the beginning of our text. There are no serious textual problems. In line 18, the reading of the manuscripts, ἡμῶς, is clearly mistaken; the emendation of Tournier, ὑμῶς, is certainly correct. Also convincing is the correction προσκατηγορηθῆ in line 11, though the exact force of the prefix πρὸς is not immediately clear.⁴⁰³

Theophrastus is said to think that Lysias pursued poetic effects rather than realism. The work *On Style* is named (line 3), and we are told that Theophrastus grouped Lysias together with others who were excessively fond of antithesis, balanced structure, similarity in sound and other such figures.⁴⁰⁴ We are also told that Theophrastus cited a passage from a speech allegedly written by Lysias: namely, Nicias' speech before the Syracusans as a prisoner of war (lines 1–8). At this point, Dionysius decides to quote the very words of

⁴⁰³ See LSJ s.v. II, where the passive form is translated by “to be predicated besides.” That suits, e.g., Aristotle, *De interpretatione* 10 19b19 where the verb is used of the copula, but in our text the idea of additional predication does not seem to be present.

⁴⁰⁴ Lysias would then be similar to, e.g., Isocrates, to whom Dionysius assigns the stylistic features listed here. See the essay *On Isocrates* 2 *ad fin.*, where we are told that Isocrates makes considerable use of similarity in sound, balanced structure, antithesis and a whole array of such figures. Such usage is said to have a negative effect on his artistry.

Theophrastus (τὴν λέξιν αὐτὴν . . . τὴν Θεοφράστου, line 9). The quotation begins with a division of antithesis into three kinds, after which the occurrence of balanced structure and similar sound in antithetical clauses is said to be childish and little suited to serious oratory. The quotation ends with an example: namely, a short excerpt from Nicias' speech (lines 10–19). Dionysius agrees that the excerpted words are worthy of censure, but he denies that the speech of Nicias was written by Lysias (lines 19–22). Dionysius may well be correct,⁴⁰⁵ and if he is, Theophrastus erred in attributing the speech to Lysias. We should, however, keep in mind that the speech of Nicias was not written for delivery in court. It was an exercise or a display piece, and as such it could have been written by Lysias, perhaps early in his career.⁴⁰⁶ We may compare the speech attributed to Lysias in Plato's *Phaedrus* (230E6–234C5). The speech is highly artificial,⁴⁰⁷ but it cannot be declared spurious for that reason alone. Indeed, even if the speech was written by Plato, it is reasonable to believe that Plato would not have attributed the speech to Lysias unless he thought that the speech resembled some of Lysias' work.⁴⁰⁸

Dionysius states without qualification that Theophrastus thought of Lysias as one who strove for crude and overdone wording, and that he listed Lysias among writers who were especially keen on antithesis, balanced structure and similarity in sound (lines 1–6). If Dionysius' words can be taken at face value, Theophrastus will have been either blind to the charm of Lysias' prose, or unfamiliar with much of what Lysias wrote. One of these alternatives may be correct, but we should take a careful look at the quoted words of Theophrastus, for there is nothing in the quotation that establishes the correctness of Dionysius' unqualified statement. Rather we have a threefold division of antithesis, followed by a negative assessment of mixing antithesis with balanced structure and similar sound; finally

⁴⁰⁵ See, e.g., Blass vol. 1 p. 448 and Dover (1968) p. 97–8.

⁴⁰⁶ See Spengel p. 138–40. Dionysius recognizes that Lysias wrote speeches that were not intended for delivery in the law courts or assembly and that these speeches were less serious and even playful in character (*On Lysias* 3, cf. 16). Apparently he did not think that the existence of these speeches justified attributing the speech of Nicias to Lysias.

⁴⁰⁷ The speech is that of a sexually interested, but dispassionate man who seeks to persuade a youth that he is preferable to someone in the grip of love. The argument is presented as a series of points strung together by repeated formulae, and the person gripped by love is repeatedly set in opposition to one who is free of passion. See Fortenbaugh (1994b) p. 20.

⁴⁰⁸ Cf. Usher (1976) p. 33.

there is an example which is attributed to Lysias (lines 10–19). That does not constitute a documented assessment of Lysias' style in general. Rather we seem to have an excerpt from a discussion of sentence structure. We may compare Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 3.9, where the topic is periodic structure. Aristotle tells us that periods which are divided into members are antithetical when in each member an opposite is brought together with an opposite, or when the same is coupled with opposites (1409b35–1410a1). A string of examples follows, after which Aristotle comments on the fact that antithetical clauses are pleasant (1410a19–22). He then takes up balanced structure and similarity in sound, offers illustrations and concludes that a sentence may have all three features: antithesis, balanced structure and similar sound (1410a23–b1). It is possible that the Theophrastean words quoted by Dionysius derive from a similar context. Theophrastus was discussing sentence structure, and in that context he took note of antithesis, balanced structure and similar sound. Only Theophrastus makes Aristotle's twofold division of antithesis into a threefold division⁴⁰⁹ and then adds a warning concerning antithesis in combination with balanced structure and similar sound: namely, that in a serious context such stylistic play is inappropriate and counterproductive. The text cited to illustrate stylistic play is entirely apt: there is balanced structure (lines 17–18),⁴¹⁰ and the occurrence of similar sound is overdone (lines 17–19). Moreover, like Aristotle, Theophrastus will have offered several examples,⁴¹¹ and since the examples were almost certainly taken from a variety of authors (τῶν τε ἄλλων — διεσπουδακόντων, lines 3–5), Theophrastus will have named Lysias in a list, but he will not have said or even implied — *pace* Dionysius — that Lysias belongs among authors whose prose is regularly marked by overdone wording and poetic effects. A single example does not establish a general characteristic.

According to Dionysius, Theophrastus criticizes writers who are overly keen concerning antitheses, balanced structures, similarities in sound and figures similar to these. The mention of “figures similar

⁴⁰⁹ ἢ πρὸς ἐναντίῳ ἐναντίον σύγκειται ἢ ταὐτὸ ἐπέξευκται τοῖς ἐναντίοις (*Rhetoric* 1409b36–1410a1) becomes τῷ αὐτῷ τὰ ἐναντία ἢ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὰ αὐτὰ ἢ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐναντία προσκατηγορηθῇ (lines 10–11).

⁴¹⁰ The balanced structure is not perfect, but nearly so: ἰκέται μὲν αὐτοὶ τῶν θεῶν καθίζοντες has 13 syllables, while προδότας δὲ τῶν ὄρκων ὑμᾶς ἀποφαίνοντες has 14.

⁴¹¹ To illustrate antithesis, Aristotle uses prose examples; to illustrate balanced structure and similar sound, he turns to poetry. It cannot be excluded that some Theophrastean examples were drawn from poetry.

to these" (line 5) may be thought to count against a close relationship to *Rhetoric* 3.9, for in that chapter Aristotle mentions no additional figures beyond the three explicitly named by Dionysius. Indeed, it might be argued that the reference to similar figures is important, for it may point to a larger treatment of figures: one that was assigned its own chapter or section, independent of periodic structure. (See the commentary on **691**.) It may be, however, that the reference to similar figures has been added by Dionysius himself, and that we should be guided by the actual quotation that follows. There we have only antithesis, balanced structure and similarity in sound; no fourth figure is named or even hinted at. In any case, nothing is said in **692** (add **691** and **693**) that suggests Theophrastus recognized a distinction between figures of style and figures of thought. That distinction is post-Theophrastean.⁴¹²

Since Dionysius makes explicit reference to *On Style*, text **692** may be assigned to that work (**666** no. 17a) without hesitation.

- 693** John of Sardis, *On the Preparatory Exercises of Aphthonius* 8 (*RhGr* vol. 15 p. 141.1–10 Rabe)

Literature: Buchheit p. 126 n. 1

Like **677** and **678**, our text comes from John's commentary on Aphthonius' *Preliminary Exercises*. The particular exercise under consideration is the encomium. John has finished discussing the several headings set forth by Aphthonius for the construction of an encomium (the last heading, the epilogue, receives brief notice on p. 140.20), and he will soon take up Aphthonius' model encomium of Thucydides (p. 142.20). Before doing that, John offers a series of supplemental observations, of which the first concerns the inappropriateness of antithesis in the encomium. Citing the *Busiris* of Isocrates, John acknowledges that the ancient rhetoricians did incorporate antitheses in encomia; but he declares himself against the practice on the grounds that encomiasts amplify accomplishments concerning which there is agreement (p. 140.23–141.1).⁴¹³ The fun-

⁴¹² See, e.g., Mayer (1910) p. 75 n. 1, Kroll col. 1109, Ballaira p. 57–8, 68–9, 83 and the commentary on **666** no. 23, above, p. 145.

⁴¹³ John appears to be drawing on Nicolaus the Sophist (5th c. A.D.), who mentions Aristides as well as Isocrates. Of the works of Isocrates, both the *Panegyricus* and the *Busiris* are cited (*Preparatory Exercises* 8 [*RhGr* vol. 3 p. 481.28–482.9 Spengel]).

damental point is clear. In a proper encomium, there is no dispute about the accomplishments of the honoree; and for that reason, there are no opposed statements that need to be refuted.⁴¹⁴ Isocrates' *Busiris* is cited and criticized, because objections by Polycrates and the detractors of Busiris are introduced and refuted (30–6, 36–7).⁴¹⁵

After John declares himself against antitheses (p. 140.23–141.1), he supports his position by citing Theophrastus and Aristotle. (That is the beginning of our text **693**.) The two Peripetetics are said to have removed antithetical speech from the encomium and to have explained that antithesis is a mark of controversy and therefore ill-suited to the encomium which amplifies what is acknowledged or agreed upon by all. No passage in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* makes the point explicitly,⁴¹⁶ but it is consistent with Aristotle's notion of epideictic oratory. In 1.3, the person who listens to an epideictic speech is characterized as an observer and not a judge (1358b2–6); and in 1.9, amplification is said to be most suited to epideictic oratory, for the actions of the honoree are agreed upon, so that it remains to add greatness and beauty (1368a27–9). It is an easy step from these passages to the assertion that the actions of an honoree are not open to antithesis and refutation. Only Aristotle might want to make the claim one of degree: i.e., for the most part. We may compare 3.17. There in the discussion of proof in epideictic oratory, Aristotle first says that the facts need to be taken on trust and then adds that orators seldom introduce proofs of them, and only if they are unbelievable or someone else is considered responsible for them (3.17 1417b31–2).⁴¹⁷

⁴¹⁴ Cf. Aphthonius, chapter 13, where we are told that the thesis is the first of the preliminary exercises to admit antithesis and solution (p. 49.30–50.1). The encomium was discussed in chapter 8; it does not admit antithesis.

⁴¹⁵ See *Busiris* 35, where Isocrates first acknowledges that the deeds of Busiris are open to question, and then claims probability for his account. In such a case, it may be sensible to recognize actual or possible objections and to refute them. But the result will be a mixture of praise and defense (cf. 44), and that is foreign to the encomium *qua* speech in which agreed upon accomplishments are amplified (John p. 140.23–4).

⁴¹⁶ Aristotle recognizes that antithesis is a mark of controversy (e.g., *Rhetoric* 2. 24 1401a4–6, 3.9 1410a21–3), but to my knowledge, he makes no explicit statement concerning the removal of antithesis from encomia.

⁴¹⁷ Cf. Nicolaus the Sophist, who recognizes that a peculiar subject matter may make it impossible to avoid antithesis and refutation. He does, however, add that antitheses of this kind produce no general rule or standard for encomiastic rhetoric (8 p. 481.28–482.9).

It is, I think, clear that John's comment is primarily concerned with objection and refutation; it is not focused on antithesis as a feature of style in general. For antithetical expression can be useful when amplifying the deeds of the honoree. Indeed, Aristotle's first example of amplification — the honoree alone, *μόνος*, did something (1.9 1368a10) — may be strengthened by antithesis: e.g., "He alone succeeded, all others failed." Furthermore, antithesis can be used to embellish the cola of a period (3.9 1409b32–1410a23) and to add urbanity (3.10 1410b28–9, 36).⁴¹⁸ None of these stylistic antitheses are out of place in an encomium and John never suggests that they are. They are simply not under discussion. As a result, our text may be considered misplaced; it might be better positioned after **677** and **678**, the other two texts from John, for all three texts are concerned with the construction of the encomium. Nevertheless, our text, placed here in the section on "Expression," may serve a useful purpose: it can remind us that there is a *λέξις* of argumentation (cf. *Rhetoric* 2.24 1401a6) and that a work *Περὶ λέξεως* may include material that is more readily classified as logical than rhetorical or poetic. See the commentary on **666** no. 17a.

Since no Aristotelian text says explicitly what John attributes to him, and since Theophrastus is named alongside the Stagirite, it is tempting to believe that Theophrastus made the point in a work called *Arts*.⁴¹⁹ John cites that work in **678.2**, and it may be the ultimate source of his report in our text. Nevertheless, if it is the source, John is drawing on it indirectly, perhaps through a later Peripatetic treatise in which Aristotle and Theophrastus were mentioned together. But that is quite uncertain, as is the character of Theophrastus' *Arts*. See the commentary on **666** no. 2a.

694 Quintilian, *Oratorical Education* 3.8.62 (*OCT* vol. 1 p. 175.30–176.3 Winterbottom)

Literature: Westermann (1833) p. 170–1; Schmidt (1839) p. 51–2; Diels (1886) p. 26; Blass (1865) p. 81–3, (1887–98) vol. 2 p. 129;

⁴¹⁸ See also *Rhetoric* 3.11 1412b16–31, where Aristotle discusses an example of antithetical expression, "It is a fit thing to die not being fit to die," which can be easily adapted to an encomium. The courageous soldier who dies nobly in battle may be said to die a fitting death when death for him is not fitting.

⁴¹⁹ It may be significant that Theophrastus' name precedes that of Aristotle and subsequently recurs apart from any reference to Aristotle (**693.1**, 6). One wonders whether Aristotle's name was added for no other reason than that he was the better known of the two Peripatetics or that the two were often thought of as a pair.

Mayer (1907–10) p. 495, (1910) p. 35 n. 1, 44; Herrle (1912) p. 21; Voit (1934) p. 100; Cousin (1936) vol. 1 p. 202; Kennedy (1957) p. 98, (1963) p. 280; Lossau (1964) p. 38, 51; Adamietz (1966) p. 196–7; Innes (1985) p. 252, 261

In 3.8 Quintilian discusses deliberative oratory. Our text occurs toward the end of this discussion and is immediately preceded by remarks on the errors to which the declaimers of deliberative themes are liable. These errors include initial abruptness, unbroken impetuosity and an excessively grand use of words (3.8.58–61).⁴²⁰ Quintilian explains the third error by recognizing a correspondence between theme and style. Declaimers prefer to represent kings and other leaders discussing matters of considerable magnitude; and since the words are suited to the theme, they acquire brilliance through the splendor of the material: *ita cum verba rebus aptentur, ipso materiae nitore clarescunt* (3.8.61). After offering this explanation, Quintilian turns to real acts of counsel (*verum consilium* 3.8.62)⁴²¹ — the beginning of our text.

The reference to actual practice is quite brief but clearly intended to support the criticism of affected diction. The argument may be fleshed out as follows: since the topics of actual deliberation are often less than magnificent, the language of real deliberative oratory is often free of affected diction; declaimers should take note of that and adopt, at least for the most part, a more moderate style. The qualifiers “often” and “for the most part” are included, because Quintilian goes on to insist that topics of special importance should be treated in an appropriately elevated manner. He twice states the principle that style should suit subject matter (3.8.64, 68, not printed in the text-translation volumes) and cites the *Philippics* of Demosthenes and the speeches of Cicero before the Senate and the people as clear examples of deliberative oratory in which elevated diction is entirely in order (3.8.65).

Quintilian tells us that Theophrastus wanted to dissociate the language of deliberative oratory as far as possible from all verbal affectation. In this he is said to have followed his teacher Aristotle,

⁴²⁰ A fourth error, unwarranted brevity achieved through short notes, is listed in 3.5.58 and discussed after our text at 3.8.67.

⁴²¹ On the shift from school exercises to actual practice, cf. 3.8.55–8, where Quintilian first discusses themes which mix deliberative and judicial material and then adds that this kind of mix can occur in actual cases: *quod genus accidere etiam veritati potest*.

although he did not hesitate to disagree with him. That concludes our text, after which Quintilian cites the Stagirite: *namque Aristoteles idoneam maxime ad scribendum demonstrativam proximamque ab ea iudicalem putavit* (3.8.63).⁴²² These words are a slightly abbreviated but nevertheless entirely acceptable rendering of two lines in *Rhetoric* 3.12: ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιδεικτικὴ λέξις γραφικωτάτη· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἀνάγνωσις· δευτέρα δὲ ἡ δικανικὴ (1414a17–18). What follows is, however, less than accurate. Quintilian explains Aristotle's characterization of epideictic style by saying that it is “entirely a matter of display” — *videlicet quoniam prior illa tota esset ostentationis* (3.8.63) — and in doing that Quintilian introduces a view of epideictic that is not Aristotelian (see the commentary to 671). Moreover, in claiming for himself, as against for Aristotle, the view that style in judicial and deliberative oratory should vary according to subject matter — *in iudiciis autem consiliisque secundum condicionem ipsius quae tractabitur rei accommodandam dicendi credo rationem* (3.8.64)⁴²³ — Quintilian is not being fair to the Stagirite. For in *Rhetoric* 3.12, Aristotle's focus is different. He is primarily concerned with style in relation to the audience. And in regard to the latter, the fundamental distinction drawn by Aristotle is that between readers and persons who listen to judicial arguments and political debates. When a speech is intended for circulation among readers, a precise or finished style is called for; and when a speech is delivered before auditors, a less precise style suited to delivery is in order. Aristotle thinks that the judges in a trial are usually fewer (a single judge is possible 1414a11) than the persons in a political assembly, and for that reason the judicial style departs less from the written style (1414a17–18). The style suited to public assemblies departs to a greater degree, because public assemblies are by comparison large. They call for a style that resembles shadow-painting (1414a8).⁴²⁴ All that is sensible and entirely compatible with

⁴²² “For Aristotle thought that the style of epideictic oratory is especially suited for writing and that the style of judicial oratory is next after epideictic.”

⁴²³ “In trials, however, and deliberations, I believe that the style should be suited to the nature of the subject that is going to be discussed.” In what follows, Quintilian continues to emphasize his own judgment: “For I see (*video*) that the *Philippics* of Demosthenes are prominent for the same virtues as are his judicial orations” (3.8.65).

⁴²⁴ In 3.12 Aristotle speaks of the style “suitable to a public assembly” (δημηγορικὴ). That is telling, for it emphasizes the size and quality of the audience — the ὄχλος (1414a9) — as against the deliberative character (συμβουλευτικόν 1.3 1358b7) of the speech.

recognizing that proper style is determined by a variety of factors including subject matter. There is, however, no reason for Aristotle to discuss them all in *Rhetoric* 3.12 — though in fact he does allude to the importance of subject matter. For he mentions appropriateness and refers to his previous discussion of excellence in style (1414a22–4). If we turn back to that discussion, we quickly discover that Aristotle relates appropriate style to subject matter (3.2 1404b12–18, cf. 3.7 1408a10–16).

Quintilian, it seems, has misread or misremembered *Rhetoric* 3.12. Will he have done any better with Theophrastus? Perhaps he is reporting what Theophrastus said somewhere in the work *On Style* (666 no.17a) or in *On Counsel* (666 no. 11). After all, the Eresian may well have cautioned against verbal affectation in deliberative oratory. He may have argued that the audience is often quite large and incapable of appreciating an elevated style, that the subjects discussed are often less than grand, and that on those (comparatively few) occasions when the subject is of the highest importance, an affected style only gets in the way of clear thinking. But here I am speculating, and it is perhaps more likely that Quintilian has simply joined Theophrastus to Aristotle in much the same way that the two are brought together in 3.7.1 = 671. That is not to overlook the fact that Theophrastus is mentioned first in our text and second in 671, and that our text goes on to say that Theophrastus “was accustomed fearlessly to dissent” from Aristotle. In mentioning Theophrastus’ willingness to depart from his teacher, Quintilian seems to be expressing surprise that the Eresian followed his teacher in an alleged mistake.⁴²⁵ But if Quintilian really has a particular Theophrastean text in mind why does he fail to discuss it? And what are the departures from Aristotle to which Quintilian refers? I, at least, would have more confidence in Quintilian as a source for Theophrastus, had he here or elsewhere given one or more examples of Theophrastean fearlessness.

Despite the sceptical remarks of the preceding paragraph, it would be wrong to dismiss what Quintilian reports. He is most likely drawing on a secondary source, in which Theophrastus and Aristotle

⁴²⁵ I.e., in failing to take account of subject matter, when saying *simpliciter* that the style of deliberative oratory should be especially free of affectation. Interestingly, Quintilian also expresses surprise at a similarly unqualified assertion by Cicero: *tota autem oratio simplex et gravis et sententiis debet ornatiores esse quam verbis*, “Moreover, the whole speech ought to be simple and weighty and more elaborate in thoughts than in words” (3.8.65 = *Classification of Oratory* 97).

are mentioned together as writers on rhetoric who warned against the use of excessively elevated style in deliberative oratory. The source probably referred to no particular Theophrastean treatise, and it may have omitted any qualifying remarks which could make room for exceptions. But that said, the source has it right on the larger issue: both Peripatetics held that deliberative oratory calls for a less ornamented style than either judicial or epideictic oratory.

- 695** Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Lysias* 6 (*Opuscula* vol. 1 p. 13.23–14.2, 9–12 Usener and Radermacher)

Literature: Spengel (1828) p. 93–5; Westermann (1833) p. 170–1; Schmidt (1839) p. 41; Cope (1877) vol. 2 p. 211; Blass (1887–98) vol. 1 p. 244, 251–2; Rabe (1890) p. 43; Hendrickson (1904) p. 138–9; Mayer (1910) p. 34–5; Stroux (1912) p. 122; Bonner (1939) p. 44–5; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1528; Grube (1952a) p. 182, (1952b) p. 255–61, (1965) p. 108, 213–14; Kennedy (1957) p. 104, (1963) p. 280; Innes (1985) p. 162

Like **692**, text **695** is taken from Dionysius' essay *On Lysias*. It occurs within the discussion of style (2–14). Dionysius has discussed the purity of Lysias' language, his use of ordinary words, the clarity of his prose and his mastery of brevity. After that comes a discussion of compressed or compact expression, which — in line with the other qualities — is labeled a virtue (ἀρετή) of style. Our text is part of this discussion. Theophrastus is said to have recognized Thrasyarchus as the first to exhibit the virtue; Dionysius disagrees, assigning priority to Lysias. His reasons are two: Lysias seems to be older than Thrasyarchus,⁴²⁶ and Lysias was involved in more real contests. Nevertheless, Dionysius does not press the issue of priority; he is content to assert that Lysias excelled in the virtue.

What is this virtue? Dionysius asks the question rhetorically and answers that it is a virtue which “compresses (roles together) thoughts and expresses them compactly (in a rounded manner)”: συστρέφουσα τὰ νοήματα καὶ στρογγύλως ἐκφέρουσα (lines 3–4). The answer involves metaphor and is not immediately clear. Little help is provided by Dionysius' subsequent observation (not included in text **695**): “Few have imitated this virtue: Demosthenes also ex-

⁴²⁶ That Lysias was in fact the older of the two is doubtful. See Spengel p. 94, Schmidt (1839) p. 41 and Usher (1974) p. 21 n. 3, p. 30 n. 2.

celled in it, yet he did not use it with the clarity and simplicity of Lysias, but in a labored and harsh manner” (6). The same is true of Dionysius’ summary remarks toward the end of the discussion of style. The virtue is mentioned, but there is only minor variation in wording, so that our understanding of the quality is not advanced (13). One might hope to find help in the excerpt from Dionysius’ earlier work *On Imitation* preserved in the *Letter to Pompey*, for this excerpt contains a systematic comparison of the virtues exhibited by Herodotus and Thucydides. But the virtue that concerns us is not mentioned (3). A likely explanation is that when Dionysius composed the work *On Imitation*, he had not incorporated the quality in question within his system of virtues. That seems to have occurred when he wrote *On Lysias*.⁴²⁷ At least his enthusiasm (“an altogether admirable virtue,” line 1) and readiness to discuss origins (Thrasymachus or Lysias) suggest that Dionysius is introducing something new. The same may be said of his failure to use a noun-label to refer to the virtue. In fact, the virtue does not seem to have acquired a label until the chronologically later essay *On Demosthenes*, where it is called συστροφή, “compression” (18).

In the essay *On Isocrates*, we are told that the style of Isocrates “is not like that of Lysias: compact and welded together and suited for judicial trials; rather it is sprawling and poured out richly” (2).⁴²⁸ “Welded together” (συγκεκροτημένη) is a new metaphor, which occurs again in *On Demosthenes*. There Dionysius first tells us that Isocrates lacks brevity and then says the same concerning compression: “the style of Isocrates is sprawling and extended and overflowing with thought as is the case with historians, but the combative style wants to be compact and welded together and free of folds” (18). The last image, “free of folds” (μηδὲν ἔχουσα κολπῶδες), is that of a garment, but it is transferred to the sea⁴²⁹ and ultimately applied to style. Whereas Lysias’ prose is like a garment that has been fitted in such a way that it hangs smoothly, the prose of Isocrates has many folds; it is like a river which does not flow in a straight line, but meanders and so appears flat and diffuse.⁴³⁰ In what follows, Dionysius illustrates this fault by rewriting two excerpts

⁴²⁷ Bonner (1939) p. 45.

⁴²⁸ *On Isocrates* 11 repeats the wording of *On Lysias* 6.

⁴²⁹ I.e., to a coastline that may or may not be broken up by recessed bodies of water; cf. Polybius 4.44.7.

⁴³⁰ Cf. *On Demosthenes* 4.

from *On Peace*.⁴³¹ He says that he has been able to tighten up (σφίγξαι) and to render more compact the words of Isocrates (19), but he does not spell out how he has accomplished the change. It is clear that he has introduced shorter expressions,⁴³² but if shortening is prominent in the examples, it is not all there is to achieving a compact style, for as Dionysius goes on to make clear, an increase in length is compatible with greater compactness (20).⁴³³ Perhaps we can say that when shortening is involved in producing a more compact style, it is shortening of a special kind: namely, the removal of diffuse elements. A particularly instructive example is Dionysius' handling of the second excerpt from *On Peace*. He not only reduces the opening clause from fifteen to six words, but also eliminates an entire phrase: καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ ταῖς διανοοίαις. This phrase is not redundant,⁴³⁴ and to a philosopher it may even seem to be a welcome clarification or mark of sophistication. But from the perspective of judicial and deliberative oratory (which is Dionysius' orientation), the phrase is an "overflow of thought" which is likely to annoy and even lose the audience.

Returning now to *On Lysias* 6 = 695, we can, I think, say that the virtue that Dionysius claims for Lysias is a direct mode of expression especially suitable in courts of law. The virtue can be applied to periodic structure, and when it is, it is not the length of the period which is at issue, but rather being well-turned "as if on a lathe" (*On Demosthenes* 43). There is, however, no necessary connection with the period. Lysias' style is not periodic, but it is compressed and compact. This point is well argued by Grube and need not be developed here.⁴³⁵ I would, however, warn against accepting everything Grube says. For it is part of his argument that *On Lysias* 6 is not concerned with style but rather with the handling of subject matter and in particular with τάξις, i.e., the arrangement of subject matter. Subject matter is indeed mentioned in the preceding two chapters, 4 and 5, but that does not mean that Dionysius' focus has become sub-

⁴³¹ From *On Peace* 42 and 43.

⁴³² E.g., τὰς πόλεις τὰς Ἑλληνίδας is reduced to τὴν Ἑλλάδα, and τὴν αὐτὴν τιμὴν ἐκείνοις ἔξομεν becomes τῶν ἴσων τευξόμεθα.

⁴³³ Dionysius first quotes a passage from *On Peace* 47 and then rewrites it in a way which is said to be more compact (στρογγυλωτέραν). The passage as rewritten is actually longer than the original. Cf. *On Literary Composition* 7, where a simple rearrangement of clauses without any increase in length can cause a loss of compactness.

⁴³⁴ I.e., not the sort of fault that is eliminated by brevity; cf. 19 *ad init*.

⁴³⁵ Grube (1952) p. 252–8.

ject matter.⁴³⁶ From chapters 2 through 14, including our chapter 6, Dionysius' primary concern is style. It is only in chapter 15 that subject matter comes to the fore, and τᾶξις is discussed in conjunction with invention, the selection of material and the development of arguments. We may compare the essay *On Isocrates*, where a similar grouping occurs, and the τᾶξις of Lysias is said to be inferior to that of Isocrates (4). This rating harmonizes well with *On Lysias* 15, where the τᾶξις of Lysias is called deficient and is not recommended as a model, but it harmonizes poorly with Grube's interpretation. For in *On Lysias* 6, Lysias is not rated below Isocrates and indeed seems to have only one serious rival, namely, Demosthenes, whose excellence is carefully qualified: "yet he did not use it (compression) with the clarity and simplicity of Lysias, but in a labored and harsh manner." Later in his essay *On Demosthenes*, Dionysius may weaken the qualification — the style of Demosthenes is said to be compact and simple like that of Lysias (13) — but if there is a shift here, it hardly tells in favor of Grube's thesis. For throughout this portion of the essay, Dionysius is concerned with stylistic qualities. Compressed or compact expression is one of these, as it also is in *On Lysias* 6.

The preceding emphasis on compression as a stylistic virtue should not obscure the fact that this virtue is important to arguing a case. Dionysius indicates as much when he says that compression is "entirely appropriate and even necessary in forensic speeches and every real contest" (lines 4–5).⁴³⁷ Further and more importantly, Aristotle makes reference to compressed or compact expression on three occasions, and each time the context is argumentation. First, in discussing the maxim as a premise within an enthymeme, Aristotle considers maxims that are not paradoxical but none the less unclear. In such cases, he advises adding an explanation as compactly as possible (στρογγυλώτατα 2.21 1394b33). Second, in his discussion of apparent enthymemes, Aristotle introduces a comparison between dialectic and rhetoric. He tells us that in the former we may make a final statement as if it were the conclusion of a valid form of reasoning,⁴³⁸ and he suggests doing the same in a rhetorical situation:

⁴³⁶ By introducing subject matter into his remarks on clarity and brevity, Dionysius anticipates and thereby prevents possible confusion. He also hopes to impress his reader through contrast; at least, he is quick to point out that many people fail to recognize clarity in subject matter (4).

⁴³⁷ The idea is repeated in several places: *On Isocrates* 2, 11; *On Isaeus* 3; *On Demosthenes* 4, 18).

⁴³⁸ Cf. Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* 15 174b8–11, cited by Cope (1877) vol. 2 p. 303.

a final statement expressed in a compressed manner (συνεστραμμένως) and with antithesis appears to be an enthymeme on account of the figure or form of expression (2.24 1401a2–7). Third, after discussing questions put by an orator in the course of a trial, Aristotle says that it is not possible to ask many questions on account of the weakness of the audience, and for that reason it is necessary to compress (συστρέφειν) enthymemes as much as possible (3.18 1419a18–19). If I understand the passage correctly, Aristotle is not advising the omission of whole arguments (that would be in line with brevity as conceived of by Dionysius, *On Lysias* 5);⁴³⁹ rather he is advocating compressing each argument (we might say “thought,” νόημα, cf. 695.3) by limiting the questions asked (cf. 1419a5–12). Be that as it may, I want to suggest that Theophrastus’ view of compactness went beyond purely aesthetic considerations. Following Aristotle, he will have stated explicitly its importance for argumentation and more generally for persuasive speech.

If we ask where Theophrastus named Thrasyarchus as the originator of the compressed and compact style, three answers suggest themselves. One is the treatise *On Enthymemes* (666 no. 6). Since Aristotle mentions compact expression in connection with argumentation (he speaks of a compressed and antithetical style as “the province of an enthymeme” *Rhetoric* 2.24 1401a5–7) and never mentions it in the chapters on style (*Rhetoric* 3.2–12), it is conceivable that Theophrastus discussed compression in a work on rhetorical argument and that in this context he referred to Thrasyarchus. A second answer is the work entitled *On Discoveries* (727 no. 11). Since several texts record “firsts” of which Theophrastus took note (728–36), and since Thrasyarchus was credited with several firsts — in addition to 695, see Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.8 1409a2–3, where we are told that paeonic rhythm came into use beginning with Thrasyarchus, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Demosthenes* 3, where it is reported that Theophrastus made him the originator of the mixed style (685.2–3) — it is tempting to assign 695 to *On Discoveries*, but the temptation should be resisted. For there is a third answer which is almost certainly correct. It is the treatise *On Style* (666 no. 17a). In two of the four texts in which Dionysius refers to Theophrastus, he

⁴³⁹ For a humorous treatment of the omission of arguments, see Theophrastus, *Characters* 17.8.

cites *On Style* (688.4 and 692.3). In the other two places (685 and 695), it is simplest and sensible to assume that Dionysius is drawing on the same Theophrastean work.

696 Demetrius, *On Style* 222 (p. 172.4–12 Roberts)

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 43; Rabe (1890) p. 43; Mayer (1910) p. 169–70; Stroux (1912) p. 43–54; Solmsen (1931) p. 260–1, 266–7, (1941) p. 184–5; Grube (1952a) p. 175–6, (1965) p. 105; Innes (1985) p. 253–5, (1995) p. 319; Kennedy (1994a) p. 85

Our text is taken from Demetrius' discussion of the plain style, ὁ ἰσχνὸς χαρακτήρ. The rhetorician begins the discussion with brief remarks on appropriate subject matter (190) and diction. He recommends the use of current and familiar words and connects this usage with clarity (190–2), which is discussed at greater length (192–203). Composition is the next topic (204–8), after which come a comparatively long discussion of vividness (209–20) and a much shorter comment on persuasiveness. The latter falls into two parts. In the first (221), we are told that persuasiveness depends upon diction that is clear and familiar, and composition that conveys firmness and lacks formal rhythm.⁴⁴⁰ In the second (222 = 696), Demetrius cites Theophrastus as an authority and recommends not elaborating on everything. In particular, he recommends the omission of details that the listener can supply on his own. The listener thinks himself perceptive and becomes favorably disposed to the speaker. In contrast, the speaker who covers every detail appears to despise his audience.

Within Demetrius' treatise, content, diction and composition are fundamental topics. They are discussed not only in the context of the plain style but also in that of the grand, elegant and forceful styles. In contrast, clarity, vividness and persuasiveness are supplemental topics. They belong to traditional discussions of narration⁴⁴¹ and appear

⁴⁴⁰ τὸ πιθανὸν δὲ ἐν δυοῖν, ἔν τε τῷ σαφεῖ καὶ συνήθει· τὸ γὰρ ἀσαφὲς καὶ ἀσύνηθες ἀπίθανον· λέξιν τε οὖν οὐ τὴν περιττὴν οὐδὲ ὑπέρογκον διωκτέον ἐν τῇ πιθανότητι, καὶ ὡσαύτως σύνθεσιν βεβαιοῦσαν καὶ μηδὲν ἔχουσαν ῥυθμοειδές (221). What is said here is easily understood. Clear expression and ordinary language are two defining marks of the plain style (cf. 190–1). Clarity promotes comprehension and is therefore fundamental to persuasion. The use of everyday language contributes to clarity and also suggests sincerity. Elevated diction and studied composition are likely to have the reverse effect.

⁴⁴¹ On the qualities of good narration, see Stroux 43–54, Solmsen (1931) p. 260–1, (1941) p. 37, 185 and Innes (1995) p. 330.

to have been transferred and adapted to the plain style by Demetrius. That is also true of brevity.⁴⁴² Quintilian tells us that Isocrates thought brevity desirable in narration, and that Aristotle disagreed (*Artium script.* B 24 no. 34 = Quint. 4.2.31–2). The Aristotelian passage referred to by Quintilian occurs in *Rhetoric* 3.16, where the Stagirite speaks scornfully of those who say narration ought to be swift. His own position is that neither brevity nor length is in itself commendable. What we should aim at is due measure — narrating with moderation (μετρίως) — “and that is saying as much as will make the matter clear, or as much as will make the listener understand (ποιήσει ὑπολαβεῖν) that an event has occurred or an injury been done or an injustice or the facts are as important as you want” (1416b35–1417a2).⁴⁴³ In other words, the mean in narration is determined by the goal which is persuasion. Against this background, it is easy to imagine Theophrastus discussing narration and calling attention to situations in which it is advantageous to omit details.⁴⁴⁴ In particular, he will have pointed to situations in which the listener can supply on his own what is not said, and in such situations he will have recommended omission. For the listener who supplies what has been omitted thinks himself intelligent, becomes well disposed toward the speaker and is persuaded of the facts as presented by the speaker.

In reflecting on narration it is natural to focus on deeds or actions — actions that save a city and are the basis of a eulogy, killings which lead to prosecution and defense, past successes and failures that serve as examples in deliberative speeches — but we should not forget that actions are complex, so that a full narration is not simply an account of success and failure. A man may rescue his friend, but he may do so in a manner that is brave or cowardly and in the heat of emotion or with cool calculation. Aristotle takes note of these possi-

⁴⁴² Cf., e.g., Cicero, *On Invention* 1.28, where Cicero is discussing narration and tells us to refrain from an excess of both facts and words.

⁴⁴³ τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν ὅσα δηλώσει τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἢ ὅσα ποιήσει ὑπολαβεῖν γεγόνειν ἢ βεβλαφέναι ἢ ἡδικηκέναι ἢ τηλικαῦτα ἡλίκα βούλει.

⁴⁴⁴ Cf., e.g., Demosthenes, *On the Crown* 168, where the orator states explicitly that everyone knows what happened and that he will relate small details and what is most essential. For complete omission, see Gorgias' *Helen*. The sophist gives Helen's pedigree and describes the passions aroused by her beauty (3–4); but he declines to relate how and why Paris carried off Helen, “for telling people who know what they know carries conviction, but it does not provide enjoyment” (5). Here in a display piece, Gorgias decides not to narrate the events central to the speech, and explains his decision by reference to audience psychology.

bilities and offers some recommendations with regard to narration. The orator should say things that reveal character, i.e., he should report choice and the behavior that follows from character (1417a17–28). Similarly with emotion, the orator does well to include details that suggest emotional response (1417a36–b8). For our purposes, the important point is that these indicators can be used without stating explicitly that the speaker or his subject has a particular character and is or was in a particular emotional condition. Rather, the speaker leaves it to the listener to draw the conclusion. Whether Theophrastus included such reflections within a discussion of narration is not stated in **696**, but he could have done so.

We should not overlook the fact that Aristotle discusses appropriate length in other contexts than narration. In fact he considers omission and audience response repeatedly in reference to rhetorical argument. In *Rhetoric* 1.2 he tells us that an enthymeme may omit a premise that is known, for it is supplied by the listener (1357a16–19). In 2.22 he warns against expressing every step in an argument, for stating what is already clear results in loquacity; and that is why uneducated speakers are more persuasive than educated ones when addressing popular gatherings (1395b24–8). In 2.23 we are told that an argument wins greatest applause, when its conclusion is foreseen at the outset, for the audience is pleased with itself (1400b28–32).⁴⁴⁵ These passages suggest a different context for our Theophrastean text: namely, a discussion of rhetorical argument. But they do not settle the issue,⁴⁴⁶ and in my opinion narration remains the more likely context. Not only do the other supplemental passages (those concerned with clarity and vividness) deal with qualities traditionally associated with narration, but also the idea of a listener becoming a witness (μάρτυς **696.4**) seems to point in the same direction. For the testimony of a witness is often introduced in order to confirm

⁴⁴⁵ Cf. the description of the Athenian assembly that Thucydides puts in the mouth of Cleon. Each citizen, we are told, wishes to be a capable speaker: but if he cannot achieve that, then he wants to appear mentally quick, expressing approval even before the speaker has expressed himself (*Hist.* 3.38.6).

⁴⁴⁶ What we can say with certainty is that the ideas put forward in **696** have wide application not only in rhetoric but also in everyday social interaction. A good example is provided by **711**, where the subject is the barbed jest or concealed rebuke. The bystander is said to supply what is missing; he is pleased and seems to believe the jester and to participate in the ridicule. See also Theophrastus, *On Winds* 59 and *Plant Explanations* 1.4.6, cited by H. Baltussen, *Theophrastus on Theories of Perception: Argument and Purpose in the De sensibus*, Diss. (Utrecht: Dept. of Philosophy 1993) p. 42.

or to emphasize facts set forth in a narrative passage. It even happens that speakers tell their listeners that they are witnesses, as Lysias does in *Against Eratosthenes*, when describing Theramenes' role in establishing the rule of the thirty (*Or.* 12.74).⁴⁴⁷

The reasons for brevity set forth in our text do not explain every case in which an orator chooses to say less rather than more. For example, an orator may avoid elaboration because he realizes that the attention span of an audience is limited, and that less memory is required when matters are stated succinctly. In addition, he may believe that busy people are grateful for speakers who take no more time than needed. For these and similar reasons orators often call attention to the brevity of their remarks, especially in transitional passages where the promise of brevity has acquired the status of a *topos*. As such the promise is sometimes made only to be ignored,⁴⁴⁸ or it is made from some ulterior motive: e.g., the orator with a weak case is tempted to emphasize brevity, thereby masking the fact that he has little to say in support of his own position.⁴⁴⁹ None

⁴⁴⁷ The Lysian context is not the formal narration that occurs earlier but a narrative passage within the proof. Lysias wants to remove association with Theramenes as a possible defense and toward this end offers a selective account of events in 411–10 and 404 B.C. (12.65–76). The listeners are called witnesses in respect to remarks of Theramenes in 404 (12.74). That narration frequently occurs outside the narrative part of an oration is obvious. Hence, Aristotle explicitly calls for narration in many different places (3.16 1417b10–11).

⁴⁴⁸ In *Against Eratosthenes* Lysias moves from the introduction to the narration saying that he will inform his audience in as few words as possible (ὥς ἂν δύνῃμαι δι' ἐλαχίστων 12.3), but the narration which follows runs a full sixteen sections (12.4–19). Later in the same speech when Lysias turns to the activities of Theramenes, he uses the same *topos* (ὥς ἂν δύνῃμαι διὰ βραχυτάτων 12.62) and again speaks at length (12.62–78). In the latter case, the *topos* is used not to introduce the narrative part of the speech, but to introduce a narrative section within the proof. An unfavorable and unfair account of Theramenes' activities in 411–10 and 404 B.C. is intended to block Eratosthenes from defending himself by claiming association with Theramenes.

⁴⁴⁹ We may compare Lysias' 24th oration, "For the Invalid." The defendant has a weak case and promises brevity repeatedly. After an introduction in which jealousy is said to motivate the accuser (24.1–3), the defendant says that he will speak as briefly as possible (ὥς ἂν οἷος τ' ᾧ διὰ βραχυτάτων ἐρῶ 24.4) concerning the issue before the court. His statement of the complaint is indeed short (24.4–5), apparently reflecting the fact that a full statement of the charges might be damaging. After that, the defendant announces that he will speak briefly (διὰ βραχέων ἐρῶ 24.5) about his life. The narrative that follows is quite short (24.6). There is a wistful reference to children, which seems intentionally humorous. Both this tone and the brevity of the narrative suggest that the defendant does well to say little. Hence he quickly digresses and introduces an extended appeal for pity (24.7–9). When he finally turns to argue the case, he again promises not to speak at length (οὐ πολλὸς ὁ λόγος 24.10) — with good reason, we may be sure.

of these considerations was unknown to Theophrastus. Our text, however, focuses on two related motives: making the listener into a witness and winning his favor.

The first of these motives is primarily concerned with belief. The listener supplies an omitted fact or premise and accepts it as true. There is a leap here which may result in error, but that will not trouble the speaker. From his point of view, the important thing is that the listener believes and becomes, as it were, a witness to his own supplement. The second motive goes beyond belief. The speaker wants a listener who is favorably disposed, and toward this end he creates a situation in which the listener sees the speaker in a good light. The listener thinks that the speaker has provided him with an opportunity to exercise intelligence, and because of this belief he feels favorably disposed toward the speaker. At this point the two motives work together, for when the listener feels favor toward the speaker, he will believe what the speaker wants him to believe. In particular, he will not only supply what the speaker fails to say but also accept it as true.

Whether we call the favor felt by the listener an emotional response depends on the intensity of the feeling and our definition of emotion.⁴⁵⁰ If we think the feeling mild and define emotion as a strong response that interferes with sound judgment (cf. Arist., *Rhet.* 2.1 1378a20–1), then we may say that the listener is not affected emotionally. If we think the feeling intense, or if we choose to widen our notion of emotion to include mild feelings, then we may speak of an emotional response. Deciding between alternative definitions of emotion is not especially important; I would, however, underline that our text concerns persuasiveness, τὸ πῖθάνόν (line 1), and the listener is said to become a witness. That suggests that the listener is influenced in judgment. His favorable feeling makes him more than an attentive listener; he becomes a partisan. In addition, the last sentence contrasts the speaker who omits something with the speaker who says everything and thereby gives the appearance of despising his audience (lines 6–7). Such an appearance alienates people, and in many it arouses an angry emotion.

⁴⁵⁰ In this paragraph, I am reacting to Innes (1985) p. 253, who says that Theophrastus gives a psychological explanation of “a purely cognitive process — flattery of the intellect, not the emotions.” Flattery is, of course, a cognitive process in that it proceeds by words, but that does not rule out emotional response as the end result.

Demetrius never cites a Theophrastean work by title: neither in the text under consideration nor in the three other texts that name Theophrastus (686, 687, 703). Since the latter are generally thought to derive from the work *On Style* (666 no. 17a), it is natural to think that our text, too, comes from the same work. Indeed, the larger context is the plain style, and the immediately preceding section considers diction and composition (221). Nevertheless, we should not overlook the fact that the preceding section discusses diction and style in reference to persuasiveness, which is a quality of good narration. Persuasiveness continues to be the focus of our text, this time in connection with brevity, which is also closely associated with good narration. Perhaps, then, our text is based on a Theophrastean discussion of narration and in particular on the work *On Statement (of the Case) and Narration* (666 no. 16). Some support for the idea may be found in the use of the second singular pronoun “you” (three times in lines 4–5). Elsewhere in the treatise, the pronoun occurs in examples, but it is not used by Demetrius to address his reader, despite the fact that imperatives and other forms of direction are common.⁴⁵¹ Use of the pronoun is, however, an effective way to engage a student, and it may have been common in *On Statement and Narration*, which is likely to have been a teaching manual.⁴⁵² A different possibility is the work entitled *Rhetorical Precepts* (666 no. 3). Here too the pronoun “you” would be at home as would precepts dealing with narration. Nevertheless, it is not certain that the use of the pronoun “you” can be attributed to Theophrastus. The pronoun occurs as part of an explanation (beginning in line 4), and although the explanation almost certainly reflects the thinking of Theophrastus, individual words may not be his.⁴⁵³

A further consideration is that the omission under consideration in 696 is not a matter of style or λέξις conceived of (narrowly) in

⁴⁵¹ A word search on TLG has turned up 21 occurrences of the pronoun: σὺ, σοῦ, σοί, σέ. Eighteen are found in 16 examples (two examples exhibit the pronoun twice); the other three occurrences are in 696.

⁴⁵² It is noteworthy that Aristotle uses the second person singular when discussing narration in *Rhet.* 3.16 (1417a2, 34–6, b7–8). In my judgment that usage reflects the fact that the chapter derives from Aristotle’s early course of lectures, which was intended to rival Isocrates and organized according to the parts of an oration. See the commentary on 666 no. 16 and Fortenbaugh (1996) p. 171–2.

⁴⁵³ Beginning with ὅτι in line 1, Schmidt (1839) p. 43 has enclosed the entire text in quotation marks, thereby suggesting that we are dealing with Theophrastus’ own words. Editors of Demetrius like Radermacher, Roberts and Innes do not do so, and we have followed them in the text-translation volumes.

terms of diction and composition. At least on my reading of the text, Theophrastus is said to have recommended the omission of details or facts that a listener can supply for himself, and in such cases, issues of diction and composition do not arise. (What is omitted is expressed neither well nor poorly; it remains unexpressed.) Nevertheless the omission may be apt in that it has a particular effect on the listener. Supplying what has been omitted, the listener thinks himself perceptive and becomes well disposed toward the speaker. In other words, text **696** concerns audience psychology, and as such it has a clear application to narration whose fundamental goal is persuasion. The speaker aims to convince the listener that certain things did or did not occur, and he is more likely to succeed if the listener becomes his witness. That may be a reason for attributing **696** to *On State-ment and Narration* or *Rhetorical Precepts*, but it is hardly decisive. For a discussion of style, a work *Περὶ λέξεως*, may contain material that is supplemental to the work's primary concern. I leave the issue undecided.⁴⁵⁴

697 Cicero, *Orator* 39 (*BT* p. 87.12–19 Reis)

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 50–1; Rose (1863) p. 138; Sandys (1885) p. 48; Mayer (1910) p. 29–30; Kroll (1913) p. 47–8; Grube (1952a) p. 175, (1965) p. 104; Innes (1985) p. 267; Fortenbaugh (1989) p. 52

Responding to a request by Brutus, Cicero has agreed to state his idea of perfect eloquence. He recognizes that the existence of several kinds of oratory makes his task difficult (36–7) and limits himself to the oratory of the forum. Excluded are eulogy, history, exhortation and whatever is called epideictic in Greek (37).⁴⁵⁵ Cicero continues by listing stylistic devices like rhythm and balanced clauses, which are frequent in epideictic speeches. He names Isocrates as one who pursued such devices (38) and then refers to Thrasymachus, Gorgias,

⁴⁵⁴ It may be a fault of our edition that text **696** is brought under the label “Expression.” It might better have been placed in a section on the parts of an oration, corresponding to chapters 13–19 in Book 3 of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. But then we would have still another section with a single text, and since **696** may in fact derive from *On Style*, perhaps the text is not poorly placed.

⁴⁵⁵ Cicero explains that speeches of this kind are called epideictic because they are composed, as it were, for viewing and pleasure (*quasi ad inspiciendum delectationis causa* 37). On this explanation and generally on the purpose of epideictic oratory, see the commentary on **671**.

Theodorus and others whom Plato calls λογοδαίδαλοι.⁴⁵⁶ They are the forerunners of Isocrates, and their prose is said to have exhibited not only many good points but also marks of immaturity: in particular, choppy clauses which are similar to verslets and excessively ornamented (39).⁴⁵⁷ Then follows our text, in which Herodotus and Thucydides are praised for avoiding the stylistic failings of their contemporaries, i.e., the λογοδαίδαλοι.

In the case of Herodotus, the praise seems straightforward. His prose is unaffected by the stylistic peculiarities of fifth-century rhetoricians. Thucydides, however, is a very different author whose style can be positively Gorgianic. That is not a new observation. It is as old as Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who quotes from a speech of Thucydides (2.62.3–5)⁴⁵⁸ and comments on its frigidity and closeness to the style of Gorgias (*Thuc.* 46).⁴⁵⁹ We must, I think, conclude that Cicero has written hastily and carelessly, bringing together two historians and failing to notice a relevant difference.⁴⁶⁰ This failure is all the more striking when we consider the next sentence in which Cicero does distinguish between Herodotus and Thucydides: the former is likened to a tranquil river; the latter is said to proceed rapidly and, as it were, to sound the trumpet of war. The use of qualifying words (*quasi* and *quodam modo*, lines 4 and 5) to soften the images of flowing water and sounding trumpets makes one think of Theophrastus' interest in the "apologetic" metaphor (689A–B, 690). Furthermore, the particular image of flowing water (*amnis fluit*, line 4) may be compared with a passage later in the *Orator*, where Cicero names Theophrastus and likens a sentence lacking rhythm to a river which flows on endlessly (228 = 699.3–4). In our passage, however, there is little reason to think that Cicero is drawing on Theophrastus when he compares Herodotus to a tranquil river. The metaphor of running water is a common place⁴⁶¹ and often used

⁴⁵⁶ Plato, *Phdr.* 266E, where the term is used of Theodorus.

⁴⁵⁷ *quorum* (Thrasymachus et al.) *satis arguta multa, sed ut modo primumque nascentia minuta et versicolorum similia quaedam nimiumque depicta.*

⁴⁵⁸ Thucydides puts the speech in the mouth of Pericles, who is made to address the Athenian assembly after the second invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesian army.

⁴⁵⁹ Cf. Marcellinus, *Life of Thucydides* 36 and see the note of Kroll (1913) p. 48.

⁴⁶⁰ That does not directly affect what Cicero says about Theophrastus in 697, but it is grounds for pause in other passages where Cicero joins Aristotle and Theophrastus and attributes the same view to both philosophers.

⁴⁶¹ It is as old as Greek literature. Cf. Homer, *Il.* 1.249, where the metaphor of flowing speech (ῥέειν αὐδῆ) is combined with that of honey.

by Cicero.⁴⁶² Similarly, the use of qualifying words to soften bold metaphors is found in many authors including Cicero.⁴⁶³

It is only in the last sentence of our text that Cicero draws on Theophrastus. The Latin words *commota est* appear to translate some form of the Greek verb κινεῖν. Sandys (p. 48) suggests that Theophrastus wrote something like οὔτοι τὴν ἱστορίαν ἐκίνησαν πρῶτοι.⁴⁶⁴ In support of his suggestion,⁴⁶⁵ he cites Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 3.1: ἤρξαντο μὲν οὖν κινῆσαι τὸ πρῶτον, ὥσπερ πέφυκεν, οἱ ποιηταί (1404a19–20)⁴⁶⁶ and Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians* 1.6: Ἐμπεδοκλέα μὲν γὰρ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶ πρῶτον ῥητορικὴν κεκινηκέναι (= Aristotle, fr. 65 Rose³).⁴⁶⁷ If Sandys is correct (and I think he is), we may still ask whether the translation is Cicero's own. If it is, was it made directly from a Theophrastean treatise, or is it based on handbook material?

The passages cited from Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3.1) and Sextus Empiricus (= Arist., fr. 65) are of further interest in that they exhibit a clear concern with “firsts”: the poets were first to investigate style, and Empedocles was first to cultivate rhetoric. This concern with “firsts” is well attested for Aristotle⁴⁶⁸ and was shared by his pupils, including Theophrastus, who wrote a work *On Discoveries* (727 no. 11) and apparently named Corax as the inventor of words (736ABC). On the basis of our present text, 697, we can say that Theophrastus' interest in “firsts” found expression in regard to the prose style of historians. Here a distinction may be called for. An interest in the origin of technical writings on style is not identical with an interest in the development of artful prose. The two do, of course, complement each other, and Theophrastus will have pursued both avenues. Nevertheless, 697 is about artful prose — when histo-

⁴⁶² In addition to 699.4, see 701.23, and on *flumen* and *fluere* in the *Orator*, see the commentary on 698–700, p. 322 n. 479.

⁴⁶³ For *quasi* in the *Orator*, see e.g. 2, 12, 37 and for *quodam modo* 64, 80, 119.

⁴⁶⁴ “They (Herodotus and Thucydides) were the first to set in motion the (writing) of history.”

⁴⁶⁵ Sandys is drawing on the comments of Schmidt p. 50.

⁴⁶⁶ “As is natural, the poets were first to begin setting in motion (the investigation of verbal expression).”

⁴⁶⁷ “Aristotle says that Empedocles first set in motion (the art of) rhetoric.”

⁴⁶⁸ It is present in Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations* 34, where the Stagirite recognizes pioneers — the first people (οἱ πρῶτοι) — who discovered the beginnings of rhetoric prior to Tisias, Thrasymachus and Theodorus (183b24–34). In his lost *Collection of Arts*, Aristotle appears to have named Corax and Tisias as the first to write a rhetorical handbook (Cicero, *Brutus* 46).

rians first began to express themselves fully and ornately — and not about technical treatises on style.

Immediately after our text (in sections not printed in the text-translation volumes) Cicero returns to Isocrates and says that he has always praised him more than the other writers of epideictic prose. To justify this evaluation, Cicero contrasts Isocrates with Thrasymachus, Gorgias and Theodorus, saying that Isocrates was the first to expand his phrases and to use softer rhythms. Cicero comments on the influence Isocrates had on his pupils, calls attention to Plato's praise of Isocrates and ultimately endorses an epideictic style which is essentially that of Isocrates (40–2). Here Isocrates is presented as the paradigm of epideictic prose. This view would soon find a worthy advocate in Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Isaeus* 19); and according to Kroll, it is Theophrastean in origin.⁴⁶⁹ That is certainly possible and even irresistible, if one agrees with Kroll that Cicero's historical account of epideictic oratory (i.e., 39–40) connects with Theophrastus, who made the first and only attempt to describe the development of Greek prose style.⁴⁷⁰ Kroll may be on target, but it should be underlined that no text states explicitly how and to what extent Theophrastus discussed the development of Greek prose style. Moreover, in *Orator* 39–40 Cicero does not cite Theophrastus as his source for everything said in regard to history and epideictic prose in general. At the beginning of 39, he refers only to tradition (what people report or say, *ferunt*); and when he turns to Herodotus and Thucydides and fails to draw a relevant distinction, the failure seems to be entirely his own. When Theophrastus is finally mentioned at the end of 39, the reference seems restricted to a single point. Certainly nothing is said to suggest that Theophrastus stands behind the subsequent characterization and evaluation of Isocratean prose.⁴⁷¹

Cicero does not name any Theophrastean work. Since the report he gives concerns prose style (λέξις), the work *On Style* (Περὶ λέξεως 666 no. 17a) comes readily to mind. Scholars have, however, taken note of the fact that our text is concerned with the writing of history (*historia*) and suggested as an alternative the work *On Research* (Περὶ

⁴⁶⁹ Kroll p. 48: "Dass Is. der Vollender des epideiktischen Stiles war, ist das Urteil des Theophrast."

⁴⁷⁰ Kroll p. 47: "Die folgende Geschichte der epideiktischen Beredsamkeit schliesst sich an Theophrast an, der in περὶ λέξεως den ersten und einzigen Versuch gemacht hatte, die historische Entwicklung des griechischen Prosastiles darzustellen."

⁴⁷¹ E.g., Schmidt (1839) p. 51 and Sandys p. 48.

ἱστορίας **727** no. 8).⁴⁷² I see no way to rule out this alternative; the Greek word ἱστορία refers generally to investigation or research and can be used with special reference to the work of Herodotus, Thucydides and others who record human events. However, the unqualified use of ἱστορία in a title most naturally suggests a general work on research, including *inter alia* a discussion of method in natural science.⁴⁷³ While such a work could include a section on the investigation of human events, it seems prudent to follow the majority of scholars and assign our text to *On Style*.

- 698** Rufinus, *On the Rhythms of Orators* (GL vol. 6 p. 573.22–5 Keil)
699 Cicero, *Orator* 228 (BT p. 87.12–19 Reis)
700 Cicero, *Orator* 172 (BT p. 66.8–12 Reis)

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 46–7; Sandys (1885) p. 194, 235; Diels (1886) p. 27; Blass (1887–98) vol. 2 p. 154–5; Mayer (1910) p. 86, 90; Kroll (1913) p. 152–4, 193; Bonner (1938) p. 259; Grube (1952a) p. 174; Kennedy (1963) p. 277; Fowler (1982) p. 97; Innes (1985) p. 252; Fantham (1988) p. 288, 290; Fortenbaugh (1989) p. 54–6; Wisse (1989) p. 181–2

Text **698** is taken from Rufinus' work *On the Rhythms of Orators*. The work is largely a collection of excerpts drawn from various authors; by far the largest number are from Cicero. Three Ciceronian texts that name Theophrastus are excerpted. They are **700–2**. Text **698** is found between excerpts taken from Victorinus and Cicero, but strictly speaking **698** is not an excerpt. Rather, it is a report in which Rufinus lists Theophrastus together with nine other persons who are said to have written on prose rhythm. The list is put together from what Cicero says in the *Orator*.⁴⁷⁴ Placing Thrasymachus at the head of the list (line two) invites comparison with *Orator* 175, where Thrasymachus is spoken of as the inventor of rhythmical prose. But we should not be misled into thinking that Rufinus has carefully or-

⁴⁷² Cf. Sollenberger (1984) p. 315.

⁴⁷³ S. Rebenich, "Historical Prose," in *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330 B.C.–A.D. 400* (Leiden: Brill 1997) p. 267, tells us that *On Research* gave a theoretical basis to the "tragic" or "Peripatetic" writing of history. That may be, but Rebenich offers no argument for making the connection with history as against research in general and scientific research in particular.

⁴⁷⁴ See "Sources" on Rufinus, above, p. 32–3.

dered his list on the basis of what is said in the *Orator*. For there, Naucrates and Ephorus are said to be pupils of Isocrates (172), yet in Rufinus' list, both appear before Isocrates (lines 2–3).⁴⁷⁵ Similarly, in the *Orator*, Theodectes is said to be Aristotle's pupil (172), but in the list, he enjoys precedence (line 3). Furthermore, placing Gorgias third (line 2), obscures the fact that Cicero regards him as an inventor in the arrangement of words (165, 175) and twice names Gorgias and Thrasymachus together as the first persons to have joined words with a certain art (39, 40). More importantly, speaking indiscriminately of persons who wrote about arrangement, rhythms and metrical feet (*de compositione et numeris et pedibus oratoriis . . . scripserunt*, lines 1–2) may suggest that all ten of the persons named wrote treatises about such topics. But that is not what Cicero says in the *Orator*. In particular, he tells us that the writings of Thrasymachus and Gorgias exhibit certain features,⁴⁷⁶ but he does not say that they wrote about (i.e., discussed) these features. They may have done so, but example, not comment, is likely to have been their primary mode of instruction. Be that as it may, Rufinus is not wrong in listing Theophrastus as someone who wrote on arrangement, rhythm and metrical feet. Only Rufinus' knowledge of Theophrastus is limited to what he knows through his Latin source, i.e., Cicero (*ut Cicero dicit* [line 1]).

Text 699 occurs within Cicero's lengthy discussion of the correct use of rhythm (*Orator* 204–36). In what immediately precedes, Cicero announces that he will discuss the practical value of rhythm (226). He tells us that a beautiful oration involves not only the best thoughts and choicest language but also a careful arrangement of words. He also states that rhythm adds luster to thought and diction, though one must avoid the rigid rhythm of poetry (227). After that comes our text. We are told that speaking elegantly requires rhythm for two reasons. First, a speaker's words ought not to flow on endlessly like a river; they ought to be brought to a stop by the rhythm and neither by the speaker's need to breathe nor by the punctuation of a scribe. Second, well-knit words have greater power than those that are loosely bound. In regard to the first reason, Cicero makes explicit reference to Aristotle and Theophrastus. The idea of coming

⁴⁷⁵ They are also separated from each other by the reference to Gorgias.

⁴⁷⁶ See, e.g., *Orator* 175: *cuius (sc. Thrasymachi) omnia nimis etiam extant scripta numerose. . . . sed (Gorgias) eis est usus intemperantius*. Unlike Aristotle and Theophrastus, Thrasymachus and Gorgias are presented as practitioners and not theorists. See also *Orator* 39, 40, 165, 167 and 176.

to an end because of the rhythm and not because of scribal notation has a close parallel in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 3.8 1409a20–1. A concern with breathing may be found in 3.9 1409b14–15, though here there is no similarity in wording. What is missing in *Rhetoric* 3.8–9 is the metaphor of a flowing river. It has been suggested that the metaphor occurred in Theophrastus' account of prose rhythm.⁴⁷⁷ That is certainly possible, and we can find the metaphor in **701.23**. We should, however, keep in mind that the metaphor is not unusual. It predates Theophrastus⁴⁷⁸ and is found repeatedly in Cicero's *Orator*.⁴⁷⁹

Text **700** comes from introductory remarks to Cicero's discussion of prose rhythm. Cicero is arguing against persons who reject rhythm. He asks rhetorically whether these persons will not be moved by the authority of learned men, says that he is passing over Isocrates, Ephorus and Naucratis, although they ought to be considered authorities, and then cites Aristotle, Theodectes and Theophrastus. Aristotle is characterized as more learned than everyone else and an advocate of rhythm. Theodectes is identified as Aristotle's pupil, a polished writer and someone who gave the same instructions as Aristotle. After that Theophrastus is said to have expressed himself even more accurately concerning the same matters.

It is clear that Cicero is contrasting Theophrastus' treatment of prose rhythm with that of Aristotle and Theodectes. Theophrastus' treatment will have been more precise, but in what way? There may have been several ways, but our sources provide little information. **701** tells us that Theophrastus took notice of anapaestic and dithyrambic rhythms and the frequent occurrence of the latter in opulent prose. In addition, **703** suggests that Theophrastus developed (or went further in developing) a notion of prose rhythm that is not limited to the use of metrical feet placed exactly at the beginning and the end of a sentence. See the commentaries on **701** and **703**.

In describing Theophrastus' treatment as more accurate, is Cicero suggesting that Theophrastus will be his primary source for what will be said in the subsequent discussion? That is possible, but it should be noted that Cicero goes on to diminish the work of Aristotle, Theodectes and Theophrastus. He asks whether he should

⁴⁷⁷ E.g., Schmidt p. 47 and Sandys p. 235.

⁴⁷⁸ See above, p. 317 n. 461.

⁴⁷⁹ The noun *flumen* (**699.4**) is found in *Orator* 53, and the verb *fluere* occurs in 39 (= **697.4**), 42, 66, 94, 199, 212, 220.

address the topic “even more accurately,” *etiam accuratius*, than those whose views have been cited, or should he be content with what they say. “Those” and “they” (*illi ipsi* and *ab illis* 174) are the three named Peripatetics. The question is more stylistic than real. Cicero intends to discuss the topic and claims that his discussion will be even more accurate.⁴⁸⁰ We are invited to believe that Theophrastus’ treatment of the same topic may have been more precise than that of the other two named Peripatetics, but it nonetheless falls short of the standard Cicero sets for himself.⁴⁸¹

All three texts, **698–700**, may be referred, albeit in different ways (in **698** Rufinus is following Cicero), to Theophrastus’ work *On Style* (**666** no. 17a).

701 Cicero, *On the Orator* 3.184–7 (*BT* p. 340.4–341.20 Kumaniecki)

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 47; Diels (1886) p. 27–8; Blass (1887) vol. 2 p. 146–7; Wilkins (1892) p. 512–13; Mayer (1910) p. 86, 92; Roberts (1910) p. 37–8; Stroux (1912) p. 12; Rostagni (1922) p. 107, 113–16; Dosi (1960) p. 616–17, 623; Kennedy (1963) p. 277; Schenkeveld (1964) p. 27; Cousin (1975–80) vol. 6 p. 9–10; Fowler (1982) p. 95–7; Adamik (1984) p. 194; Fortenbaugh (1989) p. 55–6; Wisse (1989) p. 180–3

In Book 3 of *On the Orator*, Cicero has Crassus speak at length on the qualities of good style. Correct language (Latin) and clarity are discussed first (3.37–52), and then ornament and aptness (3.53–212).⁴⁸² Our text is part of the discussion of ornament. It comes after Crassus’ remarks on individual words (3.149–70) and within his remarks on composition (3.171–212). In particular, it is part of the discussion of periodic structure and prose rhythm (3.173–98). At the

⁴⁸⁰ Cf. *Orator* 226 *ad fin.*

⁴⁸¹ The repetition of “even more accurate” makes one wonder whether the first occurrence is less a report concerning the depth and extent of Theophrastus’ treatment of the topic than a preparation for and enhancement of Cicero’s own discussion: Theophrastus’ treatment may have been even more accurate than that of Aristotle, but mine (Cicero’s) will attain even greater accuracy. For a similar case, see the commentary on **702**: At first Cicero describes Aristotle as *optimus* and leaves unchallenged his preference for the paeon, but later Cicero criticizes Aristotle and declares the cretic preferable.

⁴⁸² Crassus discusses the four qualities recognized by Theophrastus (**684**); but the order in which the qualities are discussed, ornament third and aptness fourth, is not Theophrastean. Similarly, the low status assigned to clarity is unlikely to be Theophrastean. See the commentary on **684**.

beginning of this discussion, Crassus explains that the need to breathe and to express thought clearly has given rise to rhythmic periods (3.173–5). He then goes on to claim that a mastery of prose rhythm is not as difficult as it is necessary (3.176–7), and he argues for a regular connection between what is useful and what is attractive (3.178–81).⁴⁸³ After that Crassus turns to a consideration of Aristotle's views on rhythm. What he offers (3.182–3) is an imprecise summary of *Rhetoric* 3.8 1408b32–1409a21. It is marred by omission, rearrangement, addition, confusion and outright error.⁴⁸⁴ My suspicion is that Cicero has not drawn directly on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. He is using someone else's report or summary and has misinterpreted one or more details.⁴⁸⁵

Next Crassus considers Theophrastus (701), whose views on prose rhythm are cited to support the idea that prose should be marked by loose rhythm (lines 6–9). Rostagni p. 107–8, 114 says that the words *quodam modo* are added by Cicero after *facta* (lines 7–8), in order to indicate that *facta* is a translation from Greek: it renders the Theophrastean notion of ποῖα λέξις (as found in the London scholia on Dionysius Thrax, *GG* vol. 1.3 p. 449.5, 9).⁴⁸⁶ On my reading of the Ciceronian passage, the words *quodam modo* do not indicate translation. Rather, as they occur in the phrase *atque facta quodam modo* (lines 7–8), they are largely stylistic, being part of a phrase that expands on *polita*, “polished” (line 7): “polished and shaped in some way.”⁴⁸⁷ This explanation may be made more com-

⁴⁸³ The idea that beauty is tied to what is useful recurs in *On the Orator* at the conclusion of the discussion of delivery (3.224–7). A similar tie is made by Aristotle at *Rhetoric* 1.5 1361b7–14, but that need not mean that Cicero is following a Peripatetic source. Wilkins p. 509 compares the description of the universe in *On the Orator* 3.178–9 with *On the Nature of the Gods* 2.98ff., where a Stoic view appears to be set forth. Michel p. 301, however, sees Academic influence in *On the Orator* 3.178.

⁴⁸⁴ Eight lines (1409a2–9) are omitted some of which would contradict what is said by Crassus; the iambic and “trochaic” rhythms are discussed before the heroic (3.182) and not afterward as in the *Rhetoric* (1408b32–1409a1); a disruptive, parenthetical remark about the cretic is added (3.183 p. 339.12–340.2 K); the tribrach is confused with the trochee (3.182); and a limited use of the heroic foot is erroneously recommended (3.182). For detailed discussion, see Fortenbaugh (1989) 46–50 and Wisse p. 121–6.

⁴⁸⁵ E.g., the confusion concerning the trochee and tribrach may be Cicero's and not an error already present in his source. At least the error is repeated in the *Orator* 193 = 704.7–9, where Cicero exhibits greater familiarity with *Rhetoric* 3.8.

⁴⁸⁶ Cf. Dosi p. 617, 626–7.

⁴⁸⁷ It is telling that Rostagni first expresses himself with some caution, (“probabilmente” p. 108 n. 4) and then later speaks as if there was never reason for hesitation (“È facile riconoscere uno schietto termine teofrasteo; poichè abbiamo

plex by recognizing the repeated use of *modus* and cognate words: *modi* (line 2), *sibi ipsa moderatur* (6), *facta quodam modo* (7–8), *modis* (9), *modulantur* (18), *modificata* (25). In this context, one may be tempted to translate *atque facta quodam modo* with “and made/shaped with a certain measure.” And if such a translation is accepted, then the immediately following qualification is all the more necessary. The measure of prose needs to be clearly marked off from the measures of verse (line 2), which are rigid rather than loose (line 8). I doubt, however, that Cicero is here (in lines 7–8) consciously playing with *modus*. Of course, the previous occurrence of *modi* together with *moderatur* (lines 2 and 6) may have had an unconscious effect, prompting Cicero to write *quodam modo*; nevertheless, the phrase is used quite generally (or vaguely): i.e., it means “in some way.”

In what follows, Crassus endorses Theophrastus’ conjecture (*sic ut ille suspicatur*) concerning the development of anapaestic and dithyrambic rhythms: the former blossomed from meters in common use (i.e., the iamb and trochee), and the latter flowed from the former (lines 9–11). Again citing Theophrastus (*ut ait idem*), Crassus tells us that the members and feet of dithyrambic verse are found spread throughout all opulent prose (lines 11–12). Crassus does not elaborate on this report concerning Theophrastus, and no other source provides additional details. We can only say that Theophrastus is reported to have put forward a theory concerning the development of various rhythms and made a connection between prose rhythm and the dithyramb, whose rhythms over time had become quite free. Despite faulty reporting concerning Aristotle (as mentioned above), there is no good reason to doubt the accuracy of what is here attributed to Theophrastus.⁴⁸⁸ But equally we should not assume that Cicero knew much more than what he has Crassus report.

The substance of what follows is clear enough. Rhythm is said to exist in voice, and properly formed to count as a merit in prose (lines 12–16); rhythmic prose is contrasted with an unbroken flow of verbiage (lines 16–23); the period is introduced and the desirability of making the final member or colon longer is emphasized (lines 23–9).

visto che con ποικίλῃς Τεοφράστου ἐκφράσει τὸν ἀντικείμενον τῆς ἀρτιστικῆς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἀντικείμενον, ἐπεὶ τὸν Τεοφράστου ἐκφράσει: *facta quodam modo oratio*” p. 114).

⁴⁸⁸ Accuracy need not imply translation, which Blass (1887–98) p. 146 claims for lines 7–12. Indeed, if Cicero has translated a Theophrastean passage, he has almost certainly omitted material concerning the development of the anapaestic and dithyrambic rhythms.

There is nothing here that cannot be Theophrastean; and since no break is signaled, it seems reasonable to believe that Crassus continues to draw on Theophrastus. The metaphor of the flowing river (*profluens* and *in amni praecipitante*, lines 17 and 23) recalls **699.4** (*flumen*), and the combination “flowing verbiage” (*loquacitas* . . . *profluens* line 17) may suggest *Characters* 7.7 (the loquacious individual, ὁ λαλός, says that his tongue is as it were in water: ὥς ἐν ὕγρῳ ἔστιν ἡ γλῶττα). But the connection with the *Characters* is not strong, and the image of a flowing river is too common to carry much weight.⁴⁸⁹

The fact that the period and its members are discussed after rhythm invites comparison with Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, in which rhythm is the topic of 3.8 and periodic structure that of 3.9. Noteworthy is the fact that neither Aristotle’s account of the period nor the related portion of **701** (lines 23–9) makes mention of the paeon or any other metrical foot. In the case of **701**, silence may be due to brevity (six and one half lines, 23–9), but I do not think so. More than likely Theophrastus followed Aristotle and analyzed the period in terms of its internal structure — balanced *χῶλα* or *membra* — without reference to initial and final feet.⁴⁹⁰ Equally interesting is the fact that **701** contains a clearly stated preference for a longer final colon (line 29). Aristotle does make brief mention of equality in length (παρίσῳσις 1410a23, cf. b1); but the subject is not developed, and he is completely silent concerning the possibility of a longer final colon. In contrast, Cicero has Crassus first recommend equal members and then say that longer final members are better and more pleasing. Perhaps we have here an area in which Theophrastus went beyond his master, especially in recognizing the positive affect that a longer second colon has on the audience. I do not want to overlook the fact that Cicero is capable of adding a preference of his own.⁴⁹¹ He does so in reporting Aristotle’s views on prose rhythm,⁴⁹² and he may be doing the same in regard to the final colon.

⁴⁸⁹ Cf. *De or.* 3.172, 190 (*fluere*) and 2.68, 188 (*flumen*); see the commentary to **699**.

⁴⁹⁰ I am in agreement with Fowler (1982) p. 90–2 and Innes (1994) p. 73 against, e.g., Schenkeveld (1964) p. 28–31 and Adamik (1984) p. 186–7.

⁴⁹¹ Cicero himself seems to have been fond of a longer final colon. See Wilkins 513 and E. Lindholm, *Stilistische Studien* (Lund: Ohlsson 1931) p. 165–73. (For the second reference I am indebted to Michael Winterbottom.)

⁴⁹² After Aristotle’s endorsement of the paeon is reported, Cicero has Crassus introduce the cretic and illustrate its use in both poetry and prose (3.183). Here we have an addition (Aristotle is silent concerning the cretic), which is potentially

But it seems more likely that Cicero has Crassus report a Theophrastean view or one jointly held by Cicero and Theophrastus. Later when Crassus mentions cola apart from Theophrastus (3.190, 198), he says nothing about a longer second member.⁴⁹³ Moreover, our text closes with a reference to philosophers valued by Catulus (3.187). These philosophers are certainly Aristotle and Theophrastus; and while the reference is introduced as a conclusion to the entire stretch from 3.182 through 186 (182–3 Aristotle, 184–6 Theophrastus), it suggests that what is said in 186 — especially the immediately preceding lines on cola — should be understood as Theophrastean.⁴⁹⁴

Like the several preceding and following texts from Cicero's *Orator* (697, 699–700, 702, 704), our text from *On the Orator* (701) contains material attributable to *On Style* (666 no. 17a).

702 Cicero, *Orator* 218 (BT p. 83.3–7 Reis)

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 47; Sandys (1885) p. 227–8; Mayer (1910) p. 89; Kroll (1913) p. 185–6; Kennedy (1963) p. 277; Fortenbaugh (1989) p. 54–5; Wisse (1989) p. 180–3

Text **702** is part of a larger discussion concerning the use of prose rhythm (204–33). The immediate context is a consideration of the several different metrical feet which can be used to bring a period to conclusion and which, when varied, can prevent satiety (212–19). Earlier Cicero had called Aristotle *optimus*⁴⁹⁵ and left unchallenged his view that the paeon is primary (196).⁴⁹⁶ Now Cicero magnifies himself by setting his own views above those of Aristotle,⁴⁹⁷ and he

confusing. For when Crassus returns to Aristotle, he fails to indicate the parenthetical nature of what he has just said. See Fortenbaugh (1989) p. 49–50.

⁴⁹³ In 3.198, at the end of the discussion of rhythm and form, Crassus does mention equal clauses, but he makes no allusion to a longer second member.

⁴⁹⁴ We may compare Demetrius Rhetor, *On Style* 18, where we are told that the final colon should be longer than the preceding. That is in line with what Cicero says in **701** (*pace* Schenkeveld [1964] p. 27), only Demetrius makes the point more strongly. He says that the final colon should (χρῆ) be longer; Cicero first allows two possibilities, equal in length or longer, after which he declares his preference for a longer final colon: it is better and more pleasing (line 29).

⁴⁹⁵ Cf. 172 (the lines immediately preceding **700**), where Cicero asks rhetorically whether anyone was more learned, acute and sharp than Aristotle.

⁴⁹⁶ See the commentary on **704**.

⁴⁹⁷ The technique hardly needs documentation, but cf. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 1.9 1368a21–2, where Aristotle is discussing amplification and recommends comparison with famous people, for the subject is amplified, if he is shown to be better than other worthy individuals.

does so four times. First, Cicero tells us that words spoken by Gaius Carbo lose their effect, if they are rearranged in such a way, that a final ditrochee is replaced by a paeon. Cicero reports that the latter foot was rated highest by Aristotle, and then states explicitly his disagreement with the Stagirite: "from whom (Aristotle) I dissent" (214). Second, Cicero focuses on the paeon and distinguishes between the first and fourth paeon. He says that the latter was considered the best cadence by the ancients (*veteres*), after which Cicero tells us that he does not absolutely reject the fourth paeon but nevertheless prefers other metrical endings. Here the ancients clearly include Aristotle (215). Third, Cicero tells us that it makes no difference whether a dactyl or a cretic comes last in a sentence (the final short syllable of the dactyl can be regarded as long), and that Aristotle does not understand this: "the one who said that the paeon, in which the final syllable is long, is more suitable (to the final position) fails to understand, for it does not matter how long the final syllable is" (218).⁴⁹⁸ Fourth, in rejecting the idea that the paeon is not a foot but a rhythm, Cicero says that all the ancients (*antiqui*) agree. He names four, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Theodectes and Ephorus, and goes on to say that those ancients (i.e., the four who have just been named) are in agreement concerning the paeon: it is most suitable not only to the beginning and middle of a sentence but also to the end. Concerning the end Cicero disagrees: "here the cretic seems to me better suited" (218). These last remarks about the ancients are our text **702**.

In **702.2–3**, Cicero makes reference not only to the beginning and the end of the sentence but also to the middle. In *Rhetoric* 3.8, Aristotle does not mention the middle. He refers the first paeon to the beginning and the fourth paeon to the end (1409a10–21). Should we, then, say that Cicero is drawing on one of the other ancients named in **702.1–2**? If we believe that Cicero knew well Theophrastus' work *On Style*, and if we believe that he followed it or at least drew on it when composing the *Orator*, then we may want to say that the reference to the middle is a mark of Theophrastean influence.⁴⁹⁹ That may be correct, but it seems to me little more than

⁴⁹⁸ Cf. 214 and 217. The criticism of Aristotle strikes me as unfair. See Sandys, who cites Quintilian, *Oratorical Education* 9.4.93, and cf. H. Hubbel (Loeb translation) p. 488 n. a. I have expressed myself on the issue in "Cicero as a Source for Aristotelian and Theophrastean Rhetoric," forthcoming in *Rhetorica* 23.1 (2005).

⁴⁹⁹ Cf. Sandys p. 227 and Kroll p. 186.

a guess.⁵⁰⁰ Theophrastus is mentioned only in a list of ancients, and his position in the list is not special: he is named after his teacher Aristotle and before Theodectes, who was also a student of Aristotle.⁵⁰¹ In addition, there is no reason to believe that Cicero could not add the reference to the middle on his own, and some reason to believe that he did. Earlier in the *Orator*, Cicero considers whether rhythm belongs throughout the whole of a period or only in the beginning and end (199); after some discussion, he tells us that all the words of the period, both those at the beginning and those in the middle, ought to look to the end (200). A little later he states that rhythm belongs in the whole of a period (203), and when he turns to consider the use of prose rhythm, he again asks whether rhythm belongs in the whole of a period or in the beginning or in the end or in each part (204). Here there is no explicit reference to the middle (as there is in 200), but the mention of the whole period suggests that Cicero is not narrowly concerned with beginnings and endings apart from the middle.⁵⁰² Moreover, Cicero may make mention of both the beginning and the middle at 702.3, because he wants to isolate emphatically the end from the rest of the sentence.⁵⁰³ In doing so, he makes even clearer his disagreement with (and imagined superiority to) Aristotle and other like-minded ancients.⁵⁰⁴

⁵⁰⁰ In the commentary on 703, I suggest that Theophrastus may have observed that the middle of a colon is likely to remain unnoticed. In making the suggestion, I am transferring to Theophrastus what Demetrius Rhetor says in section 39 of *On Style*. If the suggestion is correct (and it may not be), it does not tell in favor of referring the middle as mentioned in 702 to Theophrastus. For the two passages, while not strictly contradictory, present very different messages. Demetrius says that the middle has less impact and is “as it were hidden.” Apparently the middle plays a lesser role in determining rhythm, so that it is unimportant whether a paeon is found there. In contrast, 702 says that the paeon is most suited to the middle as well as the beginning and end. Unless we understand some qualifier, it would seem that the middle does not go unnoticed and that it does make a difference whether a paeon is found there. However, in *On the Orator* 3.191, Cicero has Crassus focus on rhythm at the beginning and end of a sentence. We are told that if the initial and final feet are properly metrical, then those in the middle can be hidden: *medii possunt latere*. That statement invites comparison with what Demetrius says in *On Style* 39.

⁵⁰¹ On Theodectes, see 700.1–2.

⁵⁰² See also 203.

⁵⁰³ Compare *On the Orator* 3.192, and see the discussion in Fortenbaugh (1989) p. 55.

⁵⁰⁴ Wisse (1989) p. 182 n. 81 declares my interpretation of 702 (as set forth in Fortenbaugh [1989] p. 54–5) unconvincing, but he offers no particulars. If I understand Wisse correctly, he wants to explain and to excuse the faulty report concerning Aristotle which is found in *On the Orator* 3.182–3. In some unclear way (“in a

Since our text concerns prose rhythm, it may be referred to *On Style* (666 no, 17a); but it conveys little information either about Cicero's knowledge of that treatise or about Theophrastus' "more detailed" treatment of prose rhythm (700.4). We learn only that Theophrastus agreed with other ancients concerning the usefulness of the paeon throughout a sentence, and that is little more than what Cicero reports earlier in the *Orator*: namely, that Aristotle, Theophrastus and Theodectes say the same thing about the paeon (704.18–19).

703 Demetrius, *On Style* 41 (p. 90.13–25 Roberts)

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 42; Sandys (1885) p. 227–8; Diels (1886) p. 27–8; Blass (1887–98) vol. 2 p. 147; Rabe (1890) p. 44; Hendrickson (1904) p. 137–8; Mayer (1910) p. 95, 114, 158; Solmsen (1931) p. 254; Grube (1952a) p. 174–5, (1952b) p. 266 n. 20, (1961) p. 36–9, (1965) p. 105; Kennedy (1963) p. 277; Adamik (1984) p. 194–5; Innes (1985) p. 258, (1995) p. 316–19; Dover (1997) p. 174, 180

Our text is found within Demetrius' discussion of the grand style (38–113). Demetrius begins by focusing on composition and in particular on prose rhythm. He cites Aristotle and tells us that paeonic composition is grand: σύνθεσις δὲ μεγαλοπρεπής, ὥς φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης, ἡ παιωνική (38). We are then told that cola or members should begin with the initial (the first) paeon and end with the final (fourth) paeon. Next Demetrius asks why Aristotle gives this advice. His answer is that the beginning and the end of a colon should be grand, and this is provided by the long syllable, which is by nature grand. What occurs in the middle of a colon is said to be, as it were, hidden and to have less effect (39). After that Demetrius refers to

way that escapes us now" Wisse p. 182), Cicero will have been influenced by Theophrastus' *On Style*, in which Aristotle's views on prose rhythm will have been reported, and this influence will have caused the errors that appear in *On the Orator*. The hypothesis seems to me imaginative and of little relevance to explaining what is going on in 702. Of course, if Cicero was familiar with *On Style* when he wrote *On the Orator*, he is likely to have had access to the work when writing the *Orator*. But even if that is the case — or more generally, even if Cicero was familiar with *On Style*, when he wrote the *Orator* (he may have gained a first hand acquaintance of the Theophrastean work after writing *On the Orator* and before writing the *Orator*) — I do not see any strong reason for introducing the work *On Style*, in order to interpret a reference to "the middle" in 702.3.

Thucydides as an example of someone whose grandeur is attributable in large measure to the use of long syllables (40). Next comes text **703**. Demetrius takes account of the fact that we cannot always place an initial paeon at the very beginning of a colon and a final paeon at the very end. In such cases, however, we can still achieve a paeonic composition by beginning and ending with long syllables. Aristotle is said to have advised this, and an example from Theophrastus is given. Demetrius comments: “It (the example) is not exactly composed of paeons, but it has a paeonic quality” (lines 7–8).

In dealing with Demetrius’ remarks concerning Aristotle and Theophrastus, we should keep in mind that an apparent quotation may not be exact in every detail,⁵⁰⁵ and that Demetrius may vary terminology to suit his own interests. That can be demonstrated in the case of Aristotle. In discussing prose rhythm, Aristotle does not use the adjective “grand,” μεγαλοπρεπής; rather, he uses “dignified,” σεμνός (3.8 1408b32, cf. 35). Demetrius has preferred “grand” (38), because he is discussing what he calls the grand style, χαρακτήρ μεγαλοπρεπής. That seems harmless enough, but if we did not have Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, we might think that Aristotle spoke of grandeur and discussed the paeon in the context of the grand style. Similarly, when Demetrius answers the question why Aristotle recommended beginning and ending with paeons, he does not report closely what is said in the *Rhetoric*. Instead, he tells us that a long syllable at the beginning is striking, and at the end it leaves the listener with a sense of grandeur. We remember the beginning and end and are moved by what comes first and last (39). These are interesting considerations, which might appeal to Aristotle, but they do not cover his reasons for preferring the paeon: namely, the paeon is unobtrusive, giving rise to no fixed meter (1409a8–9), and as an ending it brings the sentence to a rhythmical close, so that punctuation is unnecessary (1409a19–21).

The application to Theophrastus is straightforward. Although Demetrius says that he offered an example of grandeur, παράδειγμα μεγαλοπρεπειάς (line 6), we cannot conclude with certainty that he used the word “grandeur.” Of course, he may have, and texts like **683.12**, **688.6** and **691.2**⁵⁰⁶ can be cited to strengthen the suspicion that he did.⁵⁰⁷ But as with Aristotle, so here Demetrius may be re-

⁵⁰⁵ See “The Sources” on Demetrius p. 6–8.

⁵⁰⁶ In **683** and **688**, the adjective μεγαλοπρεπής occurs; in **691** μέγας occurs in the phrase τὸ μέγα.

⁵⁰⁷ Cf. Innes (1995) p. 319, who suggests that the connection between the paeon

vealing his own interests rather than repeating the words of Theophrastus. Moreover, it would be wrong to argue on the basis of **703** that Theophrastus embraced a doctrine of four styles. That is a later development, even though it appears in an author who may have lived as early as the second century B.C.⁵⁰⁸

At the beginning of **703**, Demetrius tells us that we cannot always place paeons precisely at the ends of cola, but we can make the composition paeonic by beginning and ending with long syllables. We are told that Aristotle seems to offer such a recommendation,⁵⁰⁹ and a Theophrastean example is given: τῶν μὲν περὶ τὰ μηδενὸς ἄξια φιλοσοφούντων. After that Demetrius comments on the example, saying that the colon is not exactly (formed) from paeons, but it is in a way paeonic (lines 1–8). Given both the emphasis on long syllables and the statement that the colon is not exactly composed of paeons, it seems reasonable to say that the paeonic character of the Theophrastean example does not depend on the occurrence of perfectly formed paeonic feet. Rather, the paeonic character is given by the long syllables which occur at the beginning and end (there are two longs in each place⁵¹⁰), and which are followed and preceded by several short syllables (three shorts follow the initial longs, and a run of five precedes the final longs).⁵¹¹ That may be correct, but it is also possible to interpret the example in terms of exact feet. At the beginning, immediately after an initial long syllable, a first paeon may be identified (τῶν is followed by the paeon μὲν περὶ τὰ), and at the end a fourth paeon may be said to precede a final long syllable (φιλοσοφούντων is a paeon plus a long syllable). In other words, there are two perfectly formed paeons, which occur near the beginning and the end, and so placed they give the colon its paeonic character.⁵¹² This interpretation finds some support in Demetrius' statement that we cannot always place paeons exactly at the ends of (around, περιτιθέναι) cola (lines 1–2), but it would be

and grandeur may derive from Theophrastus and that Demetrius has transferred this connection from Theophrastus to Aristotle. On the latter, see p. 316–17.

⁵⁰⁸ Grube (1961) p. 39–56 places Demetrius even earlier, i.e., in the first half of the third century B.C. See "Sources" on Demetrius, p. 6 with note 4.

⁵⁰⁹ The qualifier "seems," (ἔοικεν, line 5) is important, for what Aristotle says is quite general and brief: "Prose ought not to have rhythm with precision. This will be realized, if there is rhythm to some extent" (*Rhetoric* 3.8 1408b31–2).

⁵¹⁰ At the beginning, the first syllable is long by nature; the second is long by position. At the end, both syllables are long by nature.

⁵¹¹ Cf. Adamik (1984) p. 194–5 and Innes (1995) p. 377 n. b.

⁵¹² Blass (1887–98) vol. 2 p. 147 and Grube (1952a) p. 175 n. 10.

much better supported by an explicit statement to the effect that paeons can be placed in the second position or more generally near the beginning and end of the colon.

It should not be overlooked that two dactyls may be identified in the middle of the Theophrastean colon: μηδενὸς ἄξια. Recognizing them seems especially important for the second interpretation, for then the run of five shorts is divided into two shorts and three shorts, of which the latter form a paeon with the following long.⁵¹³ But whether we opt for the first or the second interpretation, the occurrence of these feet raises the question of why the colon does not have a dactylic quality or a mixed quality, partly dactylic and partly paeonic. The answer is that in comparison with the beginning and the end, the middle of a colon passes largely unnoticed and therefore has little impact. Demetrius makes this point when explaining why Aristotle recommends paeons at the beginning and end of cola (39), and I am inclined to believe that Theophrastus made the point and perhaps illustrated it with examples like the one recorded by Demetrius.⁵¹⁴

The Theophrastean example and any comments which Theophrastus may have offered will have been found in *On Style* (666 no. 17a).

704 Cicero, *Orator* 192–4 (BT p. 74.9–30, 75.7–8 Reis)

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 47–8; Sandys (1885) p. 209–11; Mayer (1910) p. 87–94; Kroll (1913) p. 166–9; Cousin (1935–6) vol. 1 p. 531–2, (1975–80) vol. 5 p. 147; Kennedy (1963) p. 277; Fortenbaugh (1989) p. 54

Text **704** is found within Cicero's discussion of the nature of prose rhythm (179–203). More precisely, Cicero is considering the question, which rhythms are best suited to well-knit prose (191–8). We are told that some persons favor an iambic rhythm, because it is close to ordinary speech; Ephorus, however uses the paeon and the dactyl, for the number of short syllables causes the words to glide with

⁵¹³ If the words μηδενὸς ἄξια are identified as dactyls, then a diaeresis occurs between ἄξια and φιλοσοφούντων. However, the diaeresis does not coincide with a natural pause, so that it will only weakly mark the introduction of a new foot, i.e., a fourth paeon.

⁵¹⁴ For further discussion of the middle, see the commentary on **702**, above, p. 328–9.

greater ease (191). Cicero expresses disagreement (192 *ad init.*) and goes on to explain his own position. That is the beginning of text **704**. Cicero first criticizes those who pass over the paeon (lines 1–2). There follows a summary of Aristotle’s position, including rejection of dactylic and iambic rhythms and approval of those that are paeonic (lines 2–12). Cicero then says that the persons of whom he has already spoken take account only of convenience, for the iamb and the dactyl are best suited to verse. In contrast, the paeon, is least adapted to verse, and for that reason it is more acceptable in prose (lines 12–18). In lines not printed in the text–translation volumes, Cicero faults Ephorus for failing to understand that the spondee is the metrical equivalent of the dactyl, and that the tribrach is the equivalent of the iamb. Finally, we are told that Theophrastus and Theodectes agree with Aristotle concerning the paeon (lines 18–19).

The flow of thought is remarkably choppy. The persons who pass over the paeon (line 1) can only be those who favor the iamb, for Ephorus is said to have used the paeon. The immediate introduction of Aristotle (line 2) may be explained by his rejection of the iamb, but what Cicero actually says about Aristotle includes much more than that rejection. It has the appearance of being a summary of *Rhetoric* 3.8 1408b32–1409a5, and as such it interrupts the argument. When Cicero returns to those with whom he has an announced disagreement, he mentions both the iamb and the dactyl (lines 12–14). Cicero may be influenced by the preceding summary in which both heroic (dactylic) and iambic rhythms are rejected (lines 3–4); but whatever the motivation, Cicero must be seen as referring not only to those who favor the iamb but also to Ephorus, for it is he who has been said to use the dactyl (sec. 191).⁵¹⁵ The subsequent criticism of Ephorus (omitted in line 18) picks up the earlier statement that Ephorus is at fault (*in culpa est*, sec. 192 *ad init.*), and what follows the criticism takes us back to the summary of Aristotle. Cicero speaks of “these things, which are found in Aristotle,” *haec quae sunt apud Aristotelen* (lines 18–19), and reports that Theophrastus and Theodectes say the same things about the paeon (line 19). In adding a reference to Theophrastus and Theodectes, Cicero appears to be multiplying authorities, in order to amplify the contrast with his own view, which is immediately introduced: namely, that a mixture

⁵¹⁵ Note 4 to the translation of **704** now seems to me faulty, for it speaks only of “persons who think the iamb most suited to prose.” Ephorus should be mentioned as well.

of rhythms is preferable (195–6, not printed). In any case, when Cicero completes the presentation of his own view, he ignores Theophrastus and Theodectes. He allows that the paeon may be the primary measure, for that accords with the judgment of the highest authority, *optimus auctor*, but other rhythms which are passed over by that authority should be included in the mix (sec. 196). The highest authority is Aristotle.

The statement of Aristotle's views on prose rhythm (lines 2–12) is clearly based on *Rhetoric* 3.8. It avoids some of the errors that mar the report found in the earlier work *On the Orator* (3.182), but it is not devoid of error. Cicero misunderstands what Aristotle says about the trochee (1408b36–1409a1), and he expands upon or simply misreports Aristotle's statement that persons beginning with Thrasymachus used the paeon (3.8 1409a2–3).⁵¹⁶ That may serve as a reminder that although Cicero is an important source, his reports must be weighed with care.

In conclusion, we can say that text **704** provides very little information concerning Theophrastus. We are told that he agreed with Aristotle in what he says about the paeon,⁵¹⁷ and we can assume with some confidence that his remarks were made in the work *On Style* (**666** no. 17a).

6. Athenian Orators

In democratic Athens, oratory flourished. Matters of great weight were decided in the assembly and trials before large juries were common, so that persons skilled in speaking could both control policy and defend themselves in court. The reader of Thucydides is familiar with the speeches that the historian puts into the mouth of Pericles, the most powerful of the Athenians both as speaker and as man of action (1.139.4).⁵¹⁸ We read his speech in favor of war, his funeral

⁵¹⁶ See "Sources" on Cicero p. 12.

⁵¹⁷ Nothing said in **704** suggests that the errors in Cicero's summary of *Rhetoric* 3.8 are in some way dependent upon his reading of Theophrastus' work *On Style*.

⁵¹⁸ The description of Pericles is reminiscent of Homer's *Iliad* 9.443, where Phoenix says that he has been sent to Troy by Peleus in order to instruct Achilles in speech and deeds. It hardly needs saying that the importance of oratory in Greek life did not begin with the rise of democracy in Athens. Indeed, its importance is already clear in the *Iliad*, in which the leaders debate issues in council and the larger host is addressed by its leader.

oration eulogizing those who died in the first year of the war and his response to criticism after the Spartans' second invasion of Attica (1.140–4, 2.35–46, 60–4). Also well-known are the opposed speeches of Cleon and Diodotus, who debated whether to put all adult male Mytileneans to death in the fifth year of the war (3.37–48). Noteworthy too is the defense made by Antiphon, a successful speechwriter (*logographos*), who was prosecuted for his role in dismantling the Athenian democracy and replacing it with the rule of four hundred men. Except for a fragment, Antiphon's speech does not survive, but Thucydides describes it as the best defense ever made by a man on trial for this life (8.68.1).⁵¹⁹ In the post war period, oratory continued to be an important part of civic life, and in the judgment of many scholars, both ancient and modern, it reached its acme in the speeches of Demosthenes (384–322 B.C.). He first engaged in judicial oratory in order to recover what he could of his lost inheritance. Success in this endeavor led to a career as a speechwriter.⁵²⁰ But he is most famous for his opposition to the dominance of Macedon over the Greek city states and over Athens in particular. That opposition prompted him to deliver the *Philippics* and the *Olynthiacs*, and ultimately resulted in condemnation, flight and suicide.

Given the importance of oratory within Athens and the emergence of individuals who gained recognition as effective speechwriters and persuasive orators, it is hardly surprising that a canon of preferred orators and speechwriters was established and that special treatises were devoted to the individuals included in the canon. When the canon was established is uncertain, but it was not early in the Hellenistic period. It may have been as late as the first century B.C.⁵²¹ In any case, it was only in the late first century that essays were written on individual orators and speechwriters.⁵²² That does not mean, however, that earlier teachers of rhetoric including the

⁵¹⁹ In fact, this best ever defense failed and Antiphon was put to death. Such a failure makes clear why Aristotle defined rhetoric as the capacity to consider the possible means of persuasion in each case (*Rhetoric* 1.2 1355b25–6).

⁵²⁰ Kennedy (1963) p. 206–7.

⁵²¹ The canon may have been established by Apollodorus of Pergamum (so Fowler in the Loeb edition p. 342) or by Caecilius of Calacte (Kennedy [1963] p. 125) or by someone else.

⁵²² Dionysius of Halicarnassus wrote six essays on the orators and speechwriters whom he deemed most elegant. Two of the essays have not survived. Dionysius hesitatingly claims originality (*On the Ancient Orators* 4), and his claim appears to be justified.

Peripatetics ignored actual practice. To be sure, Aristotle often cites poets when he might have drawn his examples from oratory, but he does cite speeches as well and may have supplemented his teaching with a collection of paradigm orations.⁵²³ His indifference to Demosthenes, who was active in Athens during Aristotle's headship of the Peripatos, has caused much discussion. The orator is cited only once for a simile concerning the Athenian people (3.4 1407a5–6).⁵²⁴ His name does occur a second time, but it is in reference to an argument of Demades against Demosthenes (2.24 1401b32–4).⁵²⁵ Such indifference to the orator may reflect Aristotle's own pro-Macedonian leanings as well as the fact that some of Demosthenes' speeches had not yet been published⁵²⁶ and that Demosthenes had not yet become the most highly rated of all orators (see the commentary on **706**). Whatever the correct explanation may be, Aristotle's indifference to a single orator does not prove a general disinterest in the actual speeches of fourth-century orators.

705 Plutarch, *Alcibiades* 10.3 (*BT* vol. 1.2 p. 235.27–236.3 Ziegler)

Literature: Heylbut (1876) p. 11–12; Mayer (1907–10) p. 495–7, (1910) p. 35–7; Mittelhaus (1911) p. 38–9; Drerup (1923) p. 90–1; Grube (1952a) p. 182; Mirhady (1992) p. 279–81

Text **705** is taken from the tenth chapter of Plutarch's *Life of Alcibiades*. After reporting Alcibiades' first entry into public life (an unplanned contribution of money, 10.1), Plutarch tells us that doors were opened for him by his birth, wealth, bravery and friends. Next we are told that Alcibiades thought it most important to gain influence with the people through the charm of his speech. As witnesses to Alcibiades' ability as a speaker, Plutarch refers to the comic poets

⁵²³ Diels p. 5–6, Lossau p. 24.

⁵²⁴ Some scholars hold that the Demosthenes named at 1407a5 is not the great orator but a fifth-century general who died in the Sicilian disaster. See, e.g., A. Wartelle in the Budè edition (1973) vol. 3 p. 105 n. 6.

⁵²⁵ Despite Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *First Letter to Ammaeus* 12, the Demosthenes referred to at 2.23 1397b7–9 seems not to be the famous orator.

⁵²⁶ After Demosthenes' death, his speeches were published by his nephew Demochares, but scholars hold that at least some speeches were already published during the orator's lifetime. See Drerup p. 83, who refers to his earlier work "Antike Demosthenesausgaben," *Philologisches Supplement* 7 (1899) p. 549–50, and Lossau p. 27.

and to Demosthenes (10.2).⁵²⁷ At this point, text **705** begins. Naming Theophrastus as his source, Plutarch tells us that Alcibiades was most capable at discovering (εὐρεῖν) what needed to be said. Moreover, Alcibiades sought not only to say what was necessary (ἃ δεῖ) but also to say it in the right way (ὡς δεῖ). In regard to the latter, Alcibiades was not well-supplied with words and phrases,⁵²⁸ so that he often stumbled and became silent, when an expression (λέξις) eluded him. From a rhetorical point of view, there is nothing here that comes as a surprise. The distinction between what must be said and how to say it (ἃ δεῖ and ὡς δεῖ) is clearly present in Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3.1 1403b16). Commenting on a particular orator occurs elsewhere (**706**), and the focus on expression (λέξις) seems appropriate in the case of Theophrastus.

In the eighth chapter of the work entitled *Precepts of Statecraft*, Plutarch presents a similar picture of Alcibiades. In the text-translation volume this passage was treated as a parallel text and therefore relegated to the apparatus. That may be unfortunate, for the context is different and perhaps points more clearly to the context in which Theophrastus referred to Alcibiades. At the beginning of chapter 8, Plutarch tells us that the statesman should use speech that has been thought out and is not empty. Pericles is cited as someone who prayed that no word foreign to the matter at hand might occur to him (803F). After that Plutarch takes account of the fact that in politics there are sudden occasions that demand nimbleness on the part of an orator. It is for this reason that Demosthenes was inferior to many: contrary to the demands of the situation, he would hesitate and draw back (803F–804A). At this point, Plutarch refers to Alcibiades. Citing Theophrastus as his source, he tells us that Alcibiades considered not only what must be said (ἃ δεῖ) but also the right way in which to say it (ὡς δεῖ). Often while speaking, Alcibiades found himself searching for and arranging expressions (λέξεις), so that he would hesitate and fall flat (804A). There are clear similarities in wording to **705**,⁵²⁹ but more interesting is the idea of responding to sudden

⁵²⁷ No comic poets are named. Demosthenes' speech *Against Meidias* is named. See section 145.

⁵²⁸ Cf. Cicero, *On the Orator* 2.93, where Alcibiades is listed alongside Pericles and Thucydides, all of whom are characterized as wealthier in ideas than words. In citing this passage, I am not suggesting that Cicero, like Plutarch, is drawing on Theophrastus.

⁵²⁹ In addition to ἃ δεῖ, ὡς δεῖ and λέξις, the words πολλάκις and ζητεῖν occur in both texts.

situations. For that may reflect the original context in Theophrastus.⁵³⁰ Picking up an idea well-known through the writing of Alcidas,⁵³¹ Theophrastus may have emphasized the importance of dealing with the immediate situation promptly and correctly. In this context, Alcibiades may have been cited as a negative example: someone who was not quick to find the right expression and accordingly was prone to lapse into silence.

In the ninth chapter of Plutarch's work on *Progress in Virtue*, the same picture of Alcibiades is presented. Plutarch tells us that in speaking we can test ourselves, seeing whether we do not retreat on account of cowardice before an unexpectedly large crowd, are not dispirited when the numbers are small, and do not miss the critical moment because of a lack of preparation in expression (λέξις). At this point, Demosthenes and Alcibiades are named by way of example, and the difficulties experienced by Alcibiades are spelled out. He is said to have been especially skilled in grasping the subject matter but rather lacking in confidence in regard to expression (λέξις). Often while searching for a word or phrase that eluded him, he fell flat (80D). This time Theophrastus is not cited as a source, but similarities in vocabulary are again obvious,⁵³² and as in the passage in *Precepts of Statecraft*, so here in *Progress in Virtue*, the context is that of meeting the immediate situation. It certainly has not been proven, but it is an attractive possibility that the original Theophrastean context was the same.

The opening words of **705**, "And if we trust Theophrastus," occurring as they do out of context, may give the impression that Plutarch has some doubts concerning the reliability of Theophrastus.⁵³³ Such an impression would be wrong. Quite apart from the fact that Plutarch cites Theophrastus in *Precepts of Statecraft* without any such if-clause, the context in the *Life of Alcibiades* seems to explain the if-clause. Prior to **705**, Plutarch has told us that

⁵³⁰ Cf. Grube (1952a) 182.

⁵³¹ I.e., through Alcidas' work *On Sophists*.

⁵³² In addition to λέξις, *Progress in Virtue* 80D shares νοεῖν, ζητεῖν, ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα, πολλάκις and διαφεύγειν in common with **705**. The use of ἐκπίπτειν in 80D may be compared with διαπίπτειν in *Precepts of Statecraft* 804A. Interestingly, the verb ἐκπίπτειν is also found in **32A.2**, where Theophrastus is said to have broken down while speaking before the council of the Areopagus. If **32B.4–5** is a fair guide, Theophrastus did not falter because he failed to find the right expression. Rather, he lacked knowledge as a result of being inexperienced.

⁵³³ Almost certainly Plutarch is drawing directly on a work of Theophrastus and not indirectly on him through an intermediary as in **706**.

Alcibiades wished to be influential through the charm (χάρις) of his speech and that Alcibiades was a capable (δύνατος) speaker. It comes, therefore, as something of a surprise to learn that he had difficulties with expression (λέξις). A capable orator concerned to speak in a charming manner ought to be a master of expression. Perhaps recognizing the oddity, Plutarch introduces Theophrastus with an if-clause — “if we trust Theophrastus” — that is more stylistic than substantive. Plutarch does not doubt Theophrastus’ report (the description of Theophrastus as fond of listening and well informed confirms that), and if the above argument is correct, Theophrastus will have explained Alcibiades’ difficulties in terms of sudden situations. Given time to prepare, Alcibiades was a capable speaker whose expression was marked by charm. But there were enough failures in unexpected situations, for Theophrastus to say that Alcibiades often tripped up.

The occurrence of the verb εὔρεῖν in line 2 of **705** calls to mind the title Περί εὐρήσεως (**666** no. 4) and may be some evidence for construing the title in terms of rhetorical invention, but the evidence is at best weak. Not only does Aristotle use the verb without using the cognate noun as a *terminus technicus* for rhetorical invention, but also the occurrence of the verb in **705** may be attributable to Plutarch. Certain words and phrases, like λέξις, ἃ δεῖ and ὥς δεῖ, were most likely used by Theophrastus, but the fact that εὔρεῖν (εὐρίσκειν) is not repeated in any of the parallel texts may indicate that it was introduced by Plutarch when writing the *Life of Alcibiades*.⁵³⁴

According to Plutarch, Alcibiades wished to be influential through the charm, χάρις, of his speech (*Life* 10.2). It is tempting to connect this report with Theophrastus’ work Περί χάριτος (**436** no. 24) and to argue that the work was focused on rhetorical style. Such a move would be, I think, unjustified, for the mention of χάρις does not occur within the section introduced by the reference to Theophrastus (10.3 = **705**). On what may have been the orientation of Περί χάριτος, see the discussion above under “Titles of Books.”

Plutarch’s report concerning Alcibiades occurs in three different places, and in each the mention of expression, λέξις, stands out. That suggests that Plutarch is drawing on the Theophrastean work Περί

⁵³⁴ Words that recur in either *Progress in Virtue* or *Precepts of Statecraft* (see notes 529 and 532) may owe their recurrence to the fact that they are present in the original Theophrastean text. But there is no certainty here.

λέξεως (666 no. 17a), but there is another possibility. In the *Precepts of Statecraft*, Plutarch mentions crises that arise quickly, ὅξεις οἱ καιροί, and tells us that Demosthenes hesitated against the demands of the moment, παρὰ τὸν καιρόν (804A). In *Progress in Virtue*, Plutarch speaks of missing the critical moment, the καιρός, on account of a lack of preparation in expression (80D). If it is correct that the same interest in responding to sudden and demanding situations governs the Theophrastean fragment in its original context, then it may be that Plutarch is drawing on the treatise *Politics regarding Crises* or simply *Regarding Crises*, Πρὸς τοὺς καιρούς (589 no. 4a and b). Plutarch is said to have written a work on that treatise (see the Lamprias catalogue of Plutarch's works, no. 53), and Mittelhaus has argued that Plutarch used Theophrastus' work *Regarding Crises* when he composed *Precepts of Statecraft*.⁵³⁵ Perhaps, then, all three Plutarchean texts, not only *Precepts on Statecraft* 804A but also 705 and *Progress in Virtue* 80D, are based on *Regarding Crises*. The fact that Plutarch never cites by title a rhetorical work of Theophrastus may be thought to support *Regarding Crises* as the common source, but arguments from silence may be misleading. In any case, there is room for doubt,⁵³⁶ and Theophrastus may have referred to Alcibiades' limitations as a speaker in both Περὶ λέξεως and Πρὸς τοὺς καιρούς.⁵³⁷

⁵³⁵ Mittelhaus p. 29–55; see also Heylbut p. 12 and Mirhady (1992) p. 277–85.

⁵³⁶ Much of what Mittelhaus has to say about *Precepts on Statecraft* 804A is sound, but I find it difficult to agree with him when he says that 804A is not about expression (περὶ λέξεως); rather, it concerns the importance for governance of being able to speak extemporaneously (p. 39). On my reading of the text, Mittelhaus has created a false opposition. Plutarch holds both that the effective politician must be able to speak extemporaneously and that effectiveness in extemporaneous speech requires being able to find the right expressions in a timely manner. We are not offered a positive example; Demosthenes and Alcibiades are introduced as negative examples. In addition, I have reservations concerning Mittelhaus' claim that the remarks on Demosthenes are from the same Theophrastean work as those on Alcibiades. In *Precepts on Statecraft* 804A, the example of Demosthenes is treated as general knowledge: ὥς φασι, "as they say." In contrast, the example of Alcibiades is introduced by an explicit reference to Theophrastus. That suggests to me that Theophrastus becomes the source only when Plutarch introduces Alcibiades. In *Progress in Virtue* 80D, the example of Demosthenes is again referred to as general knowledge: λέγουσι, "(as) they say." The subsequent mention of Alcibiades may depend upon λέγουσι, but something may have been lost from the Greek text.

⁵³⁷ Mirhady (1992) p. 281.

706 Plutarch, *Demosthenes* 10.2–3 (*BT* vol. 1.2 p. 289.15–24 Ziegler)

Literature: Heylbut (1884) p. 158–9; Mayer (1907–10) p. 495–6, (1910) p. 35 n. 1, 37; Mittelhaus (1911) p. 38–41; Drerup (1923) p. 89–91; Solmsen (1931) p. 264; Voit (1934) p. 80; Grube (1952a) p. 182, (1961) p. 42, 54–5, (1965) p. 108; Lossau (1964) p. 28, 52; Innes (1995) p. 315

In chapters 8–9 of the *Life of Demosthenes*, Plutarch considers whether the famous orator, lacking natural talent (οὐκ εὐφυῆς ὢν), succeeded through toilsome preparation (8.2). We are told that Demosthenes rarely spoke when a crisis arose (ἐπὶ καιροῦ). Called upon by name in the assembly, he would not come forward unless he had already prepared himself to speak (8.3). Demosthenes' lack of boldness in the face of a crisis (πρὸς καιρόν) differentiated him from Demades. While the latter often supported Demosthenes on the spur of the moment, Demosthenes did not return the service (8.5). Plutarch does offer some evidence suggesting that Demosthenes could speak effectively in sudden situations (9.1–2, 4–5), but in the course of presenting this evidence, Plutarch tells us that Demosthenes imitated Pericles' refusal to speak quickly and in response to whatever subject might present itself (9.3). At the beginning of chapter 10, Plutarch returns to Demades. All men, we are told, used to agree that Demades' natural talent (τῇ φύσει χρώμενον) made him unbeatable, and that speaking off the cuff he surpassed the preparations of Demosthenes (10.1). At this point, text **706** begins. Plutarch cites Aristo of Chios as his source and reports Theophrastus' characterization of Demosthenes and Demades: the former is worthy of the city, and the latter is superior to the city (lines 1–4). There follows another report drawn from the same philosopher, i.e., Aristo.⁵³⁸ Polyeuctus is said to have declared Demosthenes the greatest orator, but Phocion the most capable in speaking, for he conveyed the most information in the fewest words (lines 4–7).

Mayer and Mittelhaus propose emending the opening reference to Aristo of Chios, so that it becomes a reference to Aristo of Ceus, i.e., instead of Χῖος read Κεῖος.⁵³⁹ The proposed change has some appeal. Aristo of Chios was a Stoic, while Aristo of Ceos was a Peripatetic, who probably succeeded Lyco as head of the School (c. 225

⁵³⁸ On the variant reading Θεόφραστος, see below.

⁵³⁹ Mayer (1907–10) p. 496 n. 21, (1910) p. 35 n. 1, 37 and Mittelhaus p. 41.

B.C.). He is thought to have written biographies of the early leaders of the School,⁵⁴⁰ and a work *Πρὸς τοὺς ῥήτορας* may be his.⁵⁴¹ Taken together these considerations suggest that Aristo of Ceos could have reported Theophrastus' judgment concerning Demosthenes and Demades, but they fall far short of proving that the report does in fact derive from the Cean. Chronologically, there is no reason to reject the Chian (*fl.* c. 250 B.C.), and the work *Πρὸς τοὺς ῥήτορας* may be his and not the Cean's.⁵⁴² Moreover, the manuscripts of the *Life of Demosthenes* are united in attributing the report concerning Theophrastus to the Chian. We have therefore followed the editors of the *Life* and read *Χῖος*.

At the end of Hellenistic period, Demosthenes had come to enjoy a preeminent position. In the *Brutus*, Cicero describes him as the perfect orator (35), and in the *Orator*, Cicero offers a similar judgment (23). Earlier, however, Demosthenes was not regarded with such awe. Demetrius Rhetor cites him only in regard to the forceful style and does not make him the sole representative of that style.⁵⁴³ Aristotle does not assign special importance to Demosthenes, and in 706, Theophrastus rates him below Demades: Demosthenes may be "worthy of the city," but Demades is "superior to the city" (lines 3–4). If we ask why Theophrastus gave Demades a higher rating, an answer is given in what immediately precedes our text. Demades, we are told, exercised his natural talent (*φύσις*) in a way that made him invincible,⁵⁴⁴ and speaking on the spur of the moment, he excelled the preparations of Demosthenes (10.1), who was thought to lack natural talent and to depend on preparation (8.2). Demades' natural talent will have enabled him not only to grasp what needed to be said but also to choose appropriate words and to arrange them effectively. In particular, he was able to see similarities and therefore to make

⁵⁴⁰ The Peripatetic wills recorded by Diogenes Laertius are likely to have been part of or supplemental to the biographies. See Diogenes' *Life of Strato* 5.64.

⁵⁴¹ In the *Life of Aristo (of Chios)*, Diogenes Laertius lists the Stoic's works including *Πρὸς τοὺς ῥήτορας*, but at the end of the list, Diogenes adds, "Panaetius and Sosicrates say that only the epistles are his (i.e., the Chians), and that the others belong to the Peripatetic Aristo" (7.163).

⁵⁴² See the preceding note. For some balanced reflections on the issue, see Drerup (1923) p. 89 n. 5.

⁵⁴³ Innes (1995) p. 315; cf. Solmsen (1931) p. 264.

⁵⁴⁴ Demades' success as an orator may have been largely due to natural talent. It was said that he never studied rhetoric, though Quintilian expressed doubts (*Oratorical Education* 2.17.12).

comparisons and to introduce metaphors.⁵⁴⁵ Demetrius Rhetor attributes to Demades several forceful sayings, among which is the following: “Macedonian power having lost Alexander is like the Cyclops having been blinded” (*On Style* 284). The comparison can be viewed as a four-term analogy: As the power of Macedon relates to the loss of Alexander, so the power of the Cyclops relates to the loss of his eye.⁵⁴⁶ Different is the saying concerning Alexander’s alleged death: “Alexander is not dead, men of Athens, for the inhabited world would have smelled his corpse” (283). Here we have metaphor within a condensed hypothetical syllogism. Spelled out the syllogism would run: “If Alexander were dead, then the world would smell his corpse; but the world does not smell his corpse; therefore Alexander is not dead.” The metaphor involves using “smelled” for “noticed.” It has special force, for as Demetrius notes, allegory is combined with hyperbole. The ability to produce such striking phrases, extemporaneously as well as with preparation, will have appealed to Theophrastus and been one reason why he rated Demades higher than Demosthenes.

Although Theophrastus rated Demades higher, he does not dismiss Demosthenes. He deems him “worthy of the city.” According to Lossau, this evaluation is indicative of a growing respect for Demosthenes as a principle representative of the λέξις ἀγωνιστική. Departing from Aristotle, who is said to have viewed style as secondary and unimportant in comparison with the enthymeme,⁵⁴⁷ Theophrastus will have upgraded style and focused on Demosthenes as a practitioner of agonistic oratory. I do not want to deny that Theophrastus may have taken a keener interest in Demosthenes than Aristotle, but the evidence for this interest is meager. In our collection of rhetorical texts, Demosthenes’ name occurs in only three texts: **680.2** (the introduction to Demosthenes’ *On behalf of Ctesiphon* is mentioned by way of illustration), **687.8** (the accusative of the orator’s name is an example of euphony) and **706.3, 6** (the text

⁵⁴⁵ On metaphor and natural talent, see Aristotle, *Poetics* 22 1459a6–7 with *Rhetoric* 3.2 1405a9–10.

⁵⁴⁶ We may be reminded of the famous comparison between the fallen youth of Athens and the spring of the year: “The youth were taken from the city, just as if the spring were taken from the year.” Aristotle attributes the comparison to Pericles (*Rhetoric* 1.7 1365a30–3, cf. 3.10 1410b36–1411a4), but the attribution is problematic. See Fortenbaugh (2000b) p. 72 with notes 33–5.

⁵⁴⁷ Lossau p. 41–2.

under consideration).⁵⁴⁸ Moreover, Lossau's fundamental text for claiming a departure from Aristotle is **78**,⁵⁴⁹ which is almost certainly a logical text. It tells us that Theophrastus distinguished two aspects of the statement-making sentence, and in so doing it glances beyond logic to rhetoric and poetics. But it cannot be used to support the claim that Theophrastus shifted the focus in rhetoric from argument to style. (See the commentary on **78**.) We do, of course, have a text, in which Lysias is criticized for being overly keen in regard to antithesis, balanced structures and similarities in sound (**692**),⁵⁵⁰ but how much one can build on this text in regard to Demosthenes is problematic.

Text **706** ends with a report concerning Polyeuctus of Sphettus. He is said to have declared Demosthenes the greatest orator, but Phocian most capable on account of his concise expression (lines 4–7 = 10.3). Heylbut thinks that the report derives from Theophrastus, and he apparently thinks that our text makes that clear.⁵⁵¹ I disagree; the natural way to read our text is that the report concerning Polyeuctus derives from Aristo. The verb *ἰστορεῖ* in line 4 picks up *ἰστόρηκε* in line 1, and both verbs have the same subject: the phrase *ὁ αὐτὸς φιλόσοφος* picks up *Ἀρίστων*, i.e., the Stoic philosopher. There is, of course, a variant reading: *Θεόφραστος* instead of *φιλόσοφος* in line 4 (see the *apparatus criticus*), but the variant is almost certainly a mistaken attempt to explain *φιλόσοφος*.⁵⁵² Heylbut also thinks that the subsequent report — Demosthenes called Phocian the “chopper” of his speeches (10.4, not printed as part of **706**) — derives from Theophrastus. This report concerning Phocian is also found in *Precepts of Statecraft* 7 803E and the *Life of Phocian* 5.4, where no attribution occurs. If we assume that Theophrastean material occurs frequently in *Precepts of Statecraft*,

⁵⁴⁸ The occurrence of Demosthenes' name is not always attributable to Theophrastus. At **687.8**, Demetrius Rhetor uses Demosthenes' name in order to elucidate the pleasant in regard to hearing. At **706.6**, the comparison of Demosthenes and Phocion is attributable to Polyeuctus as reported by Aristo of Chios. If that is correct, we are left with two places, **680.2** and **706.3**, where the occurrence of the name is attributable to Theophrastus.

⁵⁴⁹ Lossau p. 39, 45.

⁵⁵⁰ Lossau p. 50–2.

⁵⁵¹ Heylbut (1884) p. 158–9. Albeit cautious, Drerup, too, (1923) p. 90 construes *ὁ αὐτὸς φιλόσοφος* as a reference to Theophrastus.

⁵⁵² In regard to the source of the report concerning Polyeuctus, I agree with Wimmer, who omits the report from his fr. 144, thereby indicating that it does not derive from Theophrastus.

then we may want to assign the report concerning Phocian to Theophrastus. But the assumption (even if it is reasonable) needs to be tested in each individual case. In regard to Phocian *qua* “chopper,” it seems significant that the *Life of Demosthenes* introduces the report with a vague reference to what men say, φασίιν (10.4). That suggests a shift from Aristo, who is the source for what precedes (10.2–3).⁵⁵³

Theophrastus may have rated Demades above Demosthenes in the work *Regarding Crises*, Πρὸς τοὺς καιρούς (589 no. 4a and b). That is suggested by what immediately precedes. Plutarch says that all men used to agree that Demades, when he spoke on the spur of the moment, surpassed Demosthenes (10.1). In other words, Demades was gifted in responding to the critical moment, the καιρός. Nevertheless, there is reason to hesitate. For it is not entirely clear that 706, i.e., 10.2 is in all respects closely tied to what precedes. 10.1 may be regarded as a conclusion to chapter 9, in which Plutarch first tells us that Demosthenes did not seek the reputation that is won in a crisis, ἐν τῷ καιρῷ (9.2). After that Plutarch complicates the picture by adding evidence that suggests competence in extemporaneous speech (9.3–6). To bring the matter to a close, Plutarch may have chosen to report what all men agree upon: Demades excelled Demosthenes in speaking off the cuff (10.1). Then, having mentioned the two orators, Plutarch may have added (thrown in for good measure) Theophrastus’ assessment of the two (10.2). Here there is no explicit reference to meeting crises, and there may not have been one in the original context.⁵⁵⁴ In what follows, Demosthenes is compared with Phocian, and again there is no reference to crises. Rather we hear about economy of expression, λέξις, and good character (10.3–5). Perhaps one of these themes or an entirely different theme formed the context in which Theophrastus passed judgment on Demosthenes and Demades (10.2). We must, then, allow the possibility that 706 records a comparison that was found in the work Περὶ λέξεως, *On Style* (666 no. 17a). Or perhaps it occurred in both *On Style* and *Precepts of Statecraft*.

⁵⁵³ We may compare the *Life of Phocian* 5.4–6, 9. Here the material found in the *Life of Demosthenes* 10.3–4 is not recorded without break. An additional anecdote (a remark by Phocian at the theater) intervenes in 5.7–9; there is no suggestion of a single source. The reference to Zeno at the beginning of 5.4 is introductory and does not announce the source of the material concerning Phocian that follows in 5.4–9.

⁵⁵⁴ Mittelhaus p. 39.

7. The Orator and the Reading of Poets

The orator will benefit from a careful reading of the poets. This is especially true in regard to λέξις, i.e., style or expression. Poets make use of words and constructions that seldom occur in everyday conversation. Judiciously used in prose, they lift the language of oratory above the ordinary, and in so doing, they convey a pleasing dignity. It is, therefore, no surprise that Aristotle, when discussing expression, makes frequent reference to the poets: e.g., he illustrates lively metaphors by citing a string of Homeric verses (*Rhetoric* 3.11 1411b32–1412a2), and to illustrate *pariosis* and *paromoeosis*, he cites Aristophanes, Homer and other poets (3.9 1410a29–b5). In addition, the benefits of reading poetry go beyond expression. Arguments are presented in poetic form and maxims may function as premises. Aristotle understands that and prepares for his discussion of the enthymeme by discussing the maxim, which he illustrates by citing verses of Euripides (*Rhetoric* 2.21 1394a29–b18). Similarly in presenting an argument, a poet may use a *τόπος* or line of argument that can be carried over to oratory. Aristotle was aware of that and draws on the poets in order to illustrate, e.g., the *τόπος* “from opposites” (2.23 1397a6–19). Even the presentation of character may benefit from reading poetry. Hence in discussing narration, Aristotle cites Sophocles to illustrate how an incredible preference — that of Antigone, who cares more for her brother than her husband and children — can be rendered intelligible by adding an explanation (3.16 1417a27–33).⁵⁵⁵ Again, in regard to reports of emotional response, Aristotle recognizes that poetry is instructive. He cites Homer to show how adding a familiar manifestation such as burying one’s face in one’s hands carries conviction (3.16 1417b3–7).

In the preceding paragraph, I spoke of a judicious use of poetic words and constructions. The word “judicious” is important, for an excessive or poorly timed use of poetic words and constructions can work a negative effect. Aristotle is fully aware of this. He tells us that at first oratorical prose was influenced by the fact that poets, whose thoughts were quite simple, acquired a good reputation through their style. The prose of Gorgias is cited as an example, and we are told

⁵⁵⁵ For the completeness’ sake, I add that poetry may be instructive in regard to persuasion through character, i.e., the orator presenting himself as a credible speaker. As an example, I cite Book 1 of Homer’s *Iliad*, where Nestor is introduced as a man of experience and goodwill, after which he is made to present himself as a man of courage and wisdom (1.250–3, 259–73). See Fortenbaugh (1992) p. 212.

that even in Aristotle's own day most uneducated people believed that the finest prose is poetic in its expression. This belief is firmly rejected. Aristotle tells us that the λέξις of prose is distinct from that of poetry, and he goes on to note that the present writers of tragedy have changed their mode of expression in the direction of everyday discourse. It is therefore laughable, Aristotle concludes, to imitate a poetic style that the poets themselves have abandoned (3.1 1404a24–36).

707 Quintilian, *Oratorical Education* 10.1.27 (OCT vol. 2 p. 572.24–573.4 Winterbottom)

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 50; Volkmann (1885) p. 398 n. 1; Mayer (1910) p. 38 n. 4; Stroux (1912) p. 14 n. 2; Rostagni (1922) p. 109–10, 121–2; Cousin (1935) vol. 1 p. 544, (1975–80) vol. 6 p. 6–10, 275; Kroll (1940) col. 1073; Grube (1952a) p. 175, (1965) p. 105; North (1952) p. 1–33; Dosi (1960) p. 614–5; Kennedy (1963) p. 277; (1969) 103–7; Wehrli (1983) p. 513; Innes (1985) p. 254–5; Manzoni (1990) p. 163–4; Leeman et al. (1981–96) vol. 4 p. 185

After discussing style in Books 8 and 9, Quintilian turns in Book 10 to the benefits of reading (10.1–2), writing (10.3–5) and speaking (10.7). He tells us that becoming a powerful speaker requires not only rules but also a supply of materials and words (10.1.5). He recognizes that these resources can be acquired through both listening and reading, points out the advantages of the latter and emphasizes the importance of selecting good authors (10.1.6–26). It is in this context that our text occurs. Quintilian cites Theophrastus on the importance of reading poets and then develops the theme briefly (10.1.27–30), before going on to the reading of historians and philosophers (10.1.31–6).

According to Quintilian, Theophrastus said that “the reading of poets is of the greatest benefit to an orator,” *plurimum . . . oratori conferre . . . lectionem poetarum* (lines 1–2). By the time of Theophrastus the idea had already gained currency; cf., e.g., Isocrates, *To Nicocles* 48–9 and the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle. The Stagirite does not make the point explicitly, but he certainly makes it implicitly by citing poets on numerous occasions (see above, the introduction to this section).⁵⁵⁶ There is, therefore, no reason to doubt Quintilian's report,

⁵⁵⁶ According to Grube (1965) p. 105, the words of Quintilian “must mean that

but can we say that he is quoting — offering an accurate translation of the words of — Theophrastus? For Rostagni the answer is “yes,” but caution is in order. The verb *conferre* together with the dative is common in Quintilian (e.g., 10.1.63, 71, 95), and the occurrence of the verb here (10.1.27) recalls the earlier statement: *ad quam* (sc. *hexin*) *scribendo plus an legendo an dicendo conferatur solere quaeri scio* (10.1.1).⁵⁵⁷ It seems, therefore, prudent to speak of a report and not to try to decide how closely the words of our text reproduce the original Greek.⁵⁵⁸

Quintilian continues by telling us that many persons followed the judgment of Theophrastus (line 2). While no person is named, it is hard not to think of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who anticipated Quintilian in offering a survey of authors who are worthy of study and imitation — not only poets but also historians, philosophers and orators (*On Imitation* fr. 6.2–5, vol. 2 p. 204.8–214.2 Usener-Radermacher; Quintilian’s survey is found at 10.1.46–72).⁵⁵⁹ In the case of poets, the two surveys are similar. Both begin with Homer and end with Menander, but they are not identical.⁵⁶⁰ One would like to know whether Theophrastus anticipated Dionysius (2, vol. 2 p. 207.4 U-R) and Quintilian (10.1.69–72) in recognizing the value of Menander’s plays for the developing orator. Theophrastus was after all the teacher of Menander (18 no. 12) and will have taken an interest in his comedies. But that only prompts the question; it does not answer it.

What comes next in our text (*namque — in personis decor petitur*, lines 2–4) would be acceptable to Theophrastus, but it is Quintilian who is speaking. The distinction between *res* and *verba*

he (Theophrastus) put greater emphasis on poetry in the education of the orator than is implied in Aristotle.” I see Aristotle’s use of poetic examples as clearly implying the importance of reading poetry, but Theophrastus will have made the point explicitly and therefore with greater emphasis.

⁵⁵⁷ “I know that it is regularly asked whether writing or reading or speaking is of greater benefit in regard to this disposition.”

⁵⁵⁸ That is especially true if Quintilian is following an intermediary. See the end of this comment,

⁵⁵⁹ *Pace* Cousin (1935–6) vol. 1 p. 563 and (1975–80) vol. 6 p. 18, Dionysius does not agree with Quintilian in surveying orators before philosophers. At least the epitome of the work *On Imitation* has philosophers before orators (fr 6.4–5, vol. 2 p. 210.11–213.12 U-R) in contrast to Quintilian who reverses the order (10.1.76–84). The difference in order is correctly reported by P. Steinmetz, “Gattungen und Epochen der griechischen Literatur in der Sicht Quintilians,” *Hermes* 92 (1964) p. 457 n. 6. In the letter *To Pompeius*, Dionysius refers to his survey in *On Imitation* and mentions philosophers before both historians and orators (p. 104.14 Roberts).

⁵⁶⁰ On the relationship between the two, see Cousin (1935–6) vol. 1 p. 563–73 and Kennedy (1969) p. 106–7.

has already been introduced by Quintilian (*copia rerum ac verborum* 10.1.5); moreover, it is too common — not only in the work *Oratorical Education* but also in other rhetorical treatises — to suggest one particular source. The same is true of the pairing of emotion and character. The subsequent reference to fatigue caused by legal activity and the regenerative effect of poetry (beginning with *praecipueque*) is another matter. It recalls Cicero's *Pro Archia* 12: *quaeres a nobis, Grati, cur tanto opere hoc homine delectemur. quia suppeditat nobis ubi et animus ex hoc forensi strepitu reficiatur et aures convicio defessae conquiescant*⁵⁶¹ — as Quintilian himself indicates by naming Cicero.⁵⁶²

In the next section (10.1.28, not printed in the text-translation volumes), we are told that poets are not to be followed in everything: especially in their freedom of language and their license in the use of figures. Rostagni believes that Quintilian is quoting Theophrastus for a second time, even though the name of the Eresian is not repeated. Cousin (1975–80) disagrees, saying simply and, in my judgment, correctly that in all likelihood Quintilian is drawing on the tradition. We might add that he is also drawing on his own experience both as a pleader in the law courts and as a teacher of rhetoric.

If one asks what Theophrastean work stands behind the report, the obvious guess is *On Style*. If one asks whether Quintilian himself had read the work, then a cautious “no” seems in order. Quintilian may well be drawing on an unnamed intermediary.⁵⁶³

⁵⁶¹ “You will inquire of me, Gratus, why I am so greatly attracted by this man (sc. Archias). It is because he enables me to restore my mind after the din of the courts and to quiet my ears fatigued by clamor.”

⁵⁶² In his notes on *Pro Archia* 12, J. Reid cites our entire passage from Quintilian, thereby suggesting that Quintilian may have more from Cicero than the point about recovering from fatigue (*M. Tulli Ciceronis Pro Licinio Archia Poeta oratio ad iudices*, [Cambridge: University Press 1912] p. 46–7). Here caution is in order, for Cicero's remarks in *Pro Archia* 12 are brief. He refers generally to what is said in daily speeches on a variety of subjects (*quod cotidie dicamus in tanta varietate rerum*). That involves a nod at content, but there is no reference to elevated style, emotional appeal or the representation of character. This is not to overlook the fact that the rhetorical works of Cicero contain material concerning the poets. For example, in *On the Orator* Crassus is made to recognize a close relationship between orators and poets (3.27), to say that reading them increases one's command of language (3.39, 48, see the commentary on 684 *ad fin.*) and to mention them when warning against an unbroken style which leads to satiety (3.100). Quintilian certainly knew these passages, but in our text he is drawing on *Pro Archia* 12, where Cicero's remarks are quite limited.

⁵⁶³ Cf. Kennedy (1969) 107 and above, “The Sources” on Quintilian p. 19.

8. Kinds of Poetry

Within the corpus of existing Greek literature, the earliest poems are those of Homer: two epics written in dactylic hexameter that tell the story of Achilles' wrath and Odysseus' return to Ithaca. The poems were revered by the Greeks and fundamental to their education, but for all their importance, the Homeric poems did not deter the development of other kinds of poetry, written in various meters, differing in length and serving diverse purposes: e.g., elegy, iambus, choral lyric, tragedy and comedy. From an early date that will have been clear to even the most ordinary Greek, and by the end of the fifth century educated Greeks may have begun writing about differences in kind.⁵⁶⁴ Be that as it may, writers of the fourth century treat difference in kind as a given. Hence, Plato discusses comedy apart from tragedy and does not hesitate to say what constitutes a true tragedy (*Laws* 7 817B3–5). But his discussions are guided by ethical and political considerations, so that his statement concerning true tragedy is essentially a persuasive definition aimed at changing attitudes toward the tragic genre. Very different is the doctrine set forth by Aristotle in the *Poetics*. Here we get definitions of tragedy and comedy that are largely aesthetic and take seriously actual practice (5 1449a32–4, 6 1449b24–8).⁵⁶⁵ For our purposes, the first three chapters of the *Poetics* are of especial interest. There Aristotle explains poetry in terms of μίμησις, imitation or representation, and sets forth three criteria for marking off different kinds of poetry. First, there are the media in or through which the imitation is presented: namely, harmony, rhythm and speech (1 1447a16–b29). Second, comes the object imitated, i.e., the subject matter: especially the action and the persons who are presented in action (2 1448a1–18). Third, there is the manner of presentation, which includes narration, drama and a mixture of the two (3 1448a19–29). Looking forward to Theophrastus, the media and the object are our special concern. The media not only serve to mark off the different kinds of poetry from the visual

⁵⁶⁴ On thinks, e.g., of Glaucus of Rhegium, who wrote a work *On the Ancient Poets and Musicians*.

⁵⁶⁵ Expressing myself more cautiously, I would describe the definition of comedy (5 1449a32–4) as a preliminary definition that in all probability was expanded upon in the lost second book of the *Poetics*. I have said "largely aesthetic," because the definition of tragedy does take account of a moral or social benefit by mentioning catharsis (6 1449b27–8).

arts⁵⁶⁶ and from each other, but also open the door to counting mime as poetry. For while mimes — at least those of Sophron and Xenarchus, whom Aristotle names (1 1447b10) — were not written in verse, they were mimetic and were presented through speech, albeit speech apart from meter and harmony (τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς 1 1447a29).⁵⁶⁷ In the *Poetics* that survives, i.e., in Book 1, Aristotle does not return to the mime, but he may have done so in the lost second book. According to Athenaeus (*The Sophists at Dinner* 11 505C), he did so in the work *On Poets* (fr. 72 Rose³). As I read the text of Athenaeus, Aristotle is prepared to call the mimes of Sophron imitations (μιμήσεις).⁵⁶⁸ That he took the next step and endorsed calling them poetry is not reported. Theophrastus may have taken that step. He may have focused on the mime, defined it and recognized it as one of four forms of dramatic poetry. (See the commentary on 708.) Also of concern is the object or content, for Aristotle explains difference in content by reference to contemporary standards. Poets represent people in action, but not the same kinds of people. The epic poet Homer is said to present people better than we are, and the tragic poets are said to do the same. In contrast, the comic poets present persons who are worse (2 1448a7–18). Our evidence regarding Theophrastus is meager, but it suggests that he departed from his master at least in regard to comedy. (See the commentary on 708.)

- 708** Diomedes, *The Art of Grammar* 3, Chapter on Poems (*GL* vol. 1 p. 483.27–484.2, 487.11–12, 488.3–5 and 14–23, 491.4–7 and 13–16 Keil)

Literature: Zeller (1879) vol. 2.2 p. 867–8 n. 5; Usener (1892) p. 614–22; Kaibel (1898) p. 49, 55, 66; Reich (1903) vol. 1 p. 263–74; Kayser (1906) p. 29; Rostagni (1922) p. 121–4, 128–34, 142;

⁵⁶⁶ The visual arts are mimetic (1 1447a18–20) and as such need to be marked off from mimetic poetry.

⁵⁶⁷ The text at this point in the *Poetics* is corrupt. I follow Janko (1984) p. 134, who prefers the emendations of S. H. Butcher and argues persuasively (following Fuhrman p. 59–60) that “just as Aristotle could loosely refer to non-mimetic verse as poetry, so too he could include mimetic prose” among the various kinds of poetry. Butcher (*Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art* [London: St. Martins 1897] p. 142–3) is cautious. He holds that the passage in question only suggests widening the use of “poet” to include writers of mimetic prose.

⁵⁶⁸ I accept the manuscript reading καὶ μιμήσεις ἢ τοὺς and not the emendation of Jahn ἢ μὴ μιμήσεις τοὺς, which is printed in the Loeb edition.

McMahon (1917) p. 45–6, (1929) p. 100–4, 126–30; Kroll (1921) col. 1208, 1214, 1270; Dosi (1960) 599–623, 629, 631, 667–71; Webster (1960) p. 179, (1970) p. 114; Giancotti (1967) p. 26–9; Lucas (1968) p. 63–4; Stark (1972) p. 70–1, 92, 176 n. 29; Fuhrmann (1973) p. 59–60, 63–7; Fortenbaugh (1981) p. 257–60; Russell (1981) p. 107; Janko (1984) p. 48–50, 128–35

Text **708** comes from the third book of Diomedes' work *The Art of Grammar* and in particular from the third chapter "On Poems." At the beginning of the chapter, three genera are recognized: the dramatic or mimetic poem, the exegetic or narrative and the common or mixed. For the last Diomedes gives alternative Greek names: κοινόν and μικτόν (p. 482.14–483.6 K). Next four *characteres* of a poem are listed and discussed briefly. In each case a Greek label is used: μακρός, βραχύς, μέσος and ἀνθηρός (p. 483.7–26). Then comes a survey of ten different forms of poetry: epic, elegy, iambus (lampoon), epode, satire, bucolic verse, tragedy, comedy, satyric drama and the mime (p. 483.27–491.19). The several forms are not treated equally (there are marked differences in length of treatment), but in each case the form is defined and the derivation of its name is discussed or at least clearly indicated.⁵⁶⁹ The beginning of text **708** coincides with the start of the survey. Along the way much is omitted.

The text has suffered in transmission, so that Keil has printed supplements in four places. In two of these (lines 12 and 19), it is clear that something has fallen out. The printed supplements, *personae* and *proprium*, are convincing and certainly convey the intended meaning. In the other two places (lines 25 and 26), the need for and choice of supplement is more problematic. The printed supplements, *imitatio et* and *dictorum*, create a readable text and give a good sense, but they also result in alternative Latin definitions separated by *vel*. That has no parallel among the other nine forms of poetry defined by Diomedes.⁵⁷⁰ Perhaps, then, *et* in line 26 should be transposed to line 25 and placed before *motus*, or *et* should be added before *motus* without transposition from line 26. We would then have a

⁵⁶⁹ I have added "or at least clearly indicated," for in the case of satyric drama, the derivation is only implied, but clearly so (p. 491.4–7). In four cases (epic, iambus, epode and mime), a single derivation is offered. In five (elegy, satire, bucolic, tragedy and comedy), more than one derivation is offered.

⁵⁷⁰ Perhaps I should say "no exact parallel," for at the beginning of the discussion of satire Diomedes draws a distinction between what is "now" called satire and what was "once" called satire (p. 485.30, 32).

single definition: *vel* would introduce an alternative within the definition, and *imitatio* would occur only once: that at the end (line 26) would govern the entire definition.⁵⁷¹ More problematic are the remedies proposed for the sentence *deinde quod — in peius adgnitio* (lines 13–15). The conjecture of Busch (in Keil's *apparatus*) and that of Leo (whose text and apparatus are printed by Kaibel, *CGF* vol. 1 p. 58) involve considerable addition to the text and are properly confined to the *apparatus criticus*. Still we can say with some certainty that the corrupt sentence originally concluded with a reference to the happy outcome that regularly marks the end of a comedy.

After giving a definition of tragedy in Latin, Diomedes reports Theophrastus' definition: τραγωδία ἐστὶν ἡρωϊκῆς τύχης περίστασις, "tragedy is a crisis of heroic fortune" (lines 6–7). The exact meaning of περίστασις is uncertain. In the text-translation volumes, we have chosen to translate with "crisis" and to suggest in footnote 2 that "shift" or "reversal" is also possible. In support of "crisis," I cite the historian Polybius, who uses the word in the sense of circumstances (1.35.10, 4.67.4, 10.21.3) and grave circumstances or crisis (1.82.7, 1.84.9, 4.45.10).⁵⁷² In support of a translation like "shift" or "reversal," I refer to Aristotle's *Meteorology* and the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problems*, where περίστασις is used of a shift in the direction of the wind (*Met.* 2.6 364b14, *Probl.* 26.26 942b27).⁵⁷³ Additional support may be found in Diomedes' brief account of the differences between tragedy and comedy, for there we are told that in tragedy joyful matters frequently have a grievous outcome (lines 13–14). That is, of course, correct, but caution is in order, for it is not clear that Diomedes' observation is intended to determine the precise meaning of περίστασις as it occurs in the Theophrastean definition.⁵⁷⁴

Aristotle's definition of tragedy set forth in *Poetics* 6 runs as follows: "tragedy is an imitation of action that is serious and complete and possesses magnitude, in language that is pleasant with each of its elements occurring separately in the parts of the play, being acted and not narrated, accomplishing through pity and fear the

⁵⁷¹ See Giancotti p. 27.

⁵⁷² Russell (1981) p. 107 translates the definition of tragedy with "the circumstances of heroic fortune." Cf. Porphyry, *On Abstinence from Eating Animals* 9.1 = **584A.86**. Dossi p. 602 suggests "la vicenda catastrophica di un destino eroico."

⁵⁷³ Webster (1960) p. 179 translates "a reversal of heroic prosperity."

⁵⁷⁴ To be sure, the phrase τύχης περίστασις recurs in line 16, where tragedy is contrasted with comedy. But the contrast does not depend on περίστασις meaning "reversal" rather than "crisis." Either meaning will do. On lines 15–20, see below.

catharsis of such emotions" (1449b24–8). Not only is the Aristotelian definition much longer than that of Theophrastus, but it also has little or nothing in common with the Theophrastean definition. Aristotle makes no explicit reference to heroic fortune;⁵⁷⁵ nor does he refer to a shift or reversal of fortune, if in fact that is the idea behind Theophrastus' use of *περίστασις*. These differences are striking, but they may not be of great significance. For there is little reason to think that the definition reported by Diomedes represents Theophrastus' considered — fully stated — opinion concerning the essence of tragedy.⁵⁷⁶ The Eresian almost certainly embraced the idea of tragedy working a catharsis of the emotions,⁵⁷⁷ and he will not have ignored the importance of an embellished language that conveys pleasure.⁵⁷⁸ Indeed, a definition may be given for a particular purpose in a particular context and therefore omit material that belongs to a full definition. An example is provided by Aristotle's *On Soul* 1.1, where two quite different definitions of anger are set forth. One is assigned to the student of nature and the other to the dialectician (403a29–b1).⁵⁷⁹ Moreover, a definition in a particular context may contain material that is appropriate only in that context. An example is Aristotle's definition of the emotions in *Rhetoric* 2.1. There effecting a change in judgment is presented as the primary feature of emotional response (1378a19–20), but that is true only in a rhetorical context. Indeed, in another context, causing a change in judgment

⁵⁷⁵ It might be argued that the mention of the "serious" in the Aristotelian definition opens the door to the "heroic" in Theophrastus' definition. That may be the case, but what counts as serious action is hardly limited to a crisis or reversal of heroic fortune. Cf. Lucas p. 63–4.

⁵⁷⁶ Cf. Zeller p. 867–8 n. 5.

⁵⁷⁷ Theophrastus is likely to have connected comedy with a catharsis of laughter (see the commentary on 709), and he will have followed Aristotle in connecting tragedy with a catharsis of pity and fear and similar emotions. Cf. the *Tractatus Coislinianus* 2–3 p. 50 Kaibel = III–IV p. 22 & 24 Janko, where both tragedy and comedy are said to work a catharsis.

⁵⁷⁸ Theophrastus wrote two works *On Poetics* (666 no. 20 and 21), in which he is likely to have discussed the importance of embellished language. Although Theophrastus' work *On Style* (666 no. 17a) is most often discussed in relation to rhetoric, we cannot rule out some discussion of expression in tragedy and other kinds of poetry.

⁵⁷⁹ The definition assigned by Aristotle to the student of nature runs as follows: "a boiling of the blood and hot matter in the region of the heart." The definition assigned to the dialectician runs: "a desire for revenge." Theophrastus' physiological treatise *On Sweat* is instructive. There (36.230–1 Fortenbaugh) Theophrastus makes use of the definition of anger that Aristotle refers to the student of nature, but he certainly does not want to say that a boiling of blood and hot matter is all there is to anger (see Fortenbaugh [1985b] p. 210–11). Aristotle would agree (403b8–9).

might be regarded as a frequent but nonessential concomitant of emotional response.

Since Diomedes gives no indication of the Theophrastean context, we can only guess why the reported definition mentions only a crisis or shift of heroic fortune. One possibility is suggested by the definitions of epic and comedy that Diomedes reports before and after the Theophrastean definition of tragedy. The definition of epic mentions divine, heroic and human affairs (lines 3–4), while that of comedy refers to private affairs. As we have seen, the definition of tragedy speaks of the heroic. Perhaps, then, the definition of tragedy is taken from a context in which Theophrastus' focus was on the kinds of character or social class that are fundamental to epic, tragedy and comedy. A different possibility depends on construing *περίστας* as a shift or reversal in fortune. In the *Poetics*, Aristotle focuses on reversal under the label *περιπέτεια*. He tells us that reversal is one of the two most powerful elements of attraction in tragedy (6 1450a33–5), and he discusses it together with recognition, which is the other most powerful element (10–11 1452a12–b13). Nevertheless, Aristotle makes no mention of reversal (under any label) in the formal definition of tragedy. That is not a failing, for Aristotle does not think that all tragedies involve reversal. There are simple plots that lack reversal as well as complex ones involving reversal (10 1452a14–18). Theophrastus will have accepted that, but in a special context in which reversal was under consideration, he may have chosen to emphasize its importance by defining tragedy in terms of a shift of fortune. He would be doing what Aristotle did in the *Rhetoric* when he defined the emotions in terms of a change in judgment.⁵⁸⁰

In the preceding paragraph, I referred to the definitions of epic and comedy in order to support a guess concerning the context in which the Theophrastean definition of tragedy may have occurred. That reference to other definitions introduces a new problem: namely, how the definitions of epic, tragedy and comedy relate to each other. More specifically, can all three be attributed to Theophrastus or only that which is explicitly said to be his? Most

⁵⁸⁰ There are, of course, other interpretations of Theophrastus' definition of tragedy. See, e.g., Reich vol. 1 p. 267, who regards the definition as a popularization of Aristotle's teaching, and McMahon (1917) p. 45–6, who suggests that the definition may have been a popularization that was originally put forward by Aristotle in his work *On Poets*.

scholars seem to accept a Theophrastean origin for all three,⁵⁸¹ and elsewhere I have accepted their judgment, at least in regard to comedy.⁵⁸² Nevertheless, there are reasons for hesitation. I offer three. First, Diomedes does not on the whole name Greek sources. He begins the chapter “On Poems,” by referring vaguely to Greeks (p. 482.15, 16, 17, 27 K), and he is equally vague when introducing the definitions of epic and comedy: “by the Greeks” (p. 484.1 = line 2) and “among the Greeks” (p. 488.4 = line 9). In contrast, Diomedes refers the definition of tragedy to a particular Greek: namely, Theophrastus. That makes the definition of tragedy exceptional, which in turn encourages restricting Theophrastean authorship to that definition.⁵⁸³ Second, the definitions of epic, tragedy and comedy do not occur together in the text of Diomedes. In Keil’s edition, the definition of epic occurs 103 lines before that of tragedy, and the definition of comedy occurs 21 lines after that of tragedy. The distances are considerable, and much that occurs in between is not attributable to Theophrastus. That is obvious in the case of references to Romans and to Greeks who lived after Theophrastus, but it is also true in regard to the derivations that Diomedes reports. For example, we are told that “epic gets its name, as the Greeks agree, from the fact that in an epic the first parts are followed by those that come next”: *epos appellatur, ut Graecis placet, παρὰ τὸ ἔπεσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ ἔξῃς μέρη τοῖς πρώτοις* (p. 484.7–8). Such a derivation can hardly be attributed to Theophrastus, and yet it is introduced by the same vague reference to Greeks as is the definition of epic, which occurs six lines above. Quite different is what we find in regard to tragedy. Immediately after giving the Theophrastean definition, Diomedes presents a plausible derivation of “tragedy” from *τράγος* and *ᾠδή*: *tragoedia, ut quidam, a τράγω et ᾠδῇ dicta est* (p. 487.12–13). Presumably (but not necessarily) the persons referred to by *quidam*, “certain persons,” are Greeks, but we do not know who they

⁵⁸¹ E.g., Reich vol. 1 p. 265, Rostagni p. 128, Dosi p. 600, 620, Janko (1984) p. 48–9. Usener (1892) p. 621 expresses caution regarding epic.

⁵⁸² Fortenbaugh (1981) p. 258.

⁵⁸³ The idea that naming Theophrastus more than once would serve no purpose (cf. Dosi p. 601: “inutile”) might be a strong consideration, were Theophrastus named in conjunction with the first definition, i.e., that of epic. But as it is, Theophrastus is named in conjunction with the second definition, i.e., that of tragedy (pace Janko [1984] p. 48), and at considerable distance from the first definition (which is my second reason for hesitation).

are, and the introduction of such a vague reference suggests that Theophrastus is no longer Diomedes' source. There is no certainty here; I am only suggesting caution in dealing with Diomedes' references to Greek sources, and that includes his sources for the definitions of epic and comedy.

A third reason for hesitation is found in the wording of the definitions themselves. I am thinking of the fact that the definitions of epic and comedy share a common formula: *περιοχή πραγμάτων* (lines 3–4 and 10 with the words reversed). The formula is not present in the definition of tragedy and that sets the definition of tragedy apart from those of epic and comedy. It is true that the lexicons of Hesychius and Photius *s.v.* *περιοχή* and the *Suda s.v.* *περιοχή* all gloss the Greek noun with *περιπέτεια*, and that encourages seeing a reference to reversal in the definition of comedy.⁵⁸⁴ Theophrastus may have merely varied his terminology, while recognizing the occurrence of reversal in (or the importance of reversal for) comedy as well as tragedy (assuming for the moment that *περίστροφis* means "reversal"). But do we want to say that epic is defined in terms of reversal, or that *περιοχή* is being used in two different senses: "reversal" in the case of comedy, but not in the case of epic? Neither alternative is attractive. Moreover, in all three of the lexicons named above, *περιπέτεια* is followed by *καὶ ὑπόθεσις*. On one reading, the lexicographers have added a second (different) meaning of *περιοχή*,⁵⁸⁵ and that suggests understanding *περιοχή*, as it occurs in the definitions of epic and comedy, as "plot" or "story line." Alternatively, the lexicographers have added a synonym or nearly synonymous word, *ὑπόθεσις*, in order to explain the initial gloss, *περιπέτεια*.⁵⁸⁶ In other words, the lexicographers have not glossed *περιοχή* with *περιπέτεια* in the sense of "reversal." Rather,

⁵⁸⁴ In an earlier article, (1981) p. 258 n. 13, I argued for the German translation "Umschwung." As will become clear, I no longer think the argument decisive. Webster (196) p. 179 offers two translations of the definition of comedy, of which the second is "a change in private affairs involving no disaster." The first is "a formed sequence of private affairs involving no disaster."

⁵⁸⁵ Hence, some editors place a comma or period between *περιπέτεια* and *καὶ ὑπόθεσις*.

⁵⁸⁶ It is clear that *καὶ* is not always used to add a new meaning. An example is provided by the lexicon of Hesychius (the earliest of the three). The sixth entry after *περιοχή* concerns *περίπατοι*. It runs as follows: *περίπατοι· ἱστορίαι καὶ οἱ λόγοι· ἢ τόποι διακινήσεων* (no. 1801, vol. 3 p. 317.26 Schmidt). Here *καὶ* is used to introduce a word that is a near equivalent to that which precedes. (For *περίπατος* meaning "discussion," "discussion," "argument," see LSJ *s.v.* II.2.) To add a second (different) meaning, "or" is used: *ἢ τόποι διακινήσεων*.

περιπέτεια is used synonymously with ὑπόθεσις and refers to “how the drama falls out,”⁵⁸⁷ i.e., to the “plot” or “story.” In *Against the Geometers* 3, Sextus Empiricus uses περιπέτεια in this sense,⁵⁸⁸ and taken this way, περιπέτεια suits both the definition of comedy and that of epic. Comedy is “a story of private affairs,”⁵⁸⁹ and epic “a story of divine and heroic and human affairs.” But however we construe the addition of ὑπόθεσις, its occurrence in the three lexicons suggests taking περιοχή in the definitions of epic and comedy as “plot” or “story.” And taken this way, the two definitions set themselves apart from the definition of tragedy.

Some additional support for construing περιοχή as “plot” or “story” can be found in the Latin definitions of epic and comedy, in which *comprehensio* corresponds to περιοχή (lines 2–3 and 9–10). The Latin noun is cognate with the verb *comprehendere*, which Diomides uses with reference to what is contained in a comedy: *in ea (sc. comedia) viculorum, id est humilium domum, fortunae comprehendantur*, “the fortunes of little villages, i.e., humble houses, are contained in this (i.e., comedy)” (p. 488.10–11). It seems, then, that *comprehensio* is used of the contents of a comedy and an epic, i.e., the story or, as we translated, the account set forth in the poem. We should not, however, overlook the fact that the Latin definition of tragedy also uses *comprehensio* (line 5). Here the corresponding Greek definition does not have περιοχή; instead, it has περίστασις. That does not mean that the Latin definition is faulty. It means only that the three Latin definitions, unlike the three Greek definitions, exhibit a single formula: *comprehensio* plus the genitive.

At first reading, the occurrence of “*in adversis*” (line 5) in the definition of tragedy may seem to be a further departure from the Greek definition of tragedy, but on reflection that may not be the case. If περίστασις (line 7) is used to refer to grave circumstances or crisis, then a reference to adversity in the Latin definition is not a departure. The occurrence of *civilis* (line 8) in the Latin definition of comedy may be an addition: *privatae* (line 8) seems to cover ἰδιωτικῶν (line 9) adequately. But if *civilis* is an addition, it is not a significant one, for *civilis* seems to do no more than call attention to the fact that comedy is largely concerned with citizens in their pri-

⁵⁸⁷ M. Haslam, “The Authenticity of Euripides, *Phoenissae* 1–2 and Sophocles, *Electra* 1,” *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 16 (1975) p. 153.

⁵⁸⁸ LSJ s.v. περιπέτεια I.2.b.

⁵⁸⁹ Russell (1981) p. 107 understands περιοχή to mean story; he translates the definition of comedy as we do: “a story of private affairs involving no danger.”

vate affairs. A clearer addition occurs in the Latin definition of epic, where a reference to hexameter verse is found (line 1). There is nothing corresponding in the Greek definition. There are, then, some differences between the Latin and Greek definitions, but the differences are few and relatively minor.⁵⁹⁰ That encourages speaking of the Latin definitions as translations of the Greek.⁵⁹¹

One omission in the definition of comedy should not be passed over without comment. I am thinking of the fact that there is no reference to worthless individuals. It is not said that the persons depicted on stage are somehow inferior to the audience. That contrasts with Aristotle's notion of comedy as an imitation of people "worse than we are" (*Poetics* 2 1448a4, cf. 1448a17–18, 5 1449a32–3). If one asks why the departure from Aristotelian doctrine, the answer seems to lie in the nature of New Comedy. Although it does not exclude unattractive persons, many of the stage figures represent quite ordinary individuals, and some are superior either in status or in character. For example, Charisius in Menander's *Men at Arbitration* combines average character with a privileged station, and Sostratus in the Grouch may be judged above average in both areas. And if young stage figures are often problematic, we can think of older men like Demeas in the *Samian Women* and Pataicus in *She Who is Shorn*. Generalizing we can say that comedy, as it developed in the fourth century, ceased to focus on inferior persons and became a study of *ιδιωτικὰ πράγματα*, private affairs (lines 9–10).⁵⁹² Hence, the definition reported by Diomedes fits well with New Comedy as we know it through the plays of Menander. Since the playwright studied under Theophrastus (18 no. 12), who will not have been ignorant of his pupil's success, it is tempting to embrace the definition of comedy as Theophrastean and then to argue that the parallel definition of epic must be Theophrastean as well. The conclusion may well be correct, but the argument itself has one weakness. The fact that the definition of comedy suits New Comedy means only that the definition does not predate New Comedy. It could be Theophrastean, but it could also be the work of someone else who knew and valued New Comedy.⁵⁹³

⁵⁹⁰ The Latin definition of mime (lines 25–6) seems to involve a more significant departure. See below.

⁵⁹¹ See, e.g., Reich vol. 1 p. 264–5, 271, who speaks of translations and attributes them to Diomedes.

⁵⁹² For fuller discussion see Fortenbaugh (1981) p. 256–60.

⁵⁹³ For further discussion of Theophrastus in relation to Menander's comedy, see the commentary on the work *On Comedy* (666 no. 22), above, p. 139–41.

In lines 15–20, Diomedes says that comedy and tragedy differ in definition: the former is said to be an ἀκίνδυνος περιοχή; the latter a τύχης περίστασις. Here portions of the Greek definitions of comedy and tragedy are repeated, underlining the fact that comedy, unlike tragedy, is not a crisis but a story involving no danger. For clarity's sake, Diomedes tells us that grief is a property of tragedy and then adds an anecdote concerning Euripides. When King Archelaus asked Euripides to write a tragedy about himself, the playwright prayed that the king might not suffer anything proper to a tragedy. The anecdote is aptly placed in Diomedes' text, and since the definition of tragedy is explicitly referred to Theophrastus, one may want to attribute the anecdote to Theophrastus. Usener suggests that Theophrastus may have deemed the anecdote worth preserving.⁵⁹⁴ That may be correct, but it is also a guess that cannot be demonstrated with any certainty.

Lines 21–4 concern satyric drama. We are told what constitutes satyric drama among the Greeks, *apud Graecos*, but no definition in Greek is given,⁵⁹⁵ and there is no reference to Theophrastus or any other individual Greek. Nevertheless, we have included lines 21–4 in text **708** for several reasons. First, the phrase “among the Greeks” (line 21) is already familiar from the discussion of comedy; it introduces the Greek definition (line 9). Second, at the beginning of the chapter “On Poems,” i.e., within the discussion of the three genera, Diomedes lists satyric drama and the mime after tragedy and comedy as species of the dramatic or mimetic genus (p. 482.27–8). We may compare the *Tractatus Coislinianus*, in which mime and satyric drama are listed after comedy and tragedy as species of the dramatic division of mimetic poetry (1 p. 50 Kaibel, p. 63.6 Koster).⁵⁹⁶ This fourfold division of the dramatic genus has been attributed to Theophrastus and may well be his.⁵⁹⁷ And if that is the case, Theophrastus is likely to have defined satyric drama and discussed it in relation to the other three species of dramatic poetry. Third, the exclusion of

⁵⁹⁴ Usener (1892) p. 620–1; cf. Rostagni p. 132, Dosi p. 608.

⁵⁹⁵ The absence of a definition in Greek is not exceptional. Six of the ten genre discussed by Diomedes lack such a definition. The six are elegy, iambus, epode, satire, bucolic verse and satyric drama.

⁵⁹⁶ The fact that comedy is listed before tragedy in the *Tractatus* appears to reflect the fact that comedy, not tragedy, is the focus of the *Tractatus*. Cf. Janko (1984) p. 130.

⁵⁹⁷ Rostagni p. 126–7 n.2 and Dosi p. 600, 619, 623. Others attribute the division to Aristotle; cf. Janko (1984) p. 135.

heroes from satyric drama (line 22) contrasts with their appearance in epic and tragedy (lines 2–3, 5–6). Indeed, the report concerning satyric drama may be said to share a common interest with the Greek definitions of epic, tragedy and comedy: all call attention to the kinds of character or social class that are fundamental to different kinds of dramatic poetry. There is, however, a striking difference. Only the report concerning satyric drama among the Greeks introduces a statement of purpose. Satyrs are said to be brought on for the sake of play and humor; in order that the spectator may be delighted by the humor and play of satyrs (lines 22–4).

The concluding lines of text **708** contain the beginning of Diomedes' brief discussion of mime. Two Latin definitions are put forward, or one definition, depending on how the text is emended.⁵⁹⁸ After that comes a Greek definition, which is referred generally (in the plural) to the Greeks (line 25–7). Scholars have not hesitated to attribute the Greek definition to Theophrastus along with the definitions of epic, tragedy and comedy.⁵⁹⁹ That is appealing, especially if one accepts the view that it was Theophrastus, who first recognized mime as one of the four divisions of dramatic poetry. Theophrastus would, then, be building on Aristotle, who in a brief (and corrupt) passage in the opening chapter of the *Poetics* appears to treat the mime as a kind of poetry (1447a28–b13). The fact that the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus were written in prose was deemed unimportant.⁶⁰⁰ They are mimetic, have speech as their medium⁶⁰¹ and like tragedy and comedy were presented in the manner of a drama, albeit with few characters and at no great length.

Also relevant to the question of attribution is the occurrence of the participle *περιέχων* at the end of the definition of mime (line 28). It is cognate with the noun *περιοχή*, which occurs in the definitions

⁵⁹⁸ See above, the second paragraph of this comment. Nothing will be said here that depends upon the occurrence of two Latin definitions as against one, or one as against two.

⁵⁹⁹ Reich vol. 1 p. 265, Rostagni p. 126–7 n. 2, Dosi p. 600, 620, Janko (1984) p. 48–9. Usener (1892) p. 621 expresses caution, as he also does in regard to the definition of epic.

⁶⁰⁰ The mimes of Herodas, which were written in verse, have been dated to the late 270s and early 260s B.C. (I. Cunningham in the Loeb edition [2002] of Herodas p. 182). That places them after the death of Theophrastus. I know of no evidence that mimes were written in verse at an earlier date. But even if some mimes in verse were known to Theophrastus, he may have treated mimes as a group with subdivisions (prose and verse) and regarded the group as a kind of mimetic poetry that is dramatic.

⁶⁰¹ See the introduction to this section.

of epic and comedy. If these two definitions are Theophrastean, then the occurrence of περιέχων is some reason for assigning the Greek definition of mime to Theophrastus. But we should keep in mind that only the definition of tragedy is explicitly assigned to Theophrastus, and this definition does not exhibit either περιοχή or περιέχων.

The definitions of the mime distinguish themselves by mentioning imitation: *imitatio* in Latin and μίμησις in Greek. There is no corresponding reference to imitation in the definitions of epic, tragedy and comedy. The explanation of this difference is, however, immediately clear. Diomedes goes on to explain “mime” as derived from μιμείσθαι (p. 491.16), and we can assume (with some certainty) that the writers of the definitions chose to capture that derivation in their definitions. More interesting is the simple reference to life: μίμησις βίου, “imitation of life” (line 27), in the Greek definition. Whereas the definitions of epic, tragedy and comedy mention specific kinds of character and social class, the definition of mime speaks generally of life. Giancotti sees here a distinction between comedy and mime. Comedy is referred to private and civic fortune, and that suggests a certain respectability and bourgeois atmosphere. In contrast, mime is referred simply to life, and that encourages one to think of a level that is more elementary and vital, not yet differentiated or arranged hierarchically.⁶⁰² A less complicated way of viewing the phrase μίμησις βίου is to see in it an emphasis on realism: mime depicts recognizable characters in realistic settings and situations. Be that as it may, it is clear that the Latin and Greek definitions of mime focus on the moral content of the drama. In the Latin, we hear of a lack of reverence and of base deeds together with licentiousness. In the Greek, there is mention not only of base deeds (τὰ ἀσυγχώρητα, line 28) but also acceptable behavior (τὰ συγκεχωρημένα, line 27). According to Reich the omission of acceptable behavior in the Latin definition⁶⁰³ reflects Diomedes’ time and a general Christian condemnation of mime.⁶⁰⁴ If that is correct, the Latin definition of mime differs from the Latin definitions of epic, tragedy and comedy in that it departs from its Greek counterpart in a striking and deliberate manner.⁶⁰⁵ Certainly it is hard to argue that the omis-

⁶⁰² Giancotti p. 29.

⁶⁰³ Reich p. 264 prints a Latin text in which only one Latin definition of mime is offered. Again, none of my remarks depend on the number of definitions offered.

⁶⁰⁴ Reich vol. 1 p. 271–3.

⁶⁰⁵ There are, of course, differences between the Latin and Greek definitions of epic, tragedy and comedy, but they are either minor or largely apparent. See above.

sion of any reference to acceptable behavior is a mere oversight, for instead of a simple reference to base deeds (equivalent to ἄσυγχώρητα) their unacceptable character is spelled out fully and forcefully: *sine reverentia, vel factorum et <dictorum> turpium cum lascivia* (lines 25–6).⁶⁰⁶

In Diomedes' text, Theophrastus is named in connection with the definition of tragedy, but no work of his is mentioned. If we ask what work may have contained the definition, the obvious answer is one of (or both of) the two works *On Poetry* (666 no. 20 and 21). If all four Greek definitions (those of epic, tragedy, comedy and mime) are attributed to Theophrastus, and if the same question is put, the answer will be the same.

- 709** Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 6.79 261D–E (BT vol. 2 p. 81.19–82.4 Kaibel)

Literature: McMahon (1917) p. 43; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1532; Parke and Wormell (1956) no. 328, vol. 1 p. 412 and vol. 2 p. 132; Fontenrose (1978) no. L86, p. 32, 387, 436, 438, 441, 442; Fortenbaugh (1981) p. 252, (1984) p. 193–4, (1995) p. 1–16; Janko (1984) p. 48

The speaker in this portion of *The Sophists at Dinner* is the philosopher Democritus of Nicomedia (cf. 248D and 262B).⁶⁰⁷ He is discussing the evils of flattery, and in connection with this topic (259F–260A) he calls attention to several rulers who had a marked weakness for laughter (259F–260A). Philip of Macedon, Dionysius of Sicily, Demetrius Poliorcates, Amasis of Egypt and the Roman Sulla are all mentioned. The term “lover-of-laughter” (φιλόγελως) is used in regard to Demetrius and Sulla (261B–C).⁶⁰⁸ After that Democritus jumps from individuals to entire cities, calling the Tiryinthians “lovers-of-laughter” (our text 709.1) and describing the people of Phaestus as life-long practitioners of wit (261E).

Democritus is presenting bits and pieces from a variety of sources. In regard to Philip he cites Theopompus and Hegesander (259F–260B); for Dionysius he refers to Eubulus and Theopompus

⁶⁰⁶ Reich p. 264 does not supply *dictorum*.

⁶⁰⁷ Democritus of Nicomedia is introduced in 1.2 1D along with his fellow townsman Pontianus. Both are said to be philosophers who excel all in polymathy. Aside from a shared name, there is little reason to connect Democritus with the Presocratic atomist who was born in Abdara and lived six centuries earlier.

⁶⁰⁸ The description is repeated in 14.3 614E, 14.4 615A.

(260C, 261A); for Demetrius to Phylarchus (261B); for Amasis to Herodotus (261C); for Sulla to Nicolas (261C). In the case of the Tiryinthians he names Theophrastus (709), and in regard to the people of Phaestus he cites Sosicrates (261E). There is no reason to doubt the references,⁶⁰⁹ though one may fault the style and the jump from individuals to groups of people who are largely unrelated to the theme of flattery.

The Greek text presents few problems. Lines 1–5 report in indirect discourse what Theophrastus said in his *On Comedy*. Lines 5–10 continue the report in direct discourse. In line 1, the form φιλόγελως is accusative plural.⁶¹⁰ That is the reading of the primary manuscript of *The Sophists at Dinner*. However, at least one manuscript of the epitome has φιλογέλωτας.⁶¹¹ Eustathius, who follows the epitome, has φιλογέλωτες, nominative plural;⁶¹² but his report is marked by shortening and variation in construction. The indirect discourse of the Athenaeus text has been changed to direct discourse. Nevertheless, φιλογέλωτες may be what Theophrastus actually wrote — in direct discourse as against indirect — so that it seems hasty and even wrong to cite Theophrastus as a witness for the accusative plural φιλόγελως.⁶¹³

In lines 8–9, the Tiryinthians are the subject of both the genitive absolute γελασάντων and the main verb ἔμαθον. The construction is unusual⁶¹⁴ — the nominative participle γελάσαντες would be normal usage — and in my judgment attributable to Theophrastus. Here

⁶⁰⁹ In the case of Herodotus, we can check the reference. What Athenaeus offers is quite accurate. First, he reports in indirect discourse Herodotus' description of Amasis' jocular behavior (*Hist.* 2.173); then he shifts to direct discourse and quotes almost verbatim what Herodotus says concerning Amasis' conduct prior to becoming king (2.174). The shift from indirect to direct discourse occurs in 709 as well.

⁶¹⁰ See Kühner-Blass I.1 p. 516 and 542.

⁶¹¹ According to S. Peppink, *Athenaei Dipnosopistarum epitome* (Leiden: Brill 1937) part 1 p. xxix, codex C of the epitome has φιλογέλωτας, and codex E has φιλογέλως with τας written above. The form φιλογέλωτας is found in Plato's *Republic* 3 388E5.

⁶¹² Eustathius, *Commentary on Homer's Odyssey* 18.100 (ed. Leipzig vol. 2 p. 170.31).

⁶¹³ For example, the Oxford *Greek-English Lexicon* (Liddell, Scott, Jones and McKenzie) p. 1935 col. 1 gives the form φιλόγελως and then cites "Thphr. *Fr.* 124" Wimmer. Cf. Kühner-Blass vol. I.1 p. 516: "Theophr. ap. Athen." Almost certainly the form should be attributed to Athenaeus, who uses φιλόγελων, accusative singular, immediately prior to our text (6.78 261C).

⁶¹⁴ Normally the genitive absolute has a different subject from that of the main verb. See Kühner-Gerth II.2 p. 78. For the omission of the subject of the genitive absolute where it can be supplied from the context, see p. 81.

in lines 5–10, we have direct discourse. The joke in line 8 appears to have been copied *verbatim*; Athenaeus neither abbreviates for effect nor expands to facilitate comprehension. Similarly the subsequent genitive, γελασάντων, involves no intervention by Athenaeus. Rather it is deliberately chosen by Theophrastus in order to emphasize laughter as the occasion for learning.⁶¹⁵

Turning now to the content of **709**, we can say that Theophrastus is cited for a story concerning the people of Tiryns. They are said to have been so addicted to laughter that they found it difficult to accomplish serious tasks. Seeking a remedy they went to Delphi, where the god told them that they would be cured if they sacrificed a bull to Poseidon without laughing. When they attempted the sacrifice and failed to suppress laughter, they understood what the god wanted to make clear: namely, the impossibility of curing a long standing condition. The lesson seems unproblematic, for it is in line with both common sense and Peripatetic doctrine. Theophrastus himself makes the point explicitly in a text preserved in Stobaeus' *Anthology* 2.31.124 = **465**. The topic is education. Theophrastus states the importance of developing good habits and goes on to criticize people who fail to consider the kind of life they wish to lead. He draws an analogy with planning a journey and tells us that once we begin to travel the wrong road, "turning back is difficult, or rather almost impossible, because time does not provide opportunity to change, and nature is unable to learn what is better, once it is trained in worse ways" (**465**.16–19). To avoid misunderstanding, I want to underline the caution with which Theophrastus expresses himself. He says that reversal "is difficult, or rather almost impossible" (χαλεπή, μᾶλλον δὲ σχεδὸν ἀδύνατος **465**.16–17). That leaves the door open to an extraordinary event like severe illness, surgery or divine intervention. We may compare two additional texts. In one, Simplicius tells us that Theophrastus argued effectively against the position that virtue cannot be lost (**462**.4–6). In another, Plutarch reports that Theophrastus discussed whether character is subject to fortune and in this context referred to Pericles, whose character was

⁶¹⁵ The variation of Eustathius avoids participles altogether. He has two finite verbs: ἐγέλασεν καὶ ἔμαθεν (ed. Leipzig vol. 2 p. 170.35). That construction gives equal status to laughter and learning, but it lacks the punch of the genitive absolute. On the use of the genitive absolute for emphasis, see Kühner-Gerth II.2 p. 110. For another Theophrastean example, cf. *Metaphysics* 8 5a24–5, and the comment of A. Laks and G. Most in the Budè edition (Paris 1993) p. 35–6 n. 41. They explain the use of the genitive absolute at 5a24 as a way of reinforcing opposition.

affected by serious disease (**463.4–9**). For Theophrastus, then, the Tirynthians do nothing absurd in consulting the god at Delphi. Their condition can be altered by special — in this case divine — intervention. But equally there is nothing unintelligible in their subsequent failure to accomplish a sacrifice without laughing. It is dramatic proof that old habits stubbornly resist change.

I shall return to the subject of curing and treating bad habits later, when I take up the Peripatetic notion of catharsis. At this moment, it may be helpful to relate the form of the story told in **709** to Aristotle's discussion of example (παράδειγμα) in *Rhetoric* 2.20. There Theophrastus' teacher distinguishes between using actual past events (πράγματα προγεγεννημένα) to establish a point and making up examples which serve the speaker's purpose. The former case is illustrated by reference to Darius and Xerxes, who seized Egypt before attacking Greece (1393a30–b3).⁶¹⁶ The latter case is bipartite. There is comparison (παράβολή) which Aristotle elucidates by citing the Socratic use of parallels: a public official ought not to be selected by lot any more than a competitor in an athletic contest or the captain of a ship (1393b3–8). There is also fable (λόγος) which is illustrated twice. First we hear of Stesichorus, who opposed assigning a bodyguard to Phalaris; he concluded his argument by telling the story of a horse that allowed a man to mount him (1393b8–23). Second, there is mention of Aesop, who defended a demagogue by relating how a fox, when caught in a hole, refused to have fleas removed from his body, for the present fleas had all but sucked their fill of blood (1393b23–1394a2).

If we ask to which category our Theophrastean story belongs, we may be tempted to answer that it must be assigned to the class of actual past events. For the story of the Tirynthians is neither a comparison of the Socratic kind nor a fable in which animals are the principle figures. In addition, we know that Greek cities did consult Delphi in order to find relief from afflictions. The Athenians, for example, did so when oppressed by plague in 596 B.C. The oracle told the Athenians to purify the city which they did and as a result put an end to the plague.⁶¹⁷ Furthermore, the directive of the oracle as reported in **709** contains a qualifier which has parallels in genuine

⁶¹⁶ The argument is as follows: Since the Persian kings Darius and Xerxes seized Egypt prior to attacking Greece, the present king should not be allowed to take Egypt, for he will then move against Greece.

⁶¹⁷ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 1.110 = no. 13 Parke and Wormell = no. Q65 Fontenrose. For another example, see **584A.332–44**.

oracles. I am thinking of the way the Tirynthians are told that they will be freed from their condition if they sacrifice to Poseidon *without laughing*. The proviso “without laughing” may be compared with a similar limitation found in a Delphic response of 431 B.C.⁶¹⁸ When the Spartans asked whether they should renew the war with Athens, the god replied that they will be victorious, fighting *forcefully*. Here the qualifier “forcefully” is attached to a participle; in **709** the proviso “without laughing” is part of a conditional clause. In both cases it serves to qualify the god’s statement.⁶¹⁹

If the general motivation for consulting the oracle and the form of the response provide no grounds for doubting the story told in **709**, the same cannot be said of the particular motivation: namely, seeking relief from laughter. There is, of course, another story concerning the Delphic oracle in which laughter is a motivating factor. I am thinking of Parmeniscus of Metapontum, who is said to have lost the ability to laugh after visiting the oracle of Trophonius. He went to Delphi and was told that he would regain the ability from “mother at home.” When his own mother did not cure his condition, he thought himself deceived, until he visited Delos where a statue of Apollo’s mother, Leto, was situated. The unshapeliness of the statue caused him to laugh, and he understood what the Delphic oracle had meant.⁶²⁰ The story is unlike that of the Tirynthians in that it concerns the loss of laughter by an individual and not intemperate laughter by an entire city. It is, however, similar in that both stories involve insight or understanding which is not only delayed but also subsequent to laughter. More important, the story of Parmeniscus is a clear fabrication, almost certainly invented to excuse the primitive figure of Leto and to denigrate the oracle of Trophonius.⁶²¹ The story of the Tirynthians is equally fictitious. That a whole city would suffer from uncontrolled laughter is incredible, and the wittiness of the story suggests that we are not dealing with an actual past event. No child managed to work his way into a sacrifice and then cause laughter by confusing the Greek words σφαγέιον (“bowl”) and σφάγιον (“victim”). Even the choice of Tiryns speaks against authenticity. While not as hopeless as the Sybarites,⁶²² the Tirynthians were unsuccessful

⁶¹⁸ Thucydides, *Histories* 1.118.3 = no. 137 P&W = no. H5 F.

⁶¹⁹ See the comment of Fontenrose on p. 33.

⁶²⁰ Athenaeus 14.2 614A–B = no. 129 P&W = no. Q185 F.

⁶²¹ Parke and Wormell, vol. 1 p. 411–12.

⁶²² The destruction of Sybaris gave rise to two stories concerning the Delphic oracle: no. 73 P&W = no. Q122 F and no. 74 P&W = no. Q123 F. The Sybarites’ weakness for pleasure was the subject of many anecdotes: see **550** and **551**.

in maintaining their position within the Peloponnesus. The comic poet Ephippus makes fun of them in the *Busiris*. He has Heracles say that they are always drunk when they fight, after which Busiris remarks, “So that’s why they always run away.”⁶²³ There is also a report that the Tirynthians consulted the god at Delphi concerning a new homeland, perhaps after a defeat by Argos in 468/7 B.C.⁶²⁴ The story is almost certainly false, but it is in line with the general reputation of the Tirynthians. They were “unfit for the more serious affairs” of life (709.2) and therefore not only losers in war but also suitable subjects for a fabricated story about uncontrolled laughter.⁶²⁵

Where does this leave us in regard to Aristotle’s three kinds of example? If 709 presents a story that is not only witty but also fabricated, perhaps it should be assigned to Aristotle’s third class, that of fictitious λόγοι (1393a30). Above I followed standard translations and rendered the Greek word λόγος with “fable.”⁶²⁶ That seemed sensible given the stories about animals introduced by Aristotle. Nevertheless, the Greek is not so precise and makes room for stories of all kinds including those about men and deities. In addition, the standard collections of Aesop’s fables include stories in which humans are the sole actors.⁶²⁷ More important, there are fables that exhibit

⁶²³ Athenaeus 10.59 442D–E = Ephippus no. 2 *CAF* vol. 2 p. 251 Kock = no. 2 *PCG* vol. 5 p. 132 Kassel and Austin.

⁶²⁴ Ephorus, *FGrH* 70 F 56 = Stephanus of Byzantium, *Ethnika*, s.v. ‘Αλιεῖς = no. 315 P&W = no. Q176 F. The date of the defeat is disputed. See Jacoby, *FGrH* vol. 2C1 p. 53, who believes that the fall of Tiryns mentioned in this report belongs to an earlier period when Argos dominated the Peloponnesus.

⁶²⁵ I am not suggesting that the people of Tiryns were always hopeless losers. In prehistoric times, the city was important, and its fortifications robust. The walls of the city were observed by Pausanias (2nd cent. A.D.), who called them marvelous (*Description of Greece* 9.36.5) and said that they were built by the Cyclopes (2.16.5, 25.8; 7.25.6). According to Pliny, Aristotle assigned the invention of towers to the Cyclopes, but Theophrastus credited the Tirynthians (*Natural History* 7.195 = 732.2–3). In historical times, the Tirynthians were able to send troops to fight against the Persians at Plataea in 479 B.C. (Pausanias 5.23.2).

⁶²⁶ E.g., the translation of Rhys Roberts (1924) and that of George Kennedy (1991).

⁶²⁷ No. 216 Hausrath = no. 200 Perry is of some interest. A mother shows approval when her young son steals, and she continues to show approval as the child grows and engages in ever larger theft. When the son is finally caught and brought into court, the child says he wants to whisper in his mother’s ear. When she comes to him, he bites her ear. She reacts indignantly, and he replies that she should have spanked him the first time he stole. The lesson drawn from the story is that what is not blocked at the outset grows ever larger. For our purposes the important point is that we have here a learned habit which need not have developed. In the two fables to which I now turn — the weasel and Aphrodite, and Zeus and the fox — the

striking similarities with **709**. I mention two. First, there is the fable of the Weasel and Aphrodite.⁶²⁸ The animal fell in love with a handsome young man and begged the goddess to turn her into a beautiful woman. Aphrodite obliged; the young man was moved by the woman's appearance, and the two married. Wanting to know whether the woman had undergone a change in character as well as in shape, Aphrodite let loose a mouse. The woman ran after it, and the goddess in disgust changed the woman back into a weasel. The author of the fable then adds a conclusion to the effect that bad men do not modify their character even if they change their appearance. Here, as in **709**, a problem is recognized after which there is an appeal to a deity for fundamental change. The deity is or appears to be favorable, but human failure stands in the way. Some things cannot be altered.

The second fable is that of Zeus and the fox.⁶²⁹ The god was impressed by the cleverness of the fox and made it king of the animals. Wanting to know whether the fox had experienced a change not only in fortune but also in character, Zeus caused a beetle to pass before the fox. The latter could not control itself, leapt up and tried to catch the beetle. The god was disgusted and returned the fox to its former status. The author then adds the observation that worthless men, even if they take on a more brilliant outward appearance, do not alter their nature. Here the similarities to **709** are less striking — no problem sets the story in motion — but they are still real and clear enough. There is a god and a creature that has an unattractive trait. A change for the better is not effected, so that the permanence of a long established character is once again demonstrated.

One difference between these two Aesopic fables and those recorded by Aristotle seems important. It is the difference between a general conclusion and a specific conclusion. In a rhetorical context, the speaker most often tries to persuade his audience to adopt a particular course of action. Hence it is hardly surprising that Aristotle has Stesichorus and Aesop conclude their fables with remarks specifically directed at the people of Himera and Samos (1393b19–23, b32–1394a2). In contrast, the two fables just related conclude with

habits under consideration are different in that they are innate. Which kind of disposition figures in **709** is not immediately clear.

⁶²⁸ No. 50 H = no. 50 P. I am indebted to Prof. William Hansen for calling my attention to this fable and to the one discussed in the next paragraph.

⁶²⁹ No. 109 H = 107 P.

general observations about the permanence of character, and the same is true of **709**. That is not to suggest that, given a context, particular conclusions cannot be drawn. In regard to **709**, I shall soon have something to say about the matter; but for the moment, I want to underline the general nature of the conclusions and to focus on the idea of worthless character. The fables — those concerning the weasel and the fox — conclude that men who are bad by nature (οἱ φύσει πονηροί) do not modify their character; that worthless men (οἱ φαῦλοι) do not alter their nature. That suggests a comparison with comedy, for Aristotle defines the genre as an imitation of comparatively worthless people (μίμησις φαυλοτέρων *Poetics* 5 1449a32–3), and the plays of Menander, Theophrastus' pupil (**18.12**), well illustrate the comic potential of an unattractive and incurable character trait.⁶³⁰

Two plays may serve to make the point. First, in *She Who was Shorn*, Menander focuses on an impetuous (σφοδρός 128 *OCT*) soldier, Polemon, who sets the play in motion with a vehement response to apparent infidelity. Polemon believes that Glykera has betrayed his trust; he cuts off her hair and then bursts into tears (173–4). A large part of the play revolves around Polemon's intense character; and at the end, Menander uses this trait to bring the play to a comical conclusion. Polemon is told to give up his military career, so that he will not act impetuously in the future. His response is first to call upon Apollo and then to ask rhetorically whether he, who has suffered so much, will ever again act impulsively. Finally, depending on how one restores the text, Polemon promises either that he will never again find fault with Glykera, or that he will never, even in a dream, do anything impulsive (1018–20). The response is amusing in its impetuosity and a dramatic indication that, whether or not Polemon gives up military life, he will remain a vehement person.

The second play is the *Grouch*. Here Knemon is presented as a difficult person who prefers to live alone (μόνος 30, 150, 329). In the fourth act, he falls into a well from which he is rescued by Gorgias, his stepson, whom he had previously treated with rudeness and even hostility. As a result, Knemon realizes that he was wrong to think himself self-sufficient (713–17) and to suspect the motives of every-

⁶³⁰ Caveat: I am not saying that Menander's plays concern only worthless people. Nor do I want to suggest that Theophrastus defined comedy in terms of worthless persons. He appears not to have done so. See the commentary on **708**. Nevertheless, worthless types are prominent on the comic stage and therefore merit special consideration in a work *On Comedy* (**666** no. 22).

one else (718–29). Nevertheless, he cannot free himself from his old habit: he chooses to be alone (869) while others enjoy a banquet next door. That makes possible a lively ending to the play. Cook and slave combine to torment the old man, ultimately picking him up and carrying him off to join the others at their banquet.

Both plays exploit a truth concerning human character: habits become second nature and cannot be easily changed.⁶³¹ That is also the lesson of our Theophrastean text, which not surprisingly makes reference to the Eresians' work *On Comedy* (709.1). That work (666 no. 22) has not survived, so that we cannot be certain how Theophrastus used the example of the Tiryinthians to elucidate comedy; but at least four possibilities suggest themselves. First, Theophrastus may have introduced the example not only to illustrate an incurable habit but also to call attention to the fact that humorous traits are often, perhaps most often, foibles that are not in themselves vicious. That is to say, they are not acquired dispositions directed by choice toward some shameful goal. The cases of Polemon and Knemon can again be instructive. The impetuosity of Polemon is not an ethical failing. It is an innate disposition that gets in the way and causes unintended suffering. In contrast, Knemon's isolation is an acquired habit, but it too can be distinguished from vice. For it is essentially a stylistic trait that, however regrettable, does not or need not involve a shameful goal and therefore does not in itself invite moral censure.

A second possibility is that Theophrastus used the example of the Tiryinthians to elucidate plot. What we have in 709 is, of course, a short anecdote and not the plot of a fully developed comedy. But it could easily be fleshed out, and in any case, it neatly illustrates a truth clearly recognized by Menander: an engrained habit can begin, guide and end a funny story. Furthermore, the anecdote involves no reversal of fortune. The Tiryinthians have had a good laugh but they have not changed their condition. That is a matter of some interest when we recall that Aristotle recognizes the importance of reversal for tragedy. He describes it as one of the two most important parts of a tragic plot (*Poetics* 6 1450b33–5). Theophrastus, too, will have recognized the importance of reversal for tragedy, and on one interpretation, he makes special mention of reversal when defining trag-

⁶³¹ Cf. Aristotle, *EN* 7.10/*EE* 6.10 1152a10–33 and *Rhet.* 1.11 1370a6–7; for commentary, see Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 192–3.

edy (708.6–7).⁶³² Concerning comedy, we are less well informed, but if Diomedes preserves Theophrastus' definition,⁶³³ then we can say that the Eresian does not make reversal a defining mark of comedy. For the definition in question states simply that "comedy is a story of private affairs involving no danger" (708.9–10). However, the definition is so short that one might ask whether it represents Theophrastus' understanding of all that is required of a comedy. Perhaps the definition was set forth for a particular purpose in a particular context, or it may have been abbreviated by Diomedes.⁶³⁴ Be that as it may, I want to underline the fact that an example is often introduced for the sake of one or two features. Theophrastus may have related an anecdote concerning the Tiryinthians, in order to make a point about reversal (it is not essential to comedy) or character (long standing character is all but impossible to alter) or both.

Third, our Theophrastean text concludes with the statement that the people of Tiryns learned (ἐμαθον 709.9) that longstanding habits cannot be cured. Perhaps Theophrastus wanted to call attention to the educational benefits of comedy. While the Tiryinthians learned an important lesson through their own actions, the spectators at a comedy can learn the very same lesson from what occurs on the stage. In the *Grouch*, Menander helps the audience grasp the message. Early on he has Gorgias say that Knemon cannot be reformed either by force or persuasion (250–4); and later Sostratus is made to exclaim "Oh, intractable character" (ὦ τρόπου ἀμάχου 869–70). But underlining the message in this way is not necessary. In fact, the playwright may find it amusing to have a stage-figure get things backwards, as Pataicus does in *She Who was Shorn*. He urges Polemon to give up being a soldier in order that he may cease from impetuous behavior (1016–17); but in fact Polemon is a good sol-

⁶³² If περίστας in the Theophrastean definition of tragedy (708.7) means reversal, then the Eresian will have departed from Aristotle by making reversal a necessary ingredient in tragedy, but περίστας as it occurs in the definition may mean crisis, i.e., adverse conditions that may (often do) result in reversal but need not do so. See the commentary on 708.

⁶³³ Most scholars believe that Diomedes preserves Theophrastus' definition, but there are some grounds for hesitation. See the commentary on 708.

⁶³⁴ The mention of private affairs alone, without any reference to those of the city, is also problematic. In the immediately preceding sentence, Diomedes mentions both "private and civic fortune" (708.8), so that one looks for some reference to the city in the subsequent definition. Perhaps Diomedes has left something out. Or is his use of "civic" rather unimportant: it simply points up the fact that comedy concerns citizens engaged in private affairs. See the commentary on 708.

dier, because he is impetuous. As a result, the perceptive spectator laughs at the seriousness of Pataicus as well as the vehemence of Polemon. He enjoys himself while learning or relearning an important truth about human behavior.

The fourth possibility picks up two earlier promises: namely, that I would return to the subject of curing and treating bad habits and that I would consider whether the story of the Tirynthians might not support a particular conclusion. I take up both promises now, for they are related and concern the benefits provided by comic performance. One of these benefits is certainly insight; and given the texts just considered, we can say that a special benefit is clear recognition of the difficulty or near impossibility that confronts men who, after a long period of time, try to change their ways (465.16–17). But that need not be the end of the matter. For men who recognize the impossibility of fundamental change can still take preventive measures to make their condition tolerable.⁶³⁵ In regard to emotions like pity and fear, Aristotle points to the cathartic effect of tragic performances (*Poetics* 6 1449b27–8). Much like persons listening to passionate music, so the spectators at a tragedy are purged and relieved (*Politics* 8.7 1341b38–40, 1342a14). They experience strong feelings of pity and fright and as a result undergo physiological change. This change is not a permanent cure, but given the pleasures of a good tragedy, most people would welcome such a therapy on a regular basis. The same is, I think true, in regard to laughter. The people of Tiryns may have been hopeless, but there are many people who laugh too much without being totally useless. Moreover, most people are like Parmeniscus of Metapontum; they would not want to lose the capacity for laughter.⁶³⁶ They would much prefer a short-term remedy that brings as much pleasure as it does relief. Perhaps, then, 709 contains an implicit recommendation: embrace comedy for its cathartic effect. Laughter is after all an emotion,⁶³⁷ and like pity and fright, it

⁶³⁵ Theophrastus is careful not to identify the nature of an individual with necessity (503.2–3), for the person who is powerless in regard to necessity can take steps to counter the effects of nature (cf. 504.6–7). See Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 232.

⁶³⁶ In 709.3 we read that the people of Tiryns went to Delphi ἀπαλλαγῆναι βουλομένους τοῦ πάθους. Out of context, the word πάθος could refer to the feeling or emotion of laughter, but here it refers to the condition from which the people of Tiryns want to be freed. They want to change a longstanding disposition — a πολυχρόνιον ἦθος (709.9) — without losing altogether the feeling or emotion of laughter.

⁶³⁷ I mean the laughter of finding something funny. In this case, the efficient

may find moderation in repeated release.⁶³⁸ If that release is found in the theater, then comedy, as well as tragedy, has an important function in the well-organized city-state.

Having now run through four possible ways in which Theophrastus could have used the story of the Tirynthians in his work *On Comedy*, I want to call attention to still another feature of the story which is relevant to comedy and generally to theories of humor. I am thinking of the words spoken by the young boy — words already mentioned above in regard to fabrication. When the youth is discovered by the adults, he says, “What then? Are you frightened that I shall turn over your victim?” (709.8) These words cause the Tirynthians to laugh. Assuming that they were quite nervous in undertaking a sacrifice without laughter and given the fact that they were prone to laugh much of the time, it may be unnecessary to look for a good joke in the boy’s words. Nevertheless, such a joke is present. The boy wants to ask whether the adults are frightened that he will turn over a sacrificial bowl. He confuses two cognate Greek words, σφαγεῖον (“bowl”) and σφάγιον (“victim”), and speaks of up-ending the bull. Similarity in sound is behind the boys confusion and the resulting absurdity evokes laughter from the adults. It cannot be shown that Theophrastus discussed this play on words in the treatise *On Comedy*, but he certainly could have done so, perhaps within a section on the causes of laughter.⁶³⁹ But whatever the truth concerning *On Comedy*, it seems certain that Theophrastus had a keen interest in laughter aroused by speech. He wrote a work *On the Ludicrous* (666 no. 23) and commented on a verbal thrust directed against the actor Simycas (710.7–10).

cause is some thought like recognizing incongruity or appreciating a clever pun. Such laughter is to be distinguished from laughter in which the efficient cause is physiological as when a person laughs on account of being tickled or receiving a blow to the midriff. See Fortenbaugh (2002a) p. 120–6.

⁶³⁸ Cf. the *Tractatus Coislinianus*, in which both tragedy and comedy are said to work a catharsis (lines 7–11 Koster = sec. 2–3 Kaibel = III–IV p. 22 & 24 Janko). Since the definition of comedy in 708.9–10 is quite brief, the omission of any reference to catharsis is probably no indication of Theophrastean doctrine. See the commentary on 708.

⁶³⁹ We may compare the outline of comedy preserved in the *Tractatus Coislinianus*. There we find a division of laughter arising from speech (γέλως ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως), which includes *inter alia* laughter brought on by alteration (κατ’ ἐξαλλαγὴν, lines 13–17 Koster = sec. 3 Kaibel = V p. 24 and 30 Janko).

9. The Ludicrous

In the heading to this section, the word “ludicrous” translates the Greek adjective γελοῖος, which is cognate with γέλως, “laughter” and γελᾶν, “to laugh.” An alternative translation is “ridiculous,” which might be preferred, because its Latin root suggests a close connection with *risus*, “laughter,” and *ridere*, “to laugh.” Be that as it may, the ludicrous — τὸ γελοῖον, “that which gives rise to laughter” — takes many forms. Persons of inferior or unusual character, word play and slips of the tongue, and bizarre or awkward behavior are all causes of laughter. Aristotle recognizes this in the *Rhetoric*, where he offers a tripartite division of the ludicrous: ἄνθρωποι, λόγοι and ἔργα, “men, words and deeds” (1.11 1371b35–1372a2).⁶⁴⁰ We are not told whether Theophrastus adopted this division, but he may have done so in the work *On the Ludicrous* (666 no. 23).⁶⁴¹ In any case, we have four texts that exhibit an interest in laughter as a response to words. 710 illustrates word play that is directed derisively at an individual. 711 is a general statement on the same subject. 31 provides an illustration of a laughable remark that does not hurt the person at whom it is directed, and 453 is a closely related precept. Here I add three reflections. First, among persons who are known to each other and share feelings of goodwill, laughter directed at an individual need not be hurtful to that individual. An example is the lame Hephaestus, whose awkwardness in serving wine causes the other gods to laugh (*Iliad* 1.599–600).⁶⁴² Homer does not suggest that Hephaestus was offended, and we should not assume that he was.⁶⁴³ Second, we need to distinguish between cases in which the laughable is intended and cases in which it is not. Saying something silly may be intended or unintended (a clever pun vs. mis-speaking), and our response may depend on which it is. But a physical imperfection with which one is born is not intended (the affected party is not responsible), so that making fun of such an imperfection is often

⁶⁴⁰ For discussion Aristotle refers to the *Poetics*, as he also does later in 3.18 1419b5–6. The reference is to the lost second book of the *Poetics*.

⁶⁴¹ Other divisions are, of course, possible. The *Tractatus Coislinianus* puts forth a twofold division. See the commentary on the title *On the Ludicrous* (666 no. 23).

⁶⁴² Applying Aristotle’s tripartite division of the laughable, we can say that Hephaestus’ ἔργον, his deed or action (puffing and moving awkwardly as he serves wine), is what arouses laughter.

⁶⁴³ See Fortenbaugh (2000a) p. 351 n. 50.

unkind. Still, as text **31** makes clear, done tactfully and in the right context, a witty remark concerning an imperfection may arouse laughter in the very person who is being teased (in this case, teased about a snub nose).⁶⁴⁴ Third, categories of the laughable need not be exclusive. Taking Aristotle's tripartite division, we can say that Strepsiades in Aristophanes' *Clouds* is laughable not only because his deeds or actions are bizarre, but also because these actions make clear that he is a foolish, intellectually inferior person.⁶⁴⁵ An awareness of incongruous behavior (an old man attempts to learn lessons suitable to a younger person) comes together with a sense of superiority on the part of the audience, so that the laughter of the spectators is intensified.

710 Athanaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 8.40 347F–348A (BT vol. 2 p. 263.5–18 Kaibel)

Literature: Schweighäuser (1801–5) vol. 4 p. 585–6; Arndt (1904) p. 15; Mittelhaus (1911) p. 49; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1524; Strömberg (1954) p. 85; Wehrli (1967–74) vol. 3 p. 73; Janko (1984) p. 48, 210–11; Rabbie (1986) p. xliii–iv; Tosi (1994) p. 180–1; Gilula (2000) p. 423–4, 427, 585

Text **710** occurs within a long discussion concerning fish in the eighth book of *The Sophists at Dinner*. Theophrastus has already been cited in regard to fish found in the Black Sea (8.2 331C = **363** no. 3 and 4) and in the waters of India (8.4 332B = **363** no. 1). He is also mentioned in lines immediately preceding **710**: a work *On Pleasure* containing an anecdote about Aeschylus is said to have been written by either Theophrastus or Chamaeleon (8.39 347E = **553**). The lines of our text are spoken by Cynulcus, a Cynic philosopher, who finds the discussion of fish irritating (8.2 331C) and the mind of Ulpian of Tyre petty (8.39 347D).⁶⁴⁶ He asks rhetorically,

⁶⁴⁴ The case of Hephaestus is in one respect similar. He is lame and cannot help moving awkwardly. However, Hephaestus may be, in part at least, responsible for his disability. According to Homer, he defended his mother Hera against Zeus and ended up being thrown out of heaven (Homer, *Iliad* 1.590–4). If he damaged his leg as a result of this fall, then he is to some extent responsible for his condition. But the Homeric evidence is not entirely clear (see *Iliad* 18.395–7).

⁶⁴⁵ Cf. Aristotle, *Poetics* 2 1448a17, 5 1449a32–3.

⁶⁴⁶ The Ulpian of the dialogue is portrayed as a pedantic grammarian. On his relationship to Ulpian, the famous Severan jurist, see D. Braund, "Learning, Luxury and Empire: Athenaeus' Roman Patron," in *Athenaeus and His Roman World: Read-*

whether Ulpian can understand what the cithara-player Stratonicus said of the cithara-singer Propis, and then cites Clearchus, who in his lost work *On Proverbs* both quoted the remark of Stratonicus, οὐδεὶς κακὸς μέγας ἰχθύς, “No bad fish (is) large,” and explained how each of the words (i.e., “no,” “bad,” “fish” and “large”) related to Propis (lines 1–7 = fr. 80 Wehrli). After that Cynulcus introduces Theophrastus, whose work *On the Ludicrous* (666 no. 23) offered a different account. Stratonicus is said to have spoken of the actor Simycas and played upon the proverb μέγας οὐδεὶς σαπρὸς ἰχθύς, “No rotten fish (is) large,” by speaking the words separately (lines 7–10).⁶⁴⁷

What follows in Athenaeus (not printed as part of 710) is problematic. Cynulcus says, “In the *Constitution of the Naxians*, Aristotle writes as follows about the proverb.” Since no indication to the contrary is given, it is natural to assume that the proverb referred to is that reported by Clearchus and Theophrastus. And if that assumption is correct, what follows is a third account or explanation of the proverb. However, there is good reason for hesitation. In particular, the proverb is never cited. That has led scholars to assume a lacuna at the end, in which Aristotle will have referred to and explained the proverb.⁶⁴⁸ The assumption may be correct, but unless one is looking for the proverb, there is no reason to miss it. Moreover, what is reported by Cynulcus seems to be a self-contained story about the people of Leïstadae, a village on Naxos. These people greatly admired an inhabitant named Telestagoras and sent him gifts on a daily basis. When persons from outside Leïstadae came to the village and offered the local merchants low prices for their goods, the latter regularly replied that they would rather give their goods to Telestagoras than sell them at such a price. One day some young people tried to buy a large fish, and the merchant responded as usual, i.e., saying he would rather give the fish to Telestagoras. The youths were annoyed at hearing the same old reply

ing *Greek Culture in the Roman Empire* (Exeter: University Press 2000) p. 17–18, who suggests that the Ulpian of the dialogue is the father of the jurist.

⁶⁴⁷ For διαρρεῖν (διελόντος, line 9) in the sense of dividing (punctuating) a *logos*, cf. Isocrates, *Panathenaicus* 17 and the comment of Casaubon quoted by Schweighäuser vol. 4 p. 585–6.

⁶⁴⁸ See, e.g., Gilula p. 427, who thinks that the Aristotelian material is a third source of the proverb, but that it suffers from a lacuna at the end. Wehrli vol. 3 p. 73 says that the excerpt from Aristotle’s *Constitution of the Naxians* offers an entirely different explanation of the proverb, i.e., different from that offered by Clearchus and Theophrastus.

and went to the house of Telestagoras, where they assaulted him and his two daughters. That outrage caused a civil war whose outcome was the tyranny of Lygdamis (8.40 348A–C). It is true that a large fish is mentioned, but this fish is not to be confused with that of the proverb attributed to Stratonicus. It is not rotten and is not overpriced. Indeed, the story of the merchants of Leïstadae seems to introduce a different proverb: namely, “I’d rather give my goods to Telestagoras.” There can be no certainty here, but I am inclined to believe that the material taken from Aristotle’s *Constitution of the Naxians* is an unfortunate insertion by Athenaeus, who picked up on the reference to a large fish and mindlessly added it as a third account to the preceding two accounts from Clearchus and Theophrastus. In what follows, I shall say no more concerning the Aristotelian material.

Stratonicus was an Athenian cithara-player whose period of activity has been dated to the first half of the fourth century B.C.⁶⁴⁹ According to Athenaeus, the Peripatetic Phaenias reported in Book 2 of his work *On Poets* that Stratonicus was the first to introduce multiplicity of notes in simple cithara playing,⁶⁵⁰ to accept pupils of harmony and to compile a table of intervals. Phaenias also took note of Stratonicus’ ability to make witty remarks, describing him as not unconvincing in regard to the ludicrous (8.46 352C = fr. 32 W). Many of Stratonicus’ witticisms are preserved by Athenaeus in a long excursus 8.41–6 348D–352D, following almost immediately on our text.⁶⁵¹ From the excursus we learn that the remarks of Stratonicus were of interest to other early Peripatetics (not just Phaenias). Clearchus recorded material not only in his work *On Proverbs* but also in his work *On Friendship* (8.42 349F = fr. 18 W), and if we can trust a marginal note to 8.43 350D, Callisthenes composed *Reminiscences of Stratonicus*. That Theophrastus’ work *On the Ludicrous* contained more than one remark by Stratonicus, is possible but unprovable.⁶⁵²

⁶⁴⁹ Gilula p. 425; cf. P. Maas, “Stratonikos,” in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* vol. 4A col. 326–7.

⁶⁵⁰ In the Loeb edition vol. 4 p. 96 n. a, Gulick explains simple cithara playing (ψιλλὴ κιθάρισις) as purely instrumental music, unaccompanied by singing or dancing.

⁶⁵¹ Material from Aristotle’s *Constitution of Naxos* intervenes, 8.40 348A–C. See above.

⁶⁵² We are not surprised to learn from Athenaeus 8.18 337D–E that witty remarks by the flute-player Dorion were collected by Theophrastus’ pupil Lynceus of Samos (18 no. 10) in his *Apophthegms*.

Propis was a cithara-singer, about whom we know nothing except that Stratonicus had a low opinion of his voice. Wilamowitz wanted to emend the text to read “Prepis,” but there is no good reason to do so.⁶⁵³ Simycas, too, is a shadowy figure. O’Connor assigns him to the latter part of the fourth century,⁶⁵⁴ but the connection with Stratonicus suggests an earlier date.⁶⁵⁵ That Simycas is referred to in Demosthenes’ oration *On the Crown* 262 is problematic. Demosthenes tells us that Ctesipho entered the service of two actors who were known for groaning heavily (they were labeled βαρύστονοι). One was named Socrates, but editors disagree concerning the name of the other. The choice is between Simyc(c)as or Simylus. The most recent editor, Mervin Dilts (*OCT* 2002), prefers Simyccas (double kappa). That may well be correct, but one is left wondering whether an actor who is known for groaning heavily can be aptly compared with a fish (710.10), for fish are mute.

Athenaeus tells us that Clearchus, in his work *On Proverbs*, explained Stratonicus’ use of the proverb concerning fish. Athenaeus also tells us that Theophrastus, in *On the Ludicrous*, reported how Stratonicus spoke a slightly modified version of the same proverb. In the Loeb edition, Gulick follows Meineke and alters the proverb that Theophrastus attributes to Stratonicus (lines 9–10): οὐδείς is placed before μέγας, so that the proverb reads οὐδείς μέγας σαπρὸς ἰχθύς. The change in wording makes the proverb somewhat closer to the remark that Clearchus attributes to Stratonicus (both now begin with οὐδείς), but the change is without manuscript support. It is better to leave the text unchanged and to recognize that proverbs may take more than one form. For example, they may be altered to better suit a particular situation, a change may be made for stylistic reasons, or a copyist may introduce a change through carelessness.

The two works referred to by Athenaeus, *On Proverbs* and *On the Ludicrous*, are now lost, so that we cannot determine whether Athenaeus has reported everything that was said in the works. He may have, but more may have been said. Be that as it may, Aristotle’s discussion of urbanity in *Rhetoric* 3.11 — the chapter will have been known to Clearchus and Theophrastus — may be instructive, for

⁶⁵³ See W. Aly, “Propis,” in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* vol. 23.1 col. 822 and Wehrli vol. 3 p. 73. For the name “Propis,” see Bechtel-Fick, *Griechische Personennamen* (1894) p. 243.

⁶⁵⁴ J. O’Connor, *Chapters in the History of Actors and Acting in Ancient Greece* (New York: Haskell House 1966) p. 132.

⁶⁵⁵ Maas, “Stratonikos,” col. 326.

there Aristotle takes note of both the ludicrous and the proverb. I begin with the proverb and give Aristotle's words: καὶ αἱ παροιμῖαι μεταφοραὶ ἀπ' εἰδους ἐπ' εἰδός εἰσιν· οἷον ἂν τις ὡς ἀγαθὸν πεισόμενος αὐτὸς ἐπαγάγηται εἴτα βλαβῇ, ὡς ὁ Καρπάθιος φασι τὸν λαγὼ· ἄμφω γὰρ τὸ εἰρημένον πεπόνθασιν, "Proverbs are metaphors from species to species. For example, if a person, who expected to be benefited, brought in (something) and then suffered harm, men say, 'As the Carpathian (brought in) the hare.' For both suffered the said (result)" (1413a14–18).⁶⁵⁶ If I understand Aristotle correctly, the first words are important. In saying "Proverbs are metaphors" (αἱ παροιμῖαι μεταφοραὶ . . . εἰσιν), he is telling us that the whole proverb, not a single word or phrase therein, is the metaphor. Of course, an individual word may be used metaphorically within a proverb, but equally a proverb may contain no word that is used metaphorically. For example, "As the Carpathian (brought in) the hare" (ὡς ὁ Καρπάθιος τὸν λαγὼ) contains no word that is used metaphorically, but the proverb taken as a whole can be and was transferred (μεταφέρεσθαι) to other actions with similar consequences.

The phrase that follows, "from species to species" (ἀπ' εἰδους ἐπ' εἶδος), reminds us of the discussion of metaphor in *Poetics* 21. There Aristotle lists metaphor from species to species along side three other kinds of metaphor: namely, from genus to species, from species to genus and according to analogy. Subsequently he elucidates metaphor from species to species by a pair of examples: "drawing the life with bronze" and "cutting (water) with long edged bronze." As Aristotle explains, "drawing" is used for "cutting" and "cutting" for "drawing," for each is a kind of removing (1457b13–16).⁶⁵⁷ In this passage, Aristotle is focused on the metaphorical use of individual words and not on the proverb used metaphorically, which

⁶⁵⁶ I have adopted the text printed in both Ross' and Kassel's edition of the *Rhetoric*. These texts involve an emendation: φασι, "they (men in general) say," has replaced φησιν, "he says," which is the reading of the manuscripts (1413a17). If we accept φησιν, or better φησι (which is printed by Cope), then the text says either "as the Carpathian says of the hare" (Cope's translation), or "he (the person already introduced by τις) says 'As the Carpathian (introduced/got) the hare'" (as Bob Sharples has suggested to me). The third plural form φασιν occurs in the *Suda* (omicron no. 105, vol. 3 p. 513.28 Adler), but that need not be what Aristotle wrote. In any case, deciding between φησι and φασι is not important for this comment. In what follows, I accept the emended text without further discussion.

⁶⁵⁷ The examples are taken from Empedocles' *Purifications* (31 B 138 and 143 Diels-Kranz).

is Aristotle's concern in *Rhetoric* 3.11. Nevertheless, the phrase "from species to species" occurs in both places, and that encourages connecting Aristotle's remarks on proverbs in *Rhetoric* 3.11 with his remarks on metaphor in *Poetics* 21.

We may, however, wonder whether the description "from species to species" is altogether accurate when applied to the proverb. At least, the example offered in *Rhetoric* 3.11 seems to concern individuals and their particular actions, and not the species of a genus. Someone (τις 1413a15), we are told, expected to achieve a benefit and ended up doing damage. His misguided effort is characterized by a proverb that recalls the Carpathian who brought the hare to his island, only to witness the harmful effects of excessive reproduction.⁶⁵⁸ The point of comparison is clear enough, and Aristotle underlines it by saying, "both suffered the said (result)," i.e., damage instead of an expected good. Here the word "both" (ἄμφω 1413a17) refers to the two aforementioned individuals: someone who is unnamed (τις) and the Carpathian whose ill-conceived action made him a proverbial figure. Hence, we seem to have a direct comparison between two individuals and their particular actions, and not a metaphor from species to species.

There is a difficulty here, to which I offer two quite different responses. The first is to accept the difficulty as serious and to say that Aristotle has erred in characterizing proverbs as metaphors from species to species. In fact, his own example in *Rhetoric* 3.11 suggests a different approach, for the second occurrence of ὥς, "as" (1413a16)⁶⁵⁹ invites adding a phrase or sentence introduced by οὕτως.⁶⁶⁰ In other words, we might formulate Aristotle's example so that it reads: "As the Carpathian (brought in) the hare, so someone did something else." Here we have a four term comparison that can be construed in terms of metaphor based on analogy: "As the Carpathian relates to bringing in the hare, so some unnamed individual relates to a different but equally disastrous action." In both cases, the relation is one of good but misguided intentions; expecting a good result is followed by an unwanted outcome. Moreover, the

⁶⁵⁸ That the harmful effects resulted from excessive reproduction is made clear in Hesychius, *Lexicon*, kappa no. 61 (vol. 2 p. 414.30 Schmidt), Zenobius, *Epitome*, cent. 4 no. 48 (vol. 1 p. 98.7–10 Leutsch-Schneidewin) and the *Suda*, omicron no. 105 (vol. 3 p. 513.28–514.1 Adler).

⁶⁵⁹ The first occurrence of ὥς (1413a15) goes with the future participle and indicates the agent's intention.

⁶⁶⁰ Cf. Aristotle's *Topics* 1.17 108a8–10.

involvement of individuals causes no difficulty, for Aristotle uses examples involving individuals in order to illustrate metaphor based on analogy. Indeed, in *Poetics* 21 (1457b21–2, cf. *Rhetoric* 3.11 1412b31–1413a1), Aristotle gives pride of place to an example concerning two gods: “The cup is to Dionysus as the shield is to Ares; therefore, the cup may be called the shield of Dionysus and the shield the cup of Ares.”

The preceding response to the stated difficulty has an appeal, but I am not altogether happy with it, for there are proverbs that do not involve individuals and that are not obvious candidates for analysis in terms of metaphor based on analogy. The proverb spoken by Stratonicus is one of these. Moreover, I am not prepared to dismiss Aristotle’s characterization of the proverb as a simple error when there is an alternative — i.e., a second response to the stated difficulty — like the following. Aristotle might insist on a distinction between applying a proverb and offering a general analysis.⁶⁶¹ The remarks of the preceding paragraph were concerned with application, where individuals are frequently (but not always) prominent. In contrast, when a proverb is being analyzed, generality comes to the fore, so that speaking of proverbs as metaphors from species to species is not wrong. The creation of a proverb about the Carpathian hare has so generalized the incident, that the particular act gone wrong (i.e., the dateable act involving an identifiable person and particular hares) has become quite unimportant. The proverb has come to represent lack of foresight in dealing with animals like hares, and as such it is transferred to other kinds of action in which good intentions have bad results. We may compare the *Suda* s.v. ὁ Καρχαίτιος τὸν λαγφόν, where the proverb is cited and explained by reference to the breeding habits of hares. After that comes the following statement: εἴρηται οὖν ἡ παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν καθ’ ἑαυτῶν τι ἐπινοουμένων, “The proverb, therefore, is said of persons who are contriving something to their own detriment” (vol. 3 p. 514.1–2 Adler). This is analysis, and we are given the generic description under which an observation concerning hares is transferred to different kinds of misguided action. The transfer is similar to that which occurs when individual words are transferred from species to species: e.g., when “drawing” replaces “cutting” and vice versa, for each refers to a specific kind of removal.⁶⁶²

⁶⁶¹ Cf. *Rhetoric* 3.10 1410b7–8.

⁶⁶² For a Clearchan example, see, e.g., Zenobius, *Epitome* cent. 5 no. 47 (vol. 1

Whatever the truth concerning the Carpathian hare, it is clear that not a few proverbs have their origin in a particular event, and that some of these proverbs become generalized, so that ordinary men no longer connect them with a particular event in the (distant) past. The proverb spoken by Stratonicus, whether the version reported by Clearchus or the version reported by Theophrastus, may serve as an example. It makes no clear reference to an individual event, person or thing, but some individual must have coined the expression. Perhaps the proverb was invented by a student during a classroom exercise or by a witty participant in a symposium. But it is also possible and perhaps more likely that the proverb originated in a particular altercation in a local fish market. A merchant was trying to sell a large but rotten fish for a considerable sum of money, when a customer reacted negatively and exclaimed, "No bad/rotten fish is large." Someone, maybe a bystander, appreciated what he had just heard and began using the words, initially in the fish market when confronted with a similarly large but rotten fish, and subsequently in markets of all kinds whenever a large offering involved spoiled or defective goods. Soon others, who knew nothing of the original incident, took to using the words and a proverb from species to species was born. The proverb refers to a large fish, but it came to be applied to anything that was large and bad. It was used of particular individuals, as it is when applied to Propis or Simycas, but it could also be applied generally to things that are both large and bad. An example might be the American student athlete, who is all too often massive but inarticulate. In faculty meeting, a professor who is overly concerned about falling academic standards might use the proverb unfairly in order to denigrate all student athletes without exception.⁶⁶³

p. 140.4–7 L-S) = fr. 66b W, where we are told that Clearchus explained the proverb οὐδὲν ἱερὸν, "nothing sacred," as the words of Heracles upon seeing a statue of Adonis. After that comes the statement: εἴρεται οὖν ἡ παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν παντελῶς εὐτελῶν καὶ ἀχρήστων, "The proverb is said of things that are altogether cheap and useless." Here as with the Carpathian hare, we have an incident that gave rise to a proverb of wide application. See, e.g., Theocritus, *Idylls* 5.21–2, where the proverb is used to characterize a goat *qua* paltry prize.

⁶⁶³ In the case of proverbs that arise from particular events, the events themselves (apart from any proverb) may be cited as examples in an inductive argument. In Aristotelian terms, the events would be used as παραδείγματα that state πράγματα προγενομένα, i.e., actual past facts (*Rhetoric* 2.20 1393a29). Should some event be so well-known that it has given rise to a proverb, the proverb itself might replace a fuller description of the event or be introduced at the end of a fuller description of the event, in order to give the argument punch (cf. 1394a9–16). As already indicated, I am not suggesting that all proverbs have their origin in

I turn now to earlier remarks in *Rhetoric* 3.11, where Aristotle discusses urbanity and along the way mentions the ludicrous (1412a27). Much of what he says has direct application to proverbs including the proverb found in text **710**. I begin with the pleasures of learning. Aristotle tells us that sayings (ἀποφθέγματα) are urbane when they do not say what they say. A well-known line of Stesichorus is quoted, “the cicadas sing to themselves from the ground,” after which Aristotle refers to successful riddles (τὰ εὖ ἠνιγμένα) and says that they are pleasant in that metaphor is involved and learning occurs (1412a19–25). The application to **710** is straightforward. Stratonicus’ words do not say what they seem to say. As Athenaeus puts it, Stratonicus is riddling (αἰνισσόμενος, line 6). Taken literally his words are about fish, but in context they are about Propis or Simycas, two individuals who are deficient in voice. Moreover, in regard to urbanity (i.e., in regard to the witty use of proverbs), being directed toward an individual is common and approved. Aristotle makes this clear when he says that sayings should always have some personal application: δεῖ δ’ αἰεὶ προσεῖναι ... τὸ πρὸς ὃν λέγεται (1412b24). The astute listener makes the transfer from fish to Propis or Simycas and is pleased to have learned something. And he is all the more pleased if the learning occurs quickly. Again Aristotle is clear, for he tells us that comprehension should occur at the same time that the words are spoken (1412a31–2). In addition, brevity of expression is desirable, for it makes the learning occur more quickly (1412b22). Hence, the proverb concerning the Carpathian hare is especially effective when it is reduced to five words, i.e., ὥς ὁ Καρπάθιος τὸν λαγῶ, “As the Carpathian the hare,” or to four words, if ὥς, “As,” is omitted. The listener supplies what is needed for comprehension — a verb like ἐπάγειν, “to bring in” — and is pleased not only with what he has learned — something is or

some event that actually occurred. The same is true of the examples that occur in inductive arguments. Hence, Aristotle is careful to distinguish between examples based on actual fact and others that are not, e.g., Socratic parallels and fables like those of Stesichorus and Aesop (1393a29–30). Consider the story of the Tiryinthians, who tried to free themselves from their inclination to excessive laughter and failed to do so. The story might be a good example in an inductive argument intended to show that long standing habits cannot be altered. The story is almost certainly a fabrication (see the commentary on **709**), but it still could be introduced effectively into an inductive argument (though not as persuasively as an example based on fact [1394a6–8]). And were the story to give rise to a proverb, e.g., “Tiryinthian laughter,” the proverb might replace a full telling of the story or be added to it for effect.

will be an unintended disaster — but also with himself. For by fleshing out the proverb without delay, he has confirmed his own quickness of mind and store of knowledge.⁶⁶⁴ In length, Stratonicus' proverb is similar to that of the Carpathian hare. It is four words long: "No bad/rotten fish (is) large." The expression is concise and therefore suited to provide the pleasure that accompanies speedy comprehension.⁶⁶⁵

But is Stratonicus' proverb immediately intelligible? Perhaps not, if you are a modern American who eats fish without reflecting on piscine lifestyle. In your mind, the word "fish" will not be closely connected with lack of voice, so that the relevant connection with Propis or Simycas will not be made without reflection. Indeed, the proverb may appear to be an unsolvable riddle. In contrast, for a Greek living in the fourth century B.C., the proverb may have presented no comparable difficulties. Fish were an important part of his diet, and piscine life is likely to have been an object of occasional or even frequent reflection. If he were a Peripatetic, like Clearchus and Theophrastus, he would know Aristotle's teachings and therefore know that fish are voiceless, because they have no lung, windpipe or pharynx (*History of Animals* 4.9 535b14–15). If he were not a Peripatetic, which was true of most ancient Greeks, experience would tell him that fish lack voice. In addition, he would probably know one or more sayings like the following: οὔτε ἐν ἰχθύσι φωνὴν οὔτε ἐν ἀπαιδεύτοις ἀρετὴν δεῖ ζητεῖν, "Neither in fish ought one to look for voice, nor in uneducated men for virtue" (*Florilegium* "Ἀριστον καὶ πρῶτον μάθημα, no. 93 Schenkl).⁶⁶⁶ Nevertheless, an ancient Greek well acquainted with fish and proverbs like the one just cited might still fail to understand how Stratonicus is using the proverb, for he might be uninformed concerning the context in

⁶⁶⁴ Cf. 696.2–6 and see the commentary on that text, above, p. 310–14.

⁶⁶⁵ Stratonicus appears to have understood the virtue of brevity. To make fun of a cithara-singer named Cleon, who was nicknamed Ox, Stratonicus cited the two word proverb ὄνος λύρας, "The ass (hears) the lyre" and changed the first word, so that the proverb ran βοῦς λύρας, "The Ox (hears) the lyre" (Athenaeus 8.41 349D).

⁶⁶⁶ The fact that fish lack voice marks them off from other animals that occupy a higher position on the *scala naturae*. And that in turn opens the door to unflattering comparisons like that just cited. For our purposes the comparison is of special interest, for it can be used to illustrate metaphor from species to species. Imagine a philosophical lecture on moral virtue, in which a necessary connection between education and virtue is being emphasized. At some point, the lecturer says, "Don't look for voice in fish" (now a proverb). The audience makes the transfer and understands "Don't look for virtue in uneducated men."

which the proverb is spoken. He might not know that Stratonicus is directing his words at a person whose professional activity depends upon a sound voice, and he might fail to perceive that Stratonicus is making fun of that person's voice. I say "perceive" for understanding Stratonicus' intention depends not only on what one already knows but also and especially on appreciating the particular situation. And that is more a matter of seeing than of reasoning.

Clearchus understands that not everyone reading his work *On Proverbs* will grasp Stratonicus' intention without help. His readers, after all, were not present when Stratonicus spoke the proverb and are, therefore, likely to be uninformed concerning the particular context. Moreover, the proverb is used in a novel way. When first said, the words of the proverb were not concerned with a fish's lack of voice. And as the words became proverbial, they will have been used not only of fish but also of a variety of items (livestock, vegetables, merchandise in general) without special reference to voice. Stratonicus, however, plays with the proverb by giving special significance to the word "fish." Now it indicates the point of comparison with Propis and Simycas, i.e., lack of voice. Accordingly, Clearchus tells us that Propis is a cithara-singer (line 2), who is bad in his art (line 4). Unlike the fish of the proverb, which is bad in body (rotten or putrid), Propis' defect is tied to his singing. Clearchus makes clear what that defect is when he explains that Propis is a fish, because he is voiceless (διὰ τὴν ἀφωνίαν, line 7).⁶⁶⁷ To avoid such an "after the event" explanation, it is possible to make the explanation part of the proverb. An example concerning fish is provided by Athenaeus, who quotes a line of Epicharmus in which fish called baiones are described as unappealing.⁶⁶⁸ After that Athenaeus records an Attic proverb that runs μή μοι βαιών· κακὸς ἰχθύς, "No baion for me; (it's) a bad fish" (7.29 288A). Here the last two words constitute an explanation for the rejection of the baion, and the words are printed as part of the proverb. The same is true in the *Etymologicum Magnum* s.v. βαιών, where a further explanation is added: ἐπὶ

⁶⁶⁷ In the work *On Proverbs*, Clearchus may have regularly explained (cf. ἐξηγούμενος in Zenobius, *Epitome* cent. 5 no. 48 [vol. 1 p. 140.8 L-S] = fr. 67 Wehrli) the proverbs that he collected, but not all collectors regularly offered explanations. Demetrius of Phalerum seems to be an example. See Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.1.172 (3.111.8–125.2 Hense = fr. 87 SOD).

⁶⁶⁸ The line of Epicharmus — ἄγε δὴ τρίγλας τε κυφὰς κάχαρίστους βαιόνας, 7.29 288A — is repeated at 7.125 324E and is no. 64 in Kaibel's collection of the fragments of Epicharmus.

φιληδόνου εἴρηται, “it is said of the lover of pleasure.” This further explanation is not part of the proverb. Rather, it tells us that the proverb is used of the lover of pleasure, who on most occasions will be a known individual — someone who is deemed unappealing and therefore appropriately disparaged by means of a proverb that speaks of the baion. That said and more importantly, even if it is possible to build an explanation into a proverb, e.g., “(it’s) a bad fish,” the possibility should be embraced sparingly. For adding an explanation works against brevity and is likely to be stylistically awkward. It will come across as an obvious add-on, as is the case in the proverb concerning the baion.⁶⁶⁹ Happily, Stratonicus’ four word proverb is not encumbered by an explanation. The listener is expected to appreciate the situation and to understand on his own what is being intimated.

I said above that proverbs that do not say what they say are pleasant because they occasion learning, and that the learning is all the more pleasant when the proverb is expressed in few words and the learning occurs quickly. The proverb spoken by Stratonicus can be said to illustrate these sources of pleasure, but that is not the end of the matter. There is still another source of pleasure that the proverb illustrates. I am thinking of the pleasure derived from thinking oneself superior to someone else. For students of Aristotle, this sort of pleasure is best known through remarks in the *Poetics*. There Aristotle tells us that comedy imitates persons who are rather worthless (5 1449a32–3) and worse than we are (2 1448a4, 17). He is advancing a superiority view of comic laughter that can be easily applied to our Athenaeus text. When Stratonicus described Propis or Symacas as a bad/rotten fish, he put a negative value on his professional skill and most especially on his voice. After that, Stratonicus may have laughed aloud or smiled broadly, but whatever his overt

⁶⁶⁹ It is possible that the last two words of the proverb, “(it’s a) bad fish,” are not part of the proverb in its original form. Schweighäuser thinks that the occurrence of a second explanation in the *Etymologium Magnum*, “it is said of the lover of pleasure,” shows that the first explanation, “(it’s a) bad fish” is part of the proverb (*Animadversiones*, vol. 4 p. 138), but I do not find the argument convincing. The two explanations are quite different (one characterizes the fish, and the other characterizes the sort of person at whom the proverb is directed), and there is no reason why the original proverb cannot have been independent of both explanations. Subsequently one and not the other may have become attached to the proverb. There is no certainty here except that the several citations of the proverb seem to treat the words “(it’s a) bad fish” as part of the proverb.

behavior may have been, he enjoyed a pleasant sense of superiority. And the same may be true of those persons who heard Stratonicus speak.⁶⁷⁰

Something should be said about the two versions of the proverb in relation to each other. In particular, which is the original version and which is the more appealing. According to Strömberg, the version reported by Theophrastus, μέγας οὐδεὶς σαπρὸς ἰχθύς (lines 9–10), is “obviously a distorted version” of that reported by Clearchus, οὐδεὶς κακὸς μέγας ἰχθύς (line 5).⁶⁷¹ Strömberg may be correct, but if one thinks that the proverb is likely to have originated in the market place, then the Theophrastean version may appear to be the earlier. For it is specific about the fish’s condition — it is said to be rotten — and mentions up front the feature — it is big — that might fetch a high price. Moreover, the Clearchan version exhibits a certain sophistication that may indicate a later development. With οὐδεὶς in the initial position, the proverb recalls Homer’s *Odyssey* and in particular the line in which the Cyclops Polyphemus tells his neighbors that Nobody is killing him with guile or force: Οὐτίς με κτείνει δόλῳ οὐδὲ βίηφι (9.408).⁶⁷² Here Οὐτίς, “Nobody,” occurs in the initial position, and it is played with in a way that invites comparison with οὐδεὶς, “no one”/“nobody,” in the Clearchan proverb. That suggests to me a sophistication that was imposed upon an already existing proverb, but perhaps I am wrong in thinking that the original version arose in the market place, or that if did originate there, “large” took

⁶⁷⁰ As a cithara-player who not only taught the instrument but also performed in public, Stratonicus may have had a strong need to assert his superiority over other persons who played the cithara. For sayings that diminish an individual, see (in addition to 710) Athenaeus 8.41 349C–D (Cleon who was nicknamed Ox), 8.41 349F (an Ephesian), 8.42 349F–350A (a man from Byzantium), 8.42 350C–D (unidentified), 8.45 351F (unidentified). He is also said to have set up two trophies: one in his classroom against persons who play the cithara badly (8.42 350B) and one in the temple of Asclepius carrying the inscription “from the spoils of bad cithara-players” (8.45 351E–F). It would, however, be a mistake to assume that all sayings attributed to Stratonicus were actually said by him. As a professional cithara-player, he will have attracted anecdotes and sayings that suit his profession and imagined persona, whether or not there was a historical basis for attributing the sayings to him. See Gilula p. 429–33.

⁶⁷¹ The word “distortion” seems to be taken from the Loeb translation, in which “by a distortion” translates διελόντος (line 9). In the text-translation volumes, we prefer “separately,” i.e., “the words of the proverb . . . were spoken separately.” See above, note 647.

⁶⁷² Cf. Eustathius, *Commentary on Homer’s Odyssey* 9.366.

the initial position.⁶⁷³ Be that as it may, I do find the Theophrastean version more appealing. In the context in which it is spoken — it is directed at the actor Simycas — the two most important words bracket the proverb. “Large” picks up the actor’s (only) impressive quality, and “fish” finishes the proverb by intimating what is wrong: namely, the actor’s lack of voice. In addition, the use of “rotten” gives the proverb punch. The hearer or reader is encouraged to visualize and smell the fish, which does not happen when “rotten” is replaced with “bad.” Of course, philologists who thrive on intertextuality, are likely to think that the features that I have just cited pale in comparison with a sophisticated allusion to the *Odyssey*. But as a person who walks the beach on a daily basis, I cast my vote for the version that all but forces one to see and smell a fish that is all the worse for being big.⁶⁷⁴

Since Athenaeus makes explicit reference to Theophrastus’ work *On the Ludicrous*, the Theophrastean material in 710 is to be assigned to that work (666 no. 23). Were there no reference to *On the Ludicrous*, the text might be assigned to *On Delivery* (666 no. 24), for Simycas is said to be an actor and the humor depends on his lack of voice.⁶⁷⁵ The text, therefore, can serve as a reminder that assigning texts to works is risky business. Finally, we may wonder whether Theophrastus also made mention of Stratonicus’ remark in *On Proverbs* (727 no. 14) or collected several sayings of Stratonicus in that work. He would be doing no more than Clearchus, who recorded remarks by Stratonicus in both *On Friendship* and *On Proverbs*.⁶⁷⁶

711 Plutarch, *Table Talk* 2.1.4 631D–E (*BT* vol. 4 p. 48.5–13 Hubert)

Literature: Radermacher (1901) p. 101; Arndt (1904) p. 23–4; Mayer (1907–10) p. 495–6; Mittelhaus (1911) p. 49; Grant, M. (1924)

⁶⁷³ Whether the Clearchan version came first or second, we can say that playing on a line in Homer is a mark of sophistication and that this sophistication is repeated in other sayings of Stratonicus. For a play on *Odyssey* 4.535, see Athenaeus 8.41 349A, and for a play on *Iliad* 16.250, see Athenaeus 8.42 350D.

⁶⁷⁴ Athenaeus 3.85 116D–E cites Clearchus (fr. 82W) for a different proverb concerning fish, in which “rotten” enjoys pride of place: σαπρὸς τάριχος τὴν ὀρίγανον φιλεῖ, “Rotten salt fish likes (i.e., needs) marjoram.” We are not told to whom, if anyone, Clearchus attributed the proverb.

⁶⁷⁵ For voice and delivery, see 712.4. The text depends upon an emendation that I accept. See the commentary on 712.

⁶⁷⁶ References are given above.

p. 35–7, 65 n. 69; Orth (1926) col. 845–6; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1524; Bolkstein (1946) p. 108–9; Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 125 Janko (1984) p. 48, 210–11, (1987) p. 167; Rabbie (1986) p. xliii–iv; Innes (1985) p. 264–5 n. 16; Teodorsson (1989) p. 180–2, 196

In the second book of *Table Talk*, Plutarch discusses questions which diners enjoy answering (2.1.2–3) and jests (σκόμματα) which please rather than offend the person at whom they are directed (2.1.4–13). We are told that jesting should be avoided by persons who lack the capacity to jest with care and art at the right moment (2.1.4 631C), and that jesting may be more offensive than direct insult (λοιδορία). For an insult is often an unreflective expression of anger, while a jest appears to be deliberate abuse attributable to insolence (631C–D). There follow several examples of jesting (631D), after which comes our text.

The text of 711 is corrupt in several places. In lines 4 and 5, there are lacunae in the archetypal manuscript.⁶⁷⁷ The supplements printed are generally accepted,⁶⁷⁸ though τινος might better be read instead of τῆς in line 4. For Plutarch is almost certainly reporting a general definition: “jest is a concealed rebuke for *some* (or *an*) error.”⁶⁷⁹ In line 2, Hubert has placed an obelisk before ἡ τέρψις thereby indicating corruption. The proposed emendations are relatively minor, and one or the other may be correct; but the text as transmitted is not unreadable.⁶⁸⁰ In any case, these textual difficulties

⁶⁷⁷ The archetype is codex Vindobonensis Gr. 148, from the tenth or eleventh century. See Teodorsson p. 15.

⁶⁷⁸ In two cases, the supplements find some support in Macrobius, who apparently knew a better text of Plutarch than that which has come down to us (Mittelhaus 49): in regard to πιστεύειν (δοκοῦσι καὶ συν)διασύρειν τῷ λέγοντι (line 4), see *Saturnalia* 7.3.5 *quo velut adsensus genere confirmatur iniuria*; and in regard to παρε(σχηματισμένος τὸ) (line 5), see 7.3.2 *morsum figuratum*. In the later case, Paton proposed reading παρε(μφαινόμενος τὸ), which finds some support in the *Tractatus Coislinianus*, where comedy is distinguished from direct insult and said to need the so-called innuendo: ἡ δὲ δεῖται τῆς καλουμένης ἐμφάσεως (4 p. 52 Kaibel, VII p. 36 Janko).

⁶⁷⁹ Turnebus proposed τῆς, and Bolkstein τινος. The latter cites *inter alia* Aristotle, *Poetics* 5 1449a34–5, where the ludicrous is defined as *an* error and ugliness: ἀμάρτημά τι καὶ αἷσχος.

⁶⁸⁰ Bolkstein has proposed reading ἡ τέρψις, (ἡ) τῇ κομψότητι καθιδύνηι τοὺς παρόντας and Post has suggested ἡ τέρψις τῇ κομψότητι καθ’ ὅσον ἡδύνηι τοὺς παρόντας (printed in the Loeb edition). For other proposals see the *apparatus criticus* of Hubert and the notes of Bolkstein and Teodorsson. The last named observes that the words in question can be read without emendation. He suggests the following translation: “Through the elegance (of the jokes) the delight (they produce) causes distress to the ridiculed and pleasure to (the rest of) the company.”

are not serious impediments to a correct understanding of what Plutarch is saying.

In **711**, Plutarch tells us that a jest causes pain which persists, and that the pleasure felt by those present is painful to the person at whom the jest is aimed, for those present seem to believe the person making the jest and to join in the ridicule. Next Plutarch reports that Theophrastus called the jest a concealed rebuke for error. Finally Plutarch says that the listener supplies on his own what is not said explicitly, thereby giving the impression that he knows and believes what the speaker is saying. It is possible that the final statement is Plutarch's own; but it is also possible and perhaps more likely that Plutarch continues to draw on Theophrastus. Grammatically the final statement is closely tied to what precedes; and what is said in the statement recalls **696**, where we are told that Theophrastus recommended leaving some things for the listener to infer. Similarities in vocabulary relate the two passages: ἐξ αὐτοῦ, "for himself," "on his own" (**696.3** and **711.6**); τὸ ἐλλειφθέν, "what was left out," and τὸ ἐλλείπον, "what is missing" (**696.3** and **711.6–7**). So does the underlying interest in listener psychology: when a listener supplies what is omitted, he is pleased and becomes a witness (**696.4**), or at least he appears to believe the speaker and even to have knowledge of what is insinuated (**711.4, 7**).

Our text is immediately followed by an illustrative anecdote concerning Theocritus of Chios, a contemporary of Theophrastus, who was well-known for caustic remarks. A reputed thief, we are told, asked Theocritus whether he was going out to dinner; the Chian replied that he was going out and that he would, of course, spend the night.⁶⁸¹ Plutarch comments that the person who laughed at the reply resembles one who confirms the slander (2.1.4 631E–F). Given the proximity of Theophrastean material and the Eresian's interest in listener psychology, it is tempting to believe that both the anecdote and subsequent comment derive from Theophrastus. That is not impossible, but we should keep in mind that Plutarch refers to Theocritus on several occasions,⁶⁸² and that he was not dependent upon Theophrastus for his knowledge of Theocritus. In the case of the reputed thief (631E–F), Plutarch's source, whether direct or indirect,

⁶⁸¹ In saying that he would spend the night with his host, Theocritus was indirectly inviting the thief to steal from his empty house.

⁶⁸² See *On the Education of Children* 14 11A–C, *On Compiancy* 14 534B, *On Exile* 10 603C and *Table Talk* 2.1.9 633C.

is likely to have been the Chian Bryon, who wrote a monograph *On Theocritus* (Diog. Laert., *Lives* 5.11).⁶⁸³ There may, of course, be other anecdotes recorded by Plutarch which do in fact derive from Theophrastus. A possibility is Leon's reply to Pasiades (2.1.9 633C–D). Mittelhaus suggests that it is taken from Theophrastus' work *On the Ludicrous*, and he may be correct. But no convincing argument for the attribution is offered; it is not good enough to mention *On the Ludicrous* and then to suggest that any material concerning tactful jesting will have been taken from that work.⁶⁸⁴

The mention of ἀμαρτία, “error” or “failing,” in line 5 of our text recalls Aristotle's definition of the ludicrous or laughable in *Poetics* 5: τὸ γὰρ γελοῖόν ἐστιν ἀμάρτημά τι καὶ αἷσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν, “The ludicrous is an error (or failing) and ugliness that is painless and not destructive” (1449a34–5). An even more striking parallel is found in the *Tractatus Coislinianus* 5, where jesting and error are mentioned together: ὁ σκώπτων ἐλέγχειν θέλει ἀμαρτήματα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, “The man who jests wishes to expose mistakes of mind and body” (p. 52 Kaibel = 8 p. 36 Janko). Since the *Tractatus* summarizes Peripatetic theory, it is tempting to see Theophrastean influence in these words of the *Tractatus*. But seeing here may be imagining; no proof is possible.

Our text also relates to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Nicomachean Ethics*. In regard to the *Rhetoric*, we may compare 3.11, where Aristotle calls attention to playful thrusts that do not mean what they appear to say. According to Aristotle, they are pleasant to the listener who understands them (μαθόντι ἡδύ 1412b2). Concerning the *Ethics*, we may refer to 4.8, where Aristotle discusses proper forms of social interaction (ὁμιλία 1127b34). He defines the jest as a kind of abuse (τὸ γὰρ σκῶμμα λοιδόρημά τι ἐστίν 1128a30) and recognizes a feature common to tactful jesting and new (i.e., contemporary) comedies: both avoid direct abuse in favor of innuendo (ὕπόνοια

⁶⁸³ The manuscripts of Diogenes have the name Ambryon. For the correction see R. Laqueur, “Theokritos,” *RE* 5A col. 2025.

⁶⁸⁴ Mittelhaus 49: *Scripserat Theophrastus Περὶ γελοίου. . . . Ad hunc igitur deperditum Theophrasti librum referenda esse puto quaecumque de recto ac moderato σκώμματος usu apud Plutarchum leguntur. Exempli gratia Theophrasti esse videntur quae de Leonis Byzantini scommatis tradidit Plutarchus.* The mention of a Theophrastean jest shortly before the anecdote concerning Leon does little to support Mittelhaus' suggestion. See below, p. 395–6, on 31. A negative result concerning individual anecdotes does not, of course, contradict the more general claim that much of what Plutarch says concerning tactful jesting is fundamentally Peripatetic. See Arndt p. 23–4.

1128a24). That relates directly to our text: i.e., to the statement that the listener supplies mentally (ὑπονοίᾳ, line 6) what is not said.⁶⁸⁵

The Theophrastean portion of text **711** most likely derives from the work *On the Ludicrous* (**666** no. 23); however, the definition of the ludicrous in Aristotle's *Poetics* and the characterization of the jester in the *Tractatus Coislinianus* suggest *On Comedy* (**666** no. 22). Less probable sources, but still possible, are *Concerning Social Interaction* (Ὀμιλητικός **436** no. 32) and *On Style* (**666** no. 17a).⁶⁸⁶

31 Plutarch, *Table Talk* 2.1.9 633B (BT vol. 4 p. 51.25–9 Hubert)

Literature: Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 125; Teodorsson (1989) p. 192–3

Like text **711**, text **31** is part of Plutarch's discussion of tactful jests. **711** is found toward the beginning of the discussion; **31** occurs later, more than half way through the discussion. In the section immediately preceding **31**, Plutarch draws a distinction between diseased and normal habits: e.g., between those of the miser and those of the musical individual. He explains that jests directed toward the former cause offense, while those aimed at the latter do not (2.1.8). In the next section, Plutarch applies the distinction to physical characteristics (2.1.9). Text **31** comes at the beginning of that section.

The last word of the first sentence, πολλῶν (line 1), is difficult and perhaps corrupt. Pohlenz has conjectured γελοίων, Madvig ποιῶν, Hembold and Bolkstein ποιότητων. The last conjecture is printed by Clement in the Loeb edition and would give good sense: "Such *qualitative* differences also exist in the case of bodily phenomena." Nevertheless, the manuscript reading is not unintelligible, so that Hubert's Teubner text has been printed without alteration in our text-translation volume.⁶⁸⁷

Plutarch considers jests directed toward bodily phenomena. He observes that men laugh when they are teased about a hooked or

⁶⁸⁵ The same word, ὑπόνοια, is used in two closely related ways. In the *Ethics*, it refers to a mode of expression in which the speaker leaves something unsaid or otherwise obscures the real meaning of his words; in the Theophrastean text it refers to the mental act whereby the listener grasps the meaning behind the speaker's words.

⁶⁸⁶ According to Mayer, Theophrastus' definition of the jest derives from *On Style*, and Plutarch has it via Ariston of Ceus.

⁶⁸⁷ I want to state clearly that the manuscript reading, that of T = codex Vind. Gr. 148, is not attractive and may be corrupt; still, Teodorsson seems to express himself too strongly when he says "τῶν πολλῶν T is meaningless" (p. 192).

snub nose. The observation is then illustrated by a remark of Theophrastus: “I am amazed that your eyes do not sing, since your nose gives them the pitch.” The remark is directed at an unidentified friend of Cassander.⁶⁸⁸ The humor in Theophrastus’ remark depends on ambiguity in the use of ἐνδιδόναι: the verb can mean “give in” or “give the pitch.”⁶⁸⁹ Being snub the nose of Cassander’s friend might be said “to give in” or “to yield”; but since Theophrastus first expresses surprise that the eyes do not sing, ἐνδιδόναι is readily understood to mean “give the pitch.”⁶⁹⁰

As recorded in our text, Theophrastus’ remark may be said to illustrate the definition of the jest in **711**. Snubness is a kind of physical error or failing (ἀμάρτημα); the jest is disguised (παρεσχηματισμένος) by the ambiguity which needs interpretation (ὑπόνοια). That might suggest that the two texts derive from the same work by Theophrastus, perhaps *On the Ludicrous* (**666** no. 23). But caution here is in order, not only because the source of **711** is uncertain, but also because **31** may not derive from a Theophrastean work. The remark attributed to the Eresian may have been recorded by a historian, a biographer or a collector of witticisms. It may even be an invention of the Hellenistic period⁶⁹¹ or an erroneous attribution at a later date.⁶⁹² Be that as it may, we know very little about the relevant works of Theophrastus. In particular, we do not know whether he mentioned his own jests in *On the Ludicrous*. If that work was an esoteric treatise, we may think it unlikely. However, if

⁶⁸⁸ As friends of Cassander, Teodorsson lists Demetrius of Phalerum, Deinarchus the rhetor and the author Euemerus; but Teodorsson is clear that the friend in question cannot be identified (p. 193).

⁶⁸⁹ LSJ p. 560 s.v. V.1 and VI.

⁶⁹⁰ Out of context, the jest could be interpreted in a different way. We might take μυκτῶρ in its primary sense of “nostril” and say that the joke is directed at some individual who regularly snorts or otherwise makes a nasal sound. But in the context of Plutarch’s *Table Talk*, the jest can only be construed as making fun of a snub nose. For a reference to snubness precedes (line 2), and there follows Cyrus’ advice to a hooked-nose officer: he should marry a snub-nosed woman (633C, not printed in the text-translation volume). Moreover, if the jest is directed at someone who repeatedly snorts, it would probably be offensive to that individual and therefore all the more of out of context, for here Plutarch is concerned with jests which occasion laughter (the first illustration of offensive jesting comes after the reference to Cyrus in 633C).

⁶⁹¹ An invented *dictum* may have roots in fact; it may be based on and intended to illustrate a known life style or set of beliefs.

⁶⁹² It is possible that Theophrastus reported someone else’s witty remark without naming the person, and that at a later time the remark was erroneously attributed to Theophrastus, perhaps by a collector of *dicta*.

we consider a dialogue — *Concerning Social Interaction* may have been a dialogue — in which Theophrastus took part, it is easier to imagine Theophrastus quoting a jest of his own. But all that is highly speculative.

453 *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, no. 327 (*WSt* vol. 10 [1888] p. 258 Sternbach)

Literature: Fortenbaugh (1984) p. 178–9

Text **453** is one of fifteen sayings attributed to Theophrastus in the so-called *Gnomologium Vaticanum*. Fourteen of the sayings may be regarded as ethical; one is political.⁶⁹³ Our text (saying no. 327 in *Gnom. Vat.*) occurs between an injunction to judge people before making them friends (no. 326 = **538E**) and one admonishing us to remember persons who have done us a kindness (no. 328 = **525**). Like its neighbors, **453** is primarily ethical.

According to our text, Theophrastus said that the subjects of ridiculous remarks ought to be such that the listener takes pleasure in them and that the speaker feels no shame. As expressed, the recommendation is quite general. The phrase τὰ γελοίων (line 1) covers all kinds of ludicrous remarks, including but not restricted to jests that make fun of someone else. Similarly the reference to the listener, ὁ ἀκούων (line 1), is general, so that it may include the bystander as well as the person toward whom a jest is directed. This generality may reflect accurately what Theophrastus said, but equally it may result from the removal of all context material and possibly from rewording by a collector of sayings or an editor. In the latter case, it may be that Theophrastus' special concern was the jest, τὸ σκῶμμα, which makes fun of an individual by mocking some failing. We have Theophrastus' definition of the jest (**711.4–5**) and know that propriety in jesting was of especial interest to Aristotle, who discussed the topic in both the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics* (*EN* 4.8 1127b34–1128b9, *EE* 3.7 1234a4–23).⁶⁹⁴

Although **453** is at home among the ethical texts, it has obvious connections with rhetoric and comedy. For example, the orator may introduce the ludicrous for pleasant relief or in an effort to obscure

⁶⁹³ The fifteen are numbered 322 to 336 in Sternbach's edition. The exception is no. 335 = **610**. It concerns the advantage of political arrangement.

⁶⁹⁴ Cf. the pseudo-Aristotelian *Magna Moralia* 1.30 1193a11–19.

the serious message of an adversary; but in doing so, he should try to avoid remarks which do not befit a gentleman and for which he will feel ashamed (cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3.18 1419b2–9). In the case of comedy, the playwright aims to arouse pleasant laughter in the audience and therefore does well to avoid unseemly jests which may offend rather than delight (cf. Arist. *EN* 4.8 1128a22–5).

Text **31** may derive from several different works. *On the Ludi-crous* (**666** no. 23) comes to mind, but so do, e.g., *Ethics*, *Varieties of Virtue* and *Concerning Social Interaction* (**436** no. 2a, 7, 32).

10. Delivery

In oratory, in the recitation of epic poetry and on the stage, delivery (ὑπόκρισις) plays an important role. Changes in voice affect comprehension and add emphasis to what is being said. Bodily motions have a similar effect, and both can be used to express character and emotion. Normally voice and bodily motion are brought into line with style (λέξις). The relationship here is not one of parallel tracks but one of mutual dependence. The elements of style, i.e., diction and composition, determine delivery and lose their effectiveness when deprived of proper delivery. Conversely changes of voice and emphatic gestures appear silly or worse if they are not supported by an appropriate style. There are, of course, situations in which one wants to be silly, e.g., when telling jokes or playing a comic role in the theater. For the most part, however, style and delivery should work together, in order that the orator be persuasive and the rhapsodist and actor have a proper effect on the audience.⁶⁹⁵

Formulating a satisfactory account of delivery was not an early occurrence in the development of rhetorical and poetic theory. Practical instruction by professional actors came first and only slowly did theoretical discussion follow. Aristotle says that the subject had been ignored by rhetoricians⁶⁹⁶ and only recently found its way into the art

⁶⁹⁵ The qualifier “for the most part” is important, for unbroken (excessive) correspondence between style and delivery can have a negative effective, especially when the correspondence is glaringly obvious and therefore appears contrived. See Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3.7 1408b4–10.

⁶⁹⁶ Some scholars have thought that Aristotle subsequently qualifies this statement, saying that Thrasymachus offered at least brief remarks on delivery in the work *Appeals to Pity* (3.1 1404a12–15). It seems to me, however, more natural to read the later passage in such a way that Thrasymachus is credited with an attempt to deal with style. See Fortenbaugh (1985) 284 n. 2.

of tragedy and epic recitation (*Rhet.* 3.1 1403b21–3). Glaucon of Teos, most probably the rhapsodist mentioned in Plato's *Ion*,⁶⁹⁷ is reported to have worked on the subject (1403b26–7), but neither his work nor that of other contemporaries seems to have taken the subject very far. Plato recognized the importance of delivery,⁶⁹⁸ but for political and ethical reasons he disparaged it (cf. *Rep.* 3 392C6–398B9). Aristotle's remarks in *Rhetoric* 3.1 are largely in line with those of his teacher.⁶⁹⁹ He calls the subject vulgar and attributes its effectiveness to the defects of the audience (1403b34–5, 1404a7–8).⁷⁰⁰ He does, however, acknowledge the exceptional power of delivery and the success it brings in political debate (1403b21, 34).

Aristotle refers delivery to voice, saying that it is a matter of how one uses the voice in relation to each emotion (1403b27–8). The connection with emotion is straightforward and also important for understanding Aristotle's negative remarks concerning delivery. These remarks are part of an ideal view of oratory, which emphasizes arguing the issue and rejects emotional appeal. Aristotle advanced such a view at an early period in his development, to which *Rhetoric* 3.1 belongs. Later after he had thoroughly investigated emotional response, his attitude toward emotion changed, and emotional appeal was recognized as a proper part of rhetorical persuasion.⁷⁰¹ This change might have prompted a revision of his comments on delivery, but apparently no such revision was undertaken.

The mention of voice alone in 3.1 is striking, especially when one realizes that elsewhere in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle treats gesture and facial expression alongside voice (2.8 1386a32, 3.7 1408b6).⁷⁰²

⁶⁹⁷ See Plato, *Ion* 530D1. The same Glaucon may be mentioned by Aristotle at *Poetics* 25 1461b1; but as pointed out by Lucas 247, the name is not unusual.

⁶⁹⁸ See, e.g., *Protagoras* 315A5–B1, where the eponymous sophist is said to attract foreigners, charming them with his voice in the manner of Orpheus.

⁶⁹⁹ Cf. *Rhetoric* 3.1 1403b34–5 with Plato's *Republic* 3 397E1; for further discussion, see Fortenbaugh (1986) p. 252–3.

⁷⁰⁰ On 1403b34–5, see M. Lossau, "μοχθηρία τῶν πολιτειῶν und ὑπόκρισις: Zu Aristot. *Rhet.* 3,1, 1403b34f," *Rheinisches Museum* 114 (1971) p. 146–58. Lossau connects the passage with Aristotle's negative assessment of radical democracy and a democratic populace that welcomes exaggerated delivery.

⁷⁰¹ See Fortenbaugh (1996) p. 173–80.

⁷⁰² *Rhet.* 2.8 1386a32 is of special interest in that it may mention clothing as well as voice and gesture, but the text is uncertain. See Fortenbaugh (1985) 285 n. 9. Whatever the correct reading, it is true that clothing can be used along with voice and gesture to arouse an emotion (e.g. pity 1386a33). Clothing can also be a means of expressing character and commanding attention. We may compare 12.1–2, where Theophrastus is said to have arrived for his lectures "looking splendid and all decked out."

Furthermore, in the *Poetics*, Aristotle does not ignore voice (19 1456b8–13, 20 1457a21–2), but his fullest remarks concern bodily movement. In chapter 26, he entertains the idea that tragedy is inferior to rhapsody, because it is directed toward a worthless audience that depends on gesture for comprehension (1461b26–1462a4). The idea is rejected partly on the grounds that tragedy can work its effect when read aloud (1462a11–14), but Aristotle is also clear that the criticism of tragedy focuses on an excessive use of gesture which had not always been true of tragic performance (1462a5–11). There was, then, a clear recognition on the part of Aristotle that delivery involves more than voice, but he seems never to have composed an inclusive account of the topic. In all probability, he left that to Theophrastus, who wrote a work entitled *On Delivery* (666 no. 24).⁷⁰³

712 Athanasius, *Prefatory Remarks to Hermogenes' On Issues* (*RhGr* vol. 14 p. 177.3–8 Rabe)

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 61; Diels (1886) p. 33–4; Kayser (1906) p. 26; Krumbacher (1920) p. 33–4; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1526; Matthes (1958) p. 213–14; Kennedy (1963) p. 283; Lossau (1964) p. 48; Calboli (1969) p. 265–7; Fortenbaugh (1985a) p. 270–2; Wöhrle (1990) p. 39; Conley (1994) p. 222, 227, 233; Matelli (1999) p. 53–73; Vallozza (2000a) p. 271–81, (2000b) p. 229–31

Text **712** is found in Rabe's edition of excerpts taken from the *Prefatory Remarks* of Athanasius. It is part of an excerpt in which the functions or tasks of an orator (ἔργα ῥήτορος, p. 175.16 Rabe) are discussed. Four tasks are named and then treated briefly one after the other: consideration of the issue (p. 175.16–21), invention (p. 175.21–176.4), arrangement (p. 176.4–12) and delivery (p. 176.12–177.8). The discussion of delivery mentions gesture, look and voice, recognizes the possibility of exaggeration, states that the actor Andronicus first introduced the subject, quotes Demosthenes, who said that rhetoric is delivery, and names the actor Polus, who is said to have taught Demosthenes (p. 176.12–177.3). After that comes **712**.

⁷⁰³ The work may have been an *opusculum* of modest length. See the commentary on 666 no. 24.

In a recent article, Elisabetta Matelli has investigated five manuscripts that contain our text. Her investigation considers not only the lines printed as **712** (p. 177.3–8 Rabe) but also the preceding lines that deal with delivery (p. 176.12–177.3). On the basis of textual variants, Matelli demonstrates convincingly that there are two branches to the textual tradition. One branch is represented by a single manuscript, the other by four. The two branches are also marked by a difference in title. The branch represented by a single manuscript has “From the (Prefatory Remarks) of Athanasius” (Ἐκ τῶν Ἀθανασίου κτλ.); in the case of the other branch, reference is made to an Anonymous.⁷⁰⁴ For our purposes, the important result of the investigation is that the several manuscripts fail to support two readings that are printed by Rabe and appear in the text of **712**. One of the readings is ῥήτορι (line 2). It is a conjecture by Rabe; the manuscripts are unanimous in reading ῥητορικῇ. The conjecture accomplishes nothing — on either reading, delivery is recognized as most important, μέγιστον, in regard to persuasion — and should be relegated to the *apparatus criticus* or simply passed over in silence.

The other reading is φωνῆς (line 4); here all the manuscripts exhibit ψυχῆς. That speaks for reading ψυχῆς, and Matelli chooses to do so. She recognizes that the phrase τὸν τόνον τῆς ψυχῆς (line 4 altered to agree with the mss.) has a Stoic ring, but she believes that Theophrastus had his own notion of psychic tension.⁷⁰⁵ The difficulty here is finding texts that support such a belief. To be sure, Matelli does discuss at length three passages from Galen’s work *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*.⁷⁰⁶ The first occurs at the beginning of Book 6, where the psychology of Aristotle and Theophrastus is contrasted with that of Hippocrates and Plato. According to the former, psychic capacities are located in the heart; according to the latter, there are three locations: the brain, heart and liver (6.1.1–2 = **330**). The second passage is found toward the end of Book 6, where Galen quotes Plato’s *Timaeus* 70B, “in order that when the strength of anger boils,” and then comments that the philosophers after Plato “made this a definition of anger, saying that it is a boiling of the heat

⁷⁰⁴ Matelli (1999) p. 54–6.

⁷⁰⁵ The following criticism of Matelli’s view was written before I had read the article of Maddalena Vallozza (2000a) p. 271–81. Since we agree in rejecting the reading ψυχῆς, and since our criticisms of Matelli’s view are complementary, I have decided to leave my comment as written and to encourage the interested reader to study the arguments of Vallozza.

⁷⁰⁶ Matelli (1999) p. 63–4.

(or hot matter) in the heart”: ὁρισμὸν τοῦτον ἐποιήσαντο τοῦ θυμοῦ, ζέσιν εἶναι φάσκοντες αὐτὸν τοῦ κατὰ τὴν καρδίαν θερμοῦ (6.8.74). In connection with this passage, Matelli cites Theophrastus’ work *On Sweat* 36 and says that Theophrastus belongs among the philosophers after Plato. For in *On Sweat*, anger is defined as “a boiling of the heat (hot matter) around the heart”: ζέσις τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν θερμοῦ. The third passage occurs in Book 7. Galen says that he has established the tripartite division of psychic capacities and then summarizes the work of each of the three parts. In this context, Galen tells us that the part situated in the heart provides the tension of the soul, steadfastness in what reason commands and the boiling of innate heat when the soul desires revenge (7.3.2). Here we have the phrase ὁ τόπος τῆς ψυχῆς and also a reference to boiling when angry. But does this passage, in combination with the others cited by Matelli, speak strongly for adopting the manuscript reading in 712.4? I do not think so. The first passage is introductory and says nothing about psychic tension. The second passage does not name Theophrastus, but it does invite comparison with Theophrastus’ definition of anger. That is interesting, but it may tell against the manuscript reading. For the definition is taken over *verbatim* from Aristotle, *On Soul* 1.1 403a31–b1,⁷⁰⁷ where the definition is carefully distinguished from a complete definition of anger, which mentions not only the material side of anger but also its cause and goal (403a27): namely, the thought of outrage and revenge. As far as I can tell, Theophrastus’ understanding of anger is in all essentials Aristotelian: it involves the thought of outrage and a desire for revenge as well as the boiling of hot matter in the region of the heart.⁷⁰⁸ That makes for a complex notion of anger, but not for one that depends on a special Theophrastean notion of psychic tension. Finally, the third passage is not about Theophrastus. There is, of course, mention of the tension of the soul and of the boiling of innate heat, but Galen is discussing the tripartite soul, which is foreign to Theophrastus.

Another passage cited by Matelli is found in Philo the Jew, *On the Eternity of the Universe* 24.125 = 184.47.⁷⁰⁹ Here the phrase πνευματικὸς τόπος occurs within an explanation that is introduced by Philo. Almost certainly he is responsible for the language, which

⁷⁰⁷ Or almost *verbatim*, for the definition in *On Soul* includes a reference to blood: ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος καὶ θερμοῦ.

⁷⁰⁸ Fortenbaugh (1985b) p. 209–12. In *On Sweats* 36, Theophrastus mentions only the material side of anger, for his focus is physiological.

⁷⁰⁹ Matelli p. 65–6.

is Stoic.⁷¹⁰ In contrast, the phrase ὁ τόνος τῆς φωνῆς (Rabe's text) has a Peripatetic ring. We may cite Aristotle, who discusses delivery, refers to the voice of the orator and uses the word τόνος in the plural to refer to high, low and intermediate pitch (*Rhetoric* 3.1 1403b29, cf. 1413b31). Similarly, Hieronymus of Rhodes tells us that the speeches of Isocrates cannot be presented publicly, and in doing so he uses τόνος in reference to the pitch of the orator's voice (Philodemus, *Rhetoric* 1.198 Sudhaus and Dionysius Halicarnassus, *On Isocrates* 13 = 38A–B White).⁷¹¹ Furthermore, reading φωνῆς makes good sense. The immediately preceding words, τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ σώματος, refer to the motions of the orator's body, i.e., his gestures and facial expressions. They are external manifestations of the orator's emotions and attitudes,⁷¹² and they are exactly what one expects in a discussion of delivery. It would be remarkable, indeed, to follow immediately with a phrase referring to the internal condition of the orator, i.e., to the tension of his soul. Far more likely is a continuation and completion of the external manifestations that constitute delivery. In the case of our text, that would be a reference to the pitch of the orator's voice.

The preceding considerations encourage me to follow Rabe and to emend the text to read φωνῆς, thereby removing Stoic language from the text. Nevertheless, the issue is not simple, for even if φωνῆς properly represents the thinking of Theophrastus, it is not clear at what point ψυχῆς entered the textual tradition. All we know is that five manuscripts representing two branches exhibit ψυχῆς. Moreover, the title which names Athanasius — Ἐκ τῶν Ἀθανασίου τοῦ σοφιστοῦ Ἀλεξανδρείας, ᾧ Ζώσιμος ὁ Θέωνος διωρθώσατο μαθητῆς, τὰ χρησιμώτατα — tells us that Athanasius' work was corrected by Zosimus, and that what we have today are excerpts from that work.⁷¹³ Assuming the title is not misleading (it is found in

⁷¹⁰ Cf. D. Sedley, "Theophrastus and Epicurean Physics," in *Theophrastus: Reappraising the Sources*, ed. by J. van Ophuijsen and M. van Raalte (New Brunswick: Transaction 1998) = Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities vol. 8 p. 332–3. On the Stoic doctrine in general, see, e.g., J. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge: University Press 1969) p. 86–8 and A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy* (London: Duckworth 1974) p. 156–8.

⁷¹¹ Conley p. 222.

⁷¹² Caveat: the skilled orator may use gesture and facial expression to mask his real emotions and attitudes.

⁷¹³ We may translate the title in two ways: either "The most useful (material excerpted) from the (Prefatory Remarks) of Athanasius, the sophist of Alexandria, which (Prefatory Remarks) were corrected by Zosimus, the pupil of Theon," or

only one manuscript), ψυχῆς may have entered the tradition at several places. It is possible that Athanasius himself wrote ψυχῆς, in which case we may prefer to print ψυχῆς and thereby present what he wrote, “warts and all.” But it is also possible that the corrector changed what Athanasius wrote, or that the change occurred when the excerpts were made. Or it may be that a scribe copying the excerpts introduced ψυχῆς prior to the division of the manuscripts into two branches.⁷¹⁴

Leaving behind textual problems,⁷¹⁵ we can say that what **712** presents is not a quotation but a report. Nevertheless, the opening portion — πλὴν καὶ Θεόφραστος ὁ φιλόσοφος ὁμοίως φησὶ μέγιστον εἶναι ῥητορικῇ πρὸς τὸ πείσαι τὴν ὑπόκρισιν (lines 1–2, reading ῥητορικῇ instead of ῥήτορι) — may well contain Theophrastus’ own words, albeit put into indirect discourse and perhaps abbreviated. Of course, the idea that delivery provides the “greatest” (help) in regard to persuasion picks up what has been previously said with reference to Demosthenes: namely, that delivery is the greatest help for the orator: ὅτι μέγιστον τὸ ὑποκρίνεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ὄφελος (p. 176.20 Rabe).⁷¹⁶ But the idea is also found in Aristotle’s

“The most useful (material excerpted) from the (Prefatory Remarks) of Athanasius, the sophist of Alexandria, which (material) was corrected by Zosimus, the pupil of Theon.” I am inclined to accept the first translation, so that Zosimus corrected the text of Athanasius before the excerpts were made. Perhaps the excerptor brackets the references to Athanasius and to Zosimus with the words Ἐκ τῶν and τὰ χρησιμώτατα, because he found both references in the manuscript from which he drew the excerpts. Kennedy (1983) speaks of Zosimus as the editor of Athanasius’ work (p. 120); later he makes Zosimus responsible for the excerpts (p. 170). There is little certainty here, but the word διορθώσατο suggests that Zosimus corrected the text of Athanasius. Thomas Conley has called my attention to *Prolegomena* no. 21, *RhGr* vol. 14 p. 319.14, where διορθούμενος is used of correcting.

⁷¹⁴ It may be argued that ψυχῆς is the *lectio difficilior*, and for that reason ψυχῆς should be read. The argument has some force, but it is not decisive, for there are plenty of cases in which the *lectio difficilior* is not to be preferred. Moreover, after the Stoics had developed the notion of psychic tension, a person familiar with their doctrine might easily introduce the reading ψυχῆς. The person might be thinking for himself and quite consciously change the text, or he might be confronted with a badly written passage, in which case guessing ψυχῆς instead of φωνῆς is an easy mistake.

⁷¹⁵ I pass over the suggestion of Rabe that ἐπιστήμη in line 3 is corrupt. (See the *apparatus criticus*.) One may ask what science Theophrastus has in mind, but that is not in itself sufficient reason to emend the text.

⁷¹⁶ These words concerning the importance of delivery are immediately preceded by a report concerning the actor Andronicus. Men, we are told, say that he was the first to introduce delivery when Demosthenes was experiencing failure in the presentation of his speeches (p. 176.17–19). Vallozza (2000b) p. 229–31 thinks that both this report and the subsequent statement concerning the importance of

Rhetoric, where delivery is said to have the greatest power: δύνανται μὲν ἔχει μεγίστην (3.1 1403b21).⁷¹⁷ Theophrastus, we may assume, made the idea his own, describing delivery as the “greatest” help with regard to persuasion: μέγιστον πρὸς τὸ πείσαι.⁷¹⁸

The words that follow in **712** — εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀναφέρων καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὴν κατανόησιν τούτων — are problematic. In the text-translation volume, we translated “referring to the principles and the emotions of the soul and the knowledge of these.” An alternative translation is “referring both the emotions of the soul and the knowledge of these to the principles.” Either way, Theophrastus followed Aristotle in associating delivery with emotion (*Rhet.* 3.1 1403b28). At this point, one wants to know whether Theophrastus offered an analysis of the emotions adequate to the needs of the orator. For all its virtues, Aristotle’s analysis in *Rhetoric* 2.2–11 is inadequate, for it ignores voice and bodily movement.⁷¹⁹ It is quite possible that Theophrastus offered an adequate analysis, for we are told that he took note of facial expression as a manifestation of emotional response (447.10–11). But that is not reported in our text. All we are told is that Theophrastus’ handling of emotions was based on principles. In my judgment, the principles in question are those of psychology. Theophrastus will have followed not only

delivery were to be found in Theophrastus’ work *On Style*. Moreover, she suggests that both are found in Quintilian, *Oratorical Education* 11.3.6–7, because of Quintilian’s reading of Theophrastus. That is possible, but, as Vallazzo is careful to acknowledge, it is also speculative. For some cautionary reflections, see above “The Sources” on Quintilian.

⁷¹⁷ In 3.1 Aristotle tells us that he has discussed argument based on the facts. He then turns to style and delivery, and says that the latter has the greatest power (1403b21).

⁷¹⁸ Tying delivery to persuasion is also Aristotelian, in that the Stagirite makes persuasion central to his rhetorical theory. **712**, then, concerns the orator and his delivery; it does not deal with actors and rhapsodists who do not have persuasion as a primary goal. Of course, there may be moments when actors and rhapsodists want to persuade their audience that something is or should be the case (cf., e.g., Aristophanes’ use of the *parabasis* in *Clouds* 518–626 and 1115–30), but on the whole their aim — what ultimately controls and guides their delivery — is not to effect a particular decision or choice of action.

⁷¹⁹ Aristotle’s analysis of individual emotions in *Rhet.* 2.2–11 focuses on the dispositions of men prone to emotion, the persons toward whom emotions are directed and the grounds that underlie emotional response. For fuller discussion see, “Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* on Emotion,” *Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 (1970) p. 53–64 and *Aristotle on Emotion* (London: Duckworth 1975) p. 12–16. Failure to consider voice and bodily movement may relate to the fact that originally Aristotle’s analysis of emotion may not have been (most likely was not) written for the *Rhetoric*. See Fortenbaugh (1996) p. 175.

Aristotle but also Plato, who insisted that the orator acquire knowledge of the soul (*Phaedrus* 270C1–2, 271A1–272B2). For as our text goes on to explain, a well-grounded knowledge of the emotions makes possible (literally, results in) a delivery which is in harmony with the entire science (τῇ ὅλῃ ἐπιστήμῃ σύμφωνον, line 4), i.e., with psychology.

A different interpretation is offered by Armin Krumbacher.⁷²⁰ On his view, the principles to which Theophrastus refers (εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀναφέρων) are the principles of delivery and not those of psychology. In addition, he thinks that the text pairs the emotions of the speaker with the audience's apprehension of these emotions (καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὴν κατανόησιν τούτων)⁷²¹ and that the science in question (τῇ ὅλῃ ἐπιστήμῃ) is that of delivery and not psychology. This interpretation is possible, but the absence of any explicit reference to the audience — not just in **712** but in the entire discussion of delivery (p. 176.12–177.8 Rabe) of which **712** is a part⁷²² — speaks against it. In addition, there is no compelling reason to construe the phrase τὴν κατανόησιν τούτων as a reference to the audience's perception of the speaker's emotional condition. To be sure, κατανόησις may be used of perception, but it seems to me more likely that in our text κατανόησις refers to scientific knowledge of the emotions. We may compare Plato's *Phaedrus* 270C1, where Socrates asks whether it is possible to know (κατανοεῖν) the nature of the soul apart from the nature of the whole.⁷²³ Finally, the science

⁷²⁰ Krumbacher translates **712** as follows: “Ausserdem bezeichnet in gleicher Weise auch der Philosoph Theophrast die Hypokrisis als den wichtigsten Faktor der Rhetorik für die Beredung, indem er sie auf ihre Prinzipien zurückführt, die seelischen Affekte und deren Wahrnehmung, sodass auch mit der ganzen Wissenschaft (des Vortrags) im Einklang steht die Bewegung des Körpers und der Ton der Stimme” (33).

⁷²¹ In translating τὴν κατανόησιν τούτων with “la loro precezione” Matelli p. 59 is following Krumbacher p. 33–4. She is also looking forward to her subsequent analysis of the larger phrase εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀναφέρων καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὴν κατανόησιν τούτων. She cites **301A** and **B**, takes note of how sensation leads to thought, and concludes that Theophrastus applied his epistemology to the reception of the emotions on the part of the audience: “l'interesse gnoseologica di Teofrasto era rivolta alla ricezione delle passioni da parte del pubblico” (p. 61).

⁷²² The discussion begins by mentioning the gesture, look and voice of the orator (p. 176.12–13 Rabe), and in my judgment, it ends by mentioning the orator's bodily movement and the tone of his voice (p. 177.7 Rabe = **712.4**). The movement of the body (p. 177.7 Rabe) may be thought to include both gesture and look or facial expression (p. 176.12–13).

⁷²³ It might be objected that this interpretation renders the words καὶ τὴν

(ἐπιστήμη) referred to may be that of delivery, but it is equally possible and in my judgment more natural to construe the text as a continuous statement of the importance of psychology for successful delivery. We should remember that Aristotle had spoken of natural talent and emphasized the non-technical side of delivery (*Rhet.* 3.1 1404a15–16). Theophrastus will not have denied the importance of natural talent, but he appears to have advanced beyond his master by developing an art of delivery in which psychology plays a fundamental role.⁷²⁴

The conclusion of our text pairs the movement of the body with the pitch of the voice. The mention of bodily movement takes us beyond Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 3.1, where voice alone is considered, but at the same time there is more to voice than pitch. As Aristotle makes explicit, volume and rhythm also count (1403b27–32).⁷²⁵ In any case, voice and bodily movement became a recognized pair in the Hellenistic period. Theophrastus' pupil, Demetrius of Phalerum, mentions them together when discussing Demosthenes' efforts to improve his delivery (fr. 136–7 SOD); Demetrius, the author of *On Style*, pairs firm utterance with gesture when discussing the period (20); and the author of the *Rhetoric to Herennius* formally divides delivery into quality of voice and movement of body: *dividitur igitur pronuntiatio in vocis figuram et in corporis motum* (3.19).

It has been suggested⁷²⁶ that the definition of delivery given by Longinus in his *Art of Rhetoric* goes back to Theophrastus: "Delivery is an imitation of the character-traits and emotions actually

κατανόησιν τούτων (sc. πάθων) redundant. I.e., they add nothing after the preceding words τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς. The objection is understandable, but I do not think that it is fatal. The addition of "and the knowledge of these" is emphatic and serves to make clear that it is not good enough simply to refer to the emotions or even to have a general knowledge of individual emotions like anger and fright. Rather, the individual emotions must be analyzed thoroughly, so that the orator has a well-grounded knowledge of emotional response.

⁷²⁴ I do not want to suggest that psychology alone is sufficient for developing a satisfactory art of delivery. Among other things, it is also important to spell out the relationship between verbal expression on the one hand and voice, gesture and facial expression on the other.

⁷²⁵ Although the phrase ὁ τόπος τῆς φωνῆς can be used broadly to include volume (cf. Xenophon, *On Hunting* 6.20), I am not inclined to argue for a broad use in our text. Rather I would suggest that the phrase is used to refer to pitch, but it is not intended to exclude other qualities of voice, i.e., volume and rhythm.

⁷²⁶ Kroll (1940) col. 1075.

present in the individual and a disposition of body and pitch of voice suitable to the underlying issue” (*RhGr* vol. 1 p. 194.21–4 Spengel-Hammer).⁷²⁷ The mention of body together with pitch invites comparison with **712**, and nothing included in the definition tells against a Theophrastean origin. Moreover, the mention of character in addition to emotion may speak for the Eresian. Aristotle was aware that delivery can express character. He says as much when discussing the style appropriate to debate (3.12 1413b9–12, 30–1), but his primary discussion of delivery is silent concerning character. It refers only to emotion (3.1 1403b28). Theophrastus may have reacted negatively to this silence and offered a definition of delivery in which character was mentioned as well as emotion. If he did, he may also have taken note of the complexity of character, making clear that delivery expresses not only moral character, virtue and vice, but also natural temperament and the manners or qualities which men exhibit in their social life.

In regard to natural temperament, Cicero’s *On the Orator* 3.219 is instructive, for Crassus is made to list energy (*vis*) among emotions which orators represent through a controlled use of voice. Crassus explains that a speaker appears energetic, when his voice is intense, vehement, eager and marked by impressive ardor.⁷²⁸ Here we seem to be dealing with a manner or stylistic trait that is not tied to an underlying belief in the way that anger (*iracundia*) and fear (*metus*) are tied to thoughts of outrage and danger. Moreover, energy, like lethargy, tends to characterize everything a man does. It seems to manifest an innate disposition and therefore to be more closely connected with character than with emotional response.⁷²⁹ That is important, for an adequate theory of delivery should recognize the possibility of manifesting traits of character as well as individual emotions. Theophrastus was capable of offering such an inclusive account; and if he did, it is likely that he drew attention to the difference between traits like energy and lethargy and emotions like anger and fear.⁷³⁰

⁷²⁷ ὑπόκρισις ἐστὶ μίμησις τῶν κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ἐκάστῳ παρισταμένων ἡθῶν καὶ παθῶν καὶ διάθεσις σώματός τε καὶ τόνου φωνῆς πρόσφορος τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασι.

⁷²⁸ The quality of voice expressive of *vis* is said to be *contentum*, *vehemens*, *imminens quadam incitatione gravitatis* (3.219).

⁷²⁹ I do not want to deny that there are “bursts” of energy, but more often than not energetic behavior is tied to an innate (or possibly an acquired) temperament.

⁷³⁰ Cicero draws no distinction; he lists energy after fear and before joy (3.218–19). If we believe that Cicero is drawing on Theophrastus’ *On Delivery* (cf. Kroll [1940] col. 1075, Regenbogen col. 1526–7), we may want to say that Theophrastus

Turning now to manners, we can say that the *Characters* makes clear Theophrastus' interest in social attributes. Furthermore, a sketch like that of surliness (αὐθάδεια) suggests a tie to delivery. The trait is defined as rudeness in verbal intercourse (ἀπὴνεια ὁμιλίας ἐν λόγοις 15.1) and illustrated in part by crude remarks (15.2, 4). If Theophrastus presented his sketches orally, he will have intensified the rudeness by adopting an appropriate tone of voice and corresponding facial expression, thereby causing his audience to smile or even laugh. He is after all the man who imitated a gourmet by sticking out his tongue and running it round his lips (12.4). And when lecturing on delivery, he will have made practice into theory; he will have stated clearly the value of matching delivery to character — not only to social attributes but also to innate dispositions and moral qualities.

Here a caveat should be stated. Correspondence is neither simple nor always desirable. It is not simple, for correspondence may be a matter of adapting delivery to character, to a momentary feeling (an emotional response), or to some underlying theme or issue.⁷³¹ That opens the door to choice. A mild mannered man may choose to express his character by adopting a mild delivery, but on occasion he may want to use words of rebuke and to underline the rebuke by means of a gruff voice and stern countenance. Theophrastus will have made the point explicitly, and he will also have taken a hint from Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3.7 1408b5–7), pointing out that excessive correspondence is counter-productive and therefore quite undesirable. At least in oratory, a speaker may be more persuasive when harsh words are spoken in a mild manner. He avoids being obvious; his delivery is artful rather than artificial.

Above I have spoken of facial expression and introduced an anecdote concerning Theophrastus' representation of a gourmet. It should be stated clearly that our text does not refer explicitly to the face. Perhaps we should understand bodily movement to include facial expression. Such an interpretation is encouraged by the fact that our text is concerned with the orator and his delivery, and not with

too ignored the distinction. It is, however, equally possible — perhaps more likely — that Cicero's silence reflects his own disinterest in philosophic distinctions. Moreover, it is not at all clear that Cicero's remarks on delivery are drawn from the work of Theophrastus. The occurrence of Theophrastean elements is one thing; drawing on a particular work is something quite different. See below, note 743 on p. 414.

⁷³¹ Cf. the end of the definition given by Longinus (p. 194.23–4 Sp-H).

the actor who wears a mask. It also finds some (weak) support in the fact that Athanasius has mentioned the orator's look earlier when introducing the subject of delivery (p. 176.13 Rabe); but that in itself does not tell us how to interpret a subsequent report concerning Theophrastus. See the comment on **713**.

Text **712** may be assigned to *On Delivery* (666 no. 24).

713 Cicero, *On the Orator* 3.221 (BT p. 358.7–16 Kumaniecki)

Literature: Schmidt (1839) p. 61–2; Wilkins (1892) p. 540–1; Kayser (1906) p. 26; Stroux (1912) p. 70; Kroll (1940) col. 1075; Regenbogen (1940) col. 1526–7; Solmsen (1941) p. 45–7; Fortenbaugh (1985a) p. 272–4; Wöhrle (1990) p. 40; Matelli (1995) p. 1073–99

At the end of *On the Orator*, following the discussion of the appropriate in style (3.210–12), Cicero has Crassus speak about delivery. To establish the importance of the topic, Crassus refers to two Greeks, Demosthenes and Aeschines, and one Roman, Gaius Gracchus (3.213–4). There follows a discussion of how delivery enables the orator to indicate his own emotional condition. Voice is discussed first and with specific reference to several different emotions. After that gesture is touched upon briefly (3.220). Finally facial expression is taken up and rated second in importance after voice (3.221–3).⁷³² Our text, **713**, is the beginning of the discussion of facial expression.

Crassus emphasizes the importance of the face and especially the dominance of the eyes (lines 1–2).⁷³³ He refers to the actor

⁷³² The opening sentence of **713** might suggest that facial expression is rated most highly, but it is clear from 3.223 that the face, albeit important, is second to the voice: *quare in hac nostra actione secundum vocem voltus valet*. Cf. *Orator* 60.

⁷³³ It is a commonly held view that the eyes are fundamental for the expression of emotion. Indeed, the view can be traced back to the beginning of Greek literature, i.e., to the first book of Homer's *Iliad*, where we are told that the eyes of the raging Agamemnon were blazing like fire (1.104). Nevertheless, modern studies make clear that the eyes are not as important as our passage suggests, especially when the eyes (and eyelids) are viewed independently of the brows and forehead. Moreover, it is almost certainly a mistake to think that one area of the face is most expressive of all kinds of emotion. Perhaps the upper half of the face is the best indicator of anger, but the lower half may indicate more clearly a positive emotion like joy or happiness. Furthermore, it may be misleading to divide the face into distinct areas, for the different areas may be interdependent in regard to the ex-

Roscius, who failed to win great applause when he wore a mask (lines 2–3),⁷³⁴ speaks of facial expression as an image of the soul and the eyes as informants (line 4), says that there are as many facial expressions as there are emotions (line 5) and tells us that no one can produce the same effects with his eyes closed (line 6). After that Crassus cites a report of Theophrastus (lines 7–8):

Theophrastus quidem Tauriscum quendam dicit actorem aversum solitum esse dicere, qui in agendo contuens aliquid pronuntiaret.

The general idea behind the report is clear — a stare or fixed gaze is normally bad delivery — but the words of Crassus are ambiguous. Here are two difficulties: 1) Is Crassus telling us what Theophrastus said about the delivery of Tauriscus, or is he telling us what, according to Theophrastus, Tauriscus said about delivery? I.e., is *dicere* (line 8) used of speaking lines, or of giving a report, as is the case with the preceding *dicit* (line 7)?

- 1.i) Theophrastus . . . says that a certain Tauriscus used to deliver his lines . . .
- 1.ii) Theophrastus . . . says that a certain Tauriscus used to say that . . .

pression of emotion. Even in the case of anger, drawn and lowered brows may occur together with lips pressed firmly together. The literature on the subject is large. See, e.g., P. Eckman et al., “What Components of Facial Behavior are Related to Observers’ Judgments of Emotion?” in *Emotion in the Human Face*, ed. P. Ekman, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: University Press 1982) p. 98–110 and “Measuring Facial Movement with the Facial Action Coding System,” *ibid.* p. 178–211. Furthermore, the matter is complicated by the fact that the face is in varying degrees asymmetric (left vs. right) in expressing emotion, and one must distinguish between expressions of pain caused by a physical stimulus (say, an electric shock or pressure applied to a bodily part) and the discomfort that follows on a judgment of impending danger or outrage (fear and anger). See, e.g., J. Hager and P. Eckman, “The Asymmetry of Facial Actions,” in *What the Face Reveals*, ed. P. Eckman and E. Rosenberg (Oxford: University Press 1997) p. 40–57 and K. Prkachin, “The Consistency of Facial Expressions of Pain,” *ibid.* p. 181–97.

⁷³⁴ According to Diomedes, masks were introduced on the Roman stage by Roscius, who wanted to hide a squint (*Art of Grammar* 3 [GL vol. 1 p. 489.10–13 Keil]), but Donatus says that masks were already in use in the time of Terence (*On Comedy* 6.3 [vol. 1 p. 26.7–8 Wessener]). See Wilkins p. 541, who rejects the early date. F. Sandbach argues that the past participle *personatum* can mean “because he wore a mask” and therefore need not imply that Roscius ever acted without a mask (*The Comic Theatre of Greece and Rome* [New York: Norton 1977] 111–12). That may be true; but in the context of the *On the Orator*, the translation “when he wore a mask” makes better sense.

2) Is Tauriscus identified as an actor, or does Tauriscus describe the person who speaks with a fixed gaze as an actor with his back turned? I.e., does *actorem* stand in apposition to the proper noun *Tauriscum*, or is *actorem* part of the predicate (it goes with *aversum*, line 7) in a statement made by Tauriscus?

2.i) . . . that a certain actor Tauriscus used to . . .

2.ii) . . . that a certain Tauriscus used to say that . . . is an actor with his back turned

In regard to both difficulties, the second possibility has been preferred in the text-translation volume:

Theophrastus indeed says that a certain Tauriscus used to say that one who in delivery makes his speech while gazing fixedly upon something is “an actor with his back turned.”

I want to acknowledge clearly that our preference is open to doubt and that I have mentioned only the major difficulties presented by the lines in question. For a full discussion, I refer to the article of Elisabetta Metalli, who argues for taking *actorem* with *Tauriscum*.⁷³⁵ She may be correct, but neither vocabulary nor grammar can decide the issue with certainty; and I am prepared to stay with the translation as we have printed it, for it gives the words wider application and added punch. Anyone who speaks with a fixed gaze loses his audience; and when an orator does that, he is no better than a bad actor.

It should be stated clearly that the Tauriscus referred to by Theophrastus is otherwise unknown. He is not to be identified with the like named grammarian, who is referred to by Sextus Empiricus (*Against the Professors* 1.248), for the grammarian, being a pupil of Crates, lived in the second century, more than a hundred years after the Eresian. We do hear of a Tauriscus, who accompanied Alexander the Great on his march into Asia (Arrian, *Anabasis* 3.6.7); but apart from chronology, there is no strong reason to think that he is the Tauriscus referred to in our text. Perhaps we should take a cue from the occurrence of *actorem* in our text (line 7) and say that Theophrastus refers to an actor prominent in his own day; and if that

⁷³⁵ In our text, *Tauriscum quendam* is separated from *actorem* by *dicit*. Matelli (1995) p. 1080–1 aptly cites two Ciceronian passages, *On the State* 2.34 and *On behalf of Scaurus* 2.8, in which a similar separation occurs, but she acknowledges that other passages exhibit a more coherent word order.

possibility is accepted, we may want to say that Tauriscus is cited with special reference to the delivery of an actor.⁷³⁶ I am, however, uneasy about moving from one possibility to another. And even if Tauriscus was an actor, it does not follow that our text is exclusively or even primarily concerned with the delivery of an actor. For actors instructed orators in delivery,⁷³⁷ and Tauriscus may have made a quite general statement that had application to orators as well as actors. Indeed, even if Tauriscus made a statement with special reference to actors, Theophrastus (or Cicero) may have chosen to report it in a way that broadened the reference and gave it special force when applied to orators.

Two comments on the concluding relative clause, *qui in agendo contuens aliquid pronuntiaret* (line 8), may be helpful. First, the words *qui in agendo . . . pronuntiaret*, translated “who in delivery makes his speech,” are in themselves neutral regarding orator and actor, but in the context of *On the Orator*, one would expect a comment on poor oratorical delivery. Second, the words *contuens aliquid*, translated “while gazing fixedly upon something,” are most naturally construed as a reference to the facial expression and eyes of the orator. Out of context, the words might refer to the one-directional gaze of an inept actor, i.e., a masked actor of the fourth or early third century who never turns his head and therefore loses a portion of his audience. But in context, a connection with facial expression is hard to deny. Crassus has just called the eyes the informants of the soul (*animi . . . indices*) and said that no one produces the same effect with his eyes closed (*conivens*). Matelli recognizes that and suggests that Theophrastus’ report is concerned with neither the orator in the political arena nor the actor who plays a role on stage. Rather it is concerned with the performer at a symposium.⁷³⁸ In particular, it concerns the professional actor, who might perform without mask and so be challenged to use his face and eyes effectively. A debate will have arisen: one side recommending that the actor direct his look at

⁷³⁶ If *actorem* stands in apposition to *Tauriscum*, Tauriscus certainly was an actor; but he could still be an actor even if *actorem* is part of the predicate of a statement attributed to Tauriscus.

⁷³⁷ See, e.g., Plutarch, *Demosthenes* 7 (by reciting lines from tragedy, the actor Satyrus made clear to Demosthenes what was wrong with his delivery) and ps. Plutarch, *Lives of the Ten Orators* 844F–845B (the actor Neoptolemus gave Demosthenes lessons in breathing; and the actor Andronicus became the teacher of Demosthenes after showing him how a speech should have been delivered).

⁷³⁸ Matelli (1995) p. 1094–9.

the diners as a whole; the other side attacking the recommendation as rigid, unemotional and the equivalent of turning one's back on the audience. That is a possibility, and Matelli is certainly to be congratulated for an original interpretation;⁷³⁹ but I prefer a simpler and less imaginative approach. Cicero's primary concern throughout our text is the facial expression of the orator. He cites the actor Roscius, but only to underline the importance of facial expression. What follows is all about the expression of the orator. When Cicero cites Theophrastus there is no change of focus or shift of venue. Rather, we are told that when a speaker — an orator — gazes fixedly in one direction, he becomes ineffective; he is no better than an actor who turns his back, so that the audience cannot even see his mask.

It is hardly surprising that Theophrastus took note of facial expression. He not only saw delivery as a means whereby the orator manifests emotion but also recognized that several parts of the face are particularly expressive of emotion. We may compare **447.11**, where Barlaamus reports Theophrastus' view of emotion, including the observation that signs of emotion appear on the mouth, in the countenance and in the eyes: *in ore*,⁷⁴⁰ *in vultu*, *in oculis*.⁷⁴¹ I am not suggesting that Theophrastus rated facial expression above voice. He knew that masked actors cannot vary their expression and that orators addressing large groups cannot expect their facial features to be appreciated by everyone in the audience. Furthermore, there are two texts in Plutarch's *Moralia* that make clear that Theophrastus recognized the way in which voice expresses (**719A.4–6**) and excites emotion. In fact, we are told that Theophrastus called hearing the most emotional of all the senses (**293.2**). None of this proves that Theophrastus assigned voice the highest rating in delivery. He may have avoided ratings altogether. Nevertheless, I think it more likely

⁷³⁹ I would feel more comfortable with Matelli's suggestion, had she referred to a text that mentions the presence of actors without masks in symposia at the beginning of the Hellenistic period. But in fairness, we must recognize that the available evidence is small; indeed, I agree with Matelli (1995) p. 1098 when she writes: "L'uso della maschera era verosimilmente limitato a questi casi più formali e impegnativi, e comunque nell'ambito del simposio poteva avere le sue eccezioni."

⁷⁴⁰ Depending on the context, the noun *os* may refer either to the mouth or more inclusively to the face. Here in **447.11**, it refers to the mouth. In **713.1** it refers to the face.

⁷⁴¹ See also **338.2–5**, where we are told that Theophrastus called sight "form," because blind people have "faces which are disfigured and as it were in continual dismay."

that Theophrastus did recognize the especial importance of voice⁷⁴² and that the account of delivery in *On the Orator* is Theophrastean in that pride of place is given to voice (3.216–19) and Crassus is made to say that the greatest part of delivery belongs to voice (3.224).⁷⁴³

Since **712** pairs bodily motion with voice (reading φωνός with Rabe) and **713** takes account of facial expression, there is reason to believe that Theophrastus' account of delivery involved a primary division between bodily motion and voice and a secondary division whereby bodily motion is split into gesture and facial expression. If that could be firmly established, we could then say with confidence that Theophrastus had a quite specific influence on subsequent accounts of delivery. For this two-tier framework occurs in the *Rhetoric to Herennius* (3.19–27)⁷⁴⁴ and seems to have been adopted by the Stoics as early as Chrysippus (fr. 297, *SVF* vol. 2 p. 96.16–18).⁷⁴⁵ That the Stoics followed Theophrastus is not a new idea,⁷⁴⁶ and I am prepared to believe it; but I also want to acknowledge that our evidence is meager.

Theophrastus probably referred to Tauriscus in the work *On Delivery* (**666** no. 24). Two other Theophrastean works have been mentioned: *On Sight* (**265** no. 5) and *On Drunkenness* (**436** no. 31).⁷⁴⁷ In my judgment, the latter work comes under consideration only if we think that Theophrastus was concerned with the delivery of un-

⁷⁴² Cf. **710**: the actor Simycas seems to have been called a fish because of a failure in voice.

⁷⁴³ In saying that Crassus' rating of voice is Theophrastean, I do not want to imply that Cicero is drawing directly on some writing of Theophrastus. See above, p. 408 n. 730. The concluding sections on delivery make a connection between what is useful and what is fitting and pleasant (3.224–7). The idea has already been put forward in introductory remarks to the subject of prose rhythm (3.178–81) and does not imply close dependence upon Theophrastus. See above, p. 324 n. 483. In regard to delivery, it is significant that the author of the *Rhetoric to Herennius* connects the useful and the pleasant within his discussion of voice (3.21–2). The author and Cicero may have a common source, or the idea may have become a commonplace in the rhetorical teaching of the Hellenistic period. Either way, it is not necessary to introduce Theophrastus to explain a shared idea.

⁷⁴⁴ See esp. *Ad Herennium* 3.25–6: *de figura vocis dictum est; nunc de corporis motu dicendum videtur. motus est corporis gestus et vultus moderatio quaedam quae probabiliora reddit ea quae pronuntiantur*.

⁷⁴⁵ The *SVF* passage is Plutarch, *On Stoic Self-Contradictions* 28 1047A–B, where modulations of voice are balanced by gestures or expressions of the countenance and the hands: σχηματισμούς τοῦ τε προσώπου καὶ τῶν χειρῶν.

⁷⁴⁶ See the note of H. Caplan in the Loeb Library edition of the *Rhetoric to Herennius* (1954, reprint 1968) p. 191 n. a.

⁷⁴⁷ Matelli (1995) p. 1099.

masked actors at symposia. The former work will have been primarily concerned with the psychological and physiological aspects of sight, but it is at least possible that the work (in four books) contained remarks on the emotional force of the eyes and their importance in oratory.

V. Summary

Several of our source texts offer very general remarks concerning Theophrastus' rhetorical writings. Quintilian tells us that Theophrastus wrote diligently on rhetoric (670); that is certainly correct but hardly informative. More interesting are two passages in Cicero's dialogue *On the Orator*. There the desire to create opposition between the discussants encourages not only harmless exaggeration (667) but also a mistaken inference from the occurrence of "rhetorical" in Aristotelian and Theophrastean book titles (668). Equally interesting but in a different way is a passage in Cicero's *On Divination*. Here Cicero tells us that Aristotle and Theophrastus joined to philosophy precepts on speaking (669). The report is self-serving — Cicero wants to justify listing his own rhetorical works together with his philosophical writings — but it is also useful, for the mention of precepts reminds us that Theophrastus' writings on rhetoric took several forms. A work like *On the Art of Rhetoric* (666 no. 1) was most probably theoretical in orientation, but *Rhetorical Precepts* (no. 3) is likely to have been a practical work. It will have offered students concise directives to guide them in composing speeches. In addition, a work like *Introductions* (no. 15) may have contained a collection of sample *prooimia* for study and imitation. The well-known *Ethical Characters* (436 no. 4), whatever its original purpose, will have served as a collection of examples for students interested in the depiction of character. Similarly the several works entitled *Theses* (68 no. 34–6) will have collected typical arguments for study by students of rhetoric as well as logic. Moreover, many of the Theophrastean theses will have been written in an attractive style (75–6), so that they provided instruction not only in regard to persuasive argumentation but also in diction and composition.

That Theophrastus was interested in the history of rhetoric is not to be doubted, but there is no evidence that he imitated Aristotle in collecting and summarizing the work of his predecessors within a single volume.¹

¹ I.e., there is no evidence that Theophrastus wrote a *Συναγωγή τέχνων*, such as Aristotle wrote (fr. 136–41 Rose³).

Instead, Theophrastus seems to have referred to the work of earlier rhetoricians in various places. We hear of a work called *Robe*, in which Theophrastus named Corax as the inventor of the art of words (736A–C). In the rhetorical treatises proper, he may have referred to earlier writers frequently, though the evidence is meager. We are told that he named Thrasyarchus as the originator of compact expression (695) and the mean in style (685). He also cited Lysias as the author of a stylistically offensive display piece (692).²

Like Aristotle, Theophrastus recognized a division of rhetoric into three kinds corresponding to three kinds of oration: judicial, deliberative and epideictic (671). The work *On Judicial Speeches* (666 no. 9) will have been a theoretical discussion of courtroom speeches for both the prosecution and defense. Particular issues concerning unjust actions were discussed in *On Injustices* (no. 10). The work *On Slander* (no. 13) is likely to have emphasized removing and producing malicious falsehoods in a courtroom situation, but it may have dealt with charges of all kinds (true as well as false) and taken up prejudice directed toward speakers in a deliberative assembly. *On Counsel* (no. 11) will have discussed deliberative rhetoric. It probably focused on protreptic and apotreptic speeches in the assembly, but discussion may have been widened to cover other areas, including private affairs. *On Praise* (no. 12) almost certainly dealt with epideictic oratory. If the title is a fair reflection of the contents, the work may have considered only one branch of the epideictic genre, i.e., eulogy. Alternatively and in my opinion more likely, the title is abbreviated — a reference to blame has been omitted — in which case the work will have offered a fuller treatment of epideictic oratory. *On Clamor* (no. 14) seems most closely connected with judicial and deliberative oratory. It will have considered ways to deal with uproar in the courtroom and the assembly, but since clamor may express approval as well as disapproval, praise and blame, some connection with the epideictic genre cannot be ruled out.

One would like to know the extent to which Theophrastus discussed the role of rhetoric in private affairs as against civic life. Since Aristotle largely focuses on civic rhetoric³ — speeches in the courts and assembly and at

² Although best known as a person who wrote speeches for others, Lysias is said to have begun his career as a rhetorician (Cicero, *Brutus* 48). That he composed display pieces seems clear from Plato, *Phaedrus* 230E6–234C5. See the commentary on 692.

³ For this reason, Kennedy's (1991) translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* carries the subtitle "A Theory of Civic Rhetoric." I do not claim that Aristotle's discussion of three kinds of rhetoric avoids all mention of private meetings. When deliberation is divided into exhortation and dissuasion, Aristotle justifies the division by sighting the practice of those who offer advice both in private and in public (1.3 1358b8–10). Nevertheless, the refer-

public ceremonies — it is tempting to believe that his pupil did the same, but there were good precedents for widening the discussion to private affairs. I cite Alcidas who emphasized the importance of speaking extemporaneously not only in deliberative assemblies and courtroom trials but also in private affairs, τὰς ἰδίας ὁμιλίας (*On Those Who Write Written Speeches or On the Sophists* 9 = B XXII 15 p. 136.24 Radermacher). In a similar vein, Plato called for a rhetoric that is applicable in public and private gatherings, ἐν ἰδίοις (*Phaedrus* 261A8–9), and the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* spoke of speech in public debate, judicial procedures and private intercourse, ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαῖς ὁμιλίαις (1 1421b14–15, 19). In Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean works, the title 'Ὀμιλητικός' (436 no. 32) occurs in the second list, which includes all but one of the rhetorical titles. It may be that this work focused on rhetorical issues in private affairs, but it seems more likely that the emphasis was ethical, perhaps influenced by Aristotle's discussion of appropriate behavior in social relations, ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις (*Nicomachean Ethics* 4.6 1126b11). For that reason the Theophrastean title has been translated (*Dialogue*) concerning *Social Interaction* and listed among the ethical titles.⁴

Nine texts have been brought together under the heading "Invention" (672–80). Although we do hear of a work Περὶ εὐρήσεως, translated *On Invention* in the text-translation volumes (666 no. 4), the title may be a variant on Περὶ εὐρημάτων, *On Discoveries* (727 no. 11), which was not a rhetorical work. Hence, we cannot be certain that Theophrastus went beyond Aristotle and used εὐρεσις as a *terminus technicus* within rhetorical discourse. Be that as it may, the source texts make clear that Theophrastus' interest in logic extended not only to dialectic but also to oratory. He is said to have passed on precepts and trained his students to argue both sides of an issue (672, 135). Some of these precepts may have been set forth in the work *Rhetorical Precepts* (666 no. 3); others will have been advanced in the treatises *On Examples* and *On Enthymemes* (666 no. 5 and 6, 673A–B). Models for arguing both sides of an issue will have been found in the collections of theses (68 no. 34–6). Deductive reasoning as against

ence is not intended to take the discussion into the private sector; it is intended only to support the division of deliberation into exhortation and dissuasion. Earlier in 1.3 when Aristotle first picks out deliberative oratory, he does so by identifying the listener as a member of the assembly (1358b4–5); and later when he argues that deliberation is concerned with advantage and not questions of justice, the example he introduces is drawn from foreign policy (1358b33–7). See the commentary on 666 no. 11.

⁴ It is, of course, possible that the work was ethical in orientation and nevertheless addressed rhetorical issues. That the work was a dialogue is not certain.

induction is said to have been a special concern of Theophrastus as well as Aristotle (674). As a matter of emphasis, that is likely to be correct. Certainly Theophrastus' work on hypothetical syllogistic (111–13) enabled him to formulate a variety of rhetorical arguments that are not amenable to Aristotle's categorical syllogistic. The so-called topics on which dialectical and rhetorical arguments are based were discussed in some detail. The titles of three different works make explicit reference to topics (68 no. 17–19). One text mentions both specific topics and common topics (**pap. app. 671**), while a second names the topic "from induction" (675). Maxims, which are useful in rhetorical arguments, also received special attention from Theophrastus. He wrote a work entitled *On Maxims* (666 no. 7) and his definition of the maxim has been preserved for us in a text of the eleventh century (676).

Theophrastus will have discussed the construction of different kinds of oration. The evidence is not great, but three texts address the epideictic oration and in particular the encomium. One text tells us that Theophrastus took account of the Academic-Peripatetic division of goods into those of the soul, of the body and of fortune (677). A second reports that he recognized a division of the encomium into two parts: one qualitative and the other quantitative. The latter will have involved amplification through comparison (678). And a third text informs us that Theophrastus taught six modes of amplification: from the deeds, from the consequences, from comparison, from a previous judgment, from the critical moments and from the suffering (or emotion). Presumably deeds are listed first, because the accomplishments of an honoree are considered most important (679). Concerning judicial oratory, a single text makes clear that Theophrastus considered how invention relates to arrangement and the larger context. In particular, he is reported to have said that the introduction may be derived from the speech (of the adversary or possibly, the plan of the speech being introduced, 680).

Strikingly absent are texts dealing with emotional appeal and the character of the orator. For Aristotle had recognized the importance of these topics and discussed them as technical modes of persuasion coordinate with persuasion through argument. Indeed, in *Rhetoric* 2.2–11, Aristotle discusses individual emotions at length, providing details that an orator will find useful for exciting a particular emotion in the audience. That Theophrastus offered a similar account within a rhetorical context cannot be ruled out, but deciding the matter may be unimportant, for we know that Theophrastus wrote a treatise *On Emotions* (436 no. 5) and that in discuss-

ing delivery he recognized its importance for arousing emotional response. Aristotle's treatment of the orator's character is found in *Rhetoric* 1.2 and 2.1. It is considerably shorter than that of emotional response, but it does make clear that an orator should present himself as wise, virtuous and full of goodwill toward the audience. We know that Theophrastus discussed virtuous character in an ethical context (666 no. 6 and 7, 449–64) and can assume that he said something about the character of the orator in one of his rhetorical treatises. We should, however, be careful to distinguish such treatments of character from what we find in the *Characters* (436 no. 4). There the focus is on unattractive traits that are conceived of as superficial behavioral regularities apart from underlying beliefs and desires. That does not mean that the *Characters* is irrelevant to rhetoric. The work relates to narration where description in terms of superficial behavior may find a place. Indeed, an orator may choose first to portray an opponent in terms of one or more superficial regularities and later to introduce unattractive motives that the audience accepts because they are possible motives, though not necessarily those of the opponent.

The section on style or expression prints or lists 29 texts. Two of these, 78 and 683, are repeatedly cited by scholars in regard to Theophrastus' doctrine of style, but on close inspection, they turn out to be logical texts and of little value for recovering the details of Theophrastus' doctrine. In the first text, Theophrastus is credited with recognizing that the statement-making sentence has a relationship to both the hearers and the facts. The report derives from *On Affirmation and Denial*, in which Theophrastus will have introduced the twofold relationship in order to dismiss one member, i.e., the sentence in relation to the hearers, which is the business of poetics and rhetoric. The other text, perhaps drawing on the same logical work, tells us that Theophrastus recognized the noun and the verb as the elements of speech. He will have touched upon style but only to remove it from consideration. Text 735 informs us that Theophrastus was interested in the letters of the alphabet, but the text concerns only their invention and may derive from *On Discoveries*. Of greater interest are two texts that concern pronunciation. From 681 we learn that Theophrastus cited Archinus, who discussed the mechanics of pronouncing the sigmatic compounds Ξ , Ψ and Z . According to 682, Theophrastus recognized a middle pitch accent between the acute and the grave. As reported, this middle accent is different from the circumflex. That may mark a departure from Aristotle, but there is much uncertainty concerning the text.

Aristotle recognized three virtues of style, or as I would prefer to say, a tripartite virtue composed of clarity, ornament and appropriateness. From **684** we learn that Theophrastus added correct Greek to the list, placing it before clarity, appropriateness and ornament. In all likelihood, the addition reflects the development of grammar as an independent subject.⁵ In contrast to Aristotle who lists the appropriate last (*Rhet.* 3.2 1404b3–4), Theophrastus places it third before ornament. If the variation in order is significant, it may be that Theophrastus wanted to emphasize the unifying role of appropriateness. It mediates between clarity and ornament. In any case, the Stoics took over Theophrastus' four virtues and added brevity as a fifth.

The doctrine of three styles — plain, middle and grand — has been attributed to Theophrastus largely on the basis of **685**, in which Theophrastus is said to believe that the middle style originated with Thrasyarchus. While arguments can be mustered to support the attribution to Theophrastus, there are good grounds for thinking otherwise. Indeed, on balance it seems likely that Theophrastus, following Aristotle, recognized excess and deficiency in prose style and viewed Thrasyarchus as the first to achieve a proper mean. Theophrastus' own interest in avoiding extremes can be seen in **686**, where we are told that Theophrastus defined the frigid as "that which exceeds the proper mode of expression." It is possible but not certain that Theophrastus followed Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3.3 1405b35–1406b19) and treated frigidity under four headings, each of which concerns diction. Be that as it may, several texts exhibit Theophrastus' interest in good diction. From **687** and **688** we learn that Theophrastus, like Aristotle, recognized three ways in which words may be beautiful: in their audible qualities, in the sense experiences that they recall and in the values that they connote. From words that lack these qualities, words that are paltry and mean, neither fine poetry nor prose will be produced. Three texts, **689A–B** and **690**, tells us that Theophrastus discussed metaphor and in particular the use of a word or phrase (e.g., "just as if" or "as it were") to introduce a bold metaphor and in this way to mitigate its harshness. Here Theophrastus is quite in line with what Aristotle says in *Rhetoric* 3.7 and 11.

Theophrastus recognized that elevated style depends not only on a careful selection of words but also upon their arrangement and a judicious use of figures (**691**). The triad is not a creation *ex nihilo*; it is already implicit

⁵ Innes (1985) 256.

in Aristotle. Concerning figures, we can say that Theophrastus made Aristotle's twofold division of antithesis into a threefold division: opposites predicated of the same thing, the same things of the opposite and opposites of opposites. He also took note of antithesis in relation to balanced structure and similarity in sound, warning that combining all three in a serious context will be counterproductive. It does away with emotional effect (692). Aristotle and Theophrastus are said to have removed antithetical speech from the encomium, for antithesis is a mark of controversy and therefore out of place in an encomium, which amplifies what is agreed upon (693). Since Aristotle never explicitly calls for the removal of antithesis from encomia, we may want to say that the report reflects a teaching of Theophrastus, who is building on views held by his teacher.

Theophrastus is said to have followed Aristotle and to have recommended a minimum of verbal affectation in deliberative oratory (694). The report is undoubtedly correct, though it calls for qualification. Both Peripatetics will have recognized that subject matter of special importance calls for an appropriately elevated style. Theophrastus also took note of compact expression, which he says began with Thrasyarchus (695). In addition, he advised leaving some things for the listener to perceive and to supply for himself (696). The advice may have been given with regard to narration, but it also applies to argumentation, and in both cases it reflects Theophrastus' interest in audience psychology.

We are told that Theophrastus credited Herodotus and Thucydides with first moving historical writing so that it dared to speak more fully and ornately (697). As we have seen, other texts attest to Theophrastus' interest in "firsts" (cf. 695, 735–6). The work *On Style* may well have contained some remarks on proper expression in historical writing, but how much may have been said is quite uncertain. That Theophrastus wrote a separate work on writing history cannot be deduced from the title *Περὶ ἱστορίας* (727 no. 8). That title most likely refers to scientific research.

Like Aristotle, Theophrastus discussed prose rhythm (698). He drew a sharp distinction between verse and rhythm, arguing that the former has no place in prose (700). He recommended that the rhythm of prose be loose (701) and expressed a preference for the paeon (702, 704). In all probability, Theophrastus analyzed the period in terms of its internal structure; he did not make prose rhythm a defining mark of the period (701). To be sure, he recognized that prose rhythm can be effective in closing a period (699), but he will have viewed the rhythmical clausula as an enhancement that is not essential to the period *qua* period. In these ways, Theophrastus

remained true to Aristotle, but there are several ways in which he seems to have gone beyond him. One is in preferring a period in which the final colon is longer than that which precedes (701). Another is in spelling out the way in which a colon or period can be rhythmical without having too precise a rhythm. In particular, he will have recognized that a line can have a paeonic quality, if it begins and ends with long syllables, which are followed and preceded by runs of short syllables (703).⁶ Finally, he called attention to anapaestic and dithyrambic rhythm and commented on the fact that the dithyramb is found throughout opulent prose (701). These details may be said to support the claim that Theophrastus expressed himself *accuratius*, “more precisely” (700.4), but they do not add up to fearless dissent (cf. 694.4). In general, Theophrastus seems to have built on and added to work already accomplished by his teacher.

Two texts concern individual Athenian orators. The first tells us that Alcibiades was quite capable when it came to determining what must be said, but that he was not well-supplied with words and often fell silent when an expression eluded him (705). The contrast here between what needs to be said and the words necessary for saying it corresponds to the rhetorical distinction between invention and style or expression. Nevertheless, the context in which Theophrastus referred to Alcibiades may have been primarily political. I am thinking especially of *Regarding Crises* (589 no. 4a and b), in which Theophrastus will have discussed the fact that politicians often find it necessary to address a sudden development and to do so without delay. In the second text, Demosthenes is said to be worthy of the city and Demades superior to the city (706). Here too the original Theophrastean context may have been a passage in *Regarding Crises*, but a different context remains possible.

Theophrastus said that “the reading of the poets is of the greatest benefit to an orator” (707). The idea did not originate with Theophrastus, and it did not end with him. Many, we are told, followed his judgment. Our source text lists several areas of benefit including content, style, the emotions and characterization. Theophrastus might accept the list, but it derives from Quintilian, who is the author of the source text.

Two works entitled *On Poetry* (666 no. 20 and 21) are attributed to Theophrastus. Different kinds of poetry will have been recognized and some will have been discussed in detail. On the basis of 708, it has been

⁶ In addition, Theophrastus may have argued that the middle of a colon passes largely unnoticed, so that metrical feet occurring in this position do not determine the rhythm of the colon. See the commentary on 703.

suggested that Theophrastus recognized four kinds of dramatic poetry: tragedy, comedy, satyric drama and mime. In recognizing mime, Theophrastus will have been building on what Aristotle says in the *Poetics* (1 1447a28–b13) or perhaps following what was said in the lost second book. A Theophrastean definition of tragedy is recorded, but it is remarkably short and does not represent Theophrastus' considered opinion concerning the essence of tragedy. Our source text also contains definitions of epic, comedy and mime that are not explicitly attributed to Theophrastus but often assigned to him in the scholarly literature. The definitions of epic, tragedy and comedy exhibit an interest in kinds of character or social class. That of mime shows an interest in moral content. A work *On Comedy* is also attributed to Theophrastus (666 no. 22). In 709 the work is named as the source of an amusing anecdote concerning the Tirynthians, who tried and failed to rid themselves of an excessive inclination to laugh that left them unfit for serious business. We are not told why Theophrastus related the anecdote, but he may have wished to make clear that comic character need not be vicious. Rather, it may manifest itself in a behavioral regularity that is not directed by choice toward some shameful goal. This possibility invites comparison with the *Characters* (436 no. 4) and with certain characters in the plays of Menander. A different possibility is that Theophrastus wanted to recommend comedy for its cathartic effect. Going to the theater and having a good laugh can reduce temporarily an unwanted propensity for laughter.

Theophrastus' interest in laughter is clear not only in the title *On Comedy* but also in the title *On the Ludicrous* (666 no. 23). Like Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1.11 1371b35–1372a2), Theophrastus may have offered a threefold division of the ludicrous: men, words and deeds. Four texts concern words. 710 presents an enigmatic proverb that is directed derisively at an individual. A third party takes pleasure in quickly comprehending how the proverb is used, in being impressed with his own acumen and in feeling superior to the person derided. According to 711, Theophrastus called the jest a concealed rebuke for error. The mention of error recalls Aristotle's definition of the ludicrous (*Poet.* 5 1449a34–5). Since the rebuke is concealed, pleasure will be felt by a third party listener who is able to supply what is missing. Again Theophrastus shows an interest in audience psychology (cf. 696). Text 31 records a jest of Theophrastus directed at a physical imperfection that did not cause offense. 453 is concerned with propriety: ludicrous remarks should be pleasing to the listener and not bring shame on the speaker.

Theophrastus wrote a treatise *On Delivery* (666 no. 24), and in so doing he filled a lacuna in the writings of his teacher. Our sources tell us that Theophrastus discussed the delivery of the orator and took account of both voice and bodily movement (712). Almost certainly the latter included facial expression as well as gesture (713). Less clear is the extent to which Theophrastus discussed the delivery of actors and rhapsodists and the performance of musicians, but given Platonic and Aristotelian precedents, it is likely that he exhibited interest in one or more of these areas. In tying delivery to emotion, Theophrastus followed Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3.1 1403b28), and in referring to the principles of the soul and a knowledge of these, he aligned himself with Plato (*Phdr.* 271A–272B2). He will have addressed the connection between style and delivery and possibly taken account of the way in which delivery is expressive of character.⁷

By giving independent treatment to delivery, Theophrastus had an important influence on the subsequent history of rhetoric. Delivery came to be recognized as a fourth part of the art coordinate with invention, style and arrangement. This fourfold division was embraced by the Stoics (*SVF* vol. 2 p. 296.3–4, fr. 295),⁸ and by the end of the Hellenistic period it had been made fivefold through the addition of memory.⁹ In fairness to Aristotle it should be acknowledged that he paved the way for these developments by shifting the focus of rhetoric from the parts of an oration to the duties or tasks of an orator.¹⁰ Nevertheless, it was Theophrastus who embraced delivery and gave it technical status.

⁷ It is nowhere stated that Theophrastus discussed delivery as a way of expressing character as well as emotion, but we should at least entertain the possibility that he connected delivery with several different kinds of character including moral virtue, manners and natural temperament. See the commentary on 712.

⁸ The text is Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 7.43: εἶναι δ' αὐτῆς τὴν διαίρεσιν εἰς τὴν εὐρεσιν καὶ εἰς τὴν φράσιν καὶ εἰς τὴν τάξιν καὶ εἰς τὴν ὑπόκρισιν. The Stoics also took over the threefold division of delivery into voice, gesture and facial expression. See the commentary on 713. Here I want to add only that there were variations in the Stoic position. In particular, some assigned delivery no fixed place within the art because it was thought to depend on nature. See Striller p. 35–7, Pohlenz vol. 1 p. 53 and Wöhrle p. 41.

⁹ For the five parts within rhetorical teaching at the end of the Hellenistic period, see the *Rhetoric to Herennius* 1.3 and Cicero, *On the Orator* 1.142.

¹⁰ See Solmsen (1941) 37–9, 45–7, R. Nadeau, *The Quarterly Journal of Speech* 50 (1964) 55 and Wöhrle 38.

VI. Bibliography of Modern Literature

The following bibliography is arranged alphabetically by author. When an author is cited for more than one work, the entries are arranged by date of publication. In the exceptional case, where two works by the same author appeared in the same year, the works are ordered alphabetically by title: e.g., Grube (1952a) = "Theophrastus etc." and Grube (1952b) = "Thrasymachus etc." In the preceding commentary, all the works cited below are referred to solely by author or author plus date.

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VII. Indices to the Titles and Texts

1. Important Words

Greek

(The phrase “**pap. app. 671**” refers to the Hancock papyrus that is mentioned in the apparatus to **671** and printed in the commentary to **671**, above, p. 177.)

- ἀγελαστί] without laughter **709.4**
ἀγωγή] training, education **678.4**
ἀγών] contest (oratorical) **695.5**
ᾄδειν] to sing **31.4**
ἄδηλος] unclear (of a maxim) **676.27, 31**
ἀδίκημα] injustice; pl. in a title **666** no. 10
αἰνίσσασθαι] to hint, to intimate **710.6**
αἰσχύνειν] to dishonor; pass. partic. feeling shame, apologetic (metaphor) **689A.3**
αἰτία] the reason (explanation of a paradoxical maxim) **676.17**
ἀκίνδυνος] without danger (in the def. of comedy) **708.10, 16**
ἀκοή] hearing **687.3, 5**
ἀκούειν] to listen; act. partic. listener **453.1, 693.6, 711.6**
ἀκρίβεια] exactness, detail **696.2, 703.5**
ἀκριβῶς] exactly **703.1, 8**
ἀκροᾶσθαι] to listen; partic. (to a sentence) **78.2, 4**
ἀκροατής] listener **78.5, 692.15, 696.3, 4, 7**
ἄκυρον] improper (word or phrase) **689B.3**
ἀληθής] true; neut. sing. as subst. **78.13**; real (contest) **695.5**
ἀληθινός] agreeable to truth; neut. sing. as subst. realism **692.3**
ἄλλοιοῦν] to make different; pass. partic. (of a word) **Append. 9.94**
ἄλλότριος] not belonging (metaphor) **689A.4**
ἄλυπος] causing no pain, inoffensive (metaphor) **689A.4**
ἁμαρτία] error, mistake **711.1**
ἀμήχανος] incapable (of character) **709.10**
ἀμφίβολος] controversial (of a maxim) **676.27, 31**
ἀμφισβητεῖν] to dispute; pass. partic. controversial (statement, speeches, matters) **693.2, 5**; (maxims) **676.10**

- ἀναγκαῖος] necessary (of a particular style) **695.4**
 ἀναιρεῖν] to take up; to answer (of an oracle) **709.4**
 ἀναμφίβολος] unambiguous, noncontroversial **675.28**
 ἀνασχευάζειν] to refute through argument (a thesis) **135.5**
 ἀνατρέπειν] to turn over **709.8**
 ἀνδρεία] courage **677.2** (listed among sources for encomia) **4**
 ἀνθρώπινος] human **708.3**
 ἀνόητος] unintelligent, foolish **696.6**
 ἀντίθεσις] antithesis (three kinds) **692.10**, (overdone) **692.4**, (belongs to controversy) **693.2**
 ἀντικείμεθα] to be opposed; neut. pl. partic. opposite (positions or conclusions) **135.8**
 ἀντιπαράβολή] comparison **679.3**
 ἀπαγγελία] diction, expression **686.3**
 ἀπαλλάττειν] to free from **709.3**
 ἀπελάύνειν] to drive away **709.7**
 ἀπλοῦς] simple, pl. (sounds which are significant) **683.3**; (expressions) **683.10**
 ἀποβαίνειν] to result, pl. partic. what results, the consequences **679.2**
 ἀποδεικνύναι] to demonstrate **678.7**; partic. **78.13**
 ἀποκοπή] apocope (omission of the final sound or syllable) **683.10**
 ἀπολογία] speech in defense (Nicias') **692.16**
 ἀποσιωπᾶν] to cease speaking **705.5**
 ἀπόφανσις] statement **78.13**, **14**
 ἀπόφασις] assertion (of a maxim) **676.7**
 ἀπόφθεγμα] saying; pl. (Laconian, laconic) **676.29**
 ἀπρεπής] unbecoming (style) **692.14**
 ἀρετή] virtue (of a person) **678.11**, **15**; (of the soul) **677.4**; (of style) **695.1**, **3**
 ἄρθρον] pl. articles (parts of expression) **683.7**
 ἀριθμός] number; pl. in a title **264** no. **1**
 ἁρμονία] harmonious arrangement (of words) **691.3**
 ἁρμόττειν] to arrange (words) harmoniously **691.4**; to suit **692.13**
 ἀρχή] rule (listed among sources of encomia) **677.6**; pl. principles (of the soul) **712.2**
 ἄρχειν] to begin; med. (with long syllables) **703.3**
 ἀσυγχώρητος] not allowed (in the def. of mime) **708.28**
 ἀσφαλής] not dangerous; comp. (of the paeon) **703.10**
 ἄτεχνος] non-technical, pl. in a title **666** no. **4**
 ἄτοπος] out of place, strange **693.4**
 αὔξησις] amplification **693.4**, **679.1**, **2**
 αὐτός] the same one; ἐξ αὐτοῦ for himself, on his own **696.3**, **711.6**
 ἀφαίρεσις] aphaeresis (removal of an initial letter or syllable) **683.10**
 ἀφαιρεῖν] to remove; pass. partic. removed (syllable) **Append. 9.9**; shortened (word) **Append. 9.79**

ἀφορμή] starting point **pap. app. 671.3**, pl. in a title **673B.5**; occasion **696.5**

ἄφωνία] lack of voice **710.7**

ἄχθέσθαι] to be annoyed, offended **31.3**

ἀχρεῖος] unfit; pl. **709.2**

βέλος] pl. arrows (of jests) **711.2**

βιβλίον] book, pl. (as against oral exercises in argumentation) **135.3**, 4, 7

βίος] life (in the def. of mime) **708.27**

βοᾶν] to shout **709.7**

βούλεσθαι] to wish, to want **709.3**

βουλευτήριον] council-chamber **673B.2**

βραχύς] short; pl. (syllables) **703.11**; superl. (expression) **706.7**

βραχυλογία] brevity of speech **78.9**

γελαῖν] to laugh **31.2**, **709.8**

γελοῖος] ludicrous, in a title **666** no. 23, **710.8**; neut. pl. jokes **453.1**

γένος] family **678.4**; genus (of a species, regarding μετουσία) **Append. 9.62a**, 63 (twice), 67; pl. kinds of rhetoric or oratory **pap. app. 671.9**, kinds (of things there are) **683.13**

γλυκύτης] sweetness (of expression) **78.8**

γλῶττα] tongue (in pronunciation) **681.4**

γνώμη] maxim **676.2**, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8; in a title **666** no. 7

γνώρισμα] mark by which something is known, pl. **693.5**

γράμμα] pl. letters (of the alphabet) **687.7**

γράφειν] pf. pass. part. written (books) **135.8**

γρυπότης] shape of a hooked nose **31.2**

γυμνάζειν] to exercise (the capacity for finding arguments) **135.5**

γυμνασία] exercise (in argumentation) **135.1**

δάκνειν] to bite (of jests) **711.1**

δεδιέναι/δεδοικέναι] to fear **709.5**, 8

δεικνύναι] to show, demonstrate **678.4**; **709.9**

δελινός] in the afternoon; pl. (discussions or lectures), in a title **727** no. 2

δεῖν] to be needed, necessary (of content) **705.2**, 3, 4

δεῖνα] with def. art. so-and-so **678.12**

δημεύειν] to make public; pass. partic. (words) **78.7**

διαβάλλειν] to deplore (metaphor) **689A.2**

διαβολή] slander, in a title **666** no. 13

διαγι(γ)νώσκειν] to discern **Append. 8.7**, 8–9

διαίρειν] to divide **677.1**, 2, **678.2**, **pap. app. 671.8**; (?) **Append. 8.13**

διαμαρτάνειν] to miss entirely; to fail to obtain **709.6**

διάνοια] thought **687.3**, 9

διαφορά] difference **31.1**

διδάσκειν] to teach; partic. **693.2**; pass. to be taught, to learn **678.15**; pass. partic. **Append. 8.7**

- διελέγγειν] to refute, partic. **78.12**
 διήγημα] narration; in a title **666** no. 16
 δίκαιος] just; adv. (of criticism) **692.20**
 δικαιοσύνη] justice (virtue of the soul) (listed among sources for encomia) **677.5**
 δικανικός] judicial; pl. (speeches) **693.3, 695.5**; in a title **666** no. 9
 δικαστήριον] court of justice **673B.2**
 διπλοῦς] double; neut. (epithet) **Append. 9.50**
 διττός] twofold (relationship of the sentence) **78.1**; neut. sing. as subst. two kinds (of paeon) **703.5**
 διχῶς] in two **678.2**
 δόξα] reputation **678.10, 16**
 δύναμις] force, meaning **Append. 8.4, 36**
 δυνατός] powerful, capable (in speaking) superl. **706.6**
- ἐγκωμιάζειν] to praise; pass. partic. person(s) praised **678.2, 10**
 ἐγκώμιον] encomium **677.2, 678.3, pl. 693.3**; (of gods) in a title **580** no. 1
 ἐκλέγεσθαι] to select (words) **78.6**
 ἐκλύειν] to set free; to lose (the listener) **692.15**
 ἐκπλήττειν] to amaze (the hearer) **78.10**
 ἐκφωνεῖν] to pronounce, pass. (of a consonant) **681.3**
 εἰδέναι] to know **Append. 8.3**; act. partic. **711.7**
 εἶδος] species (of a genus, regarding μετουσία) **Append. 9.62a, 62b, 64, 66**; kind or form (of argument) **135.2**; pl. kinds (in a title) **666** no. 2a
 εἶναι] to be; neut. partic. pl. things which exist **683.13**
 εἰσάγειν] to bring onto (the stage) **Append. 8.32, 39**
 εἰσιέναι] to enter, pres. partic. (metaphor) **689A.5**
 ἐκλέγειν] to select (words) **691.4**
 ἐκλογή] selection (of words) **691.2**
 ἐκτός] outside; τὰ ἐκτός external things **677.4, 6**
 ἔλεος] pity (aroused through speech) **692.16**
 ἐκφέρειν] to express (thoughts) **695.4, 706.7**
 ἐλλείπειν] to leave out; neut. pass. partic. what is left out **696.3**; to be wanting; neut. act. partic. what is missing **711.7**
 ἐμβάλλειν] to throw into **709.5**
 ἐναντίος] opposite (in antithesis) **692.10–11** (four times)
 ἐναργής] clear; self-evident (statements) **78.14**
 ἐναρμονίως] harmoniously (of weaving words together) **78.7**
 ἐνδιάθετος] internal (reasoning) **673A.1**
 ἐνδιδόναι] to give the pitch **31.5**
 ἔνδοξος] pl. generally accepted (premises) **135.6, 8**; (maxims) **676.9, 10**
 ἐνθύμημα] enthymeme **673A.2–3, 675.1, 3, 16**; in a title **666** no. 6, **673B.4**
 ἔντιμος] of great value, (of words which suggest great value) **687.9**;
 neut. sing. as subst. (of words) **687.3**; comp. (of words and things) **687.10**
 (twice)
 ἐξαλλάττειν] to change; pass. partic. altered (word) **Append. 9.91–2**

- ἐξέτασις] examination **678.8**
 ἐπάγειν] to adduce (examples in an inductive argument) **675.19**
 ἐπαγωγή] induction **675.16**
 ἐπαινεῖν] to praise, pass. partic. pl. the persons praised **768.10**
 ἔπαινος] praise, in a title **666** no. 12
 ἐπεκτείνειν] to extend; pass. partic. lengthened (word) **Append. 9.63**
 ἐπενθύμησις] supplemental argumentation **675.1, 3**
 ἐπίθετον] epithet **Append. 9.46**
 ἐπίλογος] pl. supplemental arguments **676.11**
 ἐπιστήμη] knowledge, science (psychology) **712.3**
 ἐπιτίμησις] censure (directed toward Lysias) **692.20**
 ἐπιχείρημα] epicheireme **673A.2**
 ἐπιχείρησις] attempt to prove, dialectical argument **135.1, 5, 9**
 ἔπος] epic (defined) **708.3**
 ἔργον] deed, action **709.9**; business (of poetics and rhetoric) **78.5**
 ἐρμηνεία] style **687.1**
 εὖ] well (written poetry) **Append. 8.9** (twice)
 εὐμενής] favorably disposed **696.5**
 εὐπαιδία] good offspring (listed among sources of encomia) **677.6**
 εὐπορεῖν] to be well-supplied (with words and phrases) **705.4**
 εὐρετικός] neut. sing. as subst. of the capacity to discover arguments **135.5**
 εὕρησις] invention, discovery, in a title **666** no. 4
 εὐρίσκειν] to discover, invent (the art of words) **736A.3, B.3, C.3**, (what needs to be said) **705.2**
 εὐσεβεῖν] to act piously **Append. 8.37**
 εὐτυχία] good fortune (listed among sources of encomia) **677.6**
 εὐφωνία] euphony **687.7, 691.5**
 εὐχαρις] charming (of style) **687.1**
 εὐχή] prayer **Append. 8.33, 37**

 ζητεῖν] to seek or strive (to say what is necessary) **705.3**
 ζηλωτής] one who strives for (crude wording) **692.2**

 ἡδεῖν] to please (the hearer) **78.10**
 ἡδεσθαι] to take pleasure, to delight **453.2**
 ἡδύνειν] to please, delight **711.3**; pass. partic. **711.3**
 ἡδύς] pleasant, (of words) **687.4**; neut. sing. as subst. (of expression) **683.12**;
 (of a word) **687.3**; ἡδέως pleasantly, with pleasure **687.5**
 ἠθικός] ethical; pl. in a title **436** no. 4
 ἦθος] character (of people) **709.9**
 ἠρωϊκός] heroic **708.3, 6**
 ἠχώδης] resonant **687.6**

 θάλαττα] sea **709.5**
 θαυμάζειν] to be amazed at **31.3**; to admire **678.13**; to wonder (negatively) **692.1**

- θαυμαστός] admirable **678.11, 695.1**
 θεῖος] divine (affairs) **708.3**
 θεός] god (Apollo) **709.4, 9**; pl. in a title **580** no. 1
 θεραπεύειν] to care for; to cure (of character) **709.10**
 θέσις] thesis (for dialectical argument) **135.4**; in a title **68** no. 34–6
 θεωρεῖν] to watch (stage-actors) **Append. 8.41, 43**
 θορυβεῖν] to clamor **675.14**
 θόρυβος] clamor; in a title **666** no. 14
 θρασύς] bold (metaphor) **690.2**
 θύειν] to sacrifice, partic. pl. **709.4**
 θυσία] sacrifice **709.6**
- ἰᾶσθαι] to cure (the boldness of a metaphor) **690.4**
 ἰδέα] quality or type of style; pl. **78.9, 683.11**; (in the title of a work by Hermogenes) **673B.3**
 ἴδιος] separate; pl. specific (topics or lines of argument) **pap. app. 671.15**
 ἰδιώτης] layman (in contrast to the poet) **Append. 8.6**
 ἰδιωτικός] private (of the affairs of comedy) **708.9**
 ἰκανός] capable; superl. (of discovering what needs to be said) **705.3**
 ἴσος] equal; neut. sing. as subst. balanced clauses **692.12**
 ἱστορικός] well-informed **705.1**
 ἰσχυρός] strong (of a thought established by argument) **675.28**
 ἰσχύς] strength (listed among sources of encomia) **677.5**
- καθολικός] general (statement) **676.1, 2, 3**
 καθόλου] in general **691.1**; as an adj. (of a statement) **676.7**
 καιρός] right time **78.9**; critical moment **679.3, 692.21**
 κακός] bad, evil **678.5**; bad (in the art of singing) **710.4**
 κακῶς] badly (written poetry) **Append. 8.9**
 καλλιλογία] beauty of language **688.2**
 κάλλος] beauty (listed among sources of encomia) **677.5**; (in a word) **687.2**
 καλός] noble **678.5**; beautiful (words) **687.1, 688.5**; (of things when spoken of) **687.5**; (style) **688.1**; (?) **Append. 8.12**
 κανών] measure (of correct style) **689B.2**
 καταγινώσκειν] to judge unfavorably, to despise **696.7**
 καταισχύνεσθαι] to be ashamed **453.2**
 καταλείπειν] to leave (for the listener) **696.2**
 καταλήγειν] to leave off, to conclude (with long syllables) **703.4**
 καταμέμφεσθαι] to criticize (overdone style) **692.4**
 κατανόησις] understanding, knowledge **712.3**
 κατασκευάζειν] to establish through argument (a thesis) **135.6, 675.27**
 κατασκευή] constructive argument (needed by a paradoxical maxim) **676.14, 17, 23**
 καταστοχαστικός] conjectural; f. sing. (of the first *stasis* of Hermagoras) **pap. app. 671.31–2**
 καταστροφή] ending (?) **Append. 8.59**

- κατηγορεῖν**] to bring a charge (in court) **673A.3**; (indicting the law) **675.14**,
 (of bad style against Lysias) **692.22**
- κεραννύναι**] to mix; pass. (of style) **685.6**
- κεφάλαιον**] heading **pap. app. 671.1–2, 5**; ἐν κεφαλαίῳ] in summary
 (of a maxim) **676.5**
- κιθαριστής**] cithara-player **710.1**
- κιθαροδός**] cithara-singer **710.2**
- κίνησις**] motion (of the body) **712.4**
- κοινός**] common; pl. (words) **78.6**; (topics, lines of argument) **pap. app. 671.13**; comp. adv. rather generally **688.4**
- κομψότης**] cleverness (of a jest) **711.3**
- κρατεῖν**] to master, to achieve (moderation) **691.7**
- κράτιστος**] strongest; pl. most effective (of words) **691.4**
- κρίσις**] judgment **679.3**
- κύριος**] prevailing, ordinary (expression) **683.9, Append. 8.5**
- κυρτός**] convex, the roof (of the mouth) **681.6**
- κῶλον**] member, clause; pl. **703.1, 7**
- κωλύειν**] to prevent **709.6**
- κωμωδία**] comedy, in a title **666 no. 22, 709.1, (defined) 708.9**
- λάμβδα**] lambda (the letter) **687.6**
- λέγειν**] to speak **705.5, 706.6**; to say **31.3, 696.6, 705.3**; (of individual words) **687.8**; act. partic. speaker **78.3, 453.2, 711.4**; pass. partic. what is said **711.3**; spoken of **687.5**; so-called **687.1**
- λείπειν**] to leave; neut. pass. partic. what is omitted **696.3**
- λέξις**] expression **705.5, 706.7**; (contrasted with significant sound *qua* significant) **683.4, 5, 8, 9, 12**; expression (*qua* significant) **683.13**; style (in a title) **666 no. 17a, 688.4, 692.3**, (which is a mean) **685.1, 4**, (playful and unbecoming) **692.15**, (which is grand) **691.2**, (which is weighty) **686.6**, (which is beautiful) **688.1**, (which is compact) **695.4**; text (quoted) **692.9**
- λογίζεσθαι**] to calculate, to infer **696.3**
- λογικός**] of speech; neut. sing. as subst. prose quality **703.10**
- λόγιον**] oracle **709.6**
- λόγος**] words, speech; phrase **Append. 8.4**; prose **703.9**; sentence **78.1, 11**, (in a title) **683.5**, (whose elements are the noun and verb) **683.7, 8**; (general statement) **676.1, 2, 3**; (art of) words **736A.2, B.2, C.3**; speech (of oratory) **pap. app. 671.9**; wording, speech (which is crude and overdone) **692.2**, (antithetical) **693.2**; oration (allegedly by Lysias) **692.7, 21**, pl. speeches (of controversy) **693.3, 7**, (judicial) **695.4–5**, in a title **666 no. 9**; prose (as against poetry) **688.8**; argument **693.6, 135.2**; (internal) reasoning **673A.1**; κατὰ λόγον: with reason **689A.1**
- λυπεῖν**] to cause pain (of jests) **711.2**
- μακρηγορεῖν**] to speak at length **696.2**
- μακρολογία**] length of speech **78.9**
- μακρός**] long (syllable) **703.3, 4, 10**

- μανθάνειν] to learn **709.7, 9**
 μαντεῖον] oracle **709.3**
 μάρτυς] witness **696.4**
 μεγαλοπρέπεια] magnificence or grandeur (of style) **688.2, 703.6**
 μεγαλοπρεπής] magnificent (style) **688.6**; neut. sing. as subst. grandeur (of expression) **683.12, 703.10**; the grand style (opposed to the frigid style) **686.1**
 μεγαλύνειν] to exalt (metaphor) **689A.2**
 μέγας] great, pl. important **679.4**; neut. sing. as subst. (of style) **691.2**; superl. (of an orator) **706.5**, (of delivery) **712.1**
 μέγεθος] greatness, size of body (listed among sources of encomia) **677.5**, magnitude (of virtue) **678.11, 15**
 μέγιστον] of delivery **712.1**
 μείζων] greater; neut. sing. more (noble) **678.2**
 μείλιγμα] pl. (phrases) which soften (metaphors) **690.1**
 μεμπτός] blameworthy, comp. (of Theophrastus) **692.22**
 μέμψις] (conjecture) blame **Append. 8.6**
 μέρος] pl. parts (of expression) **683.8**
 μέσον] middle **678.14**
 μεσότης] mean (in style) **685.5**
 μεταλημπτικός] (for the classical Attic spelling μεταληπικός) involving objection; f. sing. (of the fourth *stasis* of Hermagoras) **pap. app. 671.33–4**
 μεταφέρειν] to transfer; pass. partic. (of a word used metaphorically) **Append. 9.41–2**
 μεταφορά] metaphor **689A.1, 680.2, Append. 9.37–8**
 μεταφορική] metaphoric (expression) **683.9**
 μετουσία] participation, (of two kinds of metaphor) **Append. 9.59**
 μέτριος] moderate; neut. sing. as subst. **691.8**
 μέτρον] measure **678.10**; pl. meters, in a title **666 no. 19**
 μικρός] small; pl. paltry (of words) **688.7**
 μικτός] mixed (style) **685.1**, (of the paeon) **703.9**
 μῖμος] mime (defined) **708.27**
 μονότονος] of one tone (of a certain pitch accent) **682.8**
 μυκτήρ] nose **31.4**
 μουσικός] musical (euphony) **691.5**

 νοεῖν] to apprehend (what needs to be said) **705.2**
 νόημα] thought **675.3, 17, 695.3**
 νοῦς] thought **675.27, 706.7**
 νῦ] nu (the letter) **687.7** (twice)

 ὄγκος] bulk; weight (of style) **686.6**
 ὀδούς] tooth, pl. (in pronunciation) **681.5**
 οἰκία] house; place (into which a metaphor is introduced) **689A.5**
 οἰκεῖος] proper, appropriate (of a word or expression) **686.3, 695.4**

- ὀκτώ] eight (parts of speech) **Append. 8.10**
 ὅμοιος] similar; neut. sing. as subst. similarity in sound **692.12**
 ὁμολογεῖν] to agree; pass. partic. pl. what is agreed upon **693.4, 5**
 ὀνειδισμός] rebuke **711.4**
 ὄνομα] noun (an element of the sentence) **683.7, 8, Append. 9.38–9**; word **687.1, 2, 688.3, 5, 691.2, 4, 692.14, 705.4**
 ὅπως] how great **678.15**
 ὀρίζειν] to mark off (beautiful words) **688.4**; med. to define (the maxim) **676.5, 6, (the frigid) 686.2, (beauty in a word) 687.2**
 ὀριστικός] definitional; f. sing. (of the second *stasis* of Hermagoras) **pap. app. 671.32**
 οὐσία] the nature (of a person) **678.8**
 ὀφθαλμός] eye **31.4**
 ὄψις] sight **687.3, 4**
 πάθος] suffering **679.4**, condition (of being prone to laughter) **709.3**; emotion (of the soul) **712.3**; emotional effect **692.14**; modifications (of expression) **683.9**
 παιδιώδης] childish (of style) **692.12**
 παίζειν] to play (with words) **692.14**
 παῖς] child **709.6**
 παῖων] paeon **703.2, 5, 8, 9**
 παιωνικός] paeonic (arrangement) **703.2, 8**
 παραγγέλλειν] to advise (the use of long syllables) **703.4**
 παράγγελμα] precept; pl. in a title **666 no. 3**
 παράδειγμα] example (mode of argument) in a title **666 no. 5**; (of beautiful words) **688.5, (of grandeur) 703.6**
 παράδοξος] paradoxical, pl. (maxims) **676.8, 13, 27**
 παράθεσις] juxtaposition **678.1, 7, 9**
 παραπλήσιος] about equal **678.14**
 παρασχηματίζειν] to transform; pass partic. concealed **711.5**
 παρίσωσις] balancing clauses **692.4**
 παροιμία] proverb **710.8, 9**, pl. in a title **710.3**
 παρομοιώσις] assonance **692.5**
 πάσχειν] to suffer, part. being overcome by (negatively) **692.1**
 παύειν] to stop; med. to cease **709.5**
 πείθειν] to persuade **78.3, 693.6, 712.2**
 πειθώ] persuasion **78.11**
 πέπλος] robe; in a title **735.1, 736A.1, B.1, C.3**
 περιαιρείν] to do away with (emotional impact) **692.15**, to remove (antithesis from encomia) **693.1, 7**
 περίεργος] overdone (wording) **692.2**; adv. excessively **691.5**
 περιέχειν] to encompass, partic. (in the def. of mime) **708.28**
 περιοχή] story (of epic and comedy) **708.3, 10, 16**
 περίσταςις] crisis or reversal **708.7, 16**
 περιτιθέναι] to place round; to place at the ends (of clauses) **703.2**

- περιττός**] extraordinary; neut. sing. as subst. eminence (in style) **691.2**
πηγή] source (of the mean in style) **685.5**
πηλίκος] how great **678.7, 13**
πιθανός] persuasive; neut. sing. as subst. (of expression) **683.12, 696.1**
πιστεύειν] to believe **711.4, 7**
πίστις] proof **675.18**; pl. in a title **666** no. 8, **673B.6**
πλοῦτος] wealth (listed among sources of encomia) **677.6**
ποιεῖν] to do **678.12**; to write poetry **Append. 8.5**; pass. partic. **Append. 8.8, (?) 48**; coined (word) **Append. 9.70–1**
ποίημα] poem **688.7, 692.13, Append. 8.3**
ποίησις] poetry **Append. 8.14, 15** (twice), 29, 33, 36, 38, 45
ποιητής] poet **Append. 8.5, 59**
ποιητικός] poetic; *ars* **78.5**, in a title **666** no. 20–1; neut. sing. as subst. poetic (effect) **692.2**
ποιός] of what kind or character **678.5, Append. 8.9**
ποιός] of a certain quality; neut. sing. the qualitative (part of an encomium) **678.3, 4, 8**
ποιότης] quality (of the person being praised) **678.6**
πόλις] city (in evaluations attributed to Theophrastus) **706.3, 4**
πολυχρόνιος] long standing (of character) **709.9**
πόρρωθεν] from afar (of introducing a figure of speech) **691.6**
ποσός] of a certain quantity; neut. sing. the quantitative (part of an encomium) **678.3, 5, 8**
πράγμα] subject matter **686.5, 691.7**; things (signified by sounds) **683.3**; facts (to which a sentence relates) **78.3, 11**; matters of conduct **676.5**; deeds **679.2**; (serious) affairs **692.14, 709.2**; affairs (presented in epic and comedy) **708.4, 10**
πραγματική] practical, of affairs **671.4**
πρακτικός] practical; neut. pl. as subst. matters of conduct **676.7**
πράξις] pl. actions, acts **678.5**
πρᾶος] mild (metaphor) **689A.3**
πρέπειν] to be fitting; partic. (of figures) **691.7**
προάγειν] to bring forward, introduce; pass partic. **678.14**
προαίρεσις] choice or plan (in style) **685.5**
πρόθεσις] statement of the case; in a title **666** no. 16
προκεῖσθαι] to be set before; partic. the subject **678.14**
προοίμιον] introduction, pl. in a title **666** no. 15, **673B.6**
προσεύχεσθαι] to offer prayer **Append. 8.34**
προσευχή] prayer **Append. 8.35**
προσῆκειν] to appertain (of criticism directed against Lysias) **692.22**
προσκατηγορεῖν] to predicate; pass. **692.11**
προστιθέναι] to add (a comparison) **678.13, (reputation) 16, (what is missing) 711.6**
πρόσωπον] stage-actor **Append. 8.43**
πρῶτος] first (to create the mean in style) **685.2, pl. (to remove antithesis from encomia) 693.1**

ρῆμα] verb (an element of the sentence) **683.7, 8, Append. 8.50**; phrase, pl. **705.4**

ῥητορικός] rhetorical *ars* or *artes* **673B.3–4**, (in a title) **666 no. 1, 2a, 3**; (of starting points, in a title) **673B.6**

ῥήτωρ] orator **706.2** (twice), **6, 712.2**; rhetorician, speech-writer **692.8**

ῥυθμός] rhythm, pl. conjecture in a title **264 no. 1**

σαφήνεια] clarity (of expression) **78.8**

σαφής] clear; neut. sing. as subst. clarity (of expression) **683.12**

σαφηνίζειν] to make clear **678.16**

σεμνός] dignified; comp. (words); neut. sing. as subst. (of style) **691.2**

σεμνότης] dignity (of style) **688.2**

σημαίνειν] to convey meaning (of a sentence) **78.3**; pl. partic. (of words)

Append. 9.12

σημαντικός] significant (sound) **683.3, 4**; (expression) **683.13**

σιμότης] shape of a snub nose **31.2**

σκληρός] hard; difficult (thought) **675.17**; harsh (metaphor) **689A.2**

σκῶμμα] pl. jests **711.1**, s. def. concealed rebuke for error **711.5**

σκώπτειν] to mock, pass. partic. being teased **31.2, 711.2**

σμικρός] small, slight (of subject matter) **686.6**

σολοικισμός] solecism; pl. in a title **666 no. 18**

σπουδαίος] good; serious, neut. pl. (of affairs) **709.2**

σπουδάζειν] to be seriously engaged **692.14**

σπουδή] earnestness, serious purpose **692.13**

στάσις] issue; pl. in a title **673B.1**

στέρησις] privation (of epithets) **Append. 9.52–3**

στοιχείον] pl. elements (of the sentence: the noun and verb) **683.7**, (in a title) **683.6**

στρογγύλως] compactly **695.4**, superl. quite tersely **676.28**

συγκόπτειν] to beat together; pass. partic. syncopated (word) **Append. 9.86–7**

συγγραφεύς] prose-writer **Append. 8.60**

συγκεῖσθαι] to be composed, partic. (of two consonants) **681.4**

σύγκρισις] comparison **678.1, 6, 10**

συγκαταμειγνύναι] to mix together, mingle (of people) **709.7**

σύγχρουσις] collision; bringing together (of letters) **687.6**

συγχωρεῖν] to allow; pass. partic. (of things permitted, in the def. of mime) **708.27**

συζευγνύναι] to yoke or couple; pass. (of opposites in antithesis) **692.12**

συλλαβή] syllable **Append. 9.6, 10**

συμβεβηκός] accidental **678.9**; κατὰ συμβεβηκός (of the third stasis of Hermagoras) **pap. app. 671.32–3**; κατὰ τὸ μὴ συμβεβηκός] in respect to what does not apply (of the epithet) **Append. 9.51–2, 57–8**

συμβουλευεῖν] partic. person engaged in deliberation **673A.4**

συμβουλευτικός] deliberative, pl. (speeches) **693.3**

συμβουλή] counsel, advice **676.32**; in a title **666 no. 11**

- συμπεραίνεσθαι] to deduce **78.14**
 συμπλέκειν] to weave together (words) **78.7**
 σύμφωνος] harmonious (of delivery in accord with psychology) **711.4**
 συνάγειν] to bring together (words) **688.3**
 σύνδεσμος] pl. conjunctions (parts of expression) **683.7**
 συνδιασύρειν] to participate in ridicule **711.4**
 συνετός] perceptive **696.5**
 συνήθεια] customary use, practice **693.8**
 σύνθεσις] arrangement, composition **703.3**
 σύνθετος] composite (style) **685.1**, pl. (expressions) **683.10**; (nouns and verbs) **Append. 9.39–40**
 συνιέναι] to understand, to perceive **696.2**, **6**
 συντιθέναι] to combine sounds or words **688.1**, pass. **688.5**
 συστρέφειν] to roll up, to compress (thoughts) **695.3**
 σφάγιον] victim, offering **709.8**
 σχέσις] relation (of the sentence) **78.1**, **4**, **11**
 σχῆμα] figure, pl. (of speech) **691.3**, **7**, **692.5**
 σχηματίζειν] to use figures (of speech) **691.5**
 σῶμα] body **677.1**, **3**, **5**, **712.4**
 σωματικός] neut. pl. bodily parts **31.1**
 σωφροσύνη] temperance (listed among sources for encomia) **677.4–5**

 ταπεινός] low; mean (of words) **688.7**
 ταῦρος] bull **709.4**
 ταχύτης] swiftness (listed among sources of encomia) **677.5**
 τέρψις] enjoyment **711.2**
 τέχνη] *technē*; art of words **736A.2**, **B.2**, **C.3**; rhetorical *ars* or *artes* **673B.3**;
 in a title **666** no. **1**, **2a**, **2b** = **678.2**; on epicheiremes and/or enthymemes
673A.1, **B.4**; on qualities of style **673B.4**; poetic *ars* **Append. 8.7**; skill
 in singing **710.4**
 τεχνολογεῖν] to treat systematically (the paeon) **703.5**
 τολμηρός] pl. daring (metaphors) **690.4**
 τόνος] pitch (of the voice) **712.4**
 τόπος] topic, line of argument **pap. app. 671.7**, **9–10**
 τραγῳδία] tragedy (defined) **708.5**
 τριπλοῦς] triple; neut. (epithet) **Append. 9.51**
 τρίτος] third (kind of style) **685.1**
 τριττός] threefold; adv. (sources of antithesis) **692.10**
 τριχῶς] three ways (division of the encomium) **677.2**
 τρόπος] manner, mode, pl. modes (of amplification) **679.1**
 τύχη] fortune **677.1**, **708.6**, **16**

 ὑγίεια] health, (listed among sources of encomia) **677.5**
 ὑπερβάλλειν] to exceed (the proper mode of expression) **686.3**
 ὑπόκρισις] delivery **712.2**, in a title **666** no. **24**
 ὑποκριτής] actor (of Simycas) **710.9**; pl. **Append. 9.67–8**

- ὑπόνοια] conjecture; dat. mentally **711.6**
 ὑποσύνθετος] pl. formed from composite (expressions) **683.11**
 ὑποτίμησις] excuse (for a metaphor) **690.4**
- φιλήκοος] fond of listening **705.1**
 φιλόγελως] laughter-loving **709.1**
 φίλος] friend **31.3**, pl. (listed among sources of encomia) **677.6**
 φιλόσοφος] philosopher **78.12**, (of Theophrastus) **78.2**, **688.4**, **705.2**, **712.1**,
 (of Aristo of Chios) **706.4**
 φορτικός] crude (wording) **692.1**; adv. (of using figures) **691.6**
 φράσις] phrasing or expression **688.6**
 φρόνησις] practical wisdom **677.2**, (listed among sources for encomia) **4**
 φύσις] nature; dat. by nature (beautiful) **688.5**
 φωνή] sound (which is significant) **683.3**, **688.2**; voice **712.4**
- χαρακτήρ] character (ethical); pl. in a title **436 no.4**
 χαρίεις] graceful, charming (of a particular situation) **692.21**
 χάρις] kindness; charm, in a title **436 no. 24**
 χαριεντίζεσθαι] to jest; to be charming (in the use of style) **692.20**
 χεῖλος] lip, pl. (in pronunciation) **681.2**
 χρήσιμος] useful; neut. sing. as subst. **685.6**
 χρηστοθήτης] of good character **Append. 8.40**
 χρηστός] fine (poem) **688.7**
- ψευδής] false; neut. sing. as subst. **78.12**
 ψυχή] soul **677.1**, **3**, **4**, **712.3**, in a title **68 no. 36**
 ψυχρός] frigid (of style) **686.2** (three times), (of Isocrates) **691.6**

Latin

- abiectus] mean (speech, prose) **704.5**
 accurate] exactly, in great detail, comp. (writing on prose rhythm) **700.4**
 accusator] accuser, plaintiff **680.3**
 actio] speech **680.3**; delivery **713.3**
 actor] actor (on the stage) **713.7**
 acumen] acuteness (of the mind of Athenodorus) **682.7**
 adfectatio] (verbal) affectation **694.2**
 adfectus] affect, emotion **707.3**
 adgnitio] recognition **708.15**
 adiumentum] pl. supports (of speaking) **667.2**
 admiratio] admiration (of a speech) **704.7**
 adstricte] rigidly (rhythmical) **701.8**
 adversus] adversity, pl. (in a def. of tragedy) **708.5**
 aequalis] equal (interval between beats) **701.14–15**, **20**
 affluens] abundant (of expression) **684.3**
 agere] ger. delivering a speech **713.8**

- alienus]** alien (context for a word) **689B.5**
altus] lofty (speech, prose) **704.5**
ambitus] the period **701.27**
amnis] stream (contrasted with drops of water) **701.23**; (of style) **697.4**
amor] love, pl. love affairs **708.12**
amplus] magnificent, superl. (of the paeonic rhythm) **704.2**
anapaestus] anapaest **701.10**
animus] soul **713.3**, 4, 5
aptus] adapted, suitable (of the paeon) **704.17**, comp. (of the cretic) **702.3**, superl. (of the paeon) **702.2**; well-knit (succession of words) **699.6**, comp. **701.24**
arbitrium] judgment of the speaker **680.2**
argumentare] to argue, ger. **674.4**
ars] art, science **668.4**, *techne* of words **736A.2**, **B.2**
articulus] pl. joints (of the period) **701.24**
artifex] craftsman (of words) **700.3**
artificiosus] skilful, superl. **674.8**
auctor] pl. authorities (esp. Aristotle and Theophrastus) **701.1**
auctoritas] authority (of Aristotle) **694.3**
audire] to hear (a speech) **704.7**
auditor] listener **671.5**
auris] pl. ears **701.18**
aversus] turned away (from the audience) **713.7**
- bellicus]** of war **697.5**
bonus] good, comp. better **701.29**
brevis] short, comp. (regarding a verse) **701.4**; (of the members of a period) **701.26**
brevitas] brevity (of rhythm) **704.9**
- cadere]** to fall (of drops of water) **701.21–2**; to be suitable (to verse) **704.14**; partic. coming to an end (of a sentence) **702.3**
caedes] slaughter, pl. **708.12**
carmen] verse (hexameter) **708.1**
causa] cause, reason (for rejecting prose without intervals) **701.17**; kind or subject of oratory **671.1**
choreus] trochee **704.8**
civilis] civic (fortune, in the def. of comedy) **708.8**
cogere] to compel, pass. partic. (by the rhythm) **699.5**
commoditas] convenience (in the use of rhythm) **704.13**
commodus] suitable, comp. **674.1**
commovere] move (of history/historians) **697.6**
communis] common, shared by the orator with Aristotle and Theophrastus **668.3**
commutatio] pl. changes **713.5**
comoedia] comedy **708.8**, 10, 11

- compositio**] arrangement **698.1, 699.1**
comprehensio] account **708.2, 5, 9, 20**
conivens] with eyes closed **713.6**
consilium] counsel, deliberation **694.1**
continuare] to make continuous, pass. partic. (of prose without measure) **701.25**, (of metrical feet) **704.15**
continuatio] uninterrupted continuity (of words lacking rhythm) **701.20**; continuous succession (of words), the period **701.23**
continuus] continuous, uninterrupted (rhythm) **701.15**
contra] against (any side of any issue) **672.3**
contractio] shortness (of rhythm) **704.9**
contueri] partic. gazing (fixedly) **713.8**
conversio] pl. revolutions (of speech), periods **701.27**
copia] verbal resources **669.2**
cordax] cordax (a vulgar dance) **704.8**
corpus] body **713.4**
corvus] crow **736A.1, B.2**
creticus] cretic (metrical foot) **702.4**
cura] care (in composing prose and verse) **701.1**
- dactylus**] dactyl **704.14**
debere] to be necessary, (of the members of a period being subjected to measure) **701.26, 28**
decere] to be appropriate **684.2**
decor] comeliness, rightness of character **707.4**
definire] to define, pass. **708.3, 6, 9, 27**
definitio] definition **708.15**
delectare] to delight, pass. **708.24**
deliberativus] of deliberation, the deliberative kind of oratory **694.2**
deliciae] delights, charms (of style) **697.3**
deus] God, part of Theophrastus' name **735.1**
dicere] to say, to speak **672.4, 5, 713.7, 8**; ger. speaking **667.2, 4, 669.2**
672.3; express oneself (esp. of style) **684.1, 697.7, 699.2**; pass. to be called **689B.6**; pass. partic. pl. (base) words **708.26**
dialectice] dialectically, for dialectic **672.1**
diffundere] to spread, pour out, (of the members and feet of the dithyramb) **701.12**
dignitas] dignity (of rhythm) **704.9, 14**
diligentia] diligence (in composing prose and verse) **701.1**
dilucide] clearly **684.1**
discipulus] student (Theophrastus of Aristotle) **670.1**
disputare] to discuss, say about **668.4**
dissentire] to dissent (Theophrastus from Aristotle) **694.4**
disserere] to discuss, argue; ger. (of logic) **672.1**
distinctio] differentiation (in voice) **701.20**
dithyrambus] dithyramb **701.11**

- dives]** rich, comp. (the dithyramb) **701.11**
divinus] divine (eloquence) **682.6**; pl. (matters) **708.1**
domicilium] home (of a word) **689B.4**
duplex] double (the ratio of the two parts of the iamb) **704.12**
dux] leader, pl. generals **708.11**
- elegantus]** elegant, superl. **674.7**
epos] epic **708.1**
errare] to wander about, go astray (of bad prose style) **701.5**
exaggeratus] elevated (speech, prose) **704.6**
excellens] outstanding, pl. (of Aristotle and Theophrastus) **669.1**
exercitatio] exercise, practice **672.3**
exilium] exile, pl. **708.12**
exitus] outcome, pl. **708.14**
expolire] to refine, elaborate (of an argument) **674.6**
expromere] to set forth (arguments) **672.5**
extremum] the end (of the period) **701.26**; pl. the last (members of the period) **701.29**
- fabula]** play **708.21**
factum] deed, pl. (base) **708.26**
facundia] eloquence **682.6**
fluere] to flow; (of Herodotus) **697.4**; (of the dithyramb) **701.11**
flumen] river (metaphor for prose style) **699.4**
forensis] judicial, in court **707.5**
fortuna] fortune (heroic) **708.5**, (private and civic) **708.8**, (former) **708.14**
fugere] to flee; run off (of bad prose style) **701.5**
- gens]** race (of Corvinus) **736B.1, C.1**
genus] kind (of oratory) **671.1, 694.2**, (of argument) **674.4**, (of rhythm) **701.15**
grammaticus] grammarian (of Glaucus and Hermocrates) **682.5**
grandis] grand, comp. (of heroic rhythm) **704.3**
gravitas] gravity (of speech, prose) **704.6**
gutta] pl. drops (of water) **701.22**
- heroicus]** heroic (fortune **708.5**; pl. (matters) **708.2**
heros] hero, pl. **708.11, 22**
herous] heroic (rhythm) **704.3**
hexameter] hexameter (verse) **708.1**
historia] history, historical writing **697.6**
humanus] pl. human (matters) **708.2**
humilis] humble (speech) **704.5**, (stage figures) **708.11**
- iambus]** iambic (rhythm) **704.4**; (foot) **704.14**
imago] image (of the soul) **713.4**

- imitatio]** imitation (in a def. of the mime) **708.25, 26**
impolitus] unpolished (prose style) **701.16**
impressio] pl. (rhythmical) beats **701.14**
incitatus] rapid, comp. adv. (of style) **697.4**
includere] to include, bring within (a line of poetry) **701.3**
index] pl. signs, informants (of the eyes) **713.4**
inductio] induction **674.4**
ineptia] pl. sillinesses (of style) **697.3**; (possible criticism of Crassus) **701.32**
infinite] endlessly (flows like a river, of style) **699.3**
ingenium] mind **707.5**
inscribere] to label, entitle **668.5**
insistere] to stop, to come to a close (of a sentence) **699.5**
interductus] interpunctuation **699.4**
intervallum] pl. intervals (lacking in run-on verbiage) **701.17**; intervals (between rhythmical beats) **701.14, 21**; intervals (between drops of water) **701.22**
inventio] invention of the alphabet **735.8**
invenire] to discover, invent (the art of words) **736A.3**
iocare] to joke, to be humorous **708.22**
iocus] joke, pl. **708.23**
iucundus] comp. more pleasing **701.24, 29**
- laetus]** joyful, pl. **708.14**
lascivia] licentiousness **708.26**
Latinus] Latin (language) **684.1**
laudare] to cite (authorities), ger. **701.31**
laus] praise as an element in epideictic oratory **671.2**; virtue (of style) **684.3**; merit or virtue (of prose) **701.15**
lectio] reading (of poetry) **707.1, 6**
liber] free, comp. (of prose) **701.4**
liber] child, pl. **708.14**
liber] book, pl. **668.4, 669.3**; (on rhetoric/oratory) **668.5, 669.3**
librarius] scribe **699.5**
licens] unrestrained, comp. (the dithyramb) **701.11**
littera] letter of the alphabet **735.3–5, 8**
locuples] rich, opulent (prose) **701.12**
locus] place (in a phrase) **689B.3**
longus] long, comp. (regarding a verse) **701.4**; (the final member of the period) **701.29**
loquacitas] (run-on) verbiage **701.17**
luctus] lamentation, pl. **708.12**
ludere] to play, to be playful **708.22**
lusus] play, pl. **708.24**
- magister]** pl. teachers (of speaking) **667.4**

- medius**] in the middle (of a part of a sentence) **702.3**; midway between (the iamb and the dactyl) **704.11**, the middle (pitch) **682.3, 9**
- melius**] see **bonus**
- membrum**] pl. members (of the dithyramb) **701.11**; members (of the period) **701.24, 25**
- metiri**] to measure (rhythm) **701.14**
- migratio**] migration (of a word used metaphorically) **689B.5**
- mimus**] mime **708.25**
- miseria**] misery, pl. **708.20**
- moderari**] to manage, control (*sibi*, itself), (of prose) **701.6**
- modificare**] to limit, control; pass. partic. subjected to measure (the members of the period) **701.25**
- modulari**] to measure (voice) **701.18**
- modus**] measure, ratio (of a metrical foot) **704.12**; pl. meters (of poetry) **701.2, 9**
- mollis**] flexible, superl. (of the paeonic rhythm) **704.1**
- motus**] (e)motions (of the soul) **713.5**; feeling **707.3**; movement (in a def. of the mime) **708.25**
- natura**] nature **701.18**
- necesse**] necessary **701.4**
- necessitas**] necessity **701.2**
- negotialis**] of affairs or business **671.4**
- nomen**] name ("epideictic") **671.5**, ("Theophrastus") **682.6**, ("Corax") **736A.3**
- numerare**] to count, number (of a virtue of style) **684.2**
- numerosus**] rhythmical **701.8, 13**
- numerus**] number; group (of books) **669.4**; rhythm (of prose) **698.1, 699.1–2, 5, 700.1, 704.2, 3**; (of poetry) **701.2, 10, 15, 19, 21**
- oculus**] pl. eyes **713.2, 4**
- oportere**] to be necessary, behoove, (of prose being rhythmical) **701.8–9**
- oratio**] speech, expression **699.4**; prose **704.4, 15, 16, 18**; prose sentence **702.2**
- oriri**] to arise; partic. beginning (of a sentence) **702.2**
- ornamentum**] pl. embellishments **667.2**
- ornate**] ornately, eloquently (of style) **699.2**, (comp.) **697.7**
- ornatum**] ornamentation or embellishment **684.3**
- oratio**] oration, speech **680.1**; prose **700.1, 701. 4, 7, 12, 16 704.4, 5**; (periodic structure of) speech **701.27**; expression or style **684.3**
- oratorie**] oratorically, for oratory **672.1**
- oratorius**] pl. (books) on oratory **669.3**; (of rhythm) **698.1**
- orator**] orator **667.1, 668.2, 4, 707.1**
- os**] face, countenance **713.1**
- ostentatio**] display **671.5**
- paeon**] paeon **704.1, 9, 17, 19**

- par]** equal (of the ratio of the two parts of the dactyl) **704.12**; pl. (of the members of the period) **701.28**
- pars]** part (of the body) **713.4**; kind (of oratory) **671.4**; pl. (of deductive arguments) **674.2**; side of an issue **672.3, 5**
- partitio]** division (of deductive arguments) **674.1**
- peplus]** robe; in a title **736A.1, B.1**
- percussio]** beating (of rhythmical voice) **701.21**
- perennis]** continuous, incessant (verbiage) **701.17**
- perfectio]** finish (of rhythmical expression) **699.1**
- periculum]** danger (within a def. of comedy) **708.8**
- persona]** pl. character of the orator **707.4**, stage figures **708.12**
- personatus]** in a mask **713.2**
- pes]** (metrical) foot **698.1, 701.12, 704.11, 16**
- philosophia]** philosophy **669.2**
- philosophus]** philosopher, pl. contrasted with rhetoricians **670.2**; (of Aristotle and Theophrastus) **701.30**, (of Theophrastus) **682.5–6**
- plane]** plainly, clearly **701.4**; (of good prose style) **684.1**
- poeta]** poet **701.2, 707.1–2, 708.21**
- politus]** polished (writer) **700.2**, (prose) **701.7**
- posterior]** n. pl. the later (members of the period) **701.28**
- praeceptum]** pl. precepts (on speaking) **669.2, 672.2**
- praeceptor]** teacher (Aristotle of Theophrastus) **694.3**
- praecipere]** to instruct, advise **700.3**
- praecipitans]** rushing (stream) **701.23**
- primus]** first; m. pl. (of persons) **697.5**; n. pl. (of members of the period) **701.29**
- princeps]** pl. leaders of the Stoa and Peripatos **670.3**; sing. first (to establish a practice) **672.2**
- principium]** introduction, prooemium **680.1**
- privatus]** private (fortune, in the def. of comedy) **708.8**, (stage figures) **708.12**
- procerus]** long, comp. (rhythm) **701.10**
- productus]** protracted (succession of words) **701.25**
- profluens]** streaming, overflowing (verbiage) **701.17**
- pronuntiare]** to make, deliver a speech **713.8**; (partic. of the speaker) **699.4**
- proprius]** peculiar, proper, belonging to **667.1, 671.6, 689B.4 708.17, 19**; proper (name) **736A.3**
- prosodia]** pitch accent **682.2, 8**
- purus]** pure (language, Latin) **684.1**
- quartus]** fourth (of a virtue of style) **684.2**
- quinque]** five (parts of deductive argument) **674.2**
- raptus]** rape, pl. **708.13**
- ratio]** manner (of speaking) **694.1**; theory (of the middle pitch accent) **682.1**
- rationcinatio]** deductive reasoning **674.5**
- regula]** pl. rules of oratory **736C.2**

- remisse]** mildly, comp. (rhythmical) **701.8**
res] thing; pl. matters, subjects, content **672.4**, **707.3**
reverentia] reverence (lacking, in a def. of the mime) **708.25–6**
rex] king **708.11**, **22**, (Archelaus) **708.18**
rhetor] orator **736C.1**; rhetorician, teacher of oratory; pl. contrasted with philosophers **670.2**, together with philosophers **674.7**
rhetorica] rhetoric, the art of oratory **670.1**
rheticus] pl. rhetorical (books) **668.5**
rudis] rough (prose style) **701.16**
- salebra]** pl. roughness (of style) **697.4**
satyricus] satyric (drama) **708.21**
satyrus] satyr, pl. **708.22**, **23**
scribere] to write **667.5**, **668.1**, **708.18**
scriptor] writer **700.3**
sedatus] quiet, tranquil **697.4**
sentire] to perceive, to realize **704.10**
serius] serious, pl. (matters) **708.23**
sermo] language **684.1**, **694.3**; conversation **704.4**; speech (in a def. of the mime) **708.25**
sesquiple] once and a half as much (of the ratio of the two parts of the paeon) **704.12**
significatio] pl. signs **713.5**
singulus] pl. single, particular **672.2**
solutus] let loose, free (of prose) **701.5**, **24** **704.4**; (opposed to well-knit prose) **699.6**
sonus] sound **701.13**
spatium] space of time (of the tribrach) **704.8**
spectator] spectator **708.23**
spiritus] breath **699.4**, **701.3**; inspiration in regard to subject matter **707.3**
suavis] pleasant **684.3**
sublimitas] elevation in style **707.3**
subtilitas] refined judgment **669.2**
superior] m. pl. former (historians) **697.7**; n. pl. preceding (members of the period) **701.28**
- tractare]** to handle, practise (of an argument) **674.5**
tragicus] tragic, pl. (poets) **708.21**, (matters) **708.23**
tragoedia] tragedy **708.5**, **10**, **11**, **17**, **18**, **19**, **20**
tra(ns)latio] metaphor **689B.7**
tristitia] grief **708.16**
tristis] grievous, pl. **708.14**
trochaeus] tribrach **704.7**
turpis] base, pl. (deeds and words) **708.26**
- uber]** n. comp. as adv. more fully (of style) **697.6**

usitatus] usual, in common use, (of the iambic and trochaic meters) **701.9**
verbum] word **689B.4**, **701.3**; (periodic structure of) words **701.23**, **27**;
 wording **707.3**; speech, oratory **736A.2**, **B.2**
verecundus] apologetic (metaphor) **689B.7**
versus] verse or line of poetry **700.1**, **701.3**, **10**, **704.14**, **15**, **17** (twice)
verus] actual (counsel) **694.1**
vinculum] pl. bonds (absent in prose) **701.6**
virgo] virgin, pl. **708.13**
vis] force, power (of well-knit prose) **699.6**
vita] life (within a def. of comedy) **708.8**
vituperatio] blame as an element in epideictic oratory **671.2**
volgaris] ordinary (conversation) **704.4**
voltus] facial expression **713.4**
vox] voice **701.13, 18**, **19**

2. Titles of Books

Theophrastean Greek

Δειλινοί] *Afternoon (Discussions)* **727** no. 2, **1.185**
Ἐγκώμια Θεῶν] *Encomia of Gods* **580** no. 1, **1.195**
Ἠθικοὶ χαρακτήρες] *Ethical Characters* **436** no. 4a, **1.201**
Θέσεις] *Theses* **68** no. 34, **1.118**
Θέσεις] *Theses* **68** no. 35, **1.248**
Παραγγέλματα ῥητορικῆς] *Rhetorical Precepts* **666** no. 3, **1.221**
Πέπλος] *Robe* **727** no. 10, **736A1**, **C3**
Περὶ ἀριθμῶν] *On Numbers* **264** no. 1, **1.285**
Περὶ γελοίου] *On the Ludicrous* **666** no. 23, **1.184**, **710.7–8**
Περὶ γνώμης] *On the Maxim* **666** no. 7, **1.183**
Περὶ διαβολῆς] *On Slander* **666** no. 13, **1.189**, **252**, **275**
Περὶ δικανικῶν λόγων] *On Judicial Speeches* **666** no. 9, **1.274**
Περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων] *On Enthymemes* **666** no. 6, **1.198**, **673B.4**
Περὶ ἐπαίνου] *On Praise* **666** no. 12, **1.190**
Περὶ εὐρήσεως] *On Invention* **666** no. 4
Περὶ θορύβου] *On Clamor* **666** no. 14, **1.202**
Περὶ κωμῳδίας] *On Comedy* **666** no. 22, **1.208**, **709.1**
Περὶ λέξεως] *On Style* **666** no. 17a, **688.4**, **692.3**
Περὶ μέτρων] *On Meters* **666** no. 19, **1.214**
Περὶ παραδείγματος] *On Example* **666** no. 5, **1.228**
Περὶ ποιητικῆς] *On (the Art of) Poetry* **666** no. 20, **1.223**
Περὶ ποιητικῆς ἄλλο] another work *On (the Art of) Poetry* **666** no. 21,
1.230

- Περὶ προθέσεως καὶ διηγήματος] *On Statement (of the Case) and Narration* **666** no. 16, **1.229**
 Περὶ σολοικισμῶν] *On Solecisms* **666** no. 18, **1.233**
 Περὶ συμβουλῆς] *On Counsel* **666** no. 11, **1.232**
 Περὶ τέχνης ῥητορικῆς] *On the Art of Rhetoric* **666** no. 1, **1.234**
 Περὶ τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν εἴδη] *On Kinds of Rhetorical Arts* **666** no. 2a, **1.235**
 Περὶ τῶν ἀδικημάτων] *On Injustices* **666** no. 10, **1.188**
 Περὶ τῶν ἀτέχνων πίστεων] *On Non-technical Proofs* **666** no. 8, **1.177**
 Περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου στοιχείων] *On the Elements of Speech* **666** no. 17b, **683.5–6**
 Περὶ ὑποκρίσεως] *On Delivery* **666** no. 24, **1.236**
 Περὶ χάριτος] *On Kindness (or Grace)* **436** no. 24, **1.240**
 Περὶ ψυχῆς θέσις] *A Thesis on the Soul* **68** no. 34, **1.176**
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 Πρὸς Αἰσχύλον] *In Reply to Aeschylus* **137** no. 42, **1.270**
 Τέχναι] *Arts* **666** no. 2b, **678.2**
 Χαρακτῆρες ἠθικοί] *Ethical Characters* **436** no. 4a, **1.241**

Latin

- Peplus] *Robe* **727** no. 10, **736A.1, B.1**

*Non-Theophrastean
Greek*

- Κατὰ πεῦσιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν] *By Question and Answer* by Porphyry **683.2**
 Περὶ ἀφορμῶν ῥητορικῶν] *On Rhetorical Starting-Points* by Alexander, son of Numenius, and another by Lollianus **673B.5–6**
 Περὶ παροιμιῶν] *On Proverbs* by Clearchus **710.2–3**
 Περὶ προοιμίων καὶ πίστεων] *On Introductions and Proofs* by Apsines **673B.6**
 Περὶ στάσεων] *On Issues* by Hermogenes **673B.1**
 Περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν] *On the Qualities* by Hermogenes **673B.3**
 Πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον ῥητορικῇ] **676.4**
 Πρὸς Γεδάλειον] *To Gedalius* by Porphyry **683.1–2**

Latin

- Pro Ctesiphonte] *On behalf of Ctesiphon* by Demosthenes **680.2**

3. Gods, Persons, Groups of People and Places Named or Referred to in either Greek or Latin Texts

- Achilles]** his name used to illustrate a lengthened word **Append. 9.85**
Aeschylus] in a title **137** no. 42
Agenor] father of Cathmus/Cadmus **735.5**
Alcibiades] his strength and weakness as an orator **705.3**
Alexander] son of Numenius, author of *On Rhetorical Starting Points* **673B.5**
Anaxagoras] named in an example of supplemental argumentation **675.22**
Annoön] his name as a example **687.6**
Apollo] (understood) told the Tirynthians what they must do **709.4, 9**
Apsines] author of *On Introductions and Proofs* **673B.6**
Archelaus] wanted a tragedy written about himself **708.17, 19**
Archilochus] named in an example of supplemental argumentation **675.18**
Archinus] his explanation of double consonants **681.1, 2**
Aristeides] an exception in that he did not dissociate antitheses from encomia **693.7**
Aristo] of Chios, source of a report concerning Theophrastus **706.1**, (the same philosopher) concerning Polyeuctus of Sphettus **706.4**
Aristotle] first to establish the practice of arguing on both sides of an issue **672.2**; wrote on arrangement, rhythms and metrical feet in oratory **698.3**; his view of prose rhythm **704.2**; cited as the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* **676.4** — teacher of Theophrastus **670.1, 694.3**; named together with Theophrastus as a writer of books containing arguments toward opposite conclusions **135.7**, as a writer on rhetoric **667.3, 668.1, 669.1, 670.1** and on dialectic and oratory (*ab isdem*) **672.1**; holds the same view as Theophrastus on epideictic being distinct from practical oratory **671.3**, on the division of deductive argument into five parts **674.2, 6**, on the tripartite division of the encomium **677.2**, on softening bold metaphors **690.1**, on the inappropriateness of antithesis in an encomium **693.1**, on the language of deliberative oratory **694.3**, on prose rhythm **699.3, 700.1, 701.30, 702.1–2, 703.4**; — teacher of Theodectes **700.1–2**; in agreement with Theodectes concerning the paeon **704.19**
Athenians] named in an example of supplemental argumentation **675.23**
Athenodorus] calls a certain pitch monotone **682.7**
Attics] speakers of Attic Greek add “n” for euphony **687.8**

Callistratus] his name as an example **687.6**
Cassander] his friend not offended when teased by Theophrastus **31.2**
Cathmus, i.e., Cadmus of Sidon] brought letters of the alphabet to Greece **735.4, 6**
Catulus] in *On the Orator*, addressed as an admirer of Aristotle and Theophrastus **701.31**
Chilon] named in an example of supplemental argumentation **675.21**

- Chios]** the people of Chios named in an example of supplemental argumentation **675.19**; the Chian Aristo **706.1**
- Cicero]** with reference to the *Pro Archia* **707.6**; with reference to a report concerning prose rhythm **698.2**
- Clearchus]** wrote *On Proverbs* **710.2**
- Corax]** invented the art of words **736A.3, B.2**, conveyed the rules of Theophrastus to the Latins **C.2, 3**
- Corvinus]** Corax **736B.1, C.1**
- Crassus]** interlocutor in *On the Orator* (2nd pers. sing.) **667.1, 668.1**, (pronoun) **701.6**
- Ctesiphon]** named in the title of a Demosthenic oration **680.2**
- Delphi]** seat of the oracle to which the Tirynthians had recourse **709.3**
- Demades]** compared with Demosthenes **706.3**
- Demosthenes]** compared with Demades **706.3**, compared with Phocion **706.6**, cited regarding the introduction to his speech *On behalf of Ctesiphon* **680.2**, his name as an example of euphony **687.8**,
- Diocles]** named in an example of supplemental argumentation **675.14**
- Doros]** his name used to illustrate the removal of a syllable **Append. 9.8**
- Egyptians]** discovered letters of the alphabet **735.3**
- Ephorus]** wrote on arrangement, rhythms and metrical feet in oratory **698.3**, preferred the paeon **702.2**
- Euripides]** refused to write a tragedy about Archelaus **708.17**
- Glaucus]** of Samos, mentioned the middle pitch accent **682.5**
- Gorgias]** wrote on arrangement, rhythms and metrical feet in oratory **698.2**
- Greece]** to which Cadmus brought letters of the alphabet **735.4**
- Greeks]** writers on arrangement, rhythms and metrical feet in oratory **698.2**; their definitions of epic, comedy and mime **708.2, 9, 27**; the content of satyric drama **708.21**
- Hermocrates]** of Iassus, mentioned the middle pitch accent **682.5**
- Hermogenes]** (understood) wrote *On Issues* **673B.1**, defined supplemental argumentation **675.2**
- Herodotus]** with Thucydides, first to write history more fully and ornately **697.1**
- Hieronimus]** wrote on arrangement, rhythms and metrical feet in oratory **698.4**
- Homer]** named in an example of supplemental argumentation **675.19**
- Iassus]** the Iassian Hermocrates **682.5**
- Isocrates]** selects and arranges words, uses figures, **691.4**, wrote on arrangement and rhythm **698.3**
- Italian Greeks]** named in an example of supplemental argumentation **675.22**

Lacedaemonians] named in an example of supplemental argumentation **675.20–1, 24**

Laconian] of sayings, i.e., laconic ones **676.29**

Lampsacians] named in an example of supplemental argumentation **675.22**

Latins] received the rules of Theophrastus **736C.2**

Leoprepus, i.e., Leoprepes] father of Simonides **735.7**

Locrians] people to whom Stesichorus addressed a maxim **676.30**

Lollianus] author of an *ars* on argumentation **673A.1**, author of *On Rhetorical Starting Points* **673B.5**

Lycurgus] named in an example of supplemental argumentation **675.24**

Lysias] criticized for inappropriate style **692.6, 15, 20**; has a compact style **695.1, 2**

Mityleneans] named in an example of supplemental argumentation **675.20**

Nauclius, i.e., Nauplius] father of Palimidis/Palamedes **735.6**

Naucrates] wrote on arrangement, rhythms and metrical feet in oratory **698.2**

Nicias] his defense written by Lysias **692.6**

Numenius] father of Alexander **673B.5**

Palimidis, i.e., Palamedes] invented double consonants **735.6**

Parians] named in an example of supplemental argumentation **675.18**

Peripatetic] Theophrastus **682.6**; pl. mentioned with Aristotle and Theophrastus (but deleted) **674.6**; as sources of rhetorical art **667.1**; mentioned with the Stoics as writers on rhetoric **670.3**;

Philemon] comic poet cited in regard to diction **Append. 8.32, 39**

Phoenicians] the people who were second to discover letters of the alphabet **735.3**, after them the letters of the alphabet are named **735.4**

Polyeuctus] of Sphettus, compares Demosthenes with Phocion **706.4**

Porphyry] his view of Aristotle's *Categories* **683.1**

Posidon] mentioned in the story of the Tirynthians **709.4**

Propis] the cithara-singer from Rhodes who was mocked by Stratoniceus **710.2, 3**

Pythagoras] named in an example of supplemental argumentation **675.22**

Rhodes] the Rhodian Propis **710.2**

Roman, of Romulus] Rhetoric **736C.1**

Roscius] the actor who received no loud applause when he wore a mask **713.2**

Samos] the Samian Glaucus **682.5**

Sappho] cited for and in an example of supplemental argumentation **675.5, 20**

Scaevola] interlocutor in *On the Orator* **668.2**

Sidon] the Sidonian Cadmus **735.5**

Simonides] invented double consonants **735.7**

- Simycas]** an actor who was mocked by Stratonicus **710.9**
Solon] named in an example of supplemental argumentation **675.23**
Spartans] see **Lacedaemonians**
Sphettus] the Sphettan Polyeuctus **706.4**
Stratonicus] a cithara-player who mocked Propis or Simycas **710.1, 3, 8**
Syracuse] the Syracusan Corax **736A.3, B.3, C.2, 3**
Socrates] practiced induction **674.4–5**; his name as an example **687.8**
Socratics] practiced induction **674.5**
Stesichorus] cited for a maxim **676.29**
Stoics] mentioned with the Peripatetics as writers on rhetoric **670.3**
- Tauriscus]** cited by Theophrastus for a remark concerning delivery **713.7**
Thebes] named in an example of supplemental argumentation **675.25**
Theodectes] wrote on arrangement, rhythms and metrical feet in oratory **698.3, 700.2, 702.2, 704.19**
Theodorus] wrote on arrangement, rhythms and metrical feet in oratory **698.3**
Theophrastus] the pupil of Aristotle **670.1, 694.1–3** — named together with Aristotle as a writer of books containing arguments toward opposite conclusions **135.7**, as a writer on rhetoric **667.4, 668.1, 669.1, 670.1**, and on dialectic and oratory (*ab isdem*) **672.1**, in a list of persons writing on prose rhythm **698.4**; wrote in greater detail on prose rhythm **700.3**; holds the same view as Aristotle on prose rhythm **699.3, 701.30**, on inexactitude in prose rhythm **703.6**, on the paeon **702.1–2, 704.19**, on epideictic being distinct from practical oratory **671.3**, on the division of deductive argument **674.2, 6–7**, on the division of the encomium **677.2**, on softening bold metaphors **690.1**, on antithesis being inappropriate in an encomium **693.1**, on the language of deliberative oratory **694.3** — cited together with other unnamed persons for a doctrine concerning the elements of the sentence **683.6** — cited alone for a witty remark **31.3**, for a humorous anecdote with a lesson **709.1**, as the author of rules **736C.2**, of an *ars* on argumentation **673A.2, B.4**; made mention of the middle pitch accent **682.6** — cited alone for a precept or doctrine on the twofold relation of the sentence **78.2**, on supplemental argumentation **675.16**, on the maxim **676.6**, on common and specific topics in relation to the three genera of oratory **pap. app. 671.12**, on the division of the encomium **678.2**, on the six modes of amplification **679.1**, on the introduction **680.1**, on the virtues of style **684.2–3**, on frigidity in expression **686.2**, on beautiful words **687.2, 688.4**, on the apologetic metaphor **689A.3, B.7**, on grandeur in style **691.1**, on persuasiveness **696.1**, on prose rhythm **701.7, 12**, on reading poets **707.1**, on tragedy **708.6**, on jokes **453.1**, on the jest **711.6**, on delivery **712.1** — cited and quoted regarding the style of Lysias **692.1, 9** — source of a report on the alphabet **735.1**, on double consonants **681.1**, on Corax and the art of words **736A.1–2, B.1–2, C.3**, on the middle style **685.3**, on the origin of compact expression **695.2**,

on Alcibiades' weakness in expression **705.1**, on Demosthenes in comparison with Demades **706.1**, on Tauriscus on delivery **713.7**; on writing history **697.6**, on a proverb spoken by Stratonicus **710.7**

Thrasymachus] possibly the source of the mean in style **685.3, 4**; the first to express his thoughts compactly **695. 2**; wrote on arrangement and rhythm **698.2**

Thucydides] with Herodotus, first to write history more fully and ornately **697.1**

Tiro] (understood) criticized by Cicero for improper diction **689B.1**

Tirynthians] the inhabitants of Tiryns, who had an incurable propensity to laugh **709.1**

Tyrannio] wrote on pitch accent **682.2**

Varro] wrote on pitch accent **682.2, 4**

VIII. Indices to the Commentary

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